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FROM 1815 TO 1923

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A HISTORY OF EUROPE

FROM 1815 TO 1923

BY

SIR J. A. R. MARRIOTT

HONORARY FELLOW, FORMERLY FELLOW, LECTURER AND TUTOR IN MODERN
HISTORY, OF WORCESTER COLLEGE, OXFORD;
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PREFACE

IN this book I have endeavoured to gather into a single volume the fruits of studies extending over forty years. During that period I have published several works dealing with various aspects or portions of the period which I have now, for the first time, synoptically reviewed. I have borrowed freely, in the present work, from those earlier studies, on the principle approved by the Greeks, that "a man may say a thing once as he would have it said, but he cannot say it twice." In acknowledgment of these "borrowings from a former self," and to the publishers who have permitted them, I append a list of the books¹ referred to, and I must also add a word of acknowledgment to the proprietors and editors of *The Quarterly Review*, *The Edinburgh Review*, *The Fortnightly Review*, and *The Nineteenth Century and After*, to which during the last thirty years I have contributed some 150 articles, many of which, though not reproduced here, were on topics cognate to those treated in the present work.

Apart, however, from the fact that the fruits of my

¹ *The Makers of Modern Italy* (Macmillan & Co., 1889, and several subsequent re-issues. Shortly to be re-issued in enlarged and revised form by The Oxford University Press).

George Canning and His Times (John Murray, 1903. Popular Edition, 1907).

The Remaking of Modern Europe (Methuen, 1909. 20th Edition, 1930).

England Since Waterloo (Methuen, 1918. 9th Edition, 1929).

The French Revolution of 1848 (2 vols., Clarendon Press, 1913).

The Evolution of Prussia (with Sir C. Grant Robertson), (Clarendon Press, 1915).

The Eastern Question (Clarendon Press, 1917. 3rd Edition, 1924).

The European Commonwealth (Clarendon Press, 1918).

Europe and Beyond (Methuen, 1922. 3rd Edition, 1929).

studies on this period are at present dispersed in ten volumes and numerous *Reviews*, another reason impels me to add this further volume to a lengthening list. It will be noted that the earliest of my books on this period was written forty-one years ago; even the latest is ten years old. This last decade, as every student of the period knows, has witnessed a perfect avalanche of publications, many of them embodying first-hand materials of the greatest importance. Since the conclusion of the World War, Government has vied with Government in opening its State archives, and revealing to a somewhat bewildered world the mainsprings of policy, the secrets of diplomacy, and the confidential comments and correspondence of Sovereigns and their Ministers. Over 35,000 documents have already been published.

These publications would, by themselves, compel a revision and reconsideration of opinions previously expressed, if not a re-writing of much of the history of the nineteenth century. In addition, individuals have been as eager as Governments to vindicate themselves in the eyes of posterity. Soldiers and sailors, diplomatists and politicians, publicists and journalists have been giving to the world, in great profusion and with apparent candour, their *Recollections*, *Memoirs*, and *Commentaries* on affairs in which they have played a part.

Nor have the historians, notably in Germany and France, been idle. They have recently produced a number of works, which, though ranking as "secondary authorities," are nevertheless of great importance.

Many of these publications,—documents and secondary authorities alike,—I have reviewed as they appeared, and have thus endeavoured, in the midst of many preoccupations, to keep abreast of the most recent work on a crowded and complicated period. References to these and to older authorities will be found in the general and special bibliographies, which will also, I hope, be accepted by the authors as an acknowledgment of my indebtedness.

On the hotly disputed question of footnotes, I have adopted, unwisely perhaps, a compromise. In a work intended less for the specialist than for the general reader and the student *in statu pupillari*, I regard a multiplicity of footnotes as a distraction. But while not obtruding the *apparatus criticus*, I have appended special bibliographies to each chapter (or groups of chapters), and have also added footnotes where a statement seemed to demand the support of an authority.

Despite the awful warning contained in a recent and brilliant parody, I am constrained to acknowledge the help of my wife in the correction of proofs and the preparation of the index.

J. A. R. MARRIOTT

January 30, 1931

NOTE TO SECOND EDITION

A FEW errors detected in the First Edition have been corrected: two or three paragraphs in Chapter xxi have been transposed, and the lists of authorities have been carefully revised and brought up to date.

J. A. R. M.

February, 1933

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A HISTORY OF EUROPE FROM 1815 TO 1923

CHAPTER I

PROLOGUE

THE years intervening between 1815 and 1923 are something more than a period of time. They possess the unity essential to great drama : with Prologue, successive Acts, and Epilogue. The Prologue is enacted, with a superb stage-setting, at Vienna ; the scene of the Epilogue is in Paris. At Vienna we see a group of great personages, Emperors, Kings, statesmen, and diplomatists, whose decisions will lay down the lines of international politics for a generation. In this group, the Czar Alexander, the Duke of Wellington, Lord Castlereagh, Metternich, and Talleyrand stand out conspicuous.

The First Act of the drama is dominated by the European settlement which emerged from the hands of the diplomatists at Vienna. That settlement is commonly stigmatized as the work of obscurantists and reactionaries, who failed to appreciate the strength and direction of the forces which had been liberated, if not generated, by the French Revolution and by the wars and conquests of Napoleon ; with the result that their handiwork was not destined to permanence. That the criticism contains an element of truth is not to be denied. But, as will be seen, the task assigned to the diplomatists in 1815 bristled with difficulties. They were called upon, not to plan and build a new Jerusalem in a new country, but to reconstruct an historic edifice on an ancient site. Confessedly, they made mistakes ; they ignored latent forces destined to operate powerfully in the near future, but they did, be it remembered to their credit,

Act I :
Restoration
and
Reaction

reconstruct an edifice which, in its main features, endured for a century, and secured for Europe as a whole some fifty years of peace.

**The Holy
Alliance**

An effort was also made in 1815 to bring the European Powers together in a sort of Confederation, based upon the acceptance of the Gospel of Christ as the supreme solvent of the problems of politics, an unerring guide to the conduct of affairs. Save for the religious element on which avowedly the Czar based his scheme, it was not novel. Similar schemes had, as we shall see, been adumbrated in the seventeenth century and at the close of the wars of Louis XIV. But this "Holy" Alliance, though honestly designed to inaugurate an era of peace and righteousness on earth, was only too soon perverted to less beneficent ends. Derided from the outset by political realists like Castlereagh and Metternich, the Holy Alliance soon stood confessed as a League of Autocrats, aiming only at the maintenance of the principle of "legitimacy," and at the suppression of every liberal movement in Europe.

The first act of the drama, then, covered the period of legitimist restorations and royalist reactions under the dominating influence of the Holy Alliance and its Imperial sponsors. But the act was a short one: "legitimacy" enjoyed only a brief triumph, and with the July Revolution in France and the fall of the "legitimate" monarchy, one corner-stone of the Vienna edifice began to crumble.

**Act II :
Liberalism**

The Second Act, opening with the establishment of the "Citizen" monarchy in France, witnessed in almost every country in Europe a movement inspired by "liberal" principles. Belgium, united to Holland by a decree of the diplomatists of 1815, revolted in 1830 against the domination of The Hague, and successfully achieved independence. Revolution broke out in many of the States of Germany and of Italy, but, modest as were the demands put forward in the name of liberty, they were not conceded, and for eighteen more years Metternich was able to keep revolution at bay, alike in Italy and in Germany. In England the Reform Bill of 1832 was carried in the teeth of opposition which at one moment seemed likely to provoke revolution. But England has proverbially preferred to avert revolution by timely reform. So it was in 1832.

With one or two notable exceptions the movements of 1830 were singularly unfruitful. One exception is found in the unpromising field of the Ottoman Empire. But the Greek War of Independence belongs in logic, if not in time, to the next act of the drama which opens with the Revolutionary movements of 1848, and culminates in the great events of 1871. The characteristic motive of this period was not so much Liberalism as Nationalism. The revolutionary movements of 1848 were indeed largely inspired by a desire to assert the elementary principles of political and personal liberty, where, as in most of the States of Germany and Italy, they had long been denied by the ruling powers. But it is the triumph of the principle of Nationality which renders this period distinctive and memorable. The idea of Nationality is singularly elusive, and none of the ordinary definitions are either scientific or satisfying. Community of race, of language, of territory, of creed, the possession of a share in a great historical tradition—all these are ordinary ingredients in the complex idea of nationality. But none of them is indispensable. The partition of Polish territories served rather to accentuate than to eradicate the sense of nationality among the Poles. The history of the Jews, during long centuries, proves that nationality can survive the loss of a national home: though the other ingredients have been exceptionally potent among the people of that race. On the other hand, take modern Switzerland. In few nations of modern Europe is the sense of nationality stronger than in the Swiss Confederation. Yet it has been evolved in defiance of geography, despite divisions of creed, of language, and of race. Nevertheless, Germans, Frenchmen, and Italians, Protestants and Catholics, have come together in the Switzerland of to-day to form a robust and intensely self-conscious nation.

An overture must not, however, attempt the detailed elaboration of themes; its function is merely to indicate the *leit-motifs* of the drama. It must suffice, therefore, to note that nationalism, though it had by no means spent its force, reached its climax in the seventies of the last century. The year 1871 forms, indeed, one of the great watersheds of modern history. In that year two great Powers simultaneously attained the goal of national unity.

The Franco-German War (1870-1) put the coping-stone not only upon the work of Bismarck in Germany, but upon that of Mazzini, Cavour, Garibaldi, and Victor Emmanuel in Italy. The German attack upon France compelled Napoleon III to withdraw the French garrison from the Holy City, and allowed Victor Emmanuel to transfer his capital from Florence to Rome. The German victories in France enabled Bismarck to transform the North German Confederation into the new German Empire, and to persuade the German States south of the Main (except German Austria) to come into it. Nor is it, as a modern writer has pointed out, "without ironical significance that the *annus mirabilis* of modern history which witnessed the completion of German and Italian unity, the destruction of Bonapartism and the humiliation of France, was marked by the sessions of the Vatican Council. The decree of Papal Infallibility was the cordial which the Roman Church administered to itself in the hour of defeat, its defiance of the modern world, its protest against the sacrilege of Italian patriotism."¹

The operation of the force which we call Nationalism was not, however, uniform. If the doctrine was conspicuously vindicated as an integrating or centripetal force in Germany and Italy, it worked elsewhere not less potently in the opposite direction. It contributed powerfully to the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, and, much later, to the destruction of the conglomerate State which the Hapsburgs, not unaided, indeed, by fortune, but still with consummate ability, had held together for centuries in Central Europe. In the Balkans, indeed, we see the force operating simultaneously with contradictory effects; on the one hand, disintegrating the Empire of the Turkish Sultan; on the other, giving an immense impulse to the creation or re-creation of a group of Nation-States which arose phoenix-like upon its ashes. The Ottoman Empire was a wholly artificial product. An army of Asiatic nomads had encamped for centuries upon European soil; but the nomads never absorbed the conquered peoples; nor were they absorbed by them. The consequence was that the essential fragility and artificiality of the superimposed structure was plainly

¹ H. A. L. Fisher: *Bonapartism*, p. 4.

revealed as soon as a spark of the nationality doctrine fell upon the inflammable materials accumulated in the Balkans by centuries of Turkish oppression and misgovernment. Turkish rule in Europe was tolerable, only so long as the Turkish armies were advancing from victory to victory. Thus Turkish power waned as rapidly as it had waxed, and it waned with accelerated rapidity as soon as Europe began to list the lessons of liberty and nationality. In 1817 the Ottoman Empire in Europe occupied an area of 218,600 square miles, and included a population of 19,660,000 souls. By 1914 the Sultan ruled less than 2,000,000 subjects in Europe, and his European Empire had shrunk to 10,882 square miles.

The first inroad upon the integrity of that Empire was made by the Greeks. After centuries of silence and submission they suddenly raised the standard of revolt in 1821, and after much tribulation and many vicissitudes the Kingdom of the Hellenes was finally established by the Treaty of London (1832) and placed under the protection of Great Britain, Russia, and France. Thus the first of the Nation-States of the Balkans was re-born.

A second came into being as a result of the Crimean War. By the Treaty of Paris (1856) the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia virtually obtained their independence, but as separate States. So Europe decreed; the Roumanian people had other views. Taking the matter into their own hands and powerfully aided by the good offices of Napoleon III, they formally proclaimed the union of the two Roumanian Principalities in 1861, and achieved final and formal independence by the Treaty of Berlin (1878). In the same Treaty two other Balkan States, Serbia and Bulgaria, found their formal charter of emancipation, though the independence of the former had been virtually achieved in 1867; while the latter did not technically repudiate the suzerainty of the Porte until 1908.

Nor has the triumph of the nationality doctrine been confined to Europe. Nation-States have arisen under the ægis of the British Crown in North America, in South Africa and in the Southern Pacific. The Canadian Dominion, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Union of South Africa, and New Zealand are not the less Nation-States because

The
Kingdom of
Greece

Colonial
Nationalism

they are, and desire to remain, constituent parts of the British Commonwealth. The South American Republics, like the great Republic of the North, attained to the dignity of Nation-Statehood in independence.

The foregoing summary, though brief and catalogic, will at least suffice to establish the general proposition that the seventies of the last centuries witnessed the consummation of a highly significant movement in European politics. At long last, after a process extending over many centuries, Europe was exhaustively parcelled out into sixteen or seventeen Sovereign States, nominally equal in status, acknowledging no common superior and roughly corresponding to the main divisions of races. Some of these States had, in process of formation, absorbed various alien nationalities, and retained in restless and reluctant subjection peoples who had no affinities to the ruling race. Some, like the Empire of the Hapsburgs, possessed no racial unity, and, though rightly designated States, had no claim to be included in a catalogue of nations. Others like France and Great Britain had, by a fusion of races, evolved a new nationality. But whatever the particular road by which they had travelled, the States of Europe had attained a common goal. So the curtain falls on the third act of the drama.

Act IV :
*Welt-
Politik*

The Fourth Act is played on an ampler stage, and its successive scenes are widely disparate and wonderfully varied. Now the scene is laid in Europe and now in Africa : Japan plays the leading rôle in one scene and the United States in the next ; now it is South Africa, now Central Asia, and now again the Pacific which claims the attention of the European Chanceries. Evidently we have passed into a new era. " Yes," said Bismarck, towards the close of his life, " this is a new age ; a new world." For Bismarck Europe was enough. He did not look much beyond it. He might indeed toss Tunis to France, but it was in order to bring Italy into the Triple Alliance. He might encourage England to occupy Egypt, but only because that occupation would keep England and France at arm's length from each other. He might stimulate the ambitions of Russia in Central Asia, but that was to prevent friendly relations between London and Petersburg. His policy was throughout directed to one supreme end : to make Europe safe for Germany.

Consequently, when he could no longer ignore the ambitions of the new "colonial" party in Germany, when his own country took part in the scramble for Africa and laid the foundations of an Overseas Empire in the Pacific, he recognized the advent of a new era. Of that new era the outstanding characteristic was the shifting in the centre of political gravity; European history ceased to be exclusively European. The era of *Welt-Politik* had dawned.

What were the forces which operated to bring about this momentous change? The first in importance is undoubtedly that of scientific invention and discovery. Just as the Renaissance was the resultant of the invention of gunpowder, of printing and the mariner's compass, so, four centuries later, the era of *Welt-Politik* was rendered possible by a series of inventions not less significant. Railways, steamships, telegraphs, and telephones have brought the ends of the world together and have revolutionized the conditions of world-history. Bessemer's invention of cheap steel, the improvements in the surface condenser in 1870, the invention of the internal combustion engine, the use of oil for the generation of power, cold storage and refrigeration—these are only a few of the inventions that have given both to men and to commodities a new mobility. "The cardinal fact of geography in the twentieth century is the shortening of distances and the shrinkage of the globe. . . . The result is that problems, which a century ago, or even fifty years ago, were exclusively European, now concern the whole world."¹

The industrialization and urbanization of the European peoples tended in the same direction. The face of Europe was transformed by the development of productive capacity. England led the way. A land of farms and villages was transformed, in a generation, into a land of factories and mines and cities. Other countries followed suit, after a long interval, and more slowly. But almost without exception they have followed: a society which depended on agriculture and hand labour has given place to one which is dominated by the forces of coal and iron, steam and electricity.

¹ General Smuts.

Two results have ensued. The enormous development in productive capacity has contributed, on the one hand, to an overmastering desire for the command of those raw materials without which modern productive processes are impotent; and, on the other hand, to a scramble for markets in which to dispose of the surplus commodities produced in profusion by those processes. "Formerly," said General Smuts, "we did not fully appreciate the Tropics as in the economy of civilization. It is only quite recently that people have come to realize that without an abundance of the raw materials which the Tropics alone can supply, the highly developed industries of to-day would be impossible. Vegetable and mineral oils, cotton, sisal, rubber, jute, and similar products, in vast quantities, are essential requirements of the industrial world."

Overseas
trade

The modern world, then, looks to the Tropics not merely for the supply of the raw material but as a market for the disposal of the manufactured products. Thus we have had in recent days a revival of the old idea of "plantations"—of oversea estates to be worked for the benefit of the home-proprietors. In a word, we have recurred to the old colonial system denounced by Burke and Adam Smith as unworthy of any nation save a nation of shopkeepers, and unworthy even of them.

Imperialism

Under the conditions of the modern world a further consequence almost necessarily ensued. To the forces of industrialism and commercialism was added that of Imperialism—a desire for the extension of territory. The British Empire is, indeed, the product less of actual conquest than of simple settlement—the occupation and colonization of the waste places of the earth. But by the time that the European States' system was completed, by the time that Germany and Italy had attained to nationhood, those waste places had been largely occupied. It is not, therefore, remarkable that the process of nation-making should hardly have been completed before there began to develop among the new and intensely self-conscious units an ardent desire to find each for itself a "place in the sun." The late comers in the colonial field imagined, if not justifiably at any rate excusably, that they could satisfy their colonial and commercial ambitions only by the use of force. *Welt-Politik* thus came to involve *Welt-Macht*.

Once again, however, we must resist the temptation to elaborate details. A bare enumeration of certain outstanding events will enforce the lesson of the preceding paragraphs more significantly, it may be, than further generalization.

The first event which seems in this connection supremely significant was the opening in 1869 of the Suez Canal. Almost immediately the Mediterranean regained much of the importance, political and commercial, which for centuries it had possessed, but, ever since the Ottoman Conquests of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, had lost. The conception and construction of the Suez Canal stands entirely to the credit of France. France supplied both the brains and the capital. England had the chance of participating, but English statesmen of all parties frowned upon the project. With infinite patience and persistence Ferdinand de Lesseps carried it through. When the work was completed, there was at the head of affairs in England a statesman who appreciated the significance of the achievement: Disraeli saw the Suez Canal in its relation to the dawning of the new era of *Welt-Politik*. "You have," he said, "a new world, new influences at work, new and unknown objects and dangers with which to cope. . . . The Queen of England has become the Sovereign of the most powerful of Oriental States. On the other side of the globe there are now establishments belonging to her teeming with wealth and population. . . . These are vast and novel elements in the distribution of power."

Disraeli not only perceived the operation of new forces; he was determined to control them in the interests of the country he served. In 1875 he purchased the Khedive's shares in the Suez Canal. The Queen cordially supported him; the Rothschilds found the money; the Cabinet gave a very reluctant assent; Parliament was not in session and could not, therefore, be consulted. Alone Disraeli did it. The purchase of the canal shares announced the beginning of a new departure in English policy. In 1876 England and France established in Egypt a financial condominium which quickly developed into political control.

In the south of the African Continent, as in the north, the long period of masterly inactivity was drawing to a close. In 1869 British sovereignty was proclaimed over Basutoland, in 1876 over Griqualand West, and in 1877 the Transvaal

Outstanding
Events

The Suez
Canal and
Egypt

South
Africa

was annexed, only to be retroceded after the disastrous war of 1880-1. In 1885 British sovereignty was extended over Bechuanaland, over Zululand in 1886, and in 1889 the British South Africa Company was incorporated by Royal Charter and accepted the administration of Mashonaland. A war with the Matabeles was followed by the annexation of their country in 1894.

Meanwhile the discovery of the diamond fields of Kimberley, and of gold in great profusion on the Witwatersrand, attracted to South Africa a crowd of adventurers and speculators who introduced a new strain into the social and economic life of the country, and created a political problem which was not solved until after another unfortunate conflict with the Dutch farmers (1899-1901).

The
scramble
for Africa

A still larger problem had to be faced. Great Britain was not the only European Power in Africa. In 1879 the Belgians began their occupation of the Congo which was finally assigned to them in full sovereignty in 1908. In 1880 the French resumed their activities in West Africa, and in 1899 France was, by a Treaty with Great Britain, confirmed in possession of a great West African Empire. To Great Britain had been assigned a Protectorate over Nigeria on the west, and over British East Africa on the east coast in 1885.

For years past the Germans had taken their full share in African exploration, and, by the Anglo-German agreements, (1884 and 1890), they were confirmed in possession of Damara-land and Namaqualand (German South-West Africa), of Togoland and the Cameroons on the west coast, and of a great province on the east coast which became known as German East Africa. Thus Germany in the course of a few years had, with the cordial assent of Great Britain, leapt into the position of the third European Power in Africa. The Italians established a colony at Massowah in 1885, and by the agreements of 1890 recognized the French Protectorate over Madagascar and the British Protectorate over Zanzibar. Thus, virtually the whole of Africa was partitioned among the European Powers, and that this was accomplished without war and with little friction is a remarkable tribute to the statesmen of that day, not least to Lord Salisbury.

The Pacific
Problem

The expansion of Europe was not confined to Africa.

Between 1884 and 1886 Germany established herself (again by agreement with Great Britain) as the neighbour of Great Britain and France in the islands of the South Pacific. The activity of Germany and France in that region caused serious perturbation to our own colonies in Australia. The apparent indifference of the Imperial Government to Australian interests excited bitter resentment among colonial statesmen, but it had the effect of giving a decisive impulse to the movement for Australian federation which, after years of hesitation, was, in 1900, at last crowned with success.

In the "Pacific problem" there were, however, other ^{Japan} factors besides those contributed by the European Powers. In the period now under review there was no single feature more remarkable than the rapid rise of Japan. Down to 1868 Japan had been wholly medieval and Asiatic. In the ensuing twenty-five years it was transformed with astounding rapidity into a modern European State. The result of that transformation was revealed to an astonished world by the victory of Japan over the Chinese Empire in the war of 1894-5. The fruits of victory were, for the moment, snatched from her by the intervention of Russia, who, acting for once in concert both with Germany and France, refused to allow the Japanese to remain in possession of Port Arthur and the Liao-Tung Peninsula.

Three years later (1898) Germany herself demanded and obtained from China a ninety-nine years lease of Kiaochow ; ^{European} Russia took a shorter lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan, ^{outposts in} and when Wei-Hai-Wei was evacuated by the Japanese it was, on the shrewd suggestion of China, taken over by Great Britain. Half a century earlier (1842) Hong-Kong had passed to Great Britain, and between 1859 and 1884 France had established a Protectorate over Annam and Tonquin. Thus had Europe "expanded" in the Far East.

Japan, however, was not to be denied, and in 1904-5 exacted from Russia ample revenge for the gratuitous intervention of 1895. Russia was compelled to surrender to Japan her lease of Port Arthur and the Liao-Tung Peninsula, and five years later Japan put an end to ambiguities by the definite annexation of Korea. The victory of Japan over one of the great military powers of Europe had tremendous repercussions throughout the East. Still more

significant, however, was the fact that in 1902 Great Britain had so far departed from her diplomatic traditions as to conclude a formal Treaty of Alliance with Japan. The Treaty was renewed and enlarged in 1905, and again renewed in 1911. Thus Japan took her place among the Powers, not merely of Asia, but of the world, a place still further assured by the part she played in the world-war and in the post-war settlement.

The U.S.A.
as a World-
Power

Before the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance yet another factor had entered into the Pacific problem. In 1898 war broke out between Spain and the United States. The results of that war had a world significance. The United States had already (1898) annexed the Sandwich Islands: the Spanish War gave her the Philippines, and in 1899, by an arrangement with Great Britain, the Samoan Islands were divided between the United States and Germany. Thus the United States, which in the course of a century had become a vast Continental Power, with territory extending from ocean to ocean, became also a Pacific Power and took its place alongside the Great Powers of Europe as a participator in *Welt-Politik*.

Bismarck's
ascendancy

To return to Europe. During the twenty years which followed on the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1, European politics were dominated by Bismarck. By 1871 blood and iron had done their work, and Bismarck was content to sheathe the sword and busy himself with consolidating his work at home, and, abroad, with sowing the seeds of discord among the potential enemies of Germany. In 1890, however, his ascendancy came to an end. In 1888 his old master had passed away, and after a few months the Emperor William II reigned in his stead. Two years later the young Emperor dropped the old pilot. Bismarck's career was closed. With his dismissal the curtain falls on the fourth act.

Act V :
The Armed
Peace

The scene of the last act is laid for the most part at Berlin, and the centre of the stage is continuously occupied by the German Kaiser. Hardly had Bismarck made his final exit when that which he most feared came to pass. France and Russia drew together. This was the first step towards the "encirclement" of Germany; and it coincided, rather ominously, with the opening of the Kiel Canal, an event

which doubled the fighting power of the German Navy. But the "encirclement" was very far from complete, and but for blundering diplomacy on the part of Germany¹ need never have been completed. For between England on the one side, and France and Russia on the other, relations were far from cordial. Towards Germany, on the contrary, England, despite the despatch of the Kaiser's telegram to President Kruger (1896), was well disposed. In the last years of the century there seemed, indeed, some possibility of an Anglo-Saxon Alliance.

But the conduct of the Kaiser dissipated any idea of it. Notably his relations with the Sultan. Bismarck's attitude towards the Near Eastern Question was one of ostentatious aloofness. But the young Emperor was persuaded that there was a diplomatic vacancy at Constantinople; and he aspired to fill it. Two visits paid by the Kaiser to Constantinople produced results of no small significance. Valuable concessions were made to Germany in Asia Minor, and a Convention was presently concluded for the construction of a railway from Constantinople to Bagdad with the possibility of further extensions to the Persian Gulf.

England's place in world-politics in the last years of the century might well have seemed to jealous onlookers precarious. The year (1895) which witnessed the conclusion of the Franco-Russian Alliance saw Great Britain involved, by the Jameson raid into the Transvaal, in difficulties in South Africa. Simultaneously difficulties arose between her and the United States in connection with the Venezuelan boundary dispute. That this dispute did not lead to more serious consequences was due solely to the patience and tact displayed by Lord Salisbury.

Three years later the outbreak of the war between Spain and the United States gave England the opportunity of manifesting the goodwill which, despite repeated pin-pricks, she entertained for her kinsmen in America. The opportunity was not neglected, and the friendlier relations thus established were not without their influence on American opinion during the South African War.

An improvement had also taken place in the relations England and

¹ On this cf. in particular, Erich Brandenburg: *From Bismarck to the World War*. Oxford, 1927.

between England and France. In 1898 France concluded with Great Britain a comprehensive agreement. France was confirmed in possession of a great West African Empire ; the rights of England over the whole Nile basin from the source of that river to its mouth were acknowledged. From that moment the relations between the two Western Powers rapidly improved, and the foundations were laid for the *Entente* happily achieved in 1904.

Morocco

The North African coast was, however, another danger spot. In 1905 the Kaiser paid his famous visit to Tangier ; France was humiliated by a virtual demand from Germany for the dismissal of her foreign minister M. Delcassé, and in 1906 a conference was held at Algeciras to settle the affairs of Morocco. That conference served to demonstrate the solidity of the Anglo-French *Entente*, which in 1907 was further strengthened by the conclusion of a Convention between England and Russia.

Europe was now sharply divided into two opposing camps. The Triple *Entente* confronted the Triple Alliance. It needed only a spark to set inflammable materials ablaze.

In 1911 Morocco seemed likely to generate the spark. The despatch of the *Panther*, a German gunboat, to Agadir, brought Europe to the verge of war. But, at the height of the crisis (July), England, by the mouth of Mr. Lloyd George, uttered a plain warning to Germany that an attack on France would involve her in war with England. This gave the Kaiser momentary pause, and at the eleventh hour war was averted—or postponed.

The Balkans

The final impulse to Armageddon came, characteristically, from the Balkans. In July 1908 the Young Turk Revolution had broken out at Constantinople. On October 5 the Czar Ferdinand of Bulgaria proclaimed the independence of his kingdom. On the 7th Austria-Hungary denounced, without notice, the Treaty of Berlin and annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Hapsburg Empire. On the 12th Crete declared its union with Greece. In April 1909 the Sultan Abdul Hamid was deposed. King Edward VII regarded these events with profound anxiety, and even the least informed could see that trouble was brewing in that witches' cauldron of Europe.

In September 1911 a fresh ingredient was added to the

cauldron by Italy who suddenly declared war on Turkey and occupied Tripoli. Before that war ended the whole of the Balkans were in a blaze. The genius of M. Venizelos, assisted by M. Gueshoff of Bulgaria, had accomplished the seemingly impossible, and had brought Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia into a league against the Turk. Before the assault of the Balkan League the Ottoman Empire collapsed. But the triumph of the League was short-lived. The victors soon quarrelled among themselves. The War of the Balkan League was followed by that of the Balkan Partition; Roumania joined Greece and Serbia against Bulgaria just in time to demand a share of the booty distributed at the Treaty of Bucharest (August 1913). Had Italy listened to the evil counsels of Vienna, Armageddon would have been antedated by a year.

During the summer of 1914 events moved with great Armageddon rapidity towards the final catastrophe. Bare dates will suffice to indicate the sequence. On June 12 the German Emperor and Admiral von Tirpitz paid their historic visit to the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Hapsburg Empire, at the castle of Konopisht. On the 23rd, the Kiel Canal, having been reconstructed to allow the passage of the largest battleships, was reopened. On the 28th, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his consort were murdered by Serbians in the Bosnian capital, Serajevo. On July 23, Austria-Hungary presented an ultimatum to Serbia; and five days later declared war on her. On August 1, Germany declared war on Russia; on the 3rd, on France; on the 4th, on Belgium, and at midnight of the latter day Great Britain and the British Empire were at war with Germany. So the curtain falls on Act Five.

The world-war and the post-war settlement supplied the Epilogue to this, perhaps the greatest of all the dramas of world-history. None, certainly, has ever been played on so vast a stage and few have presented so rich a variety of scenes and players. The foregoing pages have been designed not so much to furnish a synopsis of scenes and list of characters, as to suggest, as we have said, some of the *leit-motifs* of the drama. To develop those fugitive themes is the purpose of the chapters that follow.

CHAPTER II

THE EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT OF 1815

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA

Congress
assembles at
Vienna

BY the middle of September 1814 the leading statesmen of Europe began to assemble at Vienna. Among the first to arrive were Lord Castlereagh, the principal representative of Great Britain, Prince von Hardenberg, who, with Baron Wilhelm von Humboldt, represented Prussia, and Count Nesselrode, the Foreign Minister of Russia. Metternich and Gentz, who acted as secretary to the Congress, returned from Baden on September 17, and on the 25th the Sovereigns of Russia and Prussia were welcomed with much pomp to the Austrian capital. They were quickly followed by a crowd of lesser kings, sovereign princes, and diplomatists, whose presence, with that of their ladies and retinues, made Vienna, during the ensuing months, not merely the centre of political activity, but a brilliant scene of social gaiety, and a hotbed of personal intrigue.

Of social life in Vienna during these months we have a graphic picture from the pen of Dr. Richard Bright, distinguished in English Medicine as the discoverer of "Bright's disease." Dr. Bright was staying in that gay city at the time, and through his eyes we see "a thin figure with shallow, sunken features, of mild expression, with a neck stiff, bending a little forwards and walking badly." That was Francis, the last of the Roman, the first of the Austrian Emperors. The "little man with white hair, a pale face and aquiline nose" was the King of Denmark. Close by them were to be seen the "tall form, the solemn and grave features" of the King of Prussia, and "the fine manly form," the "round

and smiling countenance" of the Czar Alexander of Russia. Others to be noticed in the crowd of Princes, Archdukes, and diplomatists were the Duke of Saxe-Coburg (a "stout, tall man") and his brother, Prince Leopold; a "short, thick old gentleman," the Grand Duke of Saxe-Weimar, and Beauharnais, viceroy of Italy (a "fine dark, military-looking man"). The Austrian Court gave to its visitors "a most imperial reception. . . . All the imperial and royal guests were lodged in the Bourg. Each sovereign had a complete suite of rooms in the lower part of this extensive building, while their attendants, secretaries, physicians, and other officers occupied the upper stories of the same edifice. For all these, establishments were regularly provided by the Austrian Court. Every royal person had a separate equipage with six or eight horses, and equerries and a crowd of servants. . . . I have heard it asserted that between two and three hundred imperial carriages were in daily use. . . . They were all painted green and adorned with either silver or gold. Many of them approached, though none of them equalled either in elegance or workmanship, the best English carriages."¹

There were constant entertainments on a magnificent scale: Courts, *Carrousels* (a species of tournament), boar hunts, balls, concerts, picnics and what not. The cost to the Austrian State, already bankrupt, was said to have exceeded £10,000 a day. The oft-quoted remark of the Prince de Ligne was no less true than witty: "Le Congrès danse danse mais ne marche pas."

Yet, despite social distractions there were three men at the Congress who knew exactly what they meant to do, and how it was to be done.

Of these the most exalted in rank, and not the least remarkable in personal endowments, was the Czar Alexander I of Russia. Curiously compounded of lofty idealism and calculating shrewdness, of mystical piety and terrestrial ambition, of generous enthusiasm and Muscovite cunning,

Its
Personnel :
the Czar
Alexander I

¹ *Travels from Vienna through Lower Hungary*. Edinburgh (Constable & Co), 1818. I cannot resist the temptation of establishing through Dr. Bright a personal link with the Congress of Vienna. His son, Dr. J. Franck Bright, was my History tutor at Oxford.

Alexander came to Vienna with a definite object. He had long been surrounded by a cohort of counsellors drawn, in the Russian mode, from many lands, and some of them—Laharpe, a Swiss Jacobin, Stein, the German nationalist, Capo d'Istria, a Corfist, Czartoryski, a Pole, and Pozzo di Borgo, a Corsican, accompanied him to Vienna. From his companions the Czar had imbibed ideas of democracy, liberty, and nationality which were destined to fructify in later years; but though the veneer was cosmopolitan Alexander was at heart a Russian, and it was Russian interests which he came to Vienna to advance. Those interests, for the moment, centred on Poland.

Lord
Castlereagh

Not less influential than the Czar, Lord Castlereagh was equally clear as to the lines on which the European settlement should be drawn. Highly esteemed by his colleagues at Vienna he was sorely misjudged by many of his compatriots, but recent research¹ has tended to correct the prejudice of contemporaries and the harsh estimates of historians.

A unique honour has, moreover, been lately paid to his memory. When the Conference of European Statesmen met at the English Foreign Office to sign the Pact of Locarno,² a portrait of Castlereagh was placed above the presidential chair, and in that position it still hangs.

Castlereagh, like Pitt, was profoundly convinced that England's primary interest lay in the defence of Europe against France or any other Power which might attempt to dominate the Continent, and to maintain that security was Castlereagh's persistent endeavour before, during, and after the Congress of Vienna. To his diplomatic skill the allies owed the Treaty of Chaumont which, concluded at the beginning of March 1814, pledged the Great Powers—England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia—to abstain from separate negotiations with Napoleon and to maintain the alliance for twenty years. The secret articles of that Treaty defined the objects to be realized before arms were laid down: a confederated Germany, an independent Switzerland, an independent Spain under a restored Bourbon monarchy, an

¹ Notably C. K. Webster in his *Foreign Policy of Castlereagh* and H. Temperley in *Foreign Policy of Canning*.

² 1925.

Italy again subdivided among its independent princelings, and an enlarged Holland under the Prince of Orange. Article XVI declared it to be the object of the allies to maintain the equilibrium of Europe and the tranquillity and independence of the Powers. In this article Dr. Webster finds the origin of that Quadruple Alliance which, concluded in 1815, was to dominate European politics for thirty years. "It was in fact," he adds, "to be a League of Nations against France to which all Powers, great and small, could look for protection. This device, invented by Castlereagh, and forced by him on the allies, is perhaps his greatest achievement and title to fame."¹

As regards the special interests of Great Britain, Castlereagh was equally clear in his mind and precise in his instructions. The principles of international law, for which England had always stood, were not to be brought into question, nor was any discussion to be permitted on the "freedom of the seas." Precautions were to be taken for the security of the Low Countries (always a cardinal object of English policy), and France was to be absolutely excluded from any naval establishments on the Scheldt, and particularly at Antwerp. In the background of his mind Castlereagh had a plan for still further securing the interests of England in the Low Countries by a marriage between the Princess Charlotte, heiress-presumptive to the British throne, and the Prince of Orange; but this plan was frustrated by the personal preference of the young lady for a Prince of the fortunate House of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. Of all the objects for which England was to strive there was none, however, dearer to Castlereagh and his colleagues than the abolition of the slave trade.

The inner circle of the Congress as originally constituted was completed by Prince Metternich who, as the principal representative of Austria, occupied the presidential chair, and by Prince Hardenberg, principal representative of Prussia. Born in 1773 Metternich had already fathomed the depths of European diplomacy. His handsome presence and graceful manners had made him *persona grata*, not only at Berlin, where he was ambassador from 1803 to 1806, but

¹ *Congress of Vienna*, p. 32. H.M. Stationery Office, 1920.

in Paris, to which, at Napoleon's express desire, he was accredited from 1806 to 1809. On the renewal of the war (1809) he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, a position which he retained continuously for nearly forty years. His appointment as Foreign Minister followed close upon the humiliating Treaty dictated to Austria by Napoleon at Schönbrunn (October 14, 1809), and from then until the close of the Napoleonic Wars he had a difficult part to play. He played it with such consummate, albeit Machiavellian, skill, that Austria, having in the later stages of the war made less sacrifices for the common cause than any of the allies, emerged from the war, and from the Peace settlement, essentially more powerful and more compact than she had been in 1792. Meanwhile, he had, as we shall see, a strenuous task before him in Vienna.

Prince Hardenberg, Metternich's senior by twenty-three years, has suffered somewhat in reputation by comparison with his more brilliant colleague, Stein, who was present at Vienna only in an unofficial capacity. With Stein he was responsible for the re-making of Prussia after the disaster of Jena, and like Stein he would, had they not been foiled by Metternich, have re-made Germany, on lines that would have anticipated the work of Bismarck.

Talleyrand

Another member of the Congress who knew his own mind was Talleyrand, the astute representative of France. An aristocrat by birth, an ecclesiastic by profession, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord had, since the outbreak of the Revolution, played a conspicuous part in French politics. He had served with equal devotion the Republic, the Consulate, and the Empire, but his wise advice in regard to Spain had been resented by the Emperor; a breach occurred between them, and on the fall of the Empire in 1814 Talleyrand espoused the cause of the Bourbons. He acted as President of the Provisional Government until the restoration of the legitimate monarchy was completed; as Foreign Minister he negotiated the first Treaty of Paris, and was naturally selected to represent his country at the Congress of Vienna. Reluctantly admitted to the inner councils of the Congress, Talleyrand played an indifferent hand with such superb skill as to make the representative of defeated France, if not the arbiter of the Congress, a make-weight of

the first importance. It may well be that the recollection of the part played by Talleyrand at Vienna decided the victorious allies to exclude Germany from the Peace Conference at Paris in 1919. But, be this as it may, Talleyrand not only compelled the "big four" to admit him to their counsels, but played with such skill upon the jealousy between Austria on the one side, and Russia and Prussia on the other, as to make his influence supreme. Talleyrand, the old minister of the Directory and the servant of Napoleon, constituted himself the champion of "legitimacy," the protector of the smaller German States against the aggression of the Hohenzollern, and the defender of the principles on which the Peace of Paris (1814) had been based. The man's audacity was matched only by his adroitness. In the matters under discussion at Vienna the interests of France were not directly involved, but Talleyrand was determined to claim for his country a part equal to that of the Allied Powers. He contended that, since the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris and the restoration of the Bourbons, France had in fact become a member of the European Alliance, and as such could not be excluded from their deliberations. Paradoxical though it was, his protest prevailed, and not even Castlereagh exercised a more commanding influence upon the course of negotiations.

Most of the questions affecting France had been already decided in the first Treaty of Paris, and with an extraordinary degree of consideration for France. Her frontiers were to be those of 1st of January 1792, with the addition of a slice of Savoy and strips of territory on the Eastern frontier; she was confirmed in the possession of Avignon and of the fortress of Landau;¹ she was not required to pay any war indemnity nor to disgorge (with the exception of the Vienna library and some trophies from Berlin) the art treasures which Napoleon had stolen from nearly every capital in Europe. France engaged not to fortify any places in the East Indies, and to recognize the independence of Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the various German and Italian States so long dominated by Napoleon. England extorted from France a promise for the abolition of the slave trade, but

The first
Treaty of
Paris, May
30, 1814

¹ This fortress was restored to Germany by the Second Treaty of Paris.

restored to her all the colonies taken in the war except Tobago, St. Lucia, and Mauritius (Ile de France). England also retained Malta and Ceylon, and agreed to purchase from the Dutch Cape Colony, which she had already twice acquired by conquest. Sweden restored Guadeloupe, and Portugal restored French Guiana to France. Other outstanding questions were referred to the Congress to meet at Vienna, but the four leading Powers took the precaution to settle many of the most thorny of these questions by a secret Treaty, before their representatives left Paris. Among these were the future of the Italian States including Genoa; the guarantee of Swiss independence; the position of Holland, and the guarantees for the free navigation of the Scheldt.

Pre-
Congress
Treaties

The diplomatists accordingly entered upon their work at Vienna with their hands tied by many existing engagements. By the Treaty of Abo (1812) Norway had already been promised to Sweden, and by an additional article in the First Treaty of Paris France had confirmed the arrangement. By the Treaty of Kalisch (February 1813) Russia had undertaken that Prussia should be restored to a position not inferior to that which she had occupied before the disastrous Treaty of Tilsit. Russia, Austria, and Prussia had agreed by the Treaty of Reichenbach (June 1813) to partition the Grand Duchy of Warsaw between them, while the Treaty of Töplitz (September 1813) had guaranteed to Austria her frontiers of 1805, and to the members of the Rhenish Confederation their independence. By the Treaty of Ried (October 1813) the King of Bavaria had received a pledge that he should retain full sovereign rights and all the territory acquired through Napoleon except the Tyrol and the Austrian districts on the Inn; and Joachim Murat had received a promise of Naples. Secret agreements made at Paris had further provided that Belgium should go to Holland, Venetia and part of Lombardy to Austria, and Genoa to the King of Sardinia.

Strictures
upon the
Settlement
of 1815

These engagements tied the hands of the diplomatists at Vienna, and may fairly be pleaded in mitigation of the strictures passed upon their work.

That regard was paid to the interests of dynasties rather than to those of peoples; that in territorial readjustments the principle of nationality was ignored; that more thought

was given to stability than to liberty ; that the diplomatists were anxiously, perhaps over-anxiously, concerned to maintain the equilibrium of the Great Powers, and were ready in the interests of the Balance of Power to sacrifice those of the smaller States—all this may be true, but viewed from the standpoint of 1815 is largely irrelevant. The primary object of the diplomatists of Vienna was to secure the peace of Europe, and they secured it for more than a generation. The rule of the Bernadottes may have been irksome to the freedom-loving and highly democratic Norwegians, but the personal union of Sweden and Norway lasted for nearly a century. The project of a “middle-kingdom” of the Netherlands—so dear to the heart of Pitt and Castlereagh—was jeopardized from the first by the illiberal policy of The Hague, and Belgium was not slow to assert its independence ; but was the project so intrinsically unsound as the critics have argued ? Might not a tactful policy steadily pursued have overcome difficulties arising from differences of race and creed and tradition, and, by maintaining the strong barrier devised by Castlereagh, have averted the sufferings which Belgium had to endure in 1914 ? The champions of the doctrine of *Nationality* were shocked by the extinction of Genoese independence and the annexation of the Republic to the Kingdom of Sardinia. Yet the nineteenth century afforded no more striking illustration of the triumph of nationalism than the unification of Italy. The absorption of Genoa was an important, perhaps an indispensable, step towards that romantic achievement. After all, the validity of the principle of “self-determination” depends upon the selection of the unit. If Genoa was to enjoy the right of self-determination, that of Italy must be denied. The principle could be conceded in the case of Ireland only if it was denied to Ulster. The diplomatists of 1815 can hardly, therefore, be blamed if they did not invariably succeed in finding the appropriate solution of a problem not yet defined.

To return to Vienna and the problems which, despite all preliminary Treaties, still awaited solution at the Congress.

Of these problems perhaps the most historically significant Poland was that of Poland. “*La question la plus exclusivement*

européenne est celle qui concerne la Pologne.” The truth of Talleyrand’s words was not perhaps fully apprehended until the issue of the famous Proclamation of the Grand Duke Nicholas to the Poles in August 1914.¹ Napoleon had apprehended it: “The future of Europe really depends,” he wrote, “on the ultimate destiny of Poland.” Long before the Russias had attained to any semblance of unity; before the Hapsburgs had acquired either Hungary or Bohemia; before the Hohenzollern had set foot in Brandenburg, Poland was a great Power—the greatest Power in Eastern Europe, and among the foremost Powers of the Continent. It rapidly declined in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and by the successive Partitions of 1772, 1793, and 1795 its vast territories were divided up among its powerful neighbours. Poland was erased from the map of Europe. But although the Polish State disappeared, the Polish nation survived and never ceased to cherish the hope of resurrection. It came in 1919.

Napoleon
and Poland

After the annihilation of Prussia (1806) Napoleon re-constituted a great part of Poland as the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and offered it to his ally Alexander of Russia who declined it. To Napoleon’s grand army, collected for the invasion of Russia, the Poles contributed 8000 men, and earnestly petitioned the Emperor for a restoration of their ancient kingdom. Napoleon committed a serious blunder in refusing this petition. If instead of advancing into the heart of Russia he had halted at Smolensko, he might have preserved his grand army intact and have paralysed the opposition of Russia. The reaction upon Napoleon’s personal fortunes it is impossible to calculate. There might have been no war of German liberation, no Leipzig, no exile to Elba, no Waterloo. But Napoleon had so far forgotten the catchwords of his youth that he could no longer pay even lip homage to the principle of nationality.

Russia and
Poland

The Czar Alexander, especially with Czartoryski at his side, was more impressionable. If the declaration published in the *Wieczernie Uremia* for September 3, 1916, may be accepted as authentic, Alexander, as far back as 1812, had

¹ For the text of this Proclamation and for the Polish Problem generally, cf. Marriott: *The European Commonwealth*, Oxford, 1918 (pp. 184 seq.). Cf. also Dmowski: *La Question Polonaise*, Paris, 1909.

pledged himself to a restoration of an independent kingdom of Poland, though it was to be connected by personal union with the Crown of Russia. Be that as it may, the Czar came to Vienna determined to achieve this object. He would thus make reparation for the outstanding political crime of the eighteenth century; though reparation was to be made not at the expense of Russia, but wholly at that of her accomplices. Her accomplices were by no means acquiescent. Ultimately, however, the opposition of Prussia was bought off by permitting her to retain the great fortresses of Thorn and Danzig, together with the province of Posen which, lying between the Oder and the Vistula, connected East Prussia with Silesia. She also obtained, as will be seen, large compensations in Central and Western Germany. Austria regained part of Galicia, while Cracow was constituted an independent Republic under the guarantee of the three Eastern Powers. This status it retained until 1846. The rest of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, now reconstituted as the "Congress Kingdom of Poland," passed to the Czar as King of Poland. Russia also retained Finland and Bessarabia. As regards the liberties of the Poles, the Final Act of the Treaty of Vienna provided that "the Poles who are respectively subjects of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, shall obtain a Representation and National Institutions, regulated according to the degree of political consideration that each of the Governments to which they belong shall judge expedient and proper to grant them." The sequel will exhibit the value of this provision.

The settlement of the Polish question is at once admirably illustrative of the character of the Czar, and typical of the temper which prevailed at Vienna. Alexander's idealism prompted the regeneration and restoration of Poland; his ambition whispered that this was the appropriate moment for the realization of Russia's long-cherished dreams. But above all else he was a political realist. *C'est à moi*, he said, laying his hand upon Poland on the outstretched map; and there was no arguing with the man in possession and the master of many battalions. "Avec 600,000 hommes on ne négocie pas beaucoup." The argument was conclusive.

If, however, the bulk of Poland was to go to Russia, ^{Other} Prussia must look for compensation elsewhere. Was it to Problems

be in Saxony, or on the Rhine, or both? Was France to be allowed to keep Alsace and Lorraine? How were the pledges given at Töplitz and Ried to be redeemed and reconciled? What was to be the future of Germany? Was the old Empire to be restored, or a new Empire created; and if so, was it to be dominated by Austria or Prussia? And what of the minor States, especially of those which had derived such material advantages from the Napoleonic régime in Germany? A mere statement of the problems suggests the difficulties of solution, and it soon became plain that the "big four" would split into two parties: Russia and Prussia on the one side; on the other, Metternich and Castlereagh, who could look for support to the minor States of Germany, if not to the smaller Powers of Europe. Between the two parties, though strongly inclining to the latter, stood Talleyrand, ever on the watch to utilize the dissensions of the allies for the benefit of France; and Talleyrand did not watch in vain.

The
Hundred
Days

The quarrels at Vienna were at their height and war between the allies seemed a not remote possibility when, on March 6, 1815, startling news reached the Congress. Napoleon, tiring of his constricted sovereignty, had left Elba (February 26) and on March 1 had landed, with about 1500 men, on the coast of France near Antibes. From there he marched, by way of Grenoble and Lyons, on Paris. No battle was fought; not a drop of blood was shed; the soldiers welcomed their old general; the peasantry hailed the statesman who brought them a guarantee of the social results of the Revolution. His speeches and proclamations were faultless in their tact, and skilfully devised to calm fears and to unite all parties in his support. "He had come," he declared, "to save France from the outrages of the returning nobles; to secure to the peasant the possession of his land; to uphold the rights won in 1789 against a minority which sought to re-establish the privileges of caste and the feudal burdens of the old régime; France had tried the Bourbons once more; but the experiment had failed; the Bourbon monarchy had proved incapable of detaching itself from its worst friends, the priests and the nobles; only the dynasty which owed its throne to the Revolution could preserve the social work of the Revolution. . . . War

and conquest he renounced . . . he would govern henceforward as a Constitutional Sovereign and seek to bequeath a Constitutional Crown to his son."

Nothing could have been more adroit. The indictment against the restored Bourbons was, as we shall see, sufficiently accurate to cajole France. Napoleon's advance was a triumphal progress; the Bourbon monarchy collapsed, and on the 20th of March the Emperor entered Paris amid scenes of frantic enthusiasm.

If France was cajoled Europe was not. Before Napoleon had reached Paris the allies had renewed the Treaty of Chaumont: each of the four Great Powers was to furnish 150,000 men and to keep them in the field "until Buonaparte should have been rendered incapable of stirring up further trouble." Great Britain, true to her traditional rôle, undertook to advance £5,000,000 to her Continental allies to facilitate mobilization. Most of the minor Powers adhered to the alliance and promised assistance against the common scourge.

Napoleon met this menace in characteristic fashion. On the one hand, he endeavoured to detach Great Britain and Austria from the coalition; on the other hand, he pushed on, with feverish haste, preparations for war. To his peace overtures Metternich returned a blank negative; Great Britain did not deign even to reply. On France and on France only, therefore, could he count for support. Nor was it easy to rouse France again to war. By June, in spite of all Napoleon's efforts, his army numbered only 284,000 men. Meanwhile by the issue of the *Acte additionnel* he sought to conciliate liberal opinion. There was to be a Legislature of two Houses: a Chamber of Peers composed of hereditary peers selected by the Emperor, and a Chamber of Representatives indirectly elected by small boards of electors, nominated by the primary constituencies. Ministers were to be, in some vague way, responsible to the Legislature, and liberty was to be guaranteed to the Press. When this new Constitution was submitted to it by plébiscite, France languidly assented to its provisions, and on June 1 the *Acte additionnel* was proclaimed.

On June 12 the Emperor started for the front, with the intention of striking a rapid blow at Brussels. The troops

of the allies were posted on a line extending from the Scheldt to the Moselle. Wellington was at Brussels at the head of a miscellaneous force of 105,000 men, of whom only 30,000 were British. Out of the total force some 20,000 were left to garrison Antwerp and other Belgian fortresses. His line extended from Ghent to Mons. Blücher was at Namur with 117,000 Prussians, their line extending from Charleroi to Liège. Napoleon's plan was to smash in the centre of the thin line, extending over a front of a hundred miles, to divide his enemies, defeat them in detail and march on Brussels. On June 14 he was at the head of a force of 125,000 men concentrated on a front of thirty-five miles on the western bank of the Sambre; on the 15th he crossed the frontier, attacked the Prussian right at Charleroi, and by that night was in possession of Charleroi and the bridges over the Sambre. Next morning (June 16) Napoleon himself attacked Blücher at Ligny, and ordered Ney to clear Wellington out of Quatre Bras and then to fall upon Blücher's right flank at Ligny. This was the first crisis of the campaign. At Quatre Bras Ney found that he had more than enough to do. So far from clearing out Wellington's force he was himself pushed back with heavy loss. Not a man could he spare for the attack on Ligny. But, though defeated, he kept Wellington so busy that the latter could not go to the support of Blücher.

Wellington's failure to do this is the foundation of the legend which still does duty, in some quarters, for a history of the Waterloo campaign. Early on the morning of the 16th, Wellington had ridden over to confer with Blücher and had promised, *if not attacked himself*, to go to the assistance of the Prussians. For the oft-repeated assertion that but for this promise Blücher would not have stood at Ligny there is no warrant. Blücher knew that Wellington's promise was conditional, and every one knows that the condition was not fulfilled.

At Ligny Napoleon defeated Blücher, but by no means decisively. The Prussians lost 20,000, the French 11,000, but after the battle Napoleon lost touch of his enemy. This was the second critical point of the campaign; for Blücher, as loyal to his colleague as he was skilful and brave, retired not eastwards upon Liège, but, in order that he might keep

in touch with Wellington, westwards upon Wavre. Napoleon, deceived by this manœuvre, despatched Grouchy with 30,000 men in pursuit of him. Grouchy, naturally, never found him. On the 17th Napoleon, making an unaccountably late start, moved slowly on towards Brussels, and on the 18th found his advance blocked by Wellington at Waterloo. On that historic field Wellington sustained the attack for five hours (11-4): and sustained it alone. But his tactics were based on the assumption that Blücher would come to his assistance. Nor was his confidence misplaced; about four o'clock the first Prussians came up, but not until six or later was their help effective. By that time the great battle was all but won; but the Prussian cavalry did an enormous though secondary service to the allied cause; they turned a defeat into a rout. Napoleon lost 30,000 men and all his guns; Wellington lost 13,000, and the Prussians 6000. But the great war was ended. The decisive factors in the final campaign were three: Blücher's strategical retreat upon Wavre; Napoleon's unaccountable delay after Ligny, and Wellington's superb tactics at Waterloo. Waterloo opened the road to Paris, and on July 7 the allied army for the second time entered the French capital.

Napoleon fled from Waterloo to Paris; executed a formal abdication in favour of his son, the King of Rome (June 22), and made his way to Rochefort with the intent to escape to America. But his old enemies were on the watch; escape was impossible, and on July 15 he surrendered to Admiral Hotham of H.M.S. *Bellerophon*. Brought to the shores of England, but never permitted to touch them, Napoleon was deported to the Island of St. Helena, and there died, a prisoner, in 1821.

While England and Prussia had been disposing of Napoleon in the North, Austria had been dealing with his brother-in-law Murat in South Italy. After Leipzig Murat had deserted Napoleon and received from Metternich that as the price of his desertion he should retain his Crown. But, inconstant even in treachery, he attempted to head a national revolt in Italy. It failed hopelessly and Murat then offered his sword and services to Napoleon by whom they were contemptuously declined. After Waterloo Murat fled to Corsica whence he made a desperate descent on the

Calabrian Coast, but was ultimately captured and shot. His conduct untied one of the diplomatic knots and rendered easy the restoration of the Bourbons, in the person of King Ferdinand, to the throne of Naples and Sicily.

Second
Bourbon
Restoration

On the day after the re-entry of the allied armies into Paris Louis XVIII returned to his capital. That he returned as the nominee of the allies was a truth not to be concealed from the quick-witted people of Paris. Had it not been for the prompt and independent action of Wellington he might not have returned at all; other members of the alliance—in particular the Czar—were by no means favourably disposed towards him. The second restoration was in fact the work of three men—Wellington, Talleyrand, and Fouché, Napoleon's Minister of Police. When the allied Sovereigns reached Paris Louis XVIII was once more King of France.

The Treaties
of Vienna

Nothing now remained but to conclude the Peace settlement with all reasonable despatch. The return of Napoleon and the episode of the Hundred Days had hardly interrupted the course of negotiations at Vienna where on June 9 the Final Act of the Congress was signed. The Final Act itself is a document containing 121 clauses, but in addition there were no fewer than twenty-seven other treaties concluded at Vienna during the first six months of 1815, not to mention twenty-two more which, between May 1814 and November 1815, were signed in Paris and elsewhere. Even then there still remained a number of territorial readjustments to be made, chiefly between different States of the Germanic Confederation. These Treaties, Conventions, and Protocols, in the aggregate constitute the settlement of 1815. The main features of that settlement must now be summarized.

Prussia

In the settlement of the Polish question Prussia, as we have seen, fared badly.

Danzig, Thorn, and Posen could not be regarded as fulfilling the promises of the Treaty of Kalisch, particularly when it is remembered that Prussia gave up Anspach and Bayreuth to Bavaria, and, to Hanover, Hildesheim and East Friesland, besides portions of Lingen and Eichsfeld. Where was Prussia to get her compensation? Saxony was the destined victim. Her king, having adhered to Napoleon

of the allies. Saxony was saved, however, or partially saved by the consummate adroitness of Talleyrand, who found in the Saxon question the desired seed for sowing discord among the allies. That discord very nearly led to a renewal of war between Prussia and Russia on the one side and, on the other, England, Austria, and France. War, however, was averted, and Prussia had to content herself with the northern and smaller half of Saxony, containing 800,000 inhabitants. The compensation was still inadequate, even when Lower Pomerania (Neu-Vorpommern) was thrown in, and Prussia ultimately found it in Western Germany.

Of Prussia's acquisitions in 1815 by far the most important was the great province on both sides of the Rhine, including Westphalia, Cleves, Köln, Aachen, Bonn, Koblenz, and Trier. The significance of this addition to the Hohenzollern dominions was not merely geographical, but economic, ecclesiastical, and cultural. Geographically it brought Prussia into immediate contact with France; it made her the guardian of the middle Rhine, and thus, in a sense, the protector of Western Germany. True, the Rhine province was isolated, cut off from Prussia by the intervening territories of Hesse and Hanover. But this fact served to justify the annexations of 1866. The inhabitants of these lands were mainly Catholics, and culturally quite distinct from Prussians and Brandenburgers. The Rhineland had for twenty years been an integral part of France; it had imbibed the doctrines of the Revolution and had known the value of Napoleonic organization. All this it brought to Prussia; and with Westphalia, it brought her a wonderful accession of industrial and economic resources, as the mere mention of Essen, Elberfeld, Düsseldorf, and Duisburg may recall.

The full significance of these changes can, however, be appreciated only if we bear in mind the changes simultaneously effected in the position of the Austrian Empire. The Hapsburgs, from their own point of view, were not less fortunate than the Hohenzollerns. They lost the Austrian Netherlands, which they had always regarded as a tiresome encumbrance, but acquired or recovered Eastern Galicia, Salzburg, the Tyrol, and the Vorarlberg, the Illyrian provinces, Venetia, and Lombardy. The ethnical factor in these changes should not be ignored. The Hapsburgs lost Flemings

and gained Italians. The Hohenzollern exchanged Slavs for Germans.

Two other questions remain to be considered: that of Alsace-Lorraine and the future constitution of Germany. Neither was easy of solution.

Alsace-
Lorraine

The three great bishoprics of Lorraine had passed to France in 1553, and the cession was confirmed by the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). By the latter treaty the Empire also ceded to France its rights over Alsace, though with certain obscure reservations. One of these obscurities was cleared up when in 1681 Strasburg was annexed, under the mockery of judicial forms, by Louis XIV. The remaining portions of the Duchy of Lorraine were promised to France by the Treaty of Vienna (1735) and actually passed to her in 1766. On the strength of these historical facts Germans have been tempted—not unnaturally—to argue that Alsace-Lorraine having been originally German had been by force and fraud annexed to France. Nor could it be denied that France had made use of those provinces as “a back door into Germany,” for the purpose of accentuating particularist tendencies and thus keeping Germany divided and impotent.

Prussia, in particular, insisted that this was the appropriate moment for restitution. “If,” said Hardenberg, “we want a durable and safe peace, as we have so often announced and declared, if France herself sincerely wants such a peace with her neighbours, she must give back to her neighbours the line of defence she has taken from them; to Germany Alsace and the fortifications of the Netherlands, the Meuse, Mosel, and Saar. Not till then will France find herself in her true line of defence with the Vosges, and her double line of fortresses from the Meuse to the sea; and not till then will France remain quiet. Let us not lose the moment, so favourable to the weal both of Europe and France, which now offers of establishing a durable and sure peace. . . . If we let it slip, streams of blood will flow to attain this object, and the cry of the unhappy victims will call us to give an account of our conduct.”

Hardenberg's foresight was more than justified by the events of 1870. But 1870 was far ahead. Even farther ahead was the Great War of 1914-18. The immediate concern of the allies was peace and stability; with a restless

and embittered France there would be neither. "What have you been fighting all these years?" asked Wellington. "Not France, but the spirit of Revolution embodied in a crusade. You want to re-establish a regular Government in France under the ancient dynasty. Are you going to associate their restoration with the loss of provinces so precious to France?" Wellington prevailed against Hardenberg, and for half a century Alsace and Lorraine remained French. The argument was nicely balanced: History was perhaps on the side of Hardenberg; policy and local sentiment on that of the Duke. That France had used the provinces for offensive purposes against Germany is certain; that the loss of them would have provoked an early renewal of the contest is probable.

The adjustment of the territorial claims of the minor **Germany** States in Germany took some time. Saxony having adhered to Napoleon to the end, had no title to consideration at the hands of the allies and suffered, as we have seen, a severe amputation. Bavaria, compelled to make restoration on a large scale to Austria, was compensated with Bayreuth and Anspach (transferred from Prussia), and with the Rhenish Palatinate; Hanover became a kingdom with some small accessions of territory. In Baden and Württemberg there was no change.

Much more difficult was the settlement of the constitutional question. For the last eight years Germany had been without a head and without a constitution. States there were *in* Germany, but there was no German State. The first Treaty of Paris (§ 6) had declared: "The States of Germany shall be independent and shall be united in a federal league." One of the first duties of the Congress of Vienna was to give substance to this general declaration.

There would seem to have been six possible alternatives: (i) the revival of some form of empire under the hegemony of Austria; or (ii) of Prussia; (iii) some loose form of confederation (*Staaten-bund*); (iv) a genuine federal State (*Bundesstaat*); (v) two federal States, under Prussia and Austria respectively; or (vi) the complete independence of the territorial princes and free cities. Even apart from the specific provision of the Treaty of Paris, the last alternative was not to be thought of. But to the realization of

effective unity the difficulties seemed almost insuperable. The first and greatest was presented by the position of the two Great Powers—Austria and Prussia. Neither was racially or politically homogeneous ; both contained provinces which had formed no part of the old Empire ; and between them there was a jealousy and rivalry which was fast hardening into a tradition. Hardly less serious was the problem presented by the position of the secondary States. In the latter, both princes and people had formed the habit of looking to France. Irksome as the *Rhein-bund* may have been as regards foreign policy and military service, it impinged hardly at all upon the absolute sovereignty of the confederate princes over their own subjects. Not one tittle of that sovereignty were the princes of Bavaria, Würtemberg, Saxony, Hesse, Baden, and the rest prepared to surrender. If Austria and Prussia were jealous of each other, the smaller States were jealous of both.

There was yet another obstacle in the path of German unity. Europe as a whole was to be a party to the settlement. But neither Russia nor France desired that the ideas of 1813 and 1814 should materialize into an efficient and unified German State. France in particular regarded the surrender of the Rhine frontier as a distasteful but temporary necessity, in which she would acquiesce only so long as she must.

Stein favoured the separation of North Germany from South and the formation of two strong federal States under Prussia and Austria respectively.¹

Austrian
views

To this division the Austrian Emperor and Metternich were inflexibly opposed. The idea of reviving the old Empire in any shape, or a resumption of the crown of Germany by Austria, was equally repugnant to them. Metternich hoped that Austria might become a sort of residuary legatee of the Napoleonic Empire in Germany ; attach to herself the loyalty of the minor sovereigns who had adhered to Napoleon ; flatter their complacency ; secure them in their absolutist rights against their own subjects and so frustrate the designs of the Prussianizing party. With this end in view Metternich worked incessantly to reduce the unitarian element in the

¹ Cf. Seeley : *Stein*, iii. 169 seq.

revised Constitution to a minimum, and to form a loose confederation of independent and co-equal sovereigns.

After long discussion the weak compromise for which Metternich had all along been fighting was finally adopted. The Federal Act was signed and sealed on June 8, 1815, just in time to be embodied in the Final Act of the Congress which was executed on June 9.¹ The Germanic Constitution was thus formally placed under the guarantee of the signatory Powers.

The Germanic Confederation was to comprise thirty-nine ²The Sovereign States and Free Cities (Lübeck, Bremen, Frankfort, Germanic Bund and Hamburg). The most powerful members of the Bund were largely non-Germanic. Austria and Prussia adhered to it only for those portions of their territories (including Silesia) which had formed part of the old Empire. England came in for the kingdom of Hanover; Denmark for the duchy of Holstein; the King of the Netherlands for Limburg and Luxemburg. The object of the Bund was defined as the "maintenance of the internal and external security of Germany and of the independence and inviolability of each of the German States." All the confederates undertook to "defend the whole of Germany as well as each individual State of the Confederation against every attack and mutually to guarantee all the possessions of each member." They engaged "neither to make war upon each other, nor to enforce their claims with violence, but to bring them before the Federal Diet and submit them to the decision of a commission or of an impartial court of reference." The members reserved to themselves the right of making alliances, provided they did not endanger the safety of the Bund or any single State; but they agreed that, in a war of the Confederation, there should be no partial negotiation, truce, or peace. All the members were to have equal rights and all bound themselves equally to keep the Act of Confederation inviolable.

The concerns of the Bund were to be managed by a Federal Diet sitting at Frankfort with Austria as president. The powers of the Diet were, in theory, very extensive.

¹ For full text cf. Hertslet: *Map of Europe by Treaty*, i. No. 27.

² Only thirty-eight appear in the Federal Act. Hesse-Homburg was included in September.

It had power to declare war and peace, to maintain a federal army, to send and receive diplomatic representatives,¹ to conclude treaties with foreign Powers, to decide inter-state disputes, and to regulate their commercial relations. But it had no administrative officers under its control, and could enforce its orders only by the cumbrous process of a "federal executive." Finally, it should be noted that the Federal Act ordained that in every confederate State a representative constitution was to be adopted.

Regarded as an organic constitution the Act of 1815 possessed almost every imaginable fault. As a provision against external dangers it was well-nigh impotent. Nor was it more satisfactory as a frame of domestic government. The legislature consisted of the plenipotentiaries of sovereign States, voting in accordance with the instructions of their respective Governments, and requiring for important decisions an unattainable unanimity. There was no real executive, and the judicial authority was devoid of sanction. On the other hand, the Bund was a facile instrument for the purposes of reaction and obstruction.

The whole arrangement was, in fact, a triumph for the principles of Metternich. It contained enough of the semblance of unity to enable him to utilize the position of Austria, as president of the Confederation, in order to obstruct constitutional reform in the smaller States. It did not possess enough of the substance of unity to give Prussia or the smaller States any real control over Austria. But the characteristic of the Bund which above every other commended itself to Metternich was a negative one. It contained no trace of any concession to the "Jacobinism" of Stein; it was well calculated to stifle the hopes, whether of liberalism or of nationalism, which had been evoked by the war of liberation.

Such was the German settlement of 1815. Alike from the point of view of the particularist liberal, or from that of the Pan-German nationalist, it was arid and unsatisfactory for the present, and unpromising for the future. Yet beneath the surface there were elements of hope. Napoleon had done more for Germany than he intended; much more

¹ Ambassadors were regularly accredited to Frankfort, but the Bund, as such, never had permanent missions at foreign courts.

than the Germans of that day could appreciate. The mere reduction of sovereignties from three hundred to thirty-nine was clear gain. The annihilation of the petty principalities by the mediatization of 1803 ; the concentration of authority and the consolidation of States unquestionably made for better government, and for the greater happiness of the mass of the German peoples. More than this : the settlement of 1815 was a necessary stage in the process by which, in the nineteenth century, Germany was transformed from a congeries of unimportant principalities under the presidency of Austria, into a great federal State under the hegemony of Prussia.

The settlement of Italy was in some respects parallel ^{Italy} with that of Germany. There also an attempt was made to erase the handiwork of Napoleon, and with the same temporary success. The Bourbon King Ferdinand once more reigned over the Two Sicilies ; the Pope was again master of the States of the Church ; Austria carved out for herself a great Lombardo-Venetian Principality ; the ex-Empress Marie Louise was installed in Parma, and Austrian cadets in Modena and Tuscany ; while Victor Emmanuel I was restored to Sardinia, Piedmont, and Savoy, with the important addition of Genoa. Once again the dynastic principle seemed to have triumphed over the national, and the outlook for the future was dark. But in Italy not less than in Germany the Napoleonic occupation had none the less left permanent results.

In Northern Europe the same principles reappear. ^{Northern Europe} Norway, torn from Denmark, was united to Sweden, which lost Finland to Russia and Western Pomerania to Prussia, and Belgium was united to Holland. Belgians and Dutchmen were opposed in race, creed, and historical tradition, and the union was effected primarily in the interests of the European equilibrium.

Switzerland, enlarged by the addition of the Cantons ^{Switzerland} of Valais, Neuchâtel, and Geneva (twenty-two in all), was guaranteed by the powers in perpetual neutrality.

One power remains to be considered. Great Britain ^{Great Britain} had entered upon the struggle with no selfish aim ; she had sustained it with unequalled pertinacity ; but in the territorial readjustments at Paris and Vienna she had little

direct or selfish interest. She struggled hard to effect a stable settlement on equitable lines ; she was anxious that a due balance of power should be maintained ; she used her influence for the abolition of the slave trade ; but her acquisitions in Europe were confined to Heligoland and Malta and the protectorate of the Ionian Isles. Her substantial gains were farther afield. For ten years she had been undisputed mistress of the sea, and the colonial possessions of France, Holland, and Spain were entirely at her mercy, and mostly in her grasp. At the Peace she retained Trinidad (from Spain), Mauritius, Tobago, and St. Lucia (from France), and Ceylon (from Holland). Cape Colony, originally acquired by conquest, was reacquired by purchase from the Dutch. In India also the British dominions were largely extended in the period between 1789 and 1815. The war with the United States (1812-14), into which Great Britain was driven by the fiscal policy of Napoleon, ended in the mutual restoration of conquests and an agreement to abolish the slave trade (Peace of Ghent, December 24, 1814).

The Second
Treaty of
Paris

The allies, for the second time in occupation of Paris, had still to decide the terms to be imposed upon France. On this point there was acute difference of opinion among them, and it was not until the end of September that their views were so far reconciled as to be communicated to Louis XVIII ; and not until November 30 was the Second Treaty of Paris signed. The prompt action of Wellington in restoring Louis XVIII virtually precluded further discussion as to the Crown of France ; but Prussia, as we have seen, demanded that France ought to be stripped of Alsace and Lorraine and the northern fortresses. Lord Liverpool informed Castlereagh that English opinion demanded that France should be compelled to restore "the principal conquests of Louis XIV." Wellington himself thought that France had been left too strong in 1814. The Czar Alexander, on the contrary, was opposed to any reduction of the territory of France, and indeed to the punishment of the French for the sins of Napoleon.

It was Wellington, however, whose voice was decisive. He regarded the matter not from the point of view of Germany, nor from that of France, but from that of Europe. Europe must, indeed, be protected against an over-powerful France ;

but the supreme interest of Europe was a settlement which would make for permanent security and tranquillity. France, therefore, must not be goaded into a war of *revanche*. Consequently, the terms offered to France were eminently reasonable.

France was compelled to give up the greater part of Savoy and most of the fortresses which, acquired since 1790, she had been permitted, in 1814, to retain, and was reduced to the frontiers of 1790; she was forced to disgorge the stolen art treasures, to pay an indemnity of 700,000,000 francs, and to leave eighteen of the fortresses on her northern and eastern frontiers in the occupation of the allies as a pledge of good behaviour. Wellington remained in France as commander of the allied army of occupation.

The great war was at last ended; Europe was at peace. That the peace thus painfully attained might be, if not permanent, at any rate prolonged, was the hope of all good men. By that hope the diplomacy of the ensuing period was inspired.

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CHAPTER III

THE CONFEDERATION OF EUROPE

THE HOLY ALLIANCE. THE QUADRUPLE TREATY. GOVERNMENT BY CONGRESSES

The Holy Alliance

THE Second Treaty of Paris was signed on November 20, 1815. On the same day the allies, Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, concluded the "Quadruple Alliance." Two months earlier (September 26) the Sovereigns of Russia, Austria, and Prussia had signed a compact designed to "publish in the face of the whole world their fixed resolution, both in the administration of their respective States, and in their political relations with every other Government to take for their sole guide the precepts of that Holy Religion, namely the precepts of Justice, Christian Charity, and Peace, which, far from being applicable only to private concerns, must have an immediate influence on the councils of Princes, and guide all their steps, as being the only means of consolidating human institutions and remedying their imperfections." The sovereigns accordingly agreed to act always in conformity with the principles of the Christian religion, to "lend each other aid and assistance," and to "protect Religion, Peace, and Justice," and to recommend their peoples to "strengthen themselves every day more and more in the principles and exercise of the duties which the Divine Saviour has taught to mankind."

The Prince Regent of England felt himself precluded by "the forms of the British Constitution" from acceding formally to the treaty, but expressed his "entire concurrence in the principles" the august allies had laid down. The Sovereigns of France, the Netherlands, Würtemberg, and Saxony, and the Governments of Switzerland and the Hanse towns, subsequently gave in their adherence, as (according to Martens) did the greater part of the Christian Powers.

Metternich, at the moment, regarded the whole transaction with cynical contempt, though he subsequently made use of the Alliance to promote the ends of his own reactionary policy. Castlereagh, though not less anxious than the Czar to maintain the Concert of Europe, regarded the Holy Alliance as a "sublime piece of mysticism and nonsense," and his reception of the project was, though studiously polite, characteristically ironical. "The benign principles of the Alliance of the 26th of September 1815, may be considered," he wrote, "as constituting the European system in the matter of political conscience. It would, however, be derogatory to the solemn act of the Sovereigns to mix its discussion with the ordinary diplomatic obligations which bind State to State, and which are to be looked for alone in the treaties which have been concluded in the accustomed form." He had, moreover, grave doubts as to the sanity of the Czar. Canning was more suspicious of his sincerity. But Canning was confronted with the Alliance after it had been perverted to the reactionary ends of Metternich. In its inception the Holy Alliance represented a noble, if impracticable, ideal. The mood of 1815 was, indeed, like the mood of 1919, an exalted one. Europe had passed through a terrible ordeal, and had emerged, if not unscathed, yet purified, it was hoped, as by fire. What more natural than that the Czar Alexander, stimulated doubtless by the Baroness Krudener, and undeterred by previous failures, should launch yet one more project for the organization of perpetual peace?

In the Holy Alliance England, as we have seen, had no formal part. For the Quadruple Treaty, on the other hand, Castlereagh was primarily responsible. As this is frequently confounded with the more resounding but less immediately important Treaty of September, it is important to scrutinize closely its genesis and its provisions.

When Castlereagh in December 1813 went out to the allied headquarters to represent the British Government, his instructions concluded with the following paragraph: "The Treaty of Alliance is not to terminate with the War, but is to contain defensive engagements, with mutual obligations to support the Power attacked by France with a certain extent of stipulated succours. The *casus fœderis*

is to be an attack by France on the European dominions of any one of the contracting parties."

The
Quadruple
Treaty

Nothing could be more precise. On this basic principle are founded both the Treaty of Chaumont and the Treaty of Vienna, and the principle reappears in the Quadruple Treaty of November 20. Therein the signatory Powers solemnly renewed their adherence to the Treaties of Chaumont and Vienna, they mutually guaranteed the Second Treaty of Paris, and finally, in order to "facilitate and secure the execution of the present treaty and to consolidate the connections which at the present moment so closely unite the four Sovereigns for the happiness of the world," they agreed to "renew their meetings at fixed periods . . . for the purpose of consulting upon their common interests and for the consideration of the measures which at each of these periods shall be considered the most salutary for the repose and prosperity of nations and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe."¹

Such were the principal stipulations of the famous treaty which laid the foundation of that "Concert of Europe," governed the international relations of the European States until 1822, and exercised a considerable though diminishing influence upon them for a still longer period.

The principle of a European Concert must command general approval. But it is undeniable that any attempt to apply the principle in practice may, unless carefully worked and vigilantly watched, gravely menace the cause of political liberty in individual States. Lord Castlereagh was, from the first, keenly alive to the danger which lurked in the specious proposals of the Czar, as is clear from the circular letter which, in December 1815, he addressed to the British representatives at foreign Courts: "In the present state of Europe it is the province of Great Britain *to turn the confidence she has inspired to the account of peace*, by exercising a conciliatory influence upon the Powers rather than put herself at the head of any combination of Courts to keep others in check."²

In practice, the Czar's project involved a definite and

¹ For full text of Treaty cf. Hertslet: *Map of Europe*, p. 572.

² *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xi, 105.

formal attempt to control international relations by a system of periodical Congresses.

The first of these Congresses met at Aix-la-Chapelle in September 1818. The Sovereigns of Russia, Austria and Prussia were present in person. Among the accredited diplomatists were Castlereagh and Wellington, Metternich, Hardenberg, Nesselrode, and Capo d'Istria. The Duke of Richelieu, Prime Minister of France, was also admitted, to enable him to present a petition that France might be forthwith relieved from the humiliation and expense of maintaining the army of occupation. The consideration of this question was indeed the primary purpose of the Congress. The Treaty of Paris had provided that "the military occupation of France might cease at the end of three years" if the allies approved. The Duke of Wellington, advised that the "army of occupation might, without danger to France herself and to the peace of Europe, be withdrawn" and the Congress accepted his advice. France, backed by the great financial houses of Baring and Hope, entered into renewed engagements for the payment of the unliquidated claims of the allies, and by the end of the year not a single foreign soldier was encamped upon French soil. At the same time France was formally readmitted to the polite society of Europe, and thus the Quadruple Alliance of 1815 was converted into the "Moral Pentarchy" of 1818. But the Treaty of November 1815 was not renewed in its original form. Experience had already suggested to the cautious mind of Castlereagh certain modifications. The three years which had elapsed since 1815 had confirmed the suspicions of the British Government. It had become manifest that Metternich was bent upon exploiting the Concert of Europe in the interests of repression and reaction. The reactionary movement was, as we shall see, already making progress in France, in Germany, in Italy, and above all in Spain. The machinery of the European Concert might prove very useful, both in furthering the cause of reaction, and in quelling any incipient insurrections provoked by the reactionary policy of the restored sovereigns. But as regards France the allies were in complete accord. By a secret Protocol (November 15, 1818) they agreed to renew the engagements of 1815 and to confer "on the most effectual means of

Congress of
Aix-la-
Chapelle

arresting the fatal effects of a new revolutionary convulsion with which France may be threatened.”¹ But against any general extension of the principle of intervention in the domestic concerns of independent States, the English Government presented an adamant front.

The general result of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle was a renewal of the Alliance of 1815 in more general terms, but in an additional Protocol it was specifically laid down that the “government by Congresses” was not to be systematized, and the doctrine that the Great Powers were to exercise a perpetual and continuous surveillance over the domestic affairs of their smaller neighbours, or of each other, was, thanks mainly to Castlereagh, definitely and firmly repudiated. For the moment Castlereagh’s influence was indeed decisive. “The weight of England,” wrote Lord Stewart to Lord Liverpool, “has been prodigious at this meeting. . . . Had it not been for the unwearied labour of my brother and the Duke of Wellington . . . it is evident that no progress would have been made.” They it was who protected the smaller States from the officious benevolence of the Holy Alliance; to them Europe owed the manifest failure of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle “to provide the transparent soul of the Holy Alliance with a body.”

Historical critics were, in past days, wont to accuse Castlereagh of wishing to “tie England to the tail of the Holy Alliance”; and the fashion is not wholly obsolete. No accusation could be more demonstrably unfair. That Castlereagh adhered to the “European Concert” is true; to have broken it up would, in view of the circumstances of the time, have been “a crime against the civilization of Europe.” But that danger lurked in the experiment no one knew better than Castlereagh, and no one was at greater pains to restrain the operations of the Alliance within well-defined and salutary limits. So soon as it transgressed them, Great Britain broke away. That time was not long in coming.

Restoration,
Reaction,
and
Revolution

Both in Spain and the Two Sicilies the restored Bourbons lost no time in initiating a veritable orgy of reaction.

¹ Wellington : *Supplementary Despatches*, xii, 885-7.

Reaction was quickly followed by the outbreak of revolution. The Czar Alexander, well meaning and sentimental, but shallow and impressionable, had already forgotten his earlier essays in Liberalism and was now the sworn ally, if not the abject slave, of Metternich. Consequently, at the first rumour of revolution in Spain, he was anxious to throw an army, in the interests of autocracy, into the Peninsula. Metternich was similarly determined to restore order in Southern Italy. Both hoped to obtain for their several enterprises the sanction of the allied Powers. In regard to Naples, Austria had by treaty a certain right of interference; in regard to Spain, Alexander had no rights save such as could be deduced from the principles accepted at Aix-la-Chapelle. Castlereagh was determined that the latter should not be perverted to that end. As regards Russian intervention in Spain he was successful, but against his wishes a Conference to consider the whole situation met at Troppau (October 20, 1820).

At Troppau the Czar met Metternich and made his complete renunciation. "To-day," he said, "I deplore all that I have said and done between the years 1814 and 1818." Once more the Muscovite leopard changed his skin. His surrender to Metternich was unconditional.

In the proceedings at Troppau, Great Britain took no formal part, though Lord Stewart, British Ambassador at Vienna, was present with a "watching brief." But the British policy as defined by Castlereagh was, from first to last, unequivocal and consistent. If Austrian interests were threatened by events in Italy, Austria might intervene to protect them, provided that "she engages in this undertaking with no views of aggrandisement," and that "her plans are limited to objects of self-defence."¹ But to anything in the nature of concerted action on the part of the Pentarchy Castlereagh was unalterably opposed. Not that he was in any sense a friend to revolution. His primary, if not his sole, consideration was the maintenance of the peace of Europe, and that peace was, in his judgment, less likely to be jeopardized by domestic revolution than by the armed intervention of the Great Powers. But the Holy

¹ Castlereagh to Stewart, September 16, 1820. *Castlereagh Correspondence*, xii, 811.

Allies went on their way unheeding ; and on November 19, 1820, the three Eastern Powers promulgated the Protocol of Troppau.

Protocol of
Troppau

This document contained a startling revelation of the fundamental doctrines of the Holy Alliance, according to the revised version.

“ States [it declared] which have undergone a change of government due to revolution, the result of which threatens other States, *ipso facto* cease to be members of the European Alliance, and remain excluded from it until their situation gives guarantee for legal order and stability. . . . If, owing to such alterations, immediate danger threatens other States, the Powers bind themselves by peaceful means, or, if need be, by arms, to bring back the guilty State into the bosom of the Great Alliance.”

This declaration contains, it will be observed, a naked avowal of the principle of intervention, sustained, of course, by the loftiest principles. There is to be a *tribunal*, else how can a State be adjudged “ guilty ” ? And the tribunal is to possess a sanction. Its decrees are to be enforced by European police. The Allies were straightforward and logical. They did not shrink from the consequences of their principles. They were under no illusion as to the sufficiency of “ moral ” sanctions, or the efficacy of an “ international public opinion.” They saw whither they were going.

So did Castlereagh. He admitted the *individual* right of Austria to interfere in Naples, but he denounced the principles enunciated at Troppau on the ground that they “ would inevitably sanction . . . a much more extensive interference in the internal transactions of States than can be reconcilable either with the general interest or with the efficient authority and dignity of independent Sovereigns.” ¹

But Castlereagh’s protest did not deter Metternich. Ferdinand of Naples was summoned to give an account, at the judgment-seat of the Holy Allies, of his dealings with his turbulent subjects. Sentence was duly delivered, and Austria, as the executive of the European police, was entrusted with the congenial task of restoring order in Southern Italy. Fifty thousand white-coats were marched into Naples ; stern

¹ Hertslet, *op. cit.*

vengeance was executed upon all who had taken part in the constitutional movement ; the principles of legitimacy were triumphantly asserted, and a régime was re-established in Naples, which was subsequently described by Mr. Gladstone as " an outrage upon religion, upon civilization, upon humanity and upon decency." Chastened and purified " the guilty State was brought back into the bosom of the Great Alliance."

These were the proceedings which evoked the famous protest from Lord Castlereagh formally repudiating the principles of the Holy Alliance, and defining with precision the attitude of his own country. " England," he wrote, " stands pledged to uphold the territorial arrangements established at the Congress of Vienna. . . . But with the internal affairs of each separate State we have nothing to do. We could neither share in nor approve, though we might not feel called upon to resist, the intervention of one ally to put down internal disturbances in the dominions of another. We have never committed ourselves to any such principle as that, and we must as a general rule protest against it."

" We might not feel called upon to resist." So Castle-
reagh ; but Castlereagh's race was nearly run, and worn out by the two-fold strain of responsibility for the peace of Europe and the leadership of the House of Commons, he died by his own hand on August 12, 1822. His successor, both at the Foreign Office and in the leadership of the House, was his old rival George Canning. That Canning adopted in their entirety the principles laid down by Castlereagh, was a truth inadequately acknowledged both at the time and afterwards. Lord Brougham was, indeed, big enough to do justice to an opponent ; Lord Wellesley also testified to Castlereagh's " spotless integrity . . . comprehensive and enlarged views . . . perfect discretion and temper in the conduct of the most arduous affairs." But the brutal shouts of a hostile mob desecrated the last solemn scene in Westminster Abbey, and impartial history has but lately begun to do tardy justice to the work of Castlereagh. One of the most brilliant of his successors at the Foreign Office has borne witness to " his courage, patience, and faultless sagacity," and has declared him to be " that rare phenomenon—a practical man of the highest order who yet did

Death of
Castlereagh

not by that fact forfeit his title to be considered a man of genius."

Lord Salisbury's eulogy was well deserved. For ten years Castlereagh played a foremost part in Continental affairs, and by his hand post-war Europe was largely shaped. He perceived that the supreme interest alike of England and of Europe lay in security and repose; he believed that these were likely to be endangered by the intervention of the Holy Allies in the domestic affairs of independent States, and that intervention he laboured to repel. He was only partially successful; but he maintained unimpaired the principle for which England stood, and the task of enforcing it he bequeathed to his successor.

At the moment when the reins passed from Castlereagh to Canning European statesmanship was confronted by four main problems.

Italy

In Italy, as we shall see presently,¹ there was almost continuous unrest, but Metternich and his Holy Allies were permitted to work their will from the Alps to the Straits of Messina, and not until 1848 was the *status quo* established at Vienna seriously disturbed.

Spain

While Austria found congenial occupation in Italy, France and Russia itched to go to the assistance of Bourbon absolutism in Spain. In no country in Europe had the shock of reaction after 1815 been felt so violently as in Spain. Ferdinand VII was of all the Spanish Bourbons perhaps the most contemptible: a miserable compound of bigotry, sensualism, superstition, and cruelty. None the less his restoration in 1814 to the throne of his father was hailed by the Spaniards with limitless enthusiasm. Ferdinand had hardly reached Madrid before he plunged into an "orgy of reaction." In 1812 the Cortes had drawn up a Constitution modelled upon the French Constitution of 1791, and based on the principle of the sovereignty of the people. The power of the Crown was reduced to a shadow, and the Legislature was to be supreme. But fantastic and extravagant as was the Constitution of 1812 it might have formed, in the hands of a strong and wise ruler, the starting-point of a constitutional régime. Ferdinand was neither strong

¹ *Infra*, c. vii.

nor wise. He revoked the Constitution, dissolved the Cortes, restored the Inquisition, recalled the Jesuits, reinstated the nobles with all their oppressive privileges, gagged the Press, let loose all the forces of disorder, and relentlessly persecuted all the adherents of the Bonapartist régime. For six years the royalist terror reigned supreme. But even for Spain the reaction was too violent. The provinces were soon honeycombed with secret societies, largely recruited from the army. Isolated insurrections were put down with barbarous cruelty, but in 1820 the flag of revolution was unfurled at Cadiz, and Ferdinand, as feeble as he was cruel, made abject surrender. The Constitution of 1812 was restored; a single Chamber Legislature was entrusted with supreme authority; the Executive was completely subordinated to it; the authority of the Crown was reduced to nullity; a Radical Ministry was installed in office; the Holy Office was once more suppressed; the religious houses were dissolved, and from the orgy of reaction Spain plunged with characteristic extravagance into an orgy of reform.

But in the years immediately succeeding Waterloo, no country could be permitted to regard itself as an isolated unit. The Holy Allies were watching closely the development of events in Spain, and with ever-deepening anxiety, as the revolutionary contagion spread to Portugal and Italy.

In 1807 the Portuguese royal family had transferred the ^{Portugal} seat of government to Brazil. After the restoration, the former regent, now John VI, declined to return to Europe. He appointed as regent Lord Beresford, the former commander of the English troops in Portugal, and proclaimed the union of the Portuguese dominions under the title of the "United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil, and the Algarves." Portugal was thus virtually reduced to a position of a dependency of Brazil. The position was not relished at Lisbon, where insurrection, stimulated by Spain, broke out (1820). The regent was deposed, and John VI was persuaded to return reluctantly to Europe. Dom Pedro, his son, was left as regent in Brazil, and was instructed, at all hazards, to preserve Brazil to the House of Braganza; "and in case of any unforeseen circumstances which should make the union of Portugal and Brazil impracticable . . . to place the crown upon his own head." The unforeseen happened.

The Brazilians, in 1822, declined to recognize the orders of the Cortes any longer, declared their country independent, and proclaimed Dom Pedro as Constitutional Emperor. In Portugal itself the political pendulum swung violently from side to side. In 1821 John VI complacently accepted a liberal Constitution. But in 1823, under pressure from Spain, from his Spanish Queen, and his second son Dom Miguel, the King, with equal complacency, accepted a reactionary Ministry.

Meanwhile, the Powers once more assembled in Congress at Vienna (September 1822), whence in October they adjourned to Verona. At Verona England was to have been represented by Castlereagh himself, but before the Congress met Castlereagh died. Fortunately, however, for his posthumous fame, he had drafted an elaborate memorandum which, after approval by the Cabinet, was to form his "instructions." That memorandum conclusively attests Castlereagh's sagacity, and the identity of his policy with that actually adopted by Canning. The main subject on the agenda of the Congress was the Eastern Question, lately reopened by the rising of the Greeks against the Turks. To that question we shall return.

For the moment it must suffice to say that the supreme object of England was to stop the isolated intervention of the Czar Alexander, and to prevent Russia from using the opportunity of the Greek insurrection to further her own traditional ambitions in the Balkan Peninsula. In the discussion on Italian affairs England was to take no part, lest by doing so she should appear to admit the justice of a proceeding against which from the outset she had protested.

Spain

More immediately important was the question of European intervention in the Iberian Peninsula. In reference to that question, Canning bluntly announced that "while England was no friend to revolution, she did emphatically insist on the right of nations to set up for themselves whatever form of government they thought best, and to be left free to manage their own affairs, so long as they left other nations to manage theirs." France, however, had already seized the excuse of an outbreak of yellow fever in Spain to mass an army of 100,000 men on the frontier for the purpose of establishing a *cordon sanitaire*. Canning's protest was too

late to stop the intervention of the French, who in April 1823 marched an army into Spain under the Duc d'Angoulême, and re-established the absolute authority of King Ferdinand. France remained in military occupation of Spain until 1827.

Powerless to avert the French occupation of old Spain, *New Spain* Canning was all the more determined to prevent the extension of French interference to new Spain.

To Wellington, who represented Great Britain at Verona, he wrote: "Every day convinces me more and more that, in the present state of the Peninsula, and in the present state of this country, the American questions are out of all proportion more important to us than the European; and that, if we do not seize and turn them to our advantage in time, we shall rue the loss of an opportunity never never to be recovered."¹ In this view Canning did but re-echo the opinion of his master, Pitt. So far back as 1790 Pitt had told Miranda that the emancipation of Spanish America was a matter which would infallibly engage the attention of every Minister in the country.² It engaged the attention of Canning from his first day at the Foreign Office until the final accomplishment of independence. Thus "the calling in the new world to redress the balance of the old" was neither a mere rhetorical ebullition, nor a sudden inspiration. It was a deliberate and essential part of his policy, long contemplated and tenaciously adhered to. As long ago as 1808, the separation of the Spanish colonies under British protection was an idea present to the minds both of Canning and Castlereagh.

For some years Spain had, indeed, experienced increasing difficulty in governing her American dependencies. In 1817 she had purchased peace with the United States by selling Florida to them for five million dollars. But the improvement thus effected in the general situation was merely temporary. Meanwhile, the trading interests of Great Britain suffered severely from the prevailing anarchy in South America. For outrages unnumbered upon British ships no redress could be obtained from Spain. In 1823 Canning appointed consuls to the Spanish colonies for the protection of British trade, and France was at the same time bluntly

¹ Bagot : *Canning and his Friends*, i, 258, 266.

² Col. E. M. Lloyd : *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, xviii, 2.

**The Monroe
Doctrine**

informed that though Spain might subdue her revolted colonies if she could, no other Power should do it for her. Finally on the 1st of January 1825, the Powers were informed that Great Britain had recognized the independence of Buenos Ayres, Colombia, and Mexico. The Powers protested, but nothing came of the protest; Canning held on his way, heedless of the Holy Allies, and found a powerful ally in the United States. On December 2, 1823, President Monroe had declared "that any interference on the part of the Great Powers of Europe for the purpose of oppressing or controlling the destiny of the Spanish American States, which had declared their independence, would be dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, and would be considered as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards them." Such was the origin of the famous "Monroe Doctrine." At the beginning of 1824 Canning wrote to Sir Charles Bagot: "I have very little doubt that the President was encouraged to make his declaration about the South American States by his knowledge of our sentiments. . . . The effect of the ultra-liberalism of our Yankee co-operators on the ultra-despotism of our Aix-la-Chapelle allies gives us just the balance that I wanted." Just a year afterwards he writes exultingly to another friend, Frere: "The thing is done . . . an act which will make a change in the face of the world almost as great as that of the discovery of the Continent now set free. The allies will fret; but they will venture no serious remonstrance. France will fidget; but it will be with a view of hastening after our example as regards South America." The action of Great Britain and the United States was decisive. By 1830 the Spanish Empire in South America had ceased to exist, and the following independent republics had come into being: Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia, Peru, Chili, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Rio de la Plata or Buenos Ayres.

Portugal

Not less prompt and decisive was Canning's action in regard to Portugal. There, as in Spain, the reactionary party, led by Dom Miguel, looked for support to France, the liberal party to Great Britain. At the request of the latter a British squadron was sent to the Tagus, "to confirm in the eyes of the Portuguese nation the strict intimacy

and goodwill subsisting between the two Crowns." This gave Dom Miguel an excuse, and early in 1824 he effected a *coup d'état*, and virtually superseded his father John VI. The latter escaped on board an English man-of-war, and managed to re-assert his authority. In 1825 Canning routed Dom Miguel and his French friends, and at the same time effected a final settlement of the long-standing difficulty between Portugal and Brazil. John VI was induced to recognize the independence of Brazil under the sovereignty of his son Dom Pedro, though retaining the imperial title for his lifetime. But in 1826 John VI died. Once more factions broke out in Portugal; Spain and France were keen to interfere on behalf of the reactionaries, but they were stopped by the prompt action of Canning, and, thanks to him, the liberal Constitution was saved.

The Holy Alliance could not survive the succession of shrewd blows directed against its policy by Canning. The Czar Alexander, the only begetter of the Alliance in its original form, had died in 1825. Metternich, who had "supplied the soul of the Alliance with a body," continued, indeed, to direct Austrian policy until 1848, with a success but little interrupted by the revolutions of 1830. But the ideals of the Czar had long since been dissipated, and to the *Realpolitik* of the Austrian statesman, Castlereagh and Canning had opposed an alternative, which not only enjoyed some measure of immediate success but ultimately achieved a complete triumph. The principles of Nationalism and Liberalism, though they suffered a temporary setback in the restorations of 1815, steadily gained ground. To those principles Great Britain adhered throughout; France espoused them after 1830; and from 1848 onwards their triumph was assured. Of the influence which these principles were already beginning to exert upon European affairs there is no better illustration than that afforded by the insurrection of the Greeks, and to that illuminating episode we now turn.

End of the
Holy
Alliance

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For the Greek Question see references to chapter iv.

CHAPTER IV

THE EASTERN QUESTION

THE GREEK WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

THE "*Eastern Question*" first came into common diplomatic usage about the time of the Greek insurrection; and not until then did Europe at large become aware of the problems covered by the phrase. Yet a problem, and an exceedingly obstinate problem, had existed ever since, in the middle of the fourteenth century, the Ottoman Turks had set foot on the European shore of the Bosphorus.

Alien from the European family alike in creed, in race, and in political instinct, the Turk remained encamped upon European soil for nearly six hundred years. His occupation was not political or economic or religious; it was purely military. He conquered the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula, Serbs, Bulgars, Greeks, and Roumans, but he never absorbed them; nor did he permit them to absorb him. This feature differentiates the Ottoman Conquest from most others of which Europe has had experience. As a result of that conquest the Balkan kingdoms were destroyed, and the Balkan peoples were politically buried beneath the superincumbent mass of Ottoman Turks. But notwithstanding the incubus, the peoples survived, and in the nineteenth century they re-emerged, and, one after another, re-established independent kingdoms.

The first of the peoples to re-emerge were the Serbians. In 1804 they raised the standard of revolt, and waged with gallantry an intermittent struggle, until in 1817 they obtained substantial concessions from the Turks. The sove-

reignty of the Sultan was to remain unimpaired, but the Serbians were to enjoy a measure of local autonomy under an hereditary prince of the native Obrenovitch house.

The Russian
factor

Milosh Obrenovitch, the hereditary prince, belonged to the party in Serbia which looked for sympathy and assistance to Russia. Russia was, in general, only too anxious to assist the Slav peoples of the peninsula. Connected with many of them by ties not merely of religion but of race, she stood forth as the champion of the Slav nationality, as well as the protector of the Orthodox Church. She posed, indeed, as the legitimate heir to the Byzantine Empire. Yet Constantinople is for Russia more than *the* Imperial city. It is the sentinel and custodian of the narrow straits. In Turkish hands it blocks the access of Russia to European waters. Russian ambitions accordingly began to turn towards the command of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

The Treaty
of Kainardji,
1774

Her first task, however, was to get on to the Black Sea ; her second to get out of it. The former task was definitely achieved by Catherine II. By the Treaty of Kainardji (1774) she acquired Azov, Jenikale, and Kertsch, with the districts adjacent thereto ; also Kinburn at the mouth of the Dnieper ; and the two Kabardas. Russia thus obtained a firm grip upon the northern shores of the Black Sea, and the control of the straits between the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea, while the possession of the two Kabardas gave her a footing on the eastern shore. The Tartars east of the Bug were at the same time declared independent of the Porte, except in ecclesiastical matters. Thus Turkish territory, instead of encircling the Black Sea, was thenceforward bounded on the north-east by the river Bug.

To develop her trade, Russia was to be allowed to establish consuls and vice-consuls wherever she might think fit, and her nationals were to trade with Turkey on the basis of the most favoured nations ; she was also to have the right of free commercial navigation in the Black Sea, instead of sending her merchandise in Turkish vessels ; and was to be allowed to establish a permanent embassy at Constantinople. The Porte agreed to protect the Christian religion and its churches, to allow pilgrimages to Jerusalem and other Holy Places, and to take into friendly consideration any repre-

sentations made by Russia on behalf of the Orthodox Church at Constantinople and its ministers. Finally, Moldavia and Wallachia and other Turkish provinces, lately occupied by Russia, were restored to the Porte, only on condition of better government in general and specific concessions in regard to taxes and religion.

The Treaty of Kainardji may be regarded as the starting-point of Russian progress in South-eastern Europe. In 1783 Catherine annexed, and then fortified, the Crimea, and in 1792, by the Treaty of Jassy, advanced her frontier to the Dniester, thus obtaining the important fortress of Oczakov.

The progress of Russia during the reign of Catherine was remarkable. To her policy the Czar Alexander I reverted. His plan was to break up European Turkey into a number of small States, which were then to be united in a federation under the hegemony of Russia. Austria was to be bought off, if necessary, by the acquisition of Wallachia, Turkish Croatia, part of Bosnia, Belgrade, and Ragusa; Russia's share was to include Moldavia, Cattaro, Corfu, and above all Constantinople with the command of the Straits.

These grandiose schemes were not destined to realization, but schemes hardly less attractive to the Czar were dangled before his eyes by Napoleon at Tilsit.

The idea of Eastern conquests had long fascinated the mind of Napoleon. At the outset of his career he had formed the conviction that the key to the conquest of England—always his supreme object—was to be found in Egypt. The acquisition of the Ionian Isles in 1797 was a first step to this end. But had Egypt been held by him, it would have supplied only the base for an attack upon British India. The same idea inspired his negotiations with the Czar at Tilsit. Impregnable at sea, England must be attacked by land. Russia might help him to Constantinople; Persia should afford a free passage to a French army and join in the attack upon British power in Asia.¹

Little came of the ambitious projects adumbrated at Tilsit. The friendship between Napoleon and Alexander could not stand the strain of the Continental system; Trafalgar

* ¹ Driault : *La Politique Orientale de Napoléon*.

was the prelude to Waterloo, and Waterloo finally dissipated the dreams of Napoleon.

Alexander's dreams were of more substantial stuff, and after Napoleon's fall, the threads of Russian policy in the Near East were quickly picked up again.

The Greek
rising

Nevertheless, the insurrection of the Greeks in 1821 opened a new phase in the development of the Eastern Question, and announced to Europe the fermentation of a new principle destined for a full century to exercise a profound influence upon politics.

Causes of
Greek
revival

In the spring of 1821 the European diplomatists were in session at Laibach, deep in discussion as to the best means of combating the spirit of revolution, which, as already indicated, had lately shown itself in Spain, Portugal, and Southern Italy. The news of the Greek rising came to them as a bolt from the blue. Yet sudden as it appeared in the eyes of Europe, the motive forces behind the Greek rising had long been operating. Suppressed though the Greeks had been by the conquering Ottomans, they were not destroyed; individual Greeks were largely employed by the Turks to carry on the despised work of civil administration, and among the Greeks as a whole the tradition of national greatness survived. The persistence of the Greek language, the memories of Hellenic culture, and the devoted labours of the parish priests all contributed to that survival. The evident decay of Ottoman power, while it accentuated the sufferings of the conquered peoples, revived dormant memories. The Greek mariners had always been conspicuous for courage and efficiency, the Turkish fleet was largely manned by Greeks; in the eighteenth century the joint-stock principle developed rapidly among the Greek merchants who amassed great wealth; a taste for classical literature revived; and the Greek language, thanks largely to the work of Adamantios Koraes, regained something of its primitive purity.

To the Greek revival the French Revolution also contributed. Ideas of liberty and nationality began to penetrate the Balkans. Dormant memories of sometime greatness began to stir both Slavs and Greeks. Secret societies multiplied. Of these the most famous was the *Philiké Hetaireia* ("Association of Friends"). Founded at Odessa by

four Greek merchants, this society had, by 1820, enrolled 200,000 members. It aimed at the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, and the re-establishment of the Greek Empire, and, however questionable its methods, it undoubtedly gave coherence and unity to the nationalist movement among the Greeks.

In 1821 Prince Alexander Hypsilanti placed himself at the head of this movement, and in March of that year unfurled in Moldavia the flag of Greek independence. Hypsilanti was the son of a Phanariot Greek, successively Hospodar of Moldavia and Wallachia, and was himself the aide-de-camp of Capo d'Istria, the Foreign Minister of the Czar. The choice of Moldavia for the initial rising was therefore natural, though it proved unfortunate. The Roumanians detested the Phanariot Greeks, and the assistance expected from the Czar was not forthcoming.

Alexander found himself, indeed, in a position of singular embarrassment. Nemesis had long lain in wait for that double-minded man; a decision could no longer be evaded. As protector of the Greek Church, as the champion of oppressed nationalities, as the traditional friend of Turkey's enemies, he was naturally impelled to interference on behalf of the Greeks. As the founder of the Holy Alliance, as a signatory of the Troppau Protocol, as the partner if not the slave of Metternich, he was the sworn foe of the revolutionary principle wherever it might manifest itself. Yet Russia had her own quarrel with the Turk, and the Greek insurrection might well facilitate the achievement of Russia's ambition.

All doubts as to the attitude of the Czar were, however, quickly dispelled. He disavowed all sympathy with Hypsilanti, ordered him to return immediately to Russia, and bade the rebels to make their submission to the Sultan, on pain of incurring the displeasure of the Czar. The attitude of Alexander decided the fate of Hypsilanti and the rising which he had led in the Principalities. The leader proved himself to be a compound of vanity and incompetence, and his force was heavily defeated by the Turks at Dragashan in Wallachia (June 19, 1821). Hypsilanti escaped into Hungary, where he was interned by the orders of Metternich, and remained a prisoner until his death in 1828. The remnant of his force, after a brief but heroic

Russia and
the Greek
revolt

resistance at Skaleni, was overwhelmed by the Turks. The Moldavian insurrection was at an end. An enterprise unwisely conceived, unskillfully led, and clumsily executed, proved to be a mere flash in the pan.

The Morea

Not so the rising in the Greek islands and in the Morea. There, also, were bitter internal feuds; nor did any revolutionary movement ever display a more confused and perplexing medley of brutality and nobility, of conspicuous heroism and consummate cowardice, of pure-minded patriotism and sordid ambition, of self-sacrificing loyalty and time-serving treachery. Nevertheless, the Greek War of Independence contributes an important chapter to the history of Europe in the nineteenth century. Avowedly a war for an idea based on the principles of liberty and nationality, it evoked enthusiastic support in Western Europe, especially in Great Britain and France. Moreover, it revealed a latent rivalry, not to say an antagonism, between England and Russia in regard to the Near East.

This rivalry, though a secondary issue in the crisis of 1821-9, supplies the keynote to the next phase in the development of the Eastern Question. The rise of the Ottoman Empire; its rapid decay and the problems raised by that decay; the struggle between the Hapsburg Empire and the Turks; between the Turks and Russia; the resurgence of the Balkan nationalities—each of these factors had contributed in successive periods to that “shifting, intractable and interwoven tangle . . . that is veiled,” as Lord Morley said, “under the easy name of the Eastern Question.” We are now about to be confronted by yet another factor—the rivalry of Great Britain and Russia.

England and Russia

The younger Pitt was the first English statesman to appreciate the truth that England was vitally concerned in Near Eastern affairs. He was the first to perceive that her interests might be jeopardized by the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, and by the access of Russia to Constantinople. But Pitt was practically alone in his prescience. Hardly a voice was raised in support of his proposed naval demonstration in the Near East (1790). But much had happened in the intervening years. Castlereagh and Canning could act effectively where Pitt could not. Both statesmen were friendly to the Greeks, but the supreme object of both

was to induce the Porte to agree with her Greek adversary quickly, lest the Czar Alexander should get the opportunity of fishing in troubled waters. Canning's fear was, indeed, that Russia would "gobble Greece at one mouthful and Turkey at the next." From first to last his policy was designed to avert both operations.

Meanwhile, war was being waged on both sides with terrible ferocity, though with indecisive results. In the Morea it was literally a war of extermination. "The Turk," sang the Moreots, "shall live no longer, neither in the Morea nor in the whole earth." The threat was almost literally fulfilled in the Morea, where out of 25,000 Ottomans hardly one was permitted to survive outside the walled towns, in which all the Moslems, who escaped the general massacre, sought refuge. By the end of May the Turkish domination in the Morea was at an end. From the Morea the insurrection spread to continental Greece and to the islands.

The Greek
War of
Independence,
1821-4

The massacre of the Moslems in the Morea was followed by Turkish reprisals elsewhere. The murder of the Patriarch Gregorius at dawn on Easter-day (April 22, 1821) was the prelude to a wholesale massacre of Christians in Thessaly, Macedonia, and Asia Minor. All Christendom was deeply stirred by these events. Metternich, it is true, regarded the Greeks merely as rebels, and would have left them to their deserved fate. The Czar Alexander, though equally opposed to revolution, could not look on unmoved. Moreover, he had his own quarrel with the Sultan. In July 1821 he sent an ultimatum to the Porte, and war seemed imminent. But Metternich was as anxious as Castlereagh to avert a general conflagration; the Sultan was induced to evacuate the Principalities; Alexander stayed his hand, and for the moment the struggle was localized.

Not, however, for long. In April 1822 Christendom was again shocked by Turkish atrocities in Chios. The whole population was put to the sword, save some thousands of young girls who were carried off into slavery. The Greek navy, however, quickly reasserted its supremacy in the Levant, and not only cleared it of Turkish ships but inflicted great damage upon the commerce of neutrals. In January 1822 the Greeks had declared their independence and promulgated a Constitution. But the Powers hesitated to

recognize them as belligerents. Consequently, no redress could be obtained from Constantinople, nor could it be sought from the provisional government in the Morea. To Great Britain and other maritimes the situation became increasingly inconvenient. Moreover, the tide of Philhellenist sentiment was rising rapidly. Byron, the most impassioned advocate of the Greek cause, landed at Missolonghi in January 1824.

Things had not of late been going too well for the insurgents, though they had just managed to hold their own. In January 1824, however, the Sultan Mahmud summoned to his aid his powerful vassal Mehemet Ali, the Pasha of Egypt. Ibrahim, his son, sailed at the head of a great expedition from Alexandria, conquered and devastated Crete, (April 1824), and in February 1825 landed in the Morea. Having secured Navarino as his base, Ibrahim advanced through the Morea "harrying, devastating, and slaughtering in all directions." He joined hands with a powerful Turkish force under Reschid Pasha and invested Missolonghi. The Greek cause was well-nigh desperate. Nothing, it seemed, short of European intervention, could save it.

Nicholas I

Towards intervention events were moving. In December 1825 the Czar Alexander died in the Crimea. His successor Nicholas I was a man of very different temper and training. Of Alexander's idealism, of his mysticism, of his veneer of Western culture Nicholas had none; he was a Muscovite to the core. For the Greeks he cared little; but he was not disposed to let the Turkish Sultan play fast and loose with Russia.

The Protocol
of St.
Petersburg

On the accession of the new Czar, Canning entrusted the Duke of Wellington with a special mission to Petersburg, and in April 1826 an agreement between Great Britain and Russia was reached in the Protocol of Petersburg. The two Powers, while renouncing any exclusive advantages for themselves, were to offer their joint mediation to the Porte; Greece though continuing to pay tribute to the Sultan was to become virtually independent. Meanwhile (March 1825), the Czar Nicholas had already despatched an ultimatum to the Sultan, who, after delaying until the last hour, accepted it on October 7, when the Convention of Ackerman was signed. The Sultan agreed to evacuate the Principalities, to make large concessions to Serbia, and in all things to submit to the will of the Czar.

Nothing was said, however, as to Greece. The Sultan, ^{The Powers and Turkey} in the full tide of triumphant barbarity, showed no signs of accepting any mediation unless backed by force. By the Treaty of London (July 1827), Great Britain, Russia, and France agreed, if the Porte refused an immediate armistice, to apply force. The Greeks were at their last gasp. Missolonghi, after an heroic defence, had been starved out (April 1826), and in June 1827 Athens, despite the help given to the Greeks by Lord Cochrane, General Church, and others, was compelled to surrender. Ibrahim, master of the Morea, was credited with the intention of transporting those who had survived his barbarities to Asia or Africa, and repopling the country with submissive fellaheen. True or false, the rumour sent a thrill of horror through Europe and hastened the halting paces of diplomacy. But how was mediation to be "enforced" without recourse to war?

In August the mediation of the three signatories to the Treaty of London was accepted by the Greeks, and refused by the Porte. Large reinforcements had, meanwhile, reached Ibrahim from Egypt, and a large squadron of Turkish and Egyptian ships was lying in Navarino Bay. ^{Navarino}

Admiral Codrington, who commanded the British fleet in the Levant, had received instructions (conformably with the Treaty of London) to "intercept all ships freighted with men or arms destined to act against the Greeks," without "degenerating into hostilities." Being a sailor and not a politician he found his instructions difficult to interpret. Was he to use force or not? Stratford Canning, who in December 1825 had been appointed by his cousin to the Embassy at Constantinople, hastened to reassure Codrington. Ibrahim was informed by the English and French admirals that not a single ship would be allowed to leave the harbour of Navarino. Foiled in an attempt to evade these orders, Ibrahim proceeded, almost under the eyes of the allied admirals, to wreak his vengeance upon the wretched survivors in the Morea. The admirals remonstrated with Ibrahim. The Turks were foolish enough to fire on a boat from the British flagship *Dartmouth*: *Dartmouth* and the French flagship replied; the battle became general, and before the sun went down on October 20, all the Turko-Egyptian ships "had disappeared, the Bay of Navarino was covered with their wrecks."

The sailors had cut the Gordian knot, but they got no thanks from the politicians. Canning had died (August 8) before Navarino was fought, and Wellington who, after a short interval succeeded him, expressed regret for the "untoward event" of Navarino. Such language could have but one result. The Turk was encouraged, in defiance of Russia, to proceed on his course with Greece; consequently in April 1828 the Czar Nicholas declared war. In May he crossed the Pruth, occupied the Principalities, and the Russian fleet entered the Dardanelles.

All the fruits of the patient and skilful diplomacy of Castlereagh and Canning were thus dissipated. The object of their policy was, as we have seen, to help Greece to independence, without helping Russia's progress towards Constantinople. The Greeks now lay at the mercy of the Sultan, and the independence of Turkey was threatened by the Czar. The Turks, however, not for the first nor the last time, proved tougher antagonists than the Czar had reckoned for, and it was not until August 1829 that the Russians reached Adrianople. A month later, Peace was signed.

Meanwhile, England and France, unwilling to see Russia arbiter of the Near East, successfully negotiated with Mehemet and Ibrahim for the withdrawal of the Egyptian forces from the Morea. After their evacuation the fortresses were occupied by the French, and by the terms of the Protocols signed in London (November 1828 and March 1829), the Morea and the Greek islands were placed under the protection of the Powers; Greece was to be an autonomous but tributary State under a Prince selected by the Powers, and the frontiers of the new State were defined.

By the Treaty of Adrianople the Porte confirmed these arrangements, thus virtually acknowledging the independence of Greece. Practical autonomy was conceded to the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia under Russian protection; Russian traders in Turkey were to be under the exclusive jurisdiction of their own consuls; all neutral vessels were to have free navigation in the Black Sea and on the Danube, and, though Russia restored all her conquests except the "Great Islands" of the Danube, her title to Georgia and the other provinces of the Caucasus was acknowledged by the Sultan.

Treaty of
Adrianople,
September
14, 1829

The three Protecting Powers subsequently decided that Greece should be an independent and monarchical State under their joint guarantee, and eventually, after refusals from Prince John of Saxony and Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg (who preferred Belgium), procured for the new kingdom a "constitutional" monarch in the person of Prince Otto of Bavaria. Capo d'Istria who, in March 1827, had been recalled from voluntary exile in Switzerland to become President of the Greek State, was assassinated in 1831, and on January 25, 1833, the Bavarian princeling ascended the Greek throne.

The field was limited, but the choice of Otto proved far from happy. The task committed to him would have tried the skill of the most accomplished and experienced statesman. Otto was a lad of seventeen, of indifferent natural capacity, devoid of any special aptitude for government, and entirely ignorant of the country and people whose fortunes were committed to his charge.

Manifold difficulties confronted him at the outset of his reign, and most of them dogged his footsteps until its inglorious ending. His tender years necessitated a Regency, which was committed, perhaps inevitably, to Bavarians, and by Bavarians he was surrounded for the first ten years of his reign.

A second difficulty arose from the niggardly and stupid fashion in which the northern frontiers were defined by the Treaty of London (1832). The line was drawn from the Gulf of Arta on the west to the Gulf of Volo on the east. Beyond that line, in Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia, were a large number of Greeks who, ardently desiring reunion with their brethren in the kingdom, were still subject to the rule of the Sultan. Yet for half a century nothing whatever was done by the Powers to remedy the sense of wrong which poisoned the minds of patriotic Greeks on both sides of the purely artificial frontier.

In 1837 King Otto came of age, and immediately assumed the reins of power. The hope was entertained that he might then prove to his people that the blunders which had thus far characterized his reign were those of his Bavarian Ministers, not his own. They were; but unfortunately his own were worse. The evils of the Regency were if anything

The
Kingdom
of Greece

The
Bavarian
Regency

The In-
surrection
of 1843

accentuated, and early in 1848 armed insurrection in epidemic form broke out in many parts of the country. But, though armed, the insurrection of 1848 was bloodless. King Otto yielded at once to the demands of the insurgents, dismissed his Bavarian Ministers, and agreed to accept a democratic constitution, with a bi-cameral legislature and a responsible executive.¹

The
Constitution
of 1844

The concession was a popular one ; and, although it soon became evident that constitutional reform would not provide a permanent solution of the many difficulties by which King Otto was confronted, the experiment thus initiated lasted for nearly twenty years ; but by the year 1862 the patience of the Greeks was worn out, and they determined to get rid of their Bavarian king.

In February 1862 a military revolt broke out at Nauplia ; the insurrection spread rapidly ; the King and Queen found themselves excluded from their own capital ; in October 1862 they embarked on an English gunboat, and from the Bay of Salamis the King issued a proclamation announcing that he had quitted Greece for a time in order to avoid plunging the country in civil war. He never returned,² and the Greek people proceeded to the election of a successor.

The protecting Powers acknowledged the right of the Greeks to decide the matter for themselves, but reiterated their resolution not to permit any member belonging to the reigning house of any of the great European Powers to accept the throne.

Search for
a new king

The Greeks, however, were perversely determined and elected Prince Alfred, the second son of Queen Victoria. Prince Alfred, despite the warning of the Powers that he was disqualified, was accordingly proclaimed King by the National Assembly (February 3, 1863). Nevertheless, the Powers adhered to their resolution,³ and England was entrusted with the invidious task of providing the Greeks with a "constitutional" King. For some months the crown was hawked round the minor Courts of Europe. Ultimately,

¹ The text of this constitution, together with a detailed account of the revolution, will be found in *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1848-4, vol. xxxii, pp. 938 seq.

² Otto died in Germany in 1867.

³ Cf. Joint Note of December 15, 1862 (*State Papers*, vol. lviii, p. 1107), and translation ap. Hertslet, vol. iii, p. 2073.

however, Great Britain secured for the Greeks the services of Prince William George of Denmark, who, in 1863, ascended the throne as King George I.

In order to complete the story of the birth of the Hellenic kingdom it has been necessary to anticipate the chronological sequence of events. We must return to Western Europe.

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CHAPTER V

RESTORATION, REACTION, AND REVOLUTION
(1815-39)

FRANCE. BELGIUM

Constitu-
tional Ex-
periments in
France

BETWEEN 1814 and 1848 most of the countries of Continental Europe witnessed a series of changes so monotonous in sequence as almost to establish a constitutional cycle. Monarchical restorations, acclaimed with general enthusiasm, were quickly followed by orgies of reaction ; reaction issued in more or less violent revolution ; revolutions invariably resulted in the re-establishment of autocracy.

This monotonous progression has already been briefly noted in Southern Europe. But it is illustrated on the most conspicuous scale in France. Moreover, it was France which in each case gave the signal to its neighbours. It is in France, therefore, that the constitutional cycle may best be studied.

Between the fall of Napoleon and the close of the century, France tried no fewer than five constitutional experiments : (i) for fifteen years (1815-30) she attempted to combine the principles of "legitimacy" and "constitutional monarchy" under two kings of the older line of the Bourbons. The folly of Charles X brought this experiment to an end and precipitated the Revolution of July. (ii) For eighteen years (1830-48) Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans, attempted to reign as a "citizen king" and to reconcile all parties in France under the ægis of a "constitutional" monarchy and a genuine parliamentary régime. But the younger line of the Bourbons succeeded no better than the elder. France understands monarchy, and understands a republic, but has no taste for the illogical compromise which has worked so successfully in Great Britain ; yet the collapse of the Orleans monarchy

was due less to political ineptitude than to economic discontent. Thus the experiment over which Louis Philippe presided issued in the Revolution of 1848. (iii) The Second Republic (1848-52) was even more short-lived than the first, and like the first ended in the establishment of a Napoleonic Empire. (iv) The Second Empire (1852-70) after a brilliant opening, was fatally weakened by the ambitious and self-contradictory enterprises of Napoleon III, and despite an attempt to "liberalize" the Imperial Constitution, collapsed under the shock of military disaster. (v) The Third Republic (1870-), established on the ruins of the Second Empire, has already outlived in duration, and perhaps exceeded in popularity, any of the experiments tried in France since the fall of the old régime in 1792.

The restoration of the Bourbons represented neither the expressed will of France, nor the unanimous resolution of the allies. On the contrary, there had been a great divergence of opinion among the allied Powers. Austria, almost up to the last moment, had hoped that the throne of France might be retained by Napoleon, if only to avoid the humiliation of his Austrian consort. Castlereagh was in favour of "signing a peace with Bonaparte, provided no act of the French nation speedily overthrew him." The Czar, on the other hand, could not forgive the invasion of Russia, and originally favoured the candidature of Bernadotte, the French peasant, who had become a Marshal of France and Crown Prince of Sweden. It was Talleyrand who, with consummate adroitness, persuaded the allies that their own safety and the tranquillity of Europe, not to mention the security of France, all depended on the acceptance of the principle of "legitimacy," and the consequent restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in the person of Louis XVIII. "The legitimacy of kings," he said, "or rather of governments, is the safeguard of nations." As far as the immediate situation in France was concerned "a government 'imposed' would be weak. With a principle we are strong. Louis XVIII is a principle. He is legitimate King of France."¹

The principle was accepted by the allies and by France. A Provisional Government was set up with Talleyrand at its head. The Senate declared Napoleon deposed (April 1);

¹ *Memoirs*, ii, 160, 165.

on the 6th it issued a constitution, and recalled the Bourbons. On the same day Napoleon abdicated for himself and his family. The Count of Artois returned on April 12, and assumed the title of *lieutenant du royaume*. On the 25th Louis XVIII himself landed at Calais, after an absence from France of twenty-three years, and on May 4 made his entry into Paris.

Louis XVIII Despite the fact that the allies were in occupation of the country, the first restoration might plausibly be represented as the spontaneous act of the French people. A man of fifty-nine, the restored King was corpulent and gouty, and his inability to sit a horse detracted somewhat from his impressiveness as a ceremonial monarch. Intellectually and by character, however, he was well qualified to preside over a restoration. Endowed with much more common sense than either of his brothers (Louis XVI and the Count of Artois), he realized from the outset the impossibility of reviving the pre-revolutionary régime. His own earnest wish was for settlement and reconciliation. "The system which I have adopted," so he wrote in 1818, "and that which my Ministers are perseveringly pursuing, is based upon the maxim that it will never do to be the King of two peoples; and to their ultimate fusion—for their distinction is only too real—all the efforts of my Government are directed." He talked indeed of "linking again the chain of tradition which had been broken during a period of nefarious crimes," and, following the example of Charles II of England, he made 1814 not the first but the nineteenth year of his reign. But he frankly accepted the social work of the Revolution, and issued (June 4, 1814) a *Charter* of an exceedingly liberal character. The terms of the Charter were elaborate.

The
Charter

A preamble to this document indicated the temper in which it had been drafted. "It is our duty," it ran, "according to the example of the kings our predecessors, to appreciate the results of the constantly increasing progress of enlightenment, the new relations that this progress has introduced into society, the direction impressed upon opinion for half a century, and the important alterations which have ensued; we have recognized that the wish of our subjects for a constitutional Charter was the expression of

a real need, but in yielding to this wish we have taken every precaution that this Charter should be worthy of us and of the people whom we are proud to rule."

At the head of the State stood the King inviolable in person. In him was vested the power of making all appointments, issuing ordinances, declaring war, concluding treaties of peace, alliance, and commerce, of commanding the army and navy, and of initiating and sanctioning laws. There were to be two legislative chambers : a Chamber of Peers, consisting of an unlimited number of members nominated by the King either as hereditary members or for life ; and a Chamber of Deputies. The former was to sit in secret, and besides its legislative functions, shared with the King and the Chamber of Deputies, was to act as a High Court of Justice, and in particular to try impeachments preferred against Ministers by the Lower House. The latter was to consist of persons who paid not less than 1000 francs a year in direct taxation elected in the departments by persons paying 300 francs in direct taxation. It was to be elected for five years, but one-fifth of its members were to retire annually. The Chambers were to meet each year, and, though the initiative of legislation was reserved to the Crown, either Chamber might petition the King to introduce legislation on a particular subject. The Napoleonic nobility was to be confirmed in its titles and placed on a legal equality with the old noblesse. The Roman Catholic Church was to be established, but all religious bodies were to enjoy complete toleration. For the rest, the Charter specifically enumerated the civil rights enjoyed by French citizens under the successive constitutions of the revolutionary and Napoleonic régimes ; the liberty of the Press was guaranteed, trial by jury retained, and the eligibility of all citizens for employment under the State was to form part of the public law of France.¹ "The Charter," said Chateaubriand, "is . . . a treaty of peace between the two parties into which France has been divided, a treaty by which both parties yield some of their pretensions in order to work together for the glory of their country."¹

¹ The complete text of the Charter was published in the *Moniteur*, Juin 5 (British and Foreign State Papers, 1812-14, ii, 960) ; and will also be found in Lamartine : *Hist. de la Restauration*, ii, 310-19, and in Hélie : *Les Constitutions*, pp. 884-90.

A treaty of peace the Charter might well have been ; it might have afforded the basis of a permanent settlement, could Louis XVIII have controlled the situation. But he could not. Politically a moderate, a Voltairian in philosophy, a man of sound common sense, the King was too easy-going and complaisant, and allowed power to drift into the hands of the returned *émigrés*, the "ultras" among the clergy, and above all his own brother the Count of Artois—reactionary fanatics who were determined to wipe out every trace of the work of the last twenty-five years. They urged upon Louis XVIII schemes that were little short of insanity : to revoke the Charter ; to restore the *Parlements*—of all the institutions of the *Ancien Régime* the most reactionary and obstructive ; to send to execution all the deputies who had voted for the death of Louis XVI, and to deport all who had held office under the republican and Napoleonic régimes.

The
Napoleonic
interlude

To such extreme counsels Louis XVIII turned a deaf ear ; the "ultras" made no secret of their ambitions, and their mere presence at Court inspired mistrust and suspicion among all classes in France. Two classes in particular—on whose support Napoleon had mainly relied—were quickly alienated from the restored monarchy : Louis XVIII failed to convince the peasants that they were secure in possession of their land, and he failed to win the affection of the army. Wellington warned his Government of the danger threatening the monarchy. "A King of France," he wrote, "is no King without the army." The accuracy of his observation was, as we have seen, demonstrated as soon as Napoleon, having escaped from Elba, landed on French soil.

Napoleon's triumphant march towards Paris has already been described. On March 10 he reached Lyons and resumed the rank and functions of Emperor. On the 13th the Chambers reassembled, and on the 16th Louis XVIII visited the Chambers and addressed to them a speech from the throne. He declared that he had reconciled his country with foreign Powers and had given her peace. Napoleon had returned to light the torch of civil war, bringing with him the scourge of foreign war ; to place the country once more under his iron yoke ; to destroy the constitutional Charter "that I have given you, that is my first claim on the regard

of posterity, the Charter that is dear to the heart of every Frenchman and that I swear here and now to maintain."

The issue was, however, already decided. On the 19th the King fled to the frontier and made his way to Ghent. On the 20th Napoleon entered Paris.

With the episode of the Hundred Days we have already dealt.

When that episode was closed by the great victory at Waterloo, the victor restored Louis XVIII for the second time to his throne. In 1814 the Bourbons were, in a sense, recalled by France. The second restoration was the work of Wellington, carried through with the assistance of Talleyrand and Fouché. To admit to office Fouché, regicide, terrorist, almost unique in villainy and treachery, was a sufficient humiliation for the restored Bourbon; but Wellington insisted on his employment as a grim necessity, and Louis XVIII was fain to assent. But though the King might accept advice which he was not in a position to refuse, the Royalists returned in an uncompromising temper, determined to erase from the pages of French history the last twenty-five years, and to exact retribution from those who had dared to write them.

Hardly had the news of Waterloo reached France before the "ultras" began to give rein to their passions. At Marseilles, a Royalist mob attacked the Bonapartists and killed about a score. At Nismes, the Catholics attacked the Protestants, and disturbances also occurred at Avignon and Toulouse. The outrages and murders, though on a scale which would have been deemed contemptible by the "Terrorists" of the Revolution, were sufficiently alarming to earn for the movement the name of the "White Terror," and, lacking a military force of its own, the Government was compelled to accept the aid of Austrian troops to restore order.

While the south was intimidated by the "White Terror" and the north-east was occupied by the allied armies, the elections for the Chamber took place (August). The result was an overwhelming victory for the Royalists, and in September Fouché and Talleyrand were dismissed. The head of the new Ministry was the Duc de Richelieu, an *émigré* who had taken refuge in Russia, had distinguished

himself as a soldier under Suvaroff and had shown administrative ability as governor of the Crimea. Richelieu, though an aristocrat, was not an "ultra," he had never borne arms against France, and quickly proved himself to be a patriot of high character and eminent ability. His principal lieutenant was Decazes, a young prefect of police, already marked out as a man of energy and ability, and destined to prove himself an enlightened and broadminded statesman.

The
Chambre
Introuvable,
1815-16

The Chambers met on October 7, and promptly showed themselves "more royalist than the King." The King, his Minister, and the Chamber of Peers, all favoured a policy of moderation and conciliation. The Lower Chamber, composed mainly of country gentlemen, followed the Count of Artois in a vociferous demand for vengeance upon their enemies. The Government proposed a limited amnesty; the Chamber demanded wholesale proscription. In the event Marshal Ney, "the bravest of the brave," and one of the most popular heroes of Napoleonic France, was, after trial by his peers, shot as a traitor; some 7000 Bonapartists were imprisoned or exiled to Cayenne, a few persons were executed, and many more were dismissed from the posts they had filled under the Republic, Consulate, and Empire. To the Church were restored some of its powers, such as the control of marriage, and some of its revenue, but the Church lands were retained by the State as security for loans. Could the Chamber have had its way restitution would have been on a much ampler scale. Fierce struggles also took place between the Government and the Chamber over the Budget, and over a new Electoral Law, but, with the help of the Chamber of Peers, the Government was able to defeat the "ultras," and in September 1816 dissolved the Chamber.

The elections proved that the Government had the support of the higher *bourgeoisie* to whom the franchise was in fact confined. The "ultras" accordingly attempted, in the new Chamber, to counteract their influence by the enfranchisement of the peasants, but the Government adhered to their own scheme of electoral reform, and the parliamentary institutions of France were thus, in 1817, securely based on a foundation which, though not democratic, was far from reactionary.

The Congress
of Aix-la-
Chapelle

The main achievement of the Richelieu Ministry was,

however, the reorganization of French finance, and the restoration of public credit. That restoration enabled Richelieu to face the allies with confidence at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. The Second Treaty of Paris had provided that the military occupation of France might cease at the end of three years if the allies approved. For this purpose the "allies" meant Wellington; the Duke advised that the period of occupation might without danger to the peace of Europe or France be terminated at once. The allies agreed; France, with the help given by the great houses of Baring and Hope, made satisfactory arrangements for the payment of the outstanding claims of the allies, and by the end of the year 1818 the soil of France was entirely free of foreign soldiery. At the same time the allies agreed to admit France again to the polity of Europe. The Quadruple Alliance of 1815 was thus converted into the "Moral Pentarchy" of 1818. The great war was indeed ended; peace was restored to Europe and to France.

Historical critics have, as already indicated, censured severely the diplomatists who were charged with the resettlement of Europe after the Napoleonic wars. Those who have had experience of the long-drawn-out peace settlement of 1918-23 will be slow to cast a stone at the expert diplomatists of the earlier period, at the Castlereaghs and Wellingtons, the Alexanders and even the Metternichs, who, in the short space of three years achieved a settlement which gave Europe substantial repose for half a century.

Yet Richelieu's diplomatic triumph did not render secure his position at home. The deputies returned at the partial renewal of the Chamber in 1818 included several opponents of the Bourbon monarchy, notably the Marquis de Lafayette, the Republican leader of 1789. Richelieu took alarm, and prompted from the Right, attempted to place himself at the head of a Conservative *bloc*. A Cabinet post was accordingly offered to the Comte de Villèle, an aristocrat of great ability who was now accepted as the leader of the ultra-royalists. But the manœuvre miscarried; Richelieu resigned (December 21, 1818), and a Liberal Ministry took office under the nominal leadership of General Desolles. The real head of the new Government was Decazes.

The Decazes
Ministry
1818-20

The programme of Decazes was expressed in the formula : "royalize France and nationalize the monarchy." His policy was conceived on liberal lines : an attack on the electoral law of 1817 was frustrated by the creation of sixty-five new Peers, and the freedom of the Press was finally secured. The results of emancipation were immediately discernible. The *Courier* (representing the eclectic views of the "Doctrinaires"), the *Constitutionnel*, the *Minerva*, and above all the *Journal Des Débats* (which in the hands of Chateaubriand became the or an of the bourgeois royalists) testified to the birth of a new force in French politics.

The annual partial election of 1819 brought a further accession of strength to the liberals in the Chamber, and Decazes was impelled to an amendment of the electoral law under which so untoward an event could occur. But before the project could materialize, an event even more untoward had driven Decazes from office and had caused a stampede towards the Right.

Murder of
the Duc de
Berri,
February 13,
1820

On the 13th of February the Duc de Berri was assassinated on the steps of the Opera House by an anti-Bourbon fanatic named Louvel. The Duke was the second son of the Count d'Artois, but in view of the fact that his elder brother, the Duc d'Angoulême was childless, was looked upon as the hope of the elder Bourbon line. The murder was the act of an isolated fanatic ; but the "ultras," transfixed with horror, were not slow to charge the responsibility for the dastardly deed upon the weakness of the King and the liberalizing policy of his Ministers. "I saw," said one of them, "the dagger that pierced the Duc de Berri ; it was a liberal idea." "Either Decazes must retire before the reigning dynasty," said another, "or the race of our Kings must retreat before him."

Wherever responsibility might lie, the effect of the crime was fatal to the policy of liberalism or even moderate conservatism. Decazes, though still high in the confidence of the King, was dismissed, and Richelieu was recalled. Richelieu was unwillingly compelled to pass a series of reactionary laws : personal liberty was restricted ; the Press was again muzzled, and the electoral system was still further modified in the interests of property. The first partial election under the new system strengthened the "ultras" in the

Chamber and encouraged Artois. The Count felt himself strong enough to dispense with the services of Richelieu and to commit the direction of affairs to the Marquis de Villèle. From the day when the Duc de Berri was assassinated Louis XVIII ceased to count. He died in 1824.

Villèle, who retained office continuously from December 1821 to January 1828, though personally opposed to a policy of mere reaction, was to all intents and purposes the Minister of Artois. His success in restoring, with the aid of the French army, the despotic Government of Ferdinand VII in Spain (1823) was an important point in his favour; it not only won him the confidence of the "ultras," but proved that he could rely on the loyalty of the army.

The accession of Artois under the style of Charles X naturally gave a further impetus to the reactionary movement. The new King had been accepted, ever since the first restoration, as the leader of the extreme Right. Bigoted, ignorant, and superstitious, the comrade of the *émigrés* and the tool of the Jesuits, Charles X gave full rein to the pent-up passions of his friends.

Of those friends the Church was at once the most powerful and the most insistent. "The union of Throne and Altar" was the formula of the "ultras"; but the throne was in fact the means; the exaltation of the altar was the end. During the last years of the previous reign strong pressure had been brought upon the King to "strengthen the authority of religion in the hearts of the people and to purify existing morals by a system of Christian and monarchical education."

In the *Congregation* he had an instrument ready to his hand. This association had been founded during the Napoleonic régime by a handful of devout ultramontanes in order to keep alive the pure flame of Roman Catholicism in France. After the Restoration it extended its activities and intensified its propaganda. Not merely was the Church to be restored to its former position, but the whole society of France was to be permeated by medieval Catholicism. Restitution was to be made of ecclesiastical property, and the Church was to be supreme over education, and to have exclusive control over marriage and the registration of births and deaths. This ambition was very imperfectly realized, but all liberal opinion in France was alarmed, not

to say outraged, when the Abbé Frayssinous was appointed head of the University, when by his orders such men as Guizot, Cousin, and Chateaubriand were suspended from their lectureships, and when the Jesuits, in defiance of the law, established colleges to counteract secular tendencies in education. Alarm reached a climax when in 1826 Bishop Tharin of Strasburg, the leader of the ultramontanes, was appointed tutor to the young Duc de Bordeaux (afterwards known as the Comte de Chambord), the posthumous son of the Duc de Berri.

The Church
and the
Press

Particularly virulent was the opposition of the Church to the lately emancipated Press. One of the first Acts passed by the Villèle Ministry was designed to make the Press the creature of the Executive. No newspaper was to appear without the sanction of the Crown; all their contents were to be subject to official censorship, and the writer of any article or designer of any illustration which "outraged or turned into ridicule the religion of the State, or which excited contempt or hatred of any class was to be punished with a heavy fine or imprisonment for seven years." Even this was not enough for the "ultras" who in 1827 compelled Villèle to bring forward a law which, had it passed, would not merely have finally extinguished any remnant of liberty left to the Press, but would have dealt a fatal blow at literature and learning. Educated men of all parties were up in arms. Chateaubriand and Béranger were equally loud in their protests against the proposed outrage upon their craft. The French Academy addressed a formal remonstrance to the King who declined to receive it. Nevertheless, the Chamber of Deputies passed the measure by a large majority, but so bitter was the opposition among the Peers that Villèle withdrew it.

Many other projects revealed the dominant influence of the power behind the throne. Efforts, partially successful, were made to indemnify the *émigrés*; religious communities for women were re-established, though not without restrictions; a proposal was made but ultimately rejected in the Chamber of Peers, for the revival of primogeniture; above all, a law of sacrilege was proposed which would have made punishable by death the theft of the sacred vessels from a church, while those who desecrated the Host were to suffer

in addition the amputation of a hand. This law, though passed with amendments, was never enforced.

The passing of such legislation through the Chamber of Deputies had been rendered possible by the enactment of a measure which prolonged its potential existence for seven years, in place of quinquennial renewal by annual instalments. But the Press proved themselves much less subservient to the Executive than the Chamber, with the result, as already indicated, that many of Villèle's projects were drastically amended if not rejected.

The cup of Villèle's unpopularity was, however, nearly full. The withdrawal of the Press Law of 1827 was greeted by a popular demonstration in which the National Guard, improperly but intelligibly, took part. On returning from a review held by the King on the Champ de Mars, the National Guard shouted, as they passed the houses of Ministers, "Down with the Jesuits," "Down with the Ministers." A bill was promptly passed for the disbandment of the force. The breach of discipline was inexcusable, but the effect of the disbandment was fatal. The Parisian *bourgeoisie* was deeply offended, and the city was deprived of a force which, tactfully handled, should have been a bulwark of moderate conservatism and a guarantee of public order.

Towards the end of the year the King decided on a dissolution, but despite every device to secure a Chamber even more subservient than the last, the opposition transformed a minority of twenty into an actual majority, and, on January 5, 1828, the *Moniteur* announced the resignation of Villèle and the appointment of a new Ministry under the leadership of the Vicomte Agay de Martignac.

Martignac was a man of ability, moderation, and experience, and his Ministry rested on the support of the right centre; but, too liberal for the King, it was too conservative for the Chamber, and could not, therefore, hope for a long tenure of office. Some useful work was, however, done: the Press censorship was relaxed; the excluded professors restored to their posts; the clerical control of education was abolished, and a considerable measure of local self-government was proposed. The reactionists were furious, and the progressives were not appeased. Martignac fell

Disband-
ment of the
National
Guard

Martignac
Ministry,
1828-9

between two stools, and in August 1828 his resignation was announced.

Polignac
Ministry

Charles X now determined to make no more concessions, but to impose his own will upon the Chamber and the country. "There is no way of dealing with these people: it is time to call a halt." So the King had said to Martignac. A halt was called. The mere names of the new Ministers were enough to cause dismay in France and disquietude throughout Europe. The head of the new Ministry recalled for the purpose from the Embassy in London, was Prince Jules de Polignac, so embittered an *émigré* and so uncompromising a Catholic that he refused allegiance to a Government which, by issuing the Charter, had promised toleration to heretics. General Bourmont, the new Minister of War, had been a leader in the Vendéan insurrection—a fact which did not endear him to republicans, and had deserted Napoleon on the eve of Waterloo, thus outraging the Bonapartists. La Bourdonnaye, the third of the triumvirate, was the hero of the White Terror. Such appointments were a direct challenge to the Chambers. But the Chambers were not in session, and before they met in March 1830 La Bourdonnaye retired (November 17).

France, meanwhile, bristled into resistance. At Lyons, Lafayette received an enthusiastic welcome, and in many parts of France associations for withholding the payment of taxes were formed. Still, nothing worse than a parliamentary struggle was apprehended; the dynasty was not threatened.

When the Chambers met in March the King addressed them in provocative tones: "The Charter has placed the liberties of France under the guarantee of the rights of the Crown. These rights are sacred, and it is my duty to hand them over intact to my successor. . . . I do not doubt that you will help me to realize my good intentions; that you will repel the shameful insinuations which malevolence has sought to spread abroad. Should conspiracies attempt to impede my Government, such as I do not wish to anticipate, I will find the means to remove the obstacles, firm in my own determination to maintain the public peace, in a just confidence in the people of France, and in their avowed love for their King."

The Press interpreted the speech as a challenge to parliamentary government. Foremost in resistance was M. Thiers, a young journalist from Marseilles, who had lately started, under the secret patronage of Talleyrand, *Le National*, in order to combat "enthroned reaction," and to advocate, by careful innuendo, a revolution on the lines of the English Revolution of 1688.

The Chamber promptly took up the challenge flung down by the King. On March 18 an address of no confidence in the Polignac Ministry was carried by 221 votes to 181. The King retorted by proroguing the Chambers for six months. Prorogation was presently followed by a dissolution; the general election, held in June and July, served only to strengthen the opposition by some fifty to sixty members. A brilliant victory in Algiers, where on July 4 General Bourmont overthrew the power of the Dey (July 4), came too late to influence the elections.

Polignac, dismayed by the result of the elections, proposed a reconstruction of the Cabinet; but the King preferred to face a storm which he persisted in belittling as a breeze. On July 25 he issued from St. Cloud a series of Ordinances prefaced by an explanatory memorandum: "A turbulent democracy," it ran, "is endeavouring to supplant the legal authority. It dominates the elections by means of newspapers and associations; it endeavours to fetter the rights of the Crown and to dissolve the Chamber. A Government that has not the right to take measures for the safety of the State cannot exist. That right, older than the laws, exists in the nature of things. An imperative necessity demands its application; the moment has come to take measures which, if they overstep the ordinary method of legislation, are undoubtedly in accord with the Charter." The King accordingly, by Ordinance, suspended the freedom of the Press, dissolved the Chamber recently elected but not yet convened, reduced the legislative term from seven years to five, with the annual renewal of one-fifth of the members, and summoned for September a new Parliament to be elected under a restricted franchise.

These Ordinances were nothing less than a royalist *coup d'état*. France was momentarily stunned, but Paris quickly recovered. The King's challenge was promptly taken up

The
Ordinances
of St. Cloud

The
Revolution
of 1830

by the journalists and under their guidance the situation developed rapidly. Forty-one journalists, led by Thiers and Mignet, the historian of the first Revolution, drafted a protest appealing to the citizens of Paris to resist the illegalities of the Government. Only the *National* and the *Temps* ventured in their issues of the 27th to print the protest, but copies of these papers were scattered broadcast throughout Paris; revolutionary committees were set up in every arrondissement; arms were procured, and the familiar barricades reappeared in the streets as if by magic. On the 27th Marshal Marmont was entrusted by Polignac with the defence of the capital; the barricades hastily erected were quickly demolished and some blood was shed. On the 28th the mob surged once more through the streets; raised the tricolour, and seized the Hôtel de Ville. Members of the old National Guard had already joined the insurrection, and on the 29th the regular troops mutinied; the populace burst into the Louvre and the Tuileries, and by nightfall were masters of the capital.

When Paris awoke on the 30th it found the walls of the city placarded with a proclamation in favour of Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans. The placards were the work of Thiers. He, Talleyrand, and Guizot had not been suggesting an English Revolution of 1688 without having their eyes on a William of Orange. They now produced him.

Louis
Philippe

Louis Philippe was a son of the "Égalité" Orleans who had played so mean a part in the Revolution of 1789; but the son's record was unsullied. He had never fought against France, but had on the contrary fought in the republican army at Jemappes. During his exile and the proscription of his house, he had maintained himself as a tutor in Switzerland, and after the Restoration, despite the recovery of the vast family estates, he had acquired popularity by living the life and assuming the mode of an ordinary citizen, opulent indeed but genial and accessible. During the crisis of July his prudence was irreproachable. After the fall of the Tuileries Charles X, tardily realizing that this was "not a revolt but a revolution," withdrew the Ordinances and dismissed Polignac. The concessions came too late. On the 30th Orleans arrived in Paris, and was installed at the Palais Royal. On the invitation of the Chamber, he assumed the

office of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom, and promised that henceforth the Charter should be a reality. On the 31st he proceeded to the Hôtel de Ville where he was melodramatically welcomed by Lafayette. Meanwhile Charles X had retired from St. Cloud to Rambouillet; and there (August 2) announced his abdication in favour of his grandson, Henry, Duke of Bordeaux, better known as the Comte de Chambord. At the same time he nominated Orleans as Lieutenant-General and regent, and bade him proclaim "Henry V." Again he was too late, or maybe Orleans was too ambitious. On the 7th the Chambers convoked by the Regent offered Orleans the Crown. He accepted it, and on the 9th was proclaimed King of the French under the style of Louis Philippe. A week later Charles X, his family and suite embarked at Cherbourg for England.¹

Such was the issue of the "glorious days of July"; thus did M. Thiers, most astute and ambitious of journalists and shrewdest of statesmen, "dispose of the French Crown by a handbill and overthrow the dynasty by a placard." In the somewhat shoddy revolution of 1830—a "Révolution de surprise"—four elements may be discerned. The majority of the Chambers would have been satisfied with a parliamentary victory sufficient to secure the inviolability of the Charter. The journalists, on the other hand, alarmed by the assault upon the liberty of the Press, were convinced that its liberty would never be secure so long as the doctrine of "legitimacy" was sacrosanct. Only a dynasty which owed its throne to the Charter could be trusted to respect it. A third element, the republicans, led by the veteran rebel Lafayette, had long awaited an opportunity to overturn the Bourbon dynasty, and relied in 1830, as in 1789 and 1848, on those disorderly elements which were never far from the surface in the capital. Finally there was at least a tinge of Bonapartism in the July Revolution; a few houses in the workman's quarter exhibited placards with the legend *Vive Napoléon II.* But who was Napoleon II? The Duke of Reichstadt was in Austrian custody; Prince Napoleon refused to put himself at the head of the Bonapartist party; the "man of destiny" now aged 22, was still engaged in

Character of
the Revolution of
July

¹ The King died in Austria in 1836.

his military studies at Thun; the moment for his advent on the political stage had not arrived, and he knew how to wait.

For the moment, therefore, France was committed to yet another constitutional experiment: a parliamentary monarchy of the English type, conceived and largely initiated by doctrinaires who knew more about the history of England than the temper of France.

Repercus-
sions

Meanwhile, the "glorious days of July," whatever their precise significance for France, had important repercussions abroad. The rising of the Poles against the Russian autocrat (November) was described by an enthusiastic young Frenchman as "like a second revolution of July." In Prussian Poland there was no actual insurrection, but some 12,000 Prussian Poles went to the assistance of their brethren in the "Congress Kingdom," and Metternich, by dangling before the eyes of Frederick William III the red spectre of revolution, induced him to embark, quite needlessly, upon a policy of repression.

In Germany itself the events of July aroused considerable excitement: there were sporadic outbreaks in Göttingen, Cassel, Dresden, Leipzig, and Brunswick, and not a little ferment in the Liberal South, but neither Austria nor Prussia felt the repercussion.¹

In Italy revolutionary embers were fanned into flames. The conflagration centred in the Papal States, and there were insurrections also in Modena and Parma. In Portugal an abortive revolution broke out in February, but was crushed with characteristic ferocity. Switzerland showed itself, not for the first time, peculiarly susceptible to French influence-while in England an impulse, overrated by the French historians but not negligible, was given to the movement for parliamentary reform.²

Belgium

It was, however, in the Low Countries that the influence of the July Revolution was most decisively felt. This was,

¹ *Infra*, p. 98.

² In particular M. Émile Halévy, the most recent and one of the most brilliant of French commentators on English History, is guilty, as it seems to me, of exaggeration in this regard. Cf. *Histoire du peuple anglaise au 19^{me} siècle*. But he is supported by the *Edinburgh Review* which (October 1830) wrote: "We take it to be abundantly manifest that the battle of English liberty has really been fought and won at Paris."

indeed, only natural. United with the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1814, "Belgium," as we now know it, had for the twenty years previous to that date formed an integral part of France. During the eighteenth century (1714-94) it had been one of the many provinces in the miscellaneous Empire of the Austrian Hapsburgs. From the days of Philip II down to the Peace of Utrecht (1714), it had adhered to Spain and had been known as the Spanish Netherlands.

The idea of the formation of a strong barrier-State, intermediate between France and the Empire, was not unfamiliar to European statesmanship. What Charles the Bold of Burgundy had actually achieved in the fifteenth century might surely be reproduced by the scientific efforts of modern diplomacy. Lord Grenville had suggested it as long ago as 1798. In 1814 the opportunity for solving a difficult problem had manifestly come. Accordingly, by the first Treaty of Paris (1814), Belgium, as we have said, was united with Holland in a kingdom of the Netherlands under the House of Orange-Nassau.

The union thus consummated proved to be singularly ill-assorted. Between the Dutch of the Northern Provinces and the Flemings and Walloons of the South there was little in common. Racially they were akin, but despite the large admixture of Flemish blood the peoples of the Belgian Provinces were powerfully attracted towards France, of which country they had for twenty years actually formed part. In creed and in historical tradition North and South were sharply divided, and the division was accentuated by commercial rivalry. Nevertheless, a conciliatory policy on the part of the House of Orange, if steadily pursued after 1815, might have done much to obliterate differences and to weld North and South into a united Power, if not into a homogeneous people. Such policy was conspicuous by its absence. King William of the Netherlands was, as Palmerston's biographer wittily phrased it, "one of those clever men who constantly do foolish things, and one of those obstinate men who support one bad measure by another worse."¹ The Dutch, though numerically inferior,² treated

¹ Lord Dalling: *Palmerston*, ii, 2.

² 2,000,000 as compared with nearly 8,500,000 Belgians.

Belgium almost as a conquered province, imposing upon it disproportionate burdens and denying it equal opportunities. They made, in fact, no secret of their intention to absorb Belgium into Holland. This policy was deeply resented and stoutly opposed by the Belgian patriots, and they found staunch allies in the Clericals, who were greatly incensed against the Calvinist authorities of Holland. Thus in 1830, as in 1790, the Clericals and Democrats of Belgium combined against an alien ruler, and both found encouragement and opportunity in the French Revolution of July, and in the general upheaval which ensued thereon.

The Powers were, for the most part, opposed to the destruction of a corner-stone of the diplomatic edifice of 1814, but the Belgians found a warm friend in Lord Palmerston, who became Foreign Secretary in the Ministry of Lord Grey in 1830. Palmerston was convinced that the recognition of Belgian independence was the only alternative to its absorption by France, and to the latter alternative the long tradition of English policy was unalterably opposed. But the danger of absorption was by no means remote. The Belgians themselves elected as their king the Duc de Nemours, the second son of King Louis Philippe. Palmerston firmly declined to allow a French prince to wear the Belgian Crown, and by a combination of firmness and adroitness he induced Louis Philippe not only to decline the Crown, on his son's behalf, but to admit the candidature of Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, a German by blood, yet an Englishman by residence and sympathies, and the sometime consort of the Princess Charlotte, heiress-presumptive to the English throne.

King
Leopold

On June 26, 1831, Prince Leopold accepted, not without hesitation, the Belgian Crown. The hesitation was justified ; for the situation which confronted the new monarch was appallingly difficult. The Dutch, refusing the *bases de séparation*, upon the ratification of which Leopold's acceptance of the Crown was conditional, marched 50,000 men into Belgium. The latter appealed for help to France and England. Louis Philippe complied, and a French army occupied Belgium. War between France and Holland—perhaps a general European conflagration—was averted only by the diplomacy of Lord Palmerston. But the situation was still

critical. Great Britain could not contemplate a French occupation of Belgium, and Palmerston bluntly informed Louis Philippe that his troops could remain there only on pain of war with England. But French troops could not be withdrawn until Belgium was secured against the attack of Holland. The dilemma appeared insoluble. It was ultimately solved by the combined firmness, patience, and tact of Lord Palmerston on the one side, and on the other by the genuine anxiety of Louis Philippe to keep on good terms with England. Not, however, until 1833 did Holland acquiesce in the decision of the Powers to recognize Belgian independence, and not until 1839 was this acquiescence embodied in a definite treaty. That treaty was concluded between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia on the one part, and the Netherlands (Holland) on the other, and was signed at London on April 19, 1839. It constituted the Charter and defined the international position of the modern kingdom of Belgium. It placed the independence, the neutrality, and the territorial integrity of Belgium under the guarantee of the five Great Powers. This was not, as Lord Clarendon pointed out in 1867, a mere collective undertaking. It was an individual obligation imposed by each Power on itself.

Thus ended a troublesome and dangerous episode. That the issue was relatively peaceful and completely satisfactory was due mainly to British diplomacy. Thanks to Lord Palmerston's firmness and tact, three definite results had been achieved: an essential part of the settlement of 1814 had been destroyed without involving Europe in war; an independent Belgian kingdom, pledged to perpetual neutrality, had been brought into being under a constitutional monarchy and a European guarantee; and France, though the most effusive friend of Belgium, had been compelled to forgo any hope of territorial acquisition or political advantage for herself. Of such a diplomatic achievement Great Britain and Lord Palmerston might well be proud.

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CHAPTER VI
RESTORATION, REACTION, AND REFORM

GERMANY

THE problem presented in 1815 to German statesmen was essentially different from that which faced the restored Bourbons in France. To both countries, indeed, external security was a matter of primary concern, but the immediate business of Louis XVIII was to rid France of the army of occupation and to ensure to his country tranquillity and stability. The situation in Germany was, if not more difficult, undeniably more complicated. Germany as a political entity had ceased to exist; if she was to be recalled into being it must needs be by the adoption of some form of federal constitution. We have already considered the extent to which that problem was solved. Another problem was presented by the component States of the Confederation.

The Federal Act had ordained that a representative constitution should be adopted in every State. The promise, however, was not fulfilled. In no country, indeed, except in Spain, did reaction run riot more conspicuously than in Germany. In some few States, in Bavaria, for example, and Baden and Hanover, the Sovereigns granted to their subjects constitutional charters on the model of that which the example of Louis XVIII had rendered fashionable. But nowhere, except in the little duchy of Saxe-Weimar, was there anything which could be described as vigorous political life.

To the general rule of reaction Prussia formed no exception. The robust Liberalism of Stein had never been congenial to the King, who fell more and more completely under the influence of Metternich.

Prussia and
the Bund

For the new German Confederation there was no enthusiasm in Prussia. The King himself, again taking his cue from Metternich, soon began to look upon the Diet as merely a convenient instrument for the suppression of liberal tendencies. Only in the field of education did Prussia provide any exception to the general law of reaction. The work of Humboldt was carried on with undiminished vigour by Altenstein, who, in 1817, became Minister of Public Instruction. Altenstein established training colleges for teachers, instituted the earliest *Realschulen* in Germany, and, with a view to the new disposition of Prussian territories, reorganized university education. A new university for the Prussian Rhineland was instituted at Bonn, the historic Saxon University of Wittenberg was incorporated with that of Halle, and that of Frankfort-on-the-Oder, which had fallen into hopeless decay, was transferred to Breslau.

The
*Burschen-
schaften*

The educational zeal of Prussia was regarded at Vienna with considerable suspicion; and not without reason. For it was in the Universities that German Liberalism found its richest soil; particularly, at this period, in that of Jena. To a small knot of Jena students was due the initiation of a movement of very considerable significance. They determined to found a society which should combine the highest ideals of personal life with a great patriotic purpose: sobriety, chastity, and German unity were their watchwords. The genesis and purpose of this and kindred societies is thus described by Sybel: "The young heroes returning from the war filled the universities with their patriotic indignation, and by the founding of societies of students (*Burschenschaften*), represented at all the universities, they sought to fill all the educated youth of Germany with their enthusiasm for unity, justice, and freedom. These societies, for the most part, cherished ambitions which were thoroughly ideal. They did not look to the overthrow of present conditions, but relied upon the training of the rising generation. By moral elevation and patriotic inspiration they hoped to lead the State of the future to the great goal of national unity. To be sure, their notions of this future State were generally indefinite, and were mere unpractical fancies; indeed, this enthusiasm rose in some groups to the pitch of wild fanaticism, so that they were even ready to seize sword and dagger for

tyrannicide. Yet such enthusiasts never succeeded in securing in the societies at large any great following for their projects.”¹

These *Burschenschaften* spread from Jena with great rapidity, and within two years the organization had obtained a footing in sixteen universities. In 1817 the students decided to organize a great patriotic festival to give cohesion to the movement initiated at Jena. The year happened to be the tercentenary of the Protestant Reformation. Appropriately, therefore, Eisenach was chosen as the meeting-place. October 18-19 was selected as the date, being the anniversary of the great battle of Leipzig. The tradition of two great German movements was thus ingeniously combined. The proceedings at the Wartburg were of a kind common enough among university students: services, sermons, and for the elect a celebration of the Lord's Supper; for the many, patriotic addresses by professors from Jena; a big feast; copious draughts; speeches, toasts, and a bonfire. With the bonfire much ebullient enthusiasm; some wild talk, and a good deal of disorder. At the Wartburg the example of Luther was of course irresistible, and into the bonfire there went various emblems of militarism—a pigtail and a corporal's cane—a copy of the *Code Napoléon*, and sundry books, treatises, and documents, perhaps the Federal Act, certainly a book by Kotzebue, a dramatist who was suspected of being a secret emissary of the Czar.

The significance of the whole proceedings has been variously estimated. At the best, an innocent and unpremeditated undergraduate outburst; at the worst a symptom of revolutionary unrest among the German intellectuals. Metternich took it very seriously, or pretended to do so. The Congress at Aix-la-Chapelle gave him an opportunity of impressing his views on the sovereigns, particularly upon Alexander, and it was not neglected.

Nor did Metternich's fears wholly lack justification. Every such movement as that of the *Burschenschaften* is apt to attract the feeble-minded as well as the stronger. The Wartburg Festival was followed by sporadic outbursts of crime. On March 23, 1819, Kotzebue, the Russian

The
Wartburg
Festival

¹ *Foundation of the German Empire*, i, 57.

dramatist and secret agent, was murdered at Mannheim by one Karl Sand. Nor did this crime stand alone.

For the cause of German Liberalism nothing could have been more disastrous than the crimes of these crazy students.

The
Karlsbad
Conference

But to Metternich the extravagances and follies of the *Burschenschaften* were a godsend. With the concurrence of the King of Prussia he summoned the Ministers of the leading German States to meet in August 1819, at Karlsbad. The resolutions adopted at Karlsbad by the representatives of eight Governments were, in September, submitted to the Diet at Frankfort. Before the eyes of his frightened colleagues Metternich drew a lurid picture of the condition of Germany. Recent events were but symbolic; there existed in the heart of Germany a monstrous conspiracy, and nothing but united and immediate action could lay the ghost.¹ Action was not delayed. The resolutions drafted at Karlsbad were formally enacted; the whole educational system of Germany was placed under police supervision; political clubs and meetings were prohibited; the Press was subjected to strict censorship, and no pamphlet containing less than twenty pages could be published without similar permission; the Governments of all the federated States were to enforce these decrees if necessary by martial law, and finally a Commission was set up at Mainz to keep careful watch upon all the manifestations of the democratic spirit.

Metternich

Already Metternich was departing from the principle of non-intervention affirmed at Vienna. The Diet, as the smaller States had feared, was beginning to usurp the functions of the immediate Sovereigns. The Emperor Francis, if no longer German Emperor, was, in Sybel's scathing phrase, endowed by Metternich with all the authority attaching to the "head of an all-powerful German police system."²

Metternich would have gone even further, but the Frankfort Decrees were not universally approved by the minor States. The King of Württemberg replied to Metternich's arrogant challenge by granting a further instalment of constitutional liberty to his own subjects, and by putting himself at the head of a "purely Germanic

¹ Sybel, *op. cit.*, i, 6.

² *Ibid.*, i, 63.

league," to resist the aggressions of Austria and Prussia upon German liberties.

Warned by these demonstrations of independence Metternich drew back, and the *Final Act of Vienna* (May 24, 1820) represented a compromise. The Karlsbad Decrees were, indeed, renewed, but the independence of the minor States was specifically guaranteed. But four years later (1824), the Karlsbad Decrees, which had been limited in the first instance to five years, were re-enacted in perpetuity.

Those decrees were the measure of the decadence of Prussian influence, the symbol and seal of the autocracy of Metternich. But already other forces were at work destined to extrude Austria from the Germanic body, and to establish on a firmer and more permanent basis the pre-eminence of the Hohenzollern. At the very moment when, terrified by the spectre of revolution so cleverly paraded by Metternich, the rulers of Prussia were surrendering their political conscience to the keeping of the Austrian chancellor, the Prussian financiers were elaborating a scheme for the fiscal unification of Germany.

During the first half of the nineteenth century Germany ^{The Zollverein} was, economically and commercially, the most backward country in Western Europe. And in no part of Germany was industry less advanced than in Prussia. The country as a whole had not yet emerged from the agrarian stage; the exports were mainly raw products; the mines were almost entirely unworked; manufactures were still produced by the hand-loom and spinning-wheels of domestic workers. The fiscal arrangements of Prussia reflected and accentuated the peculiarities of her political evolution. In some provinces, notably in the Rhineland, there was an approximation to Free Trade; in others the tariffs were exceedingly oppressive. Nowhere were duties uniform. Altogether there were in the Prussian Kingdom sixty-seven different tariffs, embracing no less than 3800 categories of goods. When it is remembered that Prussia contained no less than thirteen "enclaves," that its external frontiers were 8000 kilometres in length, and touched twenty-eight different States, the difficulties of collection will be understood.

The first step towards order and uniformity in the ^{Law of} Prussian dominions was taken by the enactment of the ^{May 28,} ¹⁸¹⁸

Tariff Reform Law of May 28, 1818. Under this Act all raw materials were to be imported free; on manufactured articles there was to be an average duty of 10 per cent. (on weight or measure, not *ad valorem*); and on "colonial" produce 20 per cent.; and all internal Custom duties were abolished. Thus internally Prussia became for the first time an economic and commercial unit, while her external tariff was the most liberal in Continental Europe; in some respects even more liberal than that of Great Britain.¹

So far the change had affected Prussia only. But in the following year (1819) we have the first modest step towards a Customs Union. Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, one of the "enclaves" dotted about the Prussian dominions, concluded a tariff treaty, and handed over its Customs administration to Prussia, in return for complete freedom of commercial intercourse and a proportionate share of external Customs revenue. This arrangement was the first of many. In 1822 the example of Schwarzburg-Sondershausen was followed by Weimar, Gotha, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Schaumburg-Lippe, Rudolstadt, and Bamberg.

The significance of these events was quickly apprehended in other parts of Germany. Between 1820 and 1828 frequent negotiations took place between the Southern States, though not until the latter year was anything effected. Bavaria and Würtemberg then formed a union which was subsequently joined by one or two of their smaller neighbours.

By this time the whole of the German States, with one significant exception, were awake to the advantages of the policy initiated by Prussia. The only question was whether there should be one Customs Union for the whole Confederation, or two, or several. In September, a third Union was formed between Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, Hanover, Brunswick, the free cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Frankfort, and several of the Thuringian duchies. The component States undertook not to enter any other *Zollverein* for a period of six years. Luckily for Prussia, and indeed for Germany, this Saxon combination failed for lack of means, and in 1829 Prussia concluded an arrangement with the Bavaria-Würtemberg group. The Thuringian States deserted the

¹ Ashley: *Tariff History*, p. 4 seq.

Saxon Union in 1880; Hesse-Cassel joined the Prussian Union in 1881, and Saxony itself joined Prussia in 1883.

Thus, for the greater part of Germany, a true *Zollverein* came into being. This *Zollverein* included seventeen States with a total population of 26,000,000 people. Its constitution was elaborate. There was to be an annual assembly or Customs Parliament, representing all the constituent States, to determine the policy of the *Verein*, and no changes could be made without the unanimous assent of the members; between State and State there was to be complete Free Trade; the tariff was to be uniform on all the frontiers, and the nett proceeds were to be divided in proportion to population; all raw materials and semi-manufactured goods required for manufacturing processes were to come in free; on "colonial produce" the tariff was to be for revenue purposes only, and even on manufactured goods it was to be moderate.

Baden came into the *Zollverein* in 1835, the free city of Frankfort in 1836, and a number of smaller States between 1836 and 1841. Not content with internal Free Trade the Union now attempted to negotiate commercial treaties with foreign Powers. So far back as 1831, Holland had consented to suspend the heavy tolls levied upon the goods of the *Zollverein* States passing down the Rhine. In 1841 a mutually advantageous treaty was made with Great Britain, and in 1844 a similar one with Belgium.

Thus far the Prussian tariff reformers had looked for Friedrich
List inspiration to Adam Smith, but, in the forties, another influence became predominant. It was that of Friedrich List, who in 1841 published his book *The National System of Political Economy*.

The effect of List's great work upon fiscal policy, if not upon economic doctrine, is comparable only to that of Adam Smith himself. Just as Adam Smith provided the philosophical apology for the industrial revolution, and inspired the Free Trade policy of Pitt, Huskisson, Peel, and Gladstone, so List, taking up the broken thread of the mercantilist tradition, inspired the policy of the architects of German unity. Both systems—List's no less than Adam Smith's—aim at the promotion of national wealth; but while Adam Smith suggested that if you seek wealth and ensue it all else shall be added unto you, List insisted that the primary

aim should be national union and national strength. Once that was attained, the reward of material prosperity would not, he promised, be withheld. That England could well afford the luxury of Free Trade, and that it was her obvious interest to induce other nations to adopt it, List did not deny. Germany, however, was not in the position of England. As yet indeed there was no Germany. It had to be created ; and in List's view the most potent instrument was Protection.

"On the development of the German protective system depend the existence, the independence, and the future of German nationality. Only in the soil of general prosperity does the national spirit strike its roots, produce fine blossoms and rich fruits ; only from the unity of material interests does mental power arise, and only from both of these national power." ¹

List, it will be seen, was at once an ardent nationalist and a convinced protectionist. His work made an immediate and a profound impression upon his compatriots, but for some years its teaching was by no means universally accepted. A battle royal ensued between Free Trade and Protection. The agriculturists were on the side of Free Trade ; so were the shippers and merchants of the Hanseatic cities, the bankers of Frankfort, and the weavers of Saxony. On the other side were the majority of the Southern States, where the spinners of Bavaria, Baden, and Würtemberg were particularly clamorous for Protection. The protectionists gradually gained ground, and by 1850 duties on everything except the raw materials of manufactures had been very largely increased.

Austria
and the
Zollverein

Towards the earlier stages of this remarkable development Austria manifested complete indifference. Metternich cared little about commerce, and despised Prussia and her ways. But after the adoption of a protectionist policy the matter became more serious for Austria, and when, after 1848, Metternich was replaced by Schwarzenberg, Austria made determined efforts to force an entrance into the Union. Prussia steadily and successfully resisted them. Early in 1853, however, Prussia came to an arrangement with Austria. A treaty was concluded postponing, until 1860, all questions

¹ *The National System*, p. 425.

as to the admission of Austria, but at the same time mutual tariff concessions were made between Austria (for her Italian provinces) on the one side, and the *Zollverein* on the other.

The importance of the *Zollverein* in the modern history of Prussia and of Germany can scarcely be exaggerated. On its purely economic consequences it is not necessary to enlarge. For the first time Germany became a fiscal and commercial unit; means of communication and transport were rapidly developed; roads were improved; railways were constructed. Foreign trade showed a remarkable expansion. Between 1834 and 1842 the imports and exports increased by 100 per cent., and the Custom duties rose from 12,000,000 to 21,000,000 thalers. Capital began to accumulate. Between 1853 and 1857 no less than £20,000,000 were raised for the construction of railways, while, in the same years, new banks were established with a capital of £30,000,000.

Nor was the influence of the *Zollverein* confined to the economic development of Germany.

"The *Zollverein* has brought the sentiment of German nationality out of the regions of hope and fancy into those of positive and material interests. . . . The general feeling in Germany towards the *Zollverein* is that it is the first step towards what is called the Germanization of the people. It has broken down some of the strongest holds of alienation and hostility. By a community of interests on commercial and trading questions it has prepared the way for a political nationality."

Thus wrote Dr. Bowring in his *Report* ¹ to Lord Palmerston as early as 1840. Nor can it be doubted that the *Zollverein* accomplished all that Dr. Bowring claimed for it; and much more. It united the German States in bonds of mutual economic interest; it united them under the leadership of Prussia; and it accustomed them to the exclusion of Austria from the Germanic body.

Apart from the *Zollverein* there is not much in the history of Germany between 1815 and 1848 over which it is profitable to linger. In the main it is a continuation of the story of repression and reaction.

The French
Revolution
of 1830

The July Revolution in France did, however, arouse some excitement in Germany. Neither Austria nor Prussia were much affected, but in many of the secondary States disturbances broke out. In Brunswick, the reigning Duke Charles, one of the least estimable of princes, was deposed, and the excitement was only allayed when his successor granted a revised Constitution. Riots also broke out in Göttingen, in Cassel, in Dresden, and Leipzig, where in like manner the people were appeased by constitutional concessions. In the Liberal south, too, there was ferment, though nothing in the nature of revolutionary violence. Indeed the German movement of 1830, though definitely radical in tendency, was nowhere anti-monarchical.

In the States bordering upon France danger of another kind was apprehended. In view of this danger the South German States felt it necessary to mobilize, but profoundly mistrusting both Austria and the Federal Diet, they begged Prussia to put herself at the head of a military league, which might act independently of the Diet. It was a great opportunity for the Hohenzollern. A great part of Germany was already ranging itself under the fiscal leadership of Prussia; if in addition to the customs union there should now be organized a military union under the same auspices, Prussia would have taken a long stride towards the political hegemony of a united Germany.

Frederick William, however, was incapable of the prompt decision necessary to take advantage of the opportunity. He declined to move without the assent of Metternich. Metternich delayed an answer until he had got the Italian insurrection well in hand (March 1831). He then proceeded to frighten Frederick William with the red spectre in Europe and in Germany. The one hope for Europe was the close alliance of the three Eastern Powers; for Germany, the combination of Prussia and Austria against the internal dangers of anarchy and revolution. Frederick William eagerly assented; and led by the two Great Powers, the Federal Diet embarked upon a fresh crusade against popular liberties; more particularly the liberty of the Press.

Metternich's renewed attack, wholly unprovoked, created the very danger against which it was directed.

In May 1832 a couple of radical journalists organized a

demonstration at Hambach in the Palatinate. The demonstration gave Metternich his excuse. At his bidding the Frankfort Diet promptly issued a fresh series of "Karlsbad" Decrees: the privileges of the State parliaments were rigorously curtailed; the federal forces were to support any prince who had difficulties with his people or parliament; political clubs and meetings were prohibited; the State constitutions were put absolutely at the mercy of the Federal Diet, and the Press was placed under even stricter surveillance.

In April 1833 an abortive attack was made upon the Diet itself in Frankfort. But the "revolution" was suppressed by the local battalion, and the conspirators were promptly lodged in gaol.

More serious in its results was the ultramontane movement in Bavaria, Westphalia, and Rhenish Prussia. The abolition of the Ecclesiastical Electorates, with their lax doctrine and easy morals, proved the opportunity of the Jesuits. It was not neglected. To the suffering populations of the borderlands tossed from Germany to France, from France to Prussia, the Catholic Church, relieved from the incubus of the prince-bishops, brought the genuine consolations of religion. Encouraged by their popularity with the people, the Church challenged the Prussian State, both in the Rhineland and in Polish Prussia, notably on the thorny question of mixed marriages.

While Frederick William was embroiling himself with the Catholics of Poland and Rhenish Prussia, his brother-in-law in Hanover was arousing bitter opposition among all the progressive parties. On the death of William IV of England (1837), the personal union of Hanover and Great Britain was dissolved, and the German Kingdom passed to the fifth son of King George III, Ernest Augustus, Duke of Cumberland. Like his father, Ernest came to the throne determined to be "a king." He promulgated a brand-new Constitution fashioned according to his own taste: parliamentary sessions were to be held *in camera*; the functions of the legislature were to be purely consultative; it was to have no control over the Executive; and the Crown lands were to be regarded as the private property of the King.

Against this decree the Hanoverian Estates appealed to the Federal Diet, and the smaller States were disposed to

Disjunction
of Hanover
and England

support the appeal ; but overborne by Austria and Prussia, the Diet eventually declined to intervene. Even the least combative of German Liberals were by now compelled to realize, that from the Federal Constitution of 1815 no good could come. Alike from the point of view of Liberalism and Nationalism, its bankruptcy was manifest to all. So it came about that the thoughts of German patriots began to turn towards the possibility of replacing the reactionary Bund by a popularly elected legislature representative of the German people as a whole.

Frederick
William IV
succeeds
Frederick
William III
in Prussia

The death of Frederick William III of Prussia (1840) removed one obstacle in the path of this ambition. The long reign of the old King (1797-1840) had been marked for his people by alternations of storm and sunshine, but during the latter part of it a wonderful transformation had been wrought, alike in the external position and the internal condition of the Hohenzollern dominions. The reign of his successor was destined to be not less momentous. Frederick William IV was richly endowed. A character singularly sympathetic was united with a firm will and a capacious intellect, though his political judgment was unfortunately inferior to his intellectual capacity. The first acts of his reign did, however, give promise of wide political toleration : he released a number of imprisoned demagogues ; he restored Arndt to his professorship at Bonn ; he appointed Dahlmann to a chair in the same University, and the brothers Grimm to posts in Berlin ; he allowed the Provincial Estates to meet regularly and to debate freely ; and he enlarged the freedom of the Press. But to the demand for a parliamentary Constitution, in the English sense, Frederick William presented an adamant front.

In February 1847, however, the King summoned a meeting of all the Provincial Estates in Berlin : a United Provincial Diet (*Vereinigter Landtag*) or States-General. But after a brief session the United Diet was dismissed. Nevertheless, the Prussian experiment was eagerly watched, both by reactionaries and progressives, in every part of Germany. The dismissal of the United Diet meant that one more attempt at reform from above had failed. It meant also one more incentive to revolution.

Towards revolution events seemed to be now hastening. In most of the secondary States there was, between 1830 and 1848, more or less persistent agitation. Stimulated by different circumstances in different States—in Hanover, for example, by the *coup d'état* of King Ernest Augustus; in Saxony by the new industrialism; in Würtemberg by economic distress; in Bavaria by the scandal raised by King Ludwig's relations with the fascinating dancer Lola Montez—the agitation was everywhere directed towards two main objects: (i) the enlargement of constitutional and personal liberty in the several States; and (ii) the realization of national unity for Germany as a whole.

Unrest in
the smaller
States

A meeting was held at Offenburg in Baden in September 1847, and there the programme of reform was drafted. It demanded the abolition of the reactionary decrees of 1819 and 1832; complete religious toleration; freedom of the Press; trial by jury; the establishment in every State of real representative assemblies; a central representative assembly for the whole Confederation; the substitution of "government by the people" for bureaucratic officials; the abolition of social privileges; the improvement of the relations between capital and labour, and a progressive income tax. So far the programme was democratic with a touch of Marxianism; it was not specifically or avowedly republican. Two further demands were, in this regard, more significant. The one was that a popular militia should be substituted for the standing army, and the other that soldiers should in future take an oath of fidelity not to the King but to the Constitution.

The meeting at Offenburg was followed a month later by a great conference at Heppenheim. Many alternative schemes were discussed, but as the autumn wore on, opinion tended to crystallize in favour of a demand for a national German Parliament, side by side with the Confederate Diet. The crystallization of opinion was opportune: for the crisis was now at hand.

On February 24, 1848, a pistol shot in Paris disposed of the July monarchy and set all Europe ablaze. France was once more a republic. Would Germany follow suit?

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See also chapters ix and xiii.

CHAPTER VII

RESTORATION, REACTION, AND REVOLUTION

ITALY (1815-48)

IN Italy, as in Germany, the restoration of 1815 was followed by reaction; reaction induced a restlessness ^{The Italian Problem} which was not less acute and not less general because forced to be subterranean; restlessness issued in revolution, relatively trivial in 1830, but in 1848-9 serious and stubborn, though not immediately successful. Italy, again like Germany, had to face in 1815 a two-fold problem: how, on the one hand, her divided States might severally obtain some measure of constitutional liberty; how, on the other, Italy as a whole might achieve unity. For Italy not less than Germany was the victim of Rome. Ancient Rome bequeathed to the world the idea of a world-empire, and the attempt of the Holy Roman Emperors to fulfil the conditions of that testament, retarded the political development of Italy, no less fatally than that of Germany.

Yet the two cases were not exactly parallel. Germany, under the Emperors, had for centuries enjoyed some semblance of unity. Italy, on the contrary, from the fall of the Roman Empire until the establishment of the Napoleonic Kingdom, was a mere "geographical expression." She could not, as one has phrased it, "be called a nation any more than a stack of timber can be called a ship." In the Middle Ages great parts were played on the stage of European politics by the city States of Italy, by Venice and Genoa, by Milan and Florence. But Italy did not exist. As we approach modern times the independence of the Italian States was extinguished; save for the States of the Church, Venice, Genoa, and Piedmont, they mostly passed under the control of one or other of the two great families—the Hapsburgs and the Bourbons—whose age-long strife

made Italy, for several centuries, the cockpit of contending nations and rival dynasties. Not until the latter half of the eighteenth century did Italy attain some degree of tranquillity, and the calm which the age of the "enlightened despots" brought to Italy was the repose not of quiet happiness but of a miserable inertia, a hopeless torpidity of soul. Mr. Trevelyan does indeed describe Italy's condition as one of "mild melancholy happiness," but he is constrained to add that it was a happiness "that held in it little honour and not much seed of further progress."¹ Whether "happiness" even mild and melancholy can subsist without "honour" is a point which it boots not, here, to decide.

Napoleon
and Italy

Repose was certainly broken, even if happiness was not dissipated, by the advent of General Bonaparte. To Italy Bonaparte came, as he went to Germany, as a scourge, but also in a sense as a deliverer. If any sentiment mingled with Napoleon's granite, Italy and Italy alone evoked it. Unified Germany owes him a profound debt of gratitude. In the story of her unification Napoleon's place is second in importance only to that of Bismarck. But for Germany he had no sentiment save that of ambition. The new Triune Kingdom, conveniently known as Jugo-Slavia, also owes something to Napoleon. The efficiency of his methods in the Kingdom of Illyria may be gauged from a Dalmatian saying about the great coast road constructed by Marshal Marmont from Zara to Spalato: "The Austrians discussed plans for eight years; Marmont mounted his horse, and when he got off, the road was made." The French codes were introduced into the provinces of Croatia, Carniola, Carinthia, Istria, Dalmatia, and Ragusa; lycées were set up at Ragusa and Laibach; schools, primary, secondary, and technical, were established throughout the country; justice was administered on a uniform system and with impartiality; means of communication were improved; and the people tasted the blessings—not always appreciated—of a really efficient administration. That in his kingdom of Illyria the Napoleonic régime stimulated a sense of national unity can be denied only by those who know nothing of modern Jugo-Slavia, though it was a full century before the results

¹ *Mainin and the Venetian Republic*, p. 10.

were made manifest. With the Swiss also, Napoleon had sympathy, and showed it in the concession of the new Constitution embodied in the *Act of Mediation*.

Yet it was only in Italy that Napoleon consciously and intentionally nourished the spirit of unity and nationality. Dictating his memoirs in his prison at St. Helena, Napoleon foretold the destiny that awaited her: "Italy, isolated within her natural frontiers, separated by the sea and by very high mountains from the rest of Europe, seems to be called to be a great and powerful nation . . . the unity of customs, of language, of literature, in some more or less distant future, ought to unite all its inhabitants under one sole government. . . . Rome is undoubtedly the capital which one day the Italians will select. . . . It is necessary to the happiness of Europe that Italy should form one sole State which will maintain the equilibrium on the Continent between France and Austria, and on the sea between France and England." But Napoleon contributed to Italian unity more than a political prophecy. He actively and consciously promoted its achievement. When he marched into Piedmont at the head of his legions in 1796 he found Italy divided into a dozen separate States: except in the subalpine province of Piedmont, the Hapsburgs dominated the north; Central Italy was in the grip of the Papacy; the Spanish Bourbons ruled in Naples and Sicily. Though not a foreigner himself, Napoleon came as the commander of a foreign army; his rule was harsh, harsher it may well be than that of the Hapsburgs and Bourbons whom he displaced, yet he was the first to hold out to the subjects of the Kingdoms and Duchies and Republics he overthrew the splendid hope of a united Italy, and his policy was uniformly directed towards its achievement. He reduced the political divisions of the country from a dozen to three; he ignored local prejudices and trampled under foot municipal jealousies; he constructed roads and bridges; he brought to Italy the fruits of the French Revolution in the extinction of feudalism and the overthrow of the social structure based upon it. As in Illyria so also in Italy he introduced the French codes, and established something of equity and uniformity in the administration of justice. All taxation is a burden upon tax-payers, and taxation

imposed by a conqueror has an added sting, but Napoleon's imposts if heavy were equitable, and the peasant, though not exempt, had the satisfaction of knowing that the nobles bore a burden heavier than his own. To enjoyment of equality before the law was added the stimulus of equality of opportunity, a career open to talent, and freedom of writing and of speech. At Napoleon's approach the Jesuits fled; education was placed on a rational basis and widely extended; innumerable monasteries were suppressed; above all, the Italians were redeemed from the lounging and effeminate habits to which they had been long inured; they were trained to think and to act like men. Even Mazzini, profound as was his detestation of despots, could not in truthfulness withhold his word of gratitude from Napoleon: "The intellectual rise, the rapid increase of national prosperity, the burst of fraternization . . . are facts, especially in the period 1805-18, irrevocably committed to history. Notwithstanding our dependence on the French Empire, under political despotism and despite war, the feeling of nationality specially incorporated in our brave army elevated our souls, picturing in the distance the oneness of Italy, the goal of all our efforts." The facts are not, indeed, open to question: the name of the First if not the Third Napoleon must be inscribed upon the roll of the makers of united Italy.

The Settlement of
1814-15

For the moment, however, the hands of the clock were set back by the diplomatists at Vienna. Their object was to restore, as far as might be, the *status quo ante* Revolution. They hoped to renew in Italy the dynastic *morcellement* of the eighteenth century. The States were once again parcelled out among Hapsburgs and Bourbons. Austria was richly compensated for losses elsewhere, by the addition of Venetia to Lombardy; Marie Louise, the consort of Napoleon but an Austrian Archduchess, was installed in the Duchy of Parma; a Bourbon Marie Louise in that of Lucca; Tuscany was restored to Ferdinand III, and Modena to Duke Francis IV, both of the Austrian House; the Bourbons were re-instated in the person of Ferdinand I on the throne of the Two Sicilies, and Pope Pius VII re-entered upon the temporal domains of the Papacy. Only the little republic of San Marino, looking sadly forth over the waters of the Adriatic, was left to recall the Italy of the Middle Ages—an Italy which, though divided, was independent.

Looking, however, no longer to the past but to the future The House of Savoy the most interesting feature of the Restoration still remains to be noticed. Among the dynasties of Europe the House of Savoy is one of the oldest. Half a century before William the Bastard landed at Pevensey, a Frankish Count, Humbert of the White Hands, was endowed by a grateful Emperor with the County of Aosta. Planted at Geneva he controlled the Alpine passes, and in that control we have the key to a policy pursued through the centuries with singular persistency by the House of Savoy. The son of Humbert of the White Hands acquired Turin as part of the dowry of an Italian wife, and the Counts of Savoy (to use a later title) thus succeeded in "straddling the Alps." Geography determined their destiny, and as the Prince de Ligne cynically said, "hardly permitted them to behave like honest men." It is indeed true that in the wars of the eighteenth century the Dukes of Savoy-Piedmont changed sides no fewer than five times; but if they were not more honest than their neighbours, they were not lacking in courage nor in straight-dealing. Thus in a treaty of alliance concluded by Charles Emmanuel III with Maria Theresa in 1742, one of the articles specifically stipulated that the Duke should be free to change sides as circumstances might dictate. Nor was the article a dead letter. Like the Hohenzollern (whose story presented many parallels with their own) the House of Savoy has always been frankly realist in politics. They have regularly worshipped in the Temple of ambition and have never gone after strange gods. Successful diplomacy enabled them in the eighteenth century to add the Royal Crown of Sardinia to the ducal Crowns of Piedmont and Savoy, nor was ever a war fought, or a peace concluded, however remote the primary issues at stake, and however detached the principal combatants might be, but the House of Savoy was able to acquire several of the towns of Lombardy, stripping it, as the common saying went, "like an artichoke leaf by leaf."

In 1815 the proud independence of the Genoese Republic Genoa was sacrificed to their ambition. Mazzini, a native of Genoa, could never forgive this "outrage." Yet, but for this outrage, it is doubtful whether Mazzini's dream of a united Italy could ever have been fulfilled. The operation of the principle of "self-determination" is curiously contradictory.

The case of Genoa affords an outstanding illustration of this truth. Advanced by the Genoese as a plea for independence, it might have been employed by the Italians as an apology for annexation. Step by step had ever been the precept of the House of Savoy. Genoa marked a stage in the advance towards Rome.

Metternich
and Italy

Such then was the Italy of 1815, little, if at all, better than Metternich's "geographical expression," and Metternich was master there. But for all that, the Italy of 1815 was not the Italy of the præ-Napoleonic days. Strive as they might, the diplomatists of Vienna could not set back the hands of time, nor "make things seem as though they had not been." They might indeed put back a Hapsburg on this throne, a Bourbon on that; they might annihilate ancient republics and revive modern dukedoms; they might draw again dividing lines which Napoleon had erased, and again set up boundaries which he had broken down; but as the next few years would show, they could not erase from the minds of the Italian people the new-born recollection of their ancient fame; they could not permanently stifle their newly conceived but none the less passionate longing for national independence, if not for national unity.

For the moment, however, Metternich was master of Italy, while Lombards and Venetians were little better than slaves beneath the Austrian yoke. In a letter addressed, thirty years later, to Sir James Graham, Mazzini gave passionate expression to their feelings: "Country, liberty, brotherhood, all are wrested from them; their faculties are mutilated, curbed, chained within a narrow circle traced for them by men who are strangers to their tendencies, to their wants, to their wishes; their tradition is broken under the cane of an Austrian corporal; their immortal soul feudatory to the stupid caprices of a man seated on a throne at Vienna." Only with the help of a second Napoleon and of Bismarck was this yoke ultimately removed. For the time being it was riveted upon the Italian peoples by Metternich. Yet the Austrian yoke, though bitterly resented by Italian patriots, was not without its alleviations. The late Duke of Argyll, inspired as he was by the sentiments of an English Liberal, bore remarkable testimony to the material prosperity enjoyed at this time by the Italian provinces of

Austria. "The whole face of the people and the country was the face of pleasantness and peace."¹ A more recent chronicler, deeply imbued with Italian sentiment, has confirmed this view. Apart from political cases, justice was better administered in the Austrian provinces than in any other part of Italy and education was more widely extended; above all, municipal autonomy (and therein lay the promise of future developments) was not infringed.² But material alleviations were purchased at the price of political liberty.

In other parts of Italy the price was paid and the alleviation not obtained. The petty despots might reign, but Metternich ruled; the strings of the puppets were pulled from Vienna. The Neapolitan insurrection of 1820 affords an illustration in point. Of all the princes restored to Italian thrones in 1815, perhaps the most despicable was Ferdinand I, King of the Two Sicilies. On his restoration he had solemnly pledged himself to respect the Liberal Constitution drawn up for Sicily in 1812 by Lord William Bentinck. In 1816 this Constitution was, at Metternich's bidding, annulled lest the example of Sicily might serve as a vicious model for the other princedoms of Italy. The excitement engendered by the Spanish Revolution in 1820 spread, as we have seen, to the Italian dominions of the Spanish Bourbons. The Neapolitan people, supported by the army, demanded a Constitution on the model of that conceded in Madrid. Ferdinand granted the demands of the insurgents with apparent eagerness, fervently protesting his gratitude to God who had permitted him, in his old age, to confer this blessing upon his people. Some days later the concession was solemnly ratified. The King having heard Mass approached the altar, and in presence of the Court and the Ministers took an oath of fidelity to the Constitution. Then, fixing his eyes upon the Cross, the King cried: "Omnipotent God, who with infinite penetration lookest into the past and into the future, if I lie, or if I have it in mind to break the oath do Thou at this instant hurl on my head the lightning of Thy vengeance." The King kissed the Bible, the oath was repeated by his sons and the new Constitution was publicly proclaimed. The Neapolitans were overjoyed; politicians and poets sang in unison that

Insurrection
in Naples

¹ *Autobiography*, i, 211.

² Trevelyan, *Manin*, c. i, *passim*.

Ferdinand had sounded the death-knell of servitude in Italy.

Metternich
and Naples

A grim smile was Metternich's response to this exuberance. Hardly had the words of his solemn oath died upon his lips before the perjured King despatched a secret message to the allied sovereigns assembled at Troppau, informing them of his intention "to leave his Kingdom and with the help of Austrian troops to resume absolute power." In December 1820, despite the opposition of his Parliament, he set out for Laibach, whither the conference had adjourned from Troppau. Before leaving Naples, he once more proclaimed his adherence to the new Constitution, but no sooner was he safe in Austrian territory, than he flung aside the mask and invoked the aid of the Holy Allies for the restoration of absolutism. The protests of England could not deter the allies from eager acceptance of the invitation. An Austrian army marched into Naples; the Neapolitan troops ran away; Ferdinand was restored; the Constitution was torn up; and the insurgent leaders were flung into dungeons or sent to the gallows. Thus did Metternich enforce respect for legitimacy in Naples.

Insurrection
in Piedmont

The insurrectionary movement of 1820 was not, however, confined to Naples. The whole of Italy was at this time honeycombed with secret societies. The most important of these were the Charcoalburners (*Carbonari*). International in its ramifications, this famous society aimed at securing constitutional government, national independence, and personal liberty for all peoples. It attracted to its ranks some of the best Liberals and some of the worst, most desperate, and most impracticable insurrectionaries, on the Continent. Semi-religious in ritual, fantastic in its elaborate symbolism, the *Carbonari* was oligarchical almost autocratic, in organization; yet in the orgy of reaction which followed on the restorations of 1815 it stood, and stood almost alone, for Liberalism and progress. The influence of the movement was first manifested in the Neapolitan insurrection of 1820; and there its weaknesses were clearly revealed. Equally was this the case in Piedmont. The Government of Victor Emmanuel had proved itself weakly reactionary, but in the insurrection which broke out in March, 1821, there was nothing of hostility to the House of Savoy. "Our

hearts are faithful to our King, but we wish to deliver him from perfidious counsels. War against Austria; at home a Constitution (*statuto*); such are the wishes of the people." So the formula ran, and it was sincere. When the Austrian troops marched on Naples, the Liberals of Piedmont, conceiving that the moment had come for striking a blow for national independence, united with the malcontents of Lombardy, with the intention of flinging themselves upon the rear of the Austrian white-coats. But the movement was badly led, and the plans hopelessly miscarried. Victor Emmanuel, though not disinclined towards Liberalism, was weakly dependent upon Metternich, and torn by conflicting sentiments resigned his Crown to his brother Charles Felix. One party among the insurgents accepted the nomination, in loyalty to the legal King; another would have passed him over in favour of his cousin Charles Albert, Prince of Savoy-Carignano. Amid divided counsels the whole movement collapsed.

On Lombardy the Austrian yoke was reimposed with tenfold rigour; the insurgent leaders were carried off to life-long imprisonment in Austrian dungeons; the young men were conscripted for the Austrian armies; the Lombard prisons were crammed with political prisoners; every movement of men suspected of "Italian" sentiment was watched with jealous vigilance, and torture was applied to extort from the victims even the unspoken wishes of the heart. A dull despair fell even upon the bravest, and for nearly a decade reaction reigned supreme.

Nevertheless, though the fire was extinguished the re-
volutionary embers smouldered, and were fanned into flames Insurrection
of 1830 by the French Revolution of July. The conflagration of 1830 burned most fiercely in the Papal States. None of the restored sovereigns was more exuberantly welcomed by his subjects than was Pope Pius VII, when, in 1814, he re-entered the Holy City. In no State of Italy, perhaps of Europe, was restoration followed by more complete reaction. The Jesuits were recalled, feudal privileges were restored, and every symbol of medievalism reappeared. The administration were replaced wholly in the hands of ecclesiastics, not in Rome only but throughout the Papal States, and nowhere was it more hopelessly inefficient or more corrupt,

Taxes were both burdensome and arbitrary ; personal liberty was precarious ; the judges vied with the police in venality, and social life was rendered insupportable by a system of espionage. Accordingly, when, encouraged by the collapse of legitimacy in France, the insurrectionary movement reappeared in Italy, it centred in the Papal States. Thence it spread to Piedmont, to Parma, and Modena. But everywhere the risings proved not less abortive than those of 1820-1. A new Pope, Gregory XVI, elected to the Papal Chair in the midst of the insurrectionary confusion, and alarmed by the declaration of the insurgents that the Temporal Dominion of the Papacy must end, invoked the aid of Austria. Metternich, nothing loath, again marched an army into Italy ; the States of the Church were occupied by the white-coats ; order was restored, and the authority of the Pope re-established.

Francis IV was restored to his throne in Modena ; the ex-Empress Marie Louise crept back under Austrian protection to Parma. But as soon as the Austrians evacuated the Romagna insurrections broke out afresh. Once more the Austrians returned, but France, growing jealous of Austrian supremacy in Italy, sent a force to occupy Ancona (February 1832), and for six years (1832-8) Austrian and French troops continued to confront each other in the Papal States.

Mazzini

From these rival occupants Italy derived no benefit. The condition of that unhappy country seemed, indeed, desperate. Fifteen years of reaction, broken only by sporadic and seemingly fruitless insurrections, had crushed the spirit of Italy. Many of her bravest sons were languishing in Austrian dungeons. The *Carbonari* had proved their incapacity for leadership. Between State and State there was no cohesion. Metternich could defeat revolution in detail.

One man in Italy faced these facts. Born in Genoa, in 1805, Joseph Mazzini had been impressed, even as a child, by the misery and degradation of his country and had resolved to dedicate his life to the cause of Italian liberation. His natural bias was not towards politics but literature, but he perceived, that for men conscious of an unfulfilled duty as citizens, the production of great literature is impossible.

“Without a country and without liberty we might perhaps produce some prophets of art, but no vital art. Therefore it was better for us to consecrate our lives to the solution of the problem, ‘Are we to have a country?’ and turn at once to the political question. If we were successful, the art of Italy would bloom and flourish over our graves.”

Were the Italians to have a country? To the solution of that problem Mazzini consecrated a life, disfigured by fanaticism if not stained with crime, yet essentially distinguished by single-minded and unselfish patriotism. Soon after leaving the university he joined the *Carbonari*, but he was half mistrustful of their aims, and heartily disliked their methods. “They had no programme, no faith, no lofty ideals.” It was his mission to supply the lack. Shortly after the Revolution of 1830 Mazzini, having been entrapped by an *agent provocateur* into the fulfilment of some trifling commission for the *Carbonari*, was arrested and imprisoned in the fortress of Savona on the western Riviera. “The Government was not fond,” so his father was informed, “of young men of talent the subject of whose musings was unknown to them.” Brought to trial after six months’ imprisonment, Mazzini was acquitted but was exiled from Italy.

While in exile at Marseilles, Mazzini founded (1831) *Young Italy* the famous *Association of Young Italy*. This association was to take the place of the *Carbonari*; its programme was definite and ambitious. The Austrians were to be expelled; Italy to be liberated and unified; and a reformed Papacy was to assume the moral leadership of the world. The ultimate form of government was to be determined by the people, though a Republic was to be commended by fair argument. The war against Austria was to be waged by Italians and for Italy. No reliance must be placed on foreign Governments, or on the efforts of diplomacy. Nor must there be any thought of federalism, or of independence divorced from unity. *Young Italy* was essentially unitarian. “Never rise in any other name than that of Italy and of all Italy.” Such was the programme of *Young Italy*, and Mazzini was not without hope of its immediate if partial realization.

In 1831 Charles Felix of Sardinia died, and was succeeded by a cousin, Charles Albert. As a Liberal and a Carbonaro,

Charles
Albert of
Piedmont

great things were hoped from him. Mazzini at once addressed to the King an eloquent appeal, beseeching him to lead Italy to the goal of liberty and unity. Charles Albert refused to respond, except with an order that Mazzini should be arrested if he attempted to return to Italy. But though the Sardinian King frowned upon it, the *Young Italy* movement attracted thousands of ardent spirits, and for ten years the hopes of the patriots in all parts of Italy were focussed upon its programme. The attitude of Charles Albert was a bitter disappointment to his quondam associates, and a plot was formed for his assassination in which Mazzini was unhappily involved. An unsuccessful raid upon Savoy (1834) further contributed to damage Mazzini's reputation among moderate Liberals, and after many vicissitudes he found—like most political exiles—a home in England (1837).

In Italy, the association which he founded did splendid work in keeping the Italian ideal alive during a period of disillusionment and reaction. Gradually, however, other parties emerged which, with similar ends in view, sought to attain them by more moderate and more practical means. Of these the most important were the Neo-Guelphs and the Piedmontese Liberals.

Massimo
D'Azeglio

Of the Piedmontese party more will be said hereafter. Led by Massimo D'Azeglio, it looked to the attainment of Italian independence, not by sporadic revolutionary outbreaks, but by the persistent promotion of administrative reforms on Conservative lines. With secret societies and "revolutions conducted by violence," D'Azeglio had no sympathy whatever, though he frankly recognized that they were "the fruit of the blind, stupid, and retrograde absolutism of the restoration." These views he enforced in a famous work *Casi di Romagna* (1846). Like the Neo-Guelphs he looked not for unity but for federalism; like them he hoped for the assistance of a reformed Papacy; but he relied mainly upon Piedmont to lead the other Italian States along the path of reform. Like Mazzini, in 1831, he appealed to Charles Albert to champion the Italian cause. Charles Albert's response was unexpectedly cordial: "If the occasion presents itself, my life, the lives of my sons, my arms, my treasure, my army, all shall be devoted to the cause of Italy."

In the King's judgment the moment had not yet arrived. "Tell these gentlemen," so he advised D'Azeglio, "to keep still; there is nothing to be done at present." That was towards the end of 1845. Nevertheless, it was upon Charles Albert that the hopes of Liberal Italy presently began to concentrate.

For the moment, however, the policy of the Neo-Guelphs ^{The Neo-Guelphs} held the field. The Neo-Guelphs, led by Gioberti, and Balbo,¹ were men who combined devout Catholicism with ardent nationalism. They looked to the Papacy, purified and reformed, to put itself at the head of the Italian movement. In 1846 they believed that their chance had come. In that year Gregory XVI died and was succeeded in the Papal chair by Pius IX (Pio Nono). Pio Nono, a genial, ^{Pio Nono} kindly ecclesiastic of Liberal inclinations, began his reign by issuing an amnesty (July 16, 1846) for all political offenders and suspects. This was immediately followed by promises of extensive reforms. Nowhere in Italy were they more sorely needed than in the States of the Church. Corruption was rampant, and abuses of every kind existed in the extremest forms. The Neo-Guelphs acclaimed Pio Nono as the predestined saviour and liberator of his country. His protest against the Austrian occupation of Ferrara raised enthusiasm to the fever height. Mazzini hailed his accession, as fifteen years ago he had hailed the accession of Charles Albert. Charles Albert himself offered to place his sword at the service of the Papacy, if war with Austria ensued. Metternich was completely taken by surprise: "We were prepared for anything except a Liberal Pope. Now we have got one, there is no telling what may happen." But Metternich's alarms were premature. The Pope's zeal for reform soon slackened. A measure of freedom to the Press and permission for the enrolment of a national militia were conceded, but little more. Yet in every State in Italy a new spirit was moving over the face of waters long stagnant. Notably was this the case in Tuscany, Modena, Parma, Lucca, and, above all, in Piedmont, though it was manifest also in Naples and Sicily, and even in the Austrian Provinces

¹ In his *Speranze D'Italia* (1844) Balbo suggested that Austria should surrender Lombardy and Venice and compensate herself in the Balkans, when the inevitable break-up of the Ottoman Empire occurred.

of Lombardy and Venetia. The movement was almost universal. Would it issue in the concession of reform or in the outbreak of revolution? Not in Italy alone was that question agitating the minds of men. The year 1848 announced the answer.

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CHAPTER VIII

THE ORLEANS MONARCHY

WE left France, committed by the Revolution of July to the trial of yet another in the lengthening series of political experiments, which, however disturbing to her own repose, have provided valuable material for the laboratories of Political Science. The Revolution of July

In 1789 not Paris only but France had overthrown the *ancien régime*; in 1792 she had got rid of the ancient monarchy; for seven years she had made trial of a Republic; the Republic had issued, as Burke had sagaciously predicted that it must, in a military dictatorship; the dictatorship had clothed itself with the form of an Empire. In 1814 the Empire was overthrown and France recalled the Bourbons. In 1815 the Emperor returned and the Bourbons fled. The Empire could not survive a crushing military disaster, and the victorious allies restored legitimacy in France. The restored monarchy of 1815 was not, however, the monarchy of 1814. But legitimacy France could understand, and both Louis XVIII and Charles X were unquestionably legitimate. All parties, save one, had now had their turn. The "people" had realized their "sovereignty" during the last decade of the eighteenth century; then came the turn of the army and its general; the ancient nobility and the clergy had enjoyed a brief triumph under Charles X (1825-30), and "legitimacy" had issued in the "Ordinances of St. Cloud." Each experiment had failed in turn. What was left?

For eighteen years the middle classes enjoyed political supremacy under a "citizen" King and a "constitutional" monarchy. The Citizen Monarchy Louis Philippe was to "reign but not to rule," according to the French aphorism and the English mode. He did his best to fill the rôle of a bourgeois King. He was affable and accessible. He divested himself of the symbols

of the ancient monarchy. The Crown and the sceptre were laid aside; a white tall hat and a green umbrella better became the chosen representative of the French *bourgeoisie*. The Orleans monarchy and its Ministers were pledged to a peaceful régime at home and abroad; to non-intervention and economic development; to the maintenance of order and the avoidance of extremes. The pledge was on the whole fulfilled, but the performance, as we shall see, did not permanently satisfy France.

From the outset there were elements of weakness in the position of the July monarchy, and, as time went on, specific causes of disillusionment combined with inherent disabilities to weaken still further the hold of Louis Philippe upon the affections, and even the respect of his people. The fundamental and essential flaw in the structure, was the dangerously narrow base on which it was erected. Deliberately self-deprived of the Divine Right of Monarchy, it made no appeal to the Divine Right of Democracy. Unblessed by the priests, it was not "broad based upon the people's will." It rested entirely upon the suffrages of the *bourgeoisie*, and it essayed an experiment—that of constitutional monarchy—alien to the genius of France.

Difficulties
of Louis
Philippe

Moreover, it essayed the experiment under circumstances of peculiar difficulty. The European situation was none too favourable; several of the sovereigns were unfriendly towards the man who had displaced the legitimist cornerstone of their reconstructed edifice. In France itself, Louis Philippe had to face the hostility not only of Legitimists, but of Bonapartists and Republicans, and though all these parties lacked organization and effective leadership, he had no party of his own so well defined as theirs, nor could he appeal to a principle equally intelligible to the people of France. Such tempered popularity as the King enjoyed was negative rather than positive; it was evoked less by zeal than by weariness. Consequently throughout the greater part of his reign the parliamentary situation was, in a degree exceptional even in France, shifting and unstable. Guizot did, indeed, succeed, during the last eight years of the reign, in establishing himself in power, but during the first ten years, Ministry succeeded Ministry with bewildering rapidity.

Even more menacing was the industrial situation. During the July monarchy France experienced the first birth pangs of the economic revolution through which England had passed a generation earlier. France has never, indeed, become industrialized in the same degree as England; agriculture has always been the main preoccupation of her thrifty and industrious people. Nevertheless, France could not entirely escape the suffering and confusion inseparable from the transition from hand-work to the machine system, and it was under the Orleanist régime that the disquieting phenomena, so unhappily familiar to us in England—trade cycles and recurrent crises, wage oscillations and unemployment—first obtruded themselves in the manufacturing cities of France. Rapid industrial changes produced their intellectual reactions. Recurrent unemployment evoked the doctrine of the *droit au travail*. Of this new gospel Louis Blanc was the prophet, and it was on an industrial rather than a political rock, that the Orleanist monarchy ultimately foundered.

The formal changes effected in the Constitution by the July Revolution were neither numerous nor specially important. Perhaps the most significant was the deletion of the monarchical preamble to the Charter of 1814, and the enunciation of the principle of popular sovereignty. Louis Philippe was not to be King of France by Divine Right, but “King of the French by the grace of God and the will of the people.” The Chamber of Peers also ceased to be hereditary; its members were nominated by the King from certain specified categories, and thus the House of Peers practically became a Council of officials. The property qualification for the electors of the Chamber of Deputies was lowered from 300 to 200 francs, and the age qualification from 30 to 25. For the elected Deputies these qualifications were similarly reduced, from 1000 to 500 francs and from 40 to 30 years of age. Article 14 of the Charter which gave the King the right “to make Ordinances for the safety of the State” was, in view of the misuse of the privilege by Charles X, suppressed, and the King bestowed upon the Chambers a right of initiating legislation concurrent with his own. Roman Catholicism was no longer to be the State

The Con-
stitution
of 1830

religion, though it continued to be recognized as "the form of worship practised by the majority of the French people." The Government censorship over the Press was abolished, and secondary education was placed under State control. Finally, the bourgeois National Guard was re-established, with the right to elect its own officers; and to its guardianship the new Constitution was confined. One point of cardinal importance was left in obscurity. The Charter had declared that Ministers were to be "responsible." But to whom? Was Louis Philippe to occupy "a throne surrounded by republican institutions," according to the catchword of the Hôtel de Ville; was he to be a King who, in the classic phrase of Thiers, "reigned but did not govern"; was he to be a "constitutional" ruler in the curious English sense; were the Ministers to be in fact his servants or responsible to the Legislature? These questions were never really answered in France, until the monarchy was finally superseded by a Republic which was not, like that of the United States, Presidential, but frankly Parliamentary.

This ambiguity accentuated the other embarrassments of the Orleanist régime. But the King himself, though the nominee of the *bourgeoisie* was not the less a Bourbon, and was resolved not to be a *pourceau à l'engrais*: "they may do what they like," he said, "but they shall not prevent me from driving my own coach."¹ Unfortunately he proved to be a very indifferent whip. Nor was the road too smooth. The difficulties were, as already hinted, in part diplomatic, in part parliamentary, and most of all industrial. Of the foreign policy of the reign more will be said presently. The domestic difficulty arose essentially from the narrow base on which the Orleans monarchy stood. The King attempted to broaden it, by drawing his first Ministry from all the parties which had acquiesced in the Revolution of July. But the Paris mob called for vengeance on the Ministers of the late King, and attacked not only the castle of Vincennes, where Polignac and his colleagues were confined, but the Palais Royal itself. The veteran Lafayette, who had been appointed to command the National Guard, did his best to restore order, but had it not been for the

¹ Dickinson, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

promptness and courage of General Dumesnil, the lives of the ex-Ministers would have been sacrificed to the fury of the mob ; as it was, they were sentenced to imprisonment for life.

The riots in Paris brought the Coalition Ministry to an end ; the Moderates, or "Party of Resistance," including Casimir-Périer, Molé, Guizot, and the Duc de Broglie resigned, and in November 1830, the Progressives or "Party of Movement," formed a Government under the leadership of Lafitte, a wealthy banker in Paris. Lafitte and his Foreign Minister, General Sebastiani, were anxious to embark upon a spirited foreign policy ; to gratify the French Republicans by intervention in Belgium, and by encouraging the revolts in Poland and Italy. Baffled by the anxiety of Louis Philippe not to risk a rupture with England over Belgium, nor with Metternich over Polish and Italian affairs, Lafitte and his "progressive" colleagues resigned in March 1831. A "Moderate" Ministry was then formed under Casimir-Périer.

Casimir-Périer was a strong man with no illusions as to the realities of the situation at home and abroad. The terms of the "contract" of 1830 were to be strictly observed ; there was to be no tampering with the Charter as then amended ; the *juste milieu* was to be maintained, and the vagaries of extremists on either flank—Legitimists and Republicans—rigorously curtailed ; public order was to be enforced at home, and interference in the affairs of neighbours to be discouraged. It was the wise programme of a man who knew his own mind, and was determined that the new constitutional experiment should have a fair trial. Against the extremists he took prompt and effective action : he instituted prosecutions against journals, associations, and individuals who were attempting to subvert the Orleans monarchy in the interests of a Republic ; and at the same time proceeded with equal vigour against the more reckless of the Legitimists, who did not hesitate to join hands with the Republicans, if by that means they could get rid of the usurping Orleanists. When riots broke out among the silk weavers of Lyons, troops were employed to suppress them.

Nor did the country fail to appreciate the combined firmness and tact displayed by Casimir-Périer. In May 1831

the electorate decisively approved his policy, and encouraged him to proceed with it. Unfortunately, however, in May 1832, Casimir-Périer was carried off by cholera; and the King, already impatient of the ascendancy of a "First Minister," himself assumed the Presidency of the Council, and filled the other offices with more subservient Ministers. The experiment was not a success. The Legitimists, led by the Duchess de Berri, raised the standard of revolt in the South; the Republicans took advantage of the funeral of General La Marque to raise an insurrection in Paris. A state of siege was proclaimed, and the Government had to prosecute some Saint-Simonist fanatics. Not until October did the King give way, and call to his councils Marshal Soult, who formed a Ministry "of all the talents"—mostly of the *doctrinaire* type, including the Duc de Broglie, Thiers, and Guizot.

Soult,
Guizot,
De Broglie,
1832-6

These three men formed the backbone of the Ministries which held office for the next four years. An Education Bill was passed which for the first time made primary education accessible to all, and before the Orleans monarchy fell no fewer than 2,000,000 children were receiving instruction in 43,000 schools. Less successful was a law against associations, which was intended to strangle trade-unionism in its birth. In April 1833 the workmen rose in insurrection in Lyons, and only after four days' heavy fighting and great loss of life, was order restored. In the same month a rising took place in Paris, but was suppressed with less loss of life. Throughout this period the great cities of France were, indeed, in a state of almost perpetual unrest.

Louis
Napoleon

Thiers came into power for a few months in 1836, but his anxiety to pursue a more "spirited" foreign policy alarmed the King, and, in September, he gave place to Count Molé, who brought Guizot back to the Ministry of Education. This Ministry was shaken by the theatrical attempt of Prince Louis Napoleon to raise the Bonapartist flag at Strasbourg in October 1836 and by a simultaneous republican outbreak at Vendôme. Both outbreaks were abortive; Louis Napoleon, after a few days' imprisonment, was deported to America, and the whole matter was treated with wisely calculated contempt by the Government. But it served, none the less, to remind France that there existed a Bonapartist Pretender; and the Pretender had himself proved

that, though he might be deficient in a sense of humour, he lacked neither courage nor imagination. Moreover, the acquittal of his accomplices, in the teeth of convincing evidence of their guilt, proved that the Pretender might become dangerous.

For the moment, however, the Orleans monarchy was safe, despite the instability of the parliamentary situation, against all its adversaries: legitimists and Bonapartists, republicans and socialists; and, during the last eight years of the reign, even the parliamentary situation was stabilized under the leadership of Guizot.

Yet the seeds of the disorder to which Louis Philippe ultimately succumbed were already sown; the virus was infecting, to an unsuspected degree, the whole body politic. But the operation was slow and subtle. Louis Philippe and his régime never excited enmity; they did something worse: they provoked boredom. In Lamartine's famous phrase: *La France s'ennuyait*. To the prevalent boredom, ^{France and her neighbours} nothing contributed more than the inglorious character of the foreign policy of the leading statesmen of the period—Guizot and Thiers. Guizot, though a sincere admirer of England, unfortunately found himself thwarted on every side by Lord Palmerston.

Lord Palmerston and Louis Philippe first came into collision, as we have seen, in reference to the revolt of Belgium. Had it not been for the stout opposition of Palmerston the offer of the Belgian Crown to the Duc de Nemours would undoubtedly have been accepted by his father, and the House of Orleans would have given a King to a country, which for twenty years had formed part of the French Republic. That satisfaction was withheld from Louis Philippe, and in place of the Duc de Nemours an anglicized Coburg reigned at Brussels.¹

Not only in Belgium did Palmerston thwart the policy ^{Mehemet Ali} of Louis Philippe. In 1839 the Eastern Question, as we shall presently see, was re-opened by the restless ambition of Mehemet Ali, the Pasha of Egypt. Mehemet Ali was not only anxious to throw off the Turkish suzerainty in Egypt, but had ulterior designs upon Constantinople itself.

¹ *Supra*, chapter v.

Louis Philippe encouraged him. Palmerston, however, had no mind to see the substitution of the powerful Mehemet for a feeble youth at Constantinople ; still less to see French influence predominant in Egypt. In the Treaty of London (July 15, 1840) he secured the adhesion of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and France found herself in a position of inglorious isolation. Would France defy the will of Europe as interpreted by Great Britain ? The fiery Thiers, then Prime Minister, would gladly have done so. Bulwer, the British Ambassador in Paris, was instructed to tell him " in the most friendly and inoffensive manner that if France threw down the gauntlet, Great Britain would not refuse to pick it up." Louis Philippe shrank from a complete rupture with the one Liberal monarchy in Europe ; Thiers resigned ; and was succeeded by the Anglophil Guizot. For the second time Palmerston had imposed his will upon Europe, and inflicted a damaging blow upon the prestige of the Orleans monarchy, if not of France.

Louis Philippe began to realize that something must be done to re-establish his credit in Europe. To this end he adopted the means most calculated to endanger his position at home. Thwarted by the Liberal Minister in England, he began to gravitate towards the absolutist courts of the Continent. Worse still, in order to promote the supposed interests of his family, he embarked upon an intrigue in Spain, which involved a gross breach of faith with England, and brought deserved discredit upon himself. But this unsavoury business requires explanation.

Affairs in
Portugal
and Spain

The situation both in Spain and Portugal had for some time past been exceedingly confused. But between the two countries there was a close parallel ; in both, Liberals and absolutists alike found champions in the Royal House ; in both, there was a young Queen under tutelage representing the cause of " constitutionalism " ; in both, there was an uncle claiming a throne in alliance with the forces of absolutism. On the death of his father, John VI, in 1826, Dom Pedro, Emperor of Brazil, had renounced the throne of Portugal in favour of his daughter, Maria, a child of seven, who was ultimately to marry her uncle, Dom Miguel. Miguel, meanwhile, was to be Regent. But this arrangement did not satisfy the Absolutists, and between Miguelists and the

Constitutionalists there was continuous strife. In July 1831 Dom Pedro, having abdicated the throne of Brazil in favour of his son, Pedro II, and after a sojourn in England, went to Portugal, the real headquarters of the Portuguese Constitutionalists, to support his daughter, Maria, against the claims of his brother, Dom Miguel. France and England had already been compelled to send fleets to the Tagus to afford protection to their respective subjects. Under a thin veil of diplomatic decorum, France and England were now in fact united in an active alliance with the Constitutionalists against the Miguelists. Pedro's fleet was commanded by an Englishman, his army by a Frenchman; and both in navy and army many Englishmen and Frenchmen served as volunteers. In the summer of 1833 Miguel's fleet was annihilated by Napier off Cape St. Vincent; Pedro entered Lisbon in July, and Donna Maria was crowned Queen.

Events had been moving in a similar direction in Spain. On September 29, 1833, Ferdinand VII died, leaving a young widow and two young daughters. Until his marriage ^{Christinos and Carlists in Spain} (*en quatrièmes nocés*) with Maria Christina of Naples, Ferdinand had been childless, and his brother, Don Carlos, had every prospect of succession to the throne. The latter's prospects were still further improved by the fact that since 1713 the Salic law had prevailed in Spain. But on Ferdinand's marriage with Christina he revoked this law by Pragmatic Sanction. Shortly afterwards a daughter, Isabella, was born, and on his death was declared Queen, with her mother, Christina, as Regent. Don Carlos—backed by all the forces of absolutism—protested against this feminine usurpation, and on October 4, 1833, was proclaimed King. Christina was consequently compelled to fling herself into the arms of the Liberals, and granted a constitution known as the *Estatuto Real*. Palmerston's comment on these events is highly significant of the point of view from which he regarded all Continental politics: "The triumph of Maria and the accession of Isabella will be important events in Europe, and will give great strength to the Liberal party."¹

That party was further strengthened by the conclusion ^{The Quadruple} Alliance

¹ To W. Temple, October 8, 1833. William Temple was British Envoy at Naples, 1832-56.

(April 22, 1834) of a formal alliance between Great Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal. This treaty provided for joint action between the contracting parties for the expulsion of the Infants, Carlos and Miguel, from Spain and Portugal respectively. "I reckon this to be a great stroke," wrote Palmerston to his brother, "it establishes a Quadruple Alliance among the constitutional States of the West, which will serve as a powerful counterpoise to the Holy Alliance of the East. . . . I should like to see Metternich's face when he reads our treaty." The sting was in the tail. The Infants were to be expelled from Spain, less for the advantage of the Spaniards and the Portuguese than as a counterstroke to the Eastern Courts. In its immediate aim the alliance was undeniably effective. In May 1834 Dom Miguel agreed, by the Treaty of Evora, to leave Portugal and renounce his claim to the throne, and in June Don Carlos retired to England.

"Portugal is settled," wrote Palmerston, "Spain is safe." As regards Portugal he had warrant for his satisfaction with his handiwork; as regards Spain it was premature; but with the alternating successes of Christinos and Carlists in Spain this work cannot concern itself; they were outside the main stream of European politics, and hardly contributed to it so much as a rivulet.

Ten years later the question of the "Spanish marriages" did, however, produce acute tension between Great Britain and France. In the interval, the Anglo-French *entente* had been seriously weakened (as we shall see presently) by the development of events in the Near East. The Spanish marriages question almost caused a complete rupture between the two countries.

The question of providing the young Queen Isabella with a husband had been for some time under discussion between the Courts of England and France. Louis Philippe, following the traditional policy of the Bourbons, was anxious to strengthen his dynastic connection with Spain. England objected to the idea of a French Prince becoming Prince Consort, but after an interchange of visits with the French Court in 1844 and 1845, Queen Victoria agreed to the engagement of the Duc de Montpensier, younger son of the French King, to Maria Louisa, younger sister of the Queen

of Spain. But it was clearly stipulated that the marriage should not take place until after the birth of an heir to the throne of Spain. The young Queen was now (1845) in her sixteenth year. Her mother, the Regent, would, failing a French Prince, have preferred a Coburg. Lord Aberdeen promised Guizot that such an alliance should receive no support from England, but in 1846 the Queen-Regent offered the Queen's hand to Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, a nephew of the King of the Belgians and a brother of the King Consort of Portugal. Palmerston's mention of Prince Leopold's possible candidature in a Foreign Office despatch gave Louis Philippe a pretext for repudiating his promise, and on October 10, 1846, the marriage of Queen Isabella to her cousin, Don Francisco, Duke of Cadiz, and of her sister to Montpensier were simultaneously celebrated at Madrid. The Spanish Prince was a man notoriously unfit for marriage, and the news of the shameful proceeding caused the liveliest indignation in England. Nor, to the credit of the French be it said, did it bring any satisfaction to them. On the contrary, they regarded the Spanish marriage policy as yet another indication of their King's preference of dynastic to national interests. Moreover, the rupture with England threw Louis Philippe into the arms of Metternich. The Austrian statesman seized the opportunity, with the cordial assent of Russia and Prussia, to extinguish the independence of Cracow, the last remnant of free Poland, a country in which France had traditional interests which Louis Philippe found it inconvenient to assert.

In regard to Portugal, however, the Western Powers were still able to act in accord. Matters had not settled down in that unhappy country. In May 1846 the Miguelists again raised an insurrection, and only by the aid of an English fleet, acting in conjunction with the fleets of France and Spain, was the authority of Queen Maria and the ascendancy of the Constitutional party restored (1847). But for Palmerston's prompt intervention, Queen Maria would have owed her restoration solely to Spain, and a severe check would have been concurrently administered to Liberal principles and to English commerce. A project launched about this time for the eventual fusion of Portugal and Spain was sternly resisted by the English Minister.

Affairs in
Portugal

The Swiss
Sonderbund,
1843-7

We pass next to Switzerland. There, also, the traditional policy of France was sacrificed to a desire to conciliate Metternich and the absolutist Powers. Between 1830 and 1848 Switzerland was in a condition of perpetual unrest, and there seemed little probability that the Confederation would hold together. In 1832 the Union was threatened by the "progressive" cantons who formed the *Siebener Konkordat*, to secure the sanctity of their reformed constitutions. In 1843 the seven Roman Catholic and more conservative cantons retaliated with the *Sonderbund*. The *Sonderbund* stood for religious education, the retention of the Jesuits, the maintenance of the monasteries, and the sanctity of the federal Pact of 1815. The conservative cantons could count on the strong support of Metternich, with whose views Russia, Prussia, and Sardinia were in full accord. Guizot and Louis Philippe inclined in the same direction. English opinion, on the contrary, strongly favoured the "progressive" cantons. Palmerston saw an opportunity of paying off Louis Philippe for the Spanish trick, and Metternich for the annexation of Cracow. He played his game with consummate skill. He kept the ring for the Protestant cantons, warded off the interference of the Powers, and had the satisfaction of seeing the forces of unionism and progress completely triumphant (Nov. 1847). The *Sonderbund* was dissolved, the federal union was consolidated, and Switzerland was finally delivered from the dangers of foreign interference.

All this was damaging to the prestige of Louis Philippe. Where French interests were vitally concerned, in Belgium and in Egypt, he was foiled by the firmness of Lord Palmerston. In the interests of his family he scored a shameful victory in Spain, at the expense of French honour and English friendship. Thus France, ardently enamoured of prestige and peculiarly sensitive to the loss of it, found herself alternately humiliated by the failures, and dismayed by the successes of her ruler.

Corruption

Nor did the success of his administration at home compensate for impaired reputation abroad. The edifice of the Orleans monarchy rested, as we have seen, upon a singularly narrow base. From the electoral franchise all citizens were excluded unless they paid (as few people did) 200 francs in direct taxation. No one could be elected to

the Chamber of Deputies unless they paid 500 francs. This was not democracy but oligarchy; and oligarchy, as is commonly the case, engendered corruption. In order to maintain a Government majority, dozens of sinecure offices were created and distributed with lavish hands among the supporters of the Ministry of the day. Democracies are not immune from a similar taint, but some democracies seek to protect themselves by a place-bill; the Orleans monarchy did not. Consequently, before 1848 not less than one-third of the Deputies had become place-holders under the Government.

Corruption was not confined to the Chamber; it infected every branch of the administration. Several gross scandals were brought to light in the last years of the July monarchy; and for every one which was discovered there were scores which were not. Denied the satisfaction of *la gloire*, the mind of France—or of its ruling class—sought compensation in commercial success, and found excitement in financial speculation. The unenfranchised artisans sought not a political ideal but economic amelioration, and looked for inspiration to the social teaching of Louis Blanc.

Of the many dangers by which the throne of Louis Philippe was beset this last was indubitably the gravest. Parties in France The demands of the dynastic Liberals might have been met by a generous instalment of electoral reform. Such reform would not, of course, have satisfied the convinced political Republicans, but until the Republic was actually declared in 1848, they were not numerous. The Legitimists had never forgiven Louis Philippe for betraying the interests of the Lord's anointed in 1830, and they were still sulking in 1848. They were not a negligible factor, but they lacked leaders and organization, and even if they had been in a position to exercise a decisive influence upon events they would hardly have displaced a king to install a Republic.

There remained, however, a fourth party, neither Legitimists nor Orleanists, nor even political Republicans—a party Socialism in France who would now be described as Social Democrats, the disciples of Louis Blanc. But for the prevalence of this party in Paris, the Revolution of 1848 would not have been accomplished so easily as it was, if indeed it had been accomplished at all.

Socialism, though it was not a plant of recent growth,

had never before made itself felt as a potent factor in French politics. The theory of socialism had long been discussed in the *salons* and the classrooms; it had even taken bodily form in the eclectic experiments of *Enfantin* and *Fourier*, but never, until 1848, did it descend into the streets and inspire the political action of the mob.

Rousseau—
Fourier

French socialism in one sense may be said to trace its descent from Rousseau. The publication, in 1754, of his *Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* marked, indeed, the intellectual beginning of the movement which reached its political zenith in February 1848, or perhaps in the Commune of 1871. A year after the publication of this treatise Morelly published *La Code de la nature* (1755), in which he insisted on four points which have become the commonplace of modern Socialists: that private property should be abolished; that every citizen should take part in productive labour; that the whole work of production and distribution should be regulated by the State, and that the State should be the sole employer of labour.

Thus far had French socialism gone before the outbreak of the first Revolution. That movement though sometimes described as socialistic was, in fact, curiously individualistic in character.¹ You may search the *Cahiers* in vain for a trace of the communistic teaching of Rousseau or Morelly. The Constitution of the Year III insisted that "Property is the right of a man to enjoy and to dispose of his goods, his revenues, the fruit of his labour and industry." The *Code Napoléon* employs almost identical language.²

Saint-Simon

The communist cult revived, however, with the Restoration. In 1817 the Comte de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) published the first of a series of works, partly ethical and partly economic, which for many years had a considerable vogue in France.

Saint-Simon saw around him the chaos into which, as it seemed, society had been plunged by the rapid changes brought about by the invention of new mechanical processes, by the application of steam to manufacture, and the supersession of the "domestic system" by that of the factory.

¹ See L. Levine: *The Labour Movement in France*, pp. 15 seq.

² See Guyot: *Les Principes de '89*, ap. Lecky: *Democracy and Liberty*, ii, 208.

Perceiving the prevailing misery and chaos Saint-Simon ardently desired and laboured to recapture for the modern industrial State some of those lessons of order, symmetry, and organization which to him, as to Carlyle, appeared to be the most enviable aspects of medieval society.

The new industrialism, though much less strong in France than in England, was too strong for the prophets of Saint-Simonism, but his disciples organized themselves into a church, looking to *Enfantin*, upon whom the mantle of Saint-Simon descended, as the Supreme Father. But the vogue did not survive the Revolution of 1848.¹

Almost contemporary with Saint-Simon was François Fourier Charles Marie Fourier. Born at Besançon, the son of a wealthy bourgeois, in 1772, Fourier published his most important work—*Nouveau Monde industriel*—in 1820, and died in 1837. His practical proposals for the social and economic regeneration of mankind were of a fantastic character, but like Saint-Simon he attracted disciples and during his own lifetime a community was founded, on his principles, by M. Dulary at Condé-sur-Vesgne, near the forest of Rambouillet (1832), and, between 1840 and 1846, no fewer than sixteen Fourierite phalansteries were established in America. One of these experiments—that at Brook Farm—has been rescued from oblivion by the genius of Nathaniel Hawthorne, but none of them actually survived beyond 1855. A similar fate attended the Owenite communities founded on Fourierite principles in England.

Fourier was the last of his school. That school sought to bring about a revolutionary reorganization of society. Human nature was to be put into a strait-waistcoat, and to be transformed in spite of itself. Modern socialism starts from a different point and aims at a different goal. With the communism of the early French school it has little affinity. With the State-Socialism of Louis Blanc, on the contrary, it has much.

Louis Blanc, in everything but date, is far removed from his immediate predecessors in France. Without exception they belonged to a passing era, but Louis Blanc, though his

¹ For Saint-Simon cf. A. J. Booth, *Saint-Simon and Saint-Simonism*, and P. Janet, *Les Origines du Socialisme contemporain*, and *Saint-Simon*.

life overlapped those of Saint-Simon and Fourier, belongs essentially to the industrial world of to-day.

The problem
of Capital
and Labour

Problems of Capital and Labour were at this time beginning to agitate France, as they had for some time agitated England. The *Code Napoléon* (in this, as in other respects, embodying the principles enunciated by the Revolution) prohibited trade combinations, whether of workmen or employers. The supersession of the hand-worker, the introduction of machinery, the evolution of the factory system tended, in the first instance, in France, as in England, to profound dislocation of industry, and inflicted upon the manual workers much unmerited suffering. It was not always borne with patience. At Lyons and in other manufacturing towns symptoms of labour unrest manifested themselves, as we have seen, more than once during the 'thirties. Violent oscillations between good trade and bad bewildered the workmen and gave rise to the problem of recurrent unemployment. The artisan found himself, amid multiplying signs of prosperity and even luxury, not infrequently without work and without bread. What was "Liberty" to starving men? At Lyons the silk weavers adopted the gloomy device, "Vivre en travaillant, ou mourir en combattant." "No," said Louis Blanc, "you shall not die fighting, the State shall see to it that you 'live by labour'." In this promise we have the germ of his most fruitful theory, his most important social experiment.

*L'Organisa-
tion du
travail*

In 1839 Louis Blanc published his famous work, *L'Organisation du travail*—a book which not only marked an important phase in the evolution of French socialism, but supplied the real driving power for the Revolution of 1848. The argument of the book, though it has now become the commonplace of literary socialism, may be briefly recalled. Individualism results in competition; competition induces poverty; of poverty the fruits are manifest to all men. Yet every man born into the world has the right to live, and to live by his labour. To secure that right industry must be organized by the State. If a man cannot live by his labour the whole social system stands condemned: injustice is enthroned.

Upon the doctrine of the *droit au travail* the French *ouvriers* eagerly fastened. In Blanc's argument it receded,

indeed, somewhat into the background, as he developed the details of his scheme for the establishment of co-operative workshops. But the workshops belonged to the world of social *utopias* remote from the Paris of 1848. In the doctrine of the *droit au travail* there was, on the contrary, something tangible upon which unemployed and starving men could fasten. It thus became mainly responsible for the Revolution of 1848.

Not, however, ostensibly, nor perhaps immediately. The position of the Orleans monarchy had gradually deteriorated, and while enemies multiplied, friends grew more and more apathetic. Yet down to February 22, 1848, nobody supposed that the existence of the monarchy was seriously threatened. For some time past the cry in favour of parliamentary reform had, indeed, been gaining in volume; in the course of 1847 "reform" banquets were held not only in Paris but at Lille, Rouen, and other towns; there was something ominous, too, in the reception accorded to M. de Lamartine's *History of the Girondins*.¹ But when the Chambers met in December 1847 the King complacently declared that the constitutional monarchy would suffice for the promotion of "all the moral and material interests of our dear country," and declined to consider the need for reform. The Opposition, consisting mainly of dynastic Liberals, reinforced by a small knot of Republicans, moved amendments to the address, but were voted down by Ministers and "placemen." The struggle was then transferred to the country, and a match was applied to inflammable materials by an unexpected demonstration on February 22, 1848.

The
Revolution
of 1848

A "reform" banquet, organized by the electors of the twelfth arrondissement of Paris, was prohibited by the Prefect of Police. But, though the banquet was abandoned by the organizers, a large mob filled the Place de la Madeleine and the Rue Royale, and the streets re-echoed to the cry of *Vive la réforme! à bas Guizot!* There were collisions between the mob and the municipal guard; the familiar barricades made their appearance, only to be torn down by the troops: nobody seems to have anticipated anything serious.

The first serious symptom was the attitude, clearly

¹ This work originally appeared in serial form, but was first published as a whole in 1847.

manifested on the 23rd, of the National Guard, who not only invaded the Chamber with petitions in favour of reform, but actually interfered to prevent the forcible dispersal of the mob by the regulars. The defection of a body hitherto so faithful to the Citizen monarchy convinced Louis Philippe that the demand for reform and for the dismissal of his trusted Minister could no longer be resisted. Guizot, therefore, resigned and was replaced by Thiers.

The parliamentary Opposition was satisfied with the surrender of Guizot; the boulevards were illuminated to celebrate the downfall of the Ministry; the National Guard and the shopkeepers were in high good humour.

The
Parisian
workmen

Not so the workmen of Paris. The resignation of Guizot, the succession of Thiers, meant to them nothing but the substitution of one group of greedy place-hunters for another. They were out for something more. A crowd collected in front of Guizot's hotel; a pistol shot killed the officer in command of the troops guarding the Foreign Office; the troops fired; some eighty people were killed or wounded, and, in a trice, the bleeding corpses were placed on tumbrils and paraded through the streets of Paris.

Abdication
of Louis
Philippe

The pistol shot disposed of the Orleans monarchy. Early on the 24th the mob marched on the Tuileries, and at 1 p.m. Louis Philippe announced his abdication in favour of his young grandson the Comte de Paris, withdrew to St. Cloud, and left the Tuileries in possession of the mob.

The mob then invaded the Chamber, and demanded the appointment of a Provisional Government. The demand was supported by Crémieux, Ledru-Rollin, and Lamartine, and amid much clamour and confusion a Provisional Government was hastily nominated in the Chamber.

The
Provisional
Government

From the very outset there were grave differences of opinion among the members of the Provisional Government. The "moderates," led by Lamartine, were anxious to regard their functions as strictly *provisional*, and not to prejudice the verdict of the country as a whole. Louis Blanc, Ledru-Rollin, and the "Reds" were determined to accept the clamour of the Parisian mob as the voice of the people of France, and to commit the country irrevocably to a Socialist republic. The movements of the Government were quickened by the menacing attitude of the mob.

The Municipal Guard was disbanded ; the protection of the capital was confided to the National Guard ; the Chamber of Deputies was dissolved ; that of the Peers abolished ; political prisoners were released ; monarchy under whatsoever name—Legitimacy, Bonapartism, or Regency—was abolished ; and the Provisional Government declared that it had taken all the steps necessary to render impossible the return of the former dynasty or the accession of a new one. The King and Queen had already escaped in disguise to the coast, and on March 2 they crossed in the steamer *Express* from Havre to Newhaven, where they landed with passports made out in the names of Mr. and Mrs. William Smith. Queen Victoria deeply sympathized with the misfortunes of the French royal family, and Claremont was placed at their disposal by their son-in-law, King Leopold. There the old King died in 1850.

In Paris events were moving rapidly. On February 26 the Republic, though not without some hesitation on the part of the “moderates” in the Government, was formally proclaimed. “Royalty is abolished. The Republic is proclaimed. The people will exercise their political rights.” So spake Lamartine. But not for the enjoyment of political rights had the workmen of Paris overturned the monarchy. Lamartine’s next words disclosed the real significance of the events of the last few days : “National workshops are open for those who are without work.” Thus had Louis Blanc’s words come home to roost. Lamartine regarded the Republic as an end in itself : not so Louis Blanc, as the following Decree, drafted by him, sufficed to indicate :—

“The Provisional Government engage themselves to guarantee the existence of the workmen by means of labour.

“They engage themselves to guarantee labour to every citizen. . . .”

It was all very well for the Government to guarantee work to all applicants, but how was the promise to be fulfilled ? The answer was forthcoming in the following Decree (February 27) :—

“The Provisional Government decrees the establishment of National Workshops. The Minister of Public Works is charged with the execution of the present decree.”

The history of the experiment thus initiated is of extra-

Labour
Parliament
at the
Luxem-
bourg

ordinary interest, but the details must not detain us.¹ Enough to say that Louis Blanc was installed at the Palace of the Luxembourg as president of a Commission charged "to examine the claims of labour and to ensure the well-being of the working class." But already there was a rift in the ranks of the Republican party, and there is some ground for the suspicion that Blanc's appointment was designed by his colleagues to put him in a situation where he could not do much practical harm; to let the workmen perceive for themselves the impracticability of his theories, and so render him impotent for mischief in the future.²

Meanwhile the Socialist assembly at the Luxembourg, being in close touch with 30,000 to 40,000 workmen, became a serious rival to the authority of the Hôtel de Ville. More than once, indeed, it attempted to supersede the Provisional Government, and to establish a Committee of Public Safety. The first demand of the Luxembourg Commission was for a ten-hours working day; the second for the prohibition of *marchandage* (sub-contracting); the third for the abolition of piecework; and the fourth for a legal minimum wage. The last two requests were refused by the Government, and the first, though conceded, was abrogated in six months.

Numberless schemes were discussed by the Labour Parliament at the Luxembourg; few of the schemes so keenly discussed were actually brought to fruition, though one real achievement does stand to the credit of the Luxembourg Commission, or its president. Louis Blanc unquestionably gave an impulse to the idea of co-operative production which is not yet spent. About one hundred societies were established by tailors, saddlers, spinners, and other craftsmen. Some were stillborn; others failed after a few years' experiment; twenty were said to be still flourishing in 1858.

Meanwhile the ensuing months were full of peril for the Republic. Thrice it was threatened with destruction by the violence of the mob clamouring for the realization of the socialistic millennium: on March 17, on April 16, and on May 15. These were the "days" of the Second Republic. From the first the Provisional Government was torn by in-

¹ They will be found in Émile Thomas: *Ateliers Nationaux* (ed. Marriott), Oxford, 1913.

² Thomas: *Ateliers Nationaux*, p. 142.

ternal dissensions : on the one side the political Republicans represented by Lamartine, on the other the Socialists led by Louis Blanc and Albert. The latter looked for support to the Labour Parliament at the Luxembourg, to the Socialist clubs, and, above all, to the inflammatory mob of Paris. The former relied immediately on the National Guard, and ultimately upon the moderation and good sense of the provinces.

Everything depended upon the issue of the elections which took place on April 23 and 24. On May 4 the National Assembly met. Elected on the basis of manhood suffrage, its meeting sealed the fate of the "ultras." Of its 840 members the vast majority were men of moderate opinions ; even Paris showed its preference for men of the type of Lamartine, who, besides being elected in nine other Departments, headed the poll in Paris with 259,800 votes, while Blanc, who was twenty-seventh on the list, got only 121,140. No fewer than 130 avowed Legitimists secured election, besides another 100 who had supported the July monarchy. Into the hands of the Assembly the Government immediately resigned its provisional authority, and in its place the Assembly elected an Executive Committee. On that Committee neither Blanc nor Albert found a place, nor were they appointed to the Ministry.

General
Election,
April 23-4

The Government, however, was still haunted by the legacy of the *droit au travail*, and still burdened with the incubus of the *ateliers nationaux*.

The Ateliers
Nationaux

The Provisional Government had proclaimed its acceptance of the doctrine of the *droit au travail* on February 25 ; and on the 27th had decreed the immediate establishment of national workshops. Of workshops, however, there were none in existence. There was nothing but a few jobs for navvies. Some 6000 men found employment in this way, but the number of applicants for work still continued to rise rapidly. The inevitable happened. The Government, unable to fulfil its promise of work, felt constrained to provide pay without work. The number of applicants then rose, not unnaturally, with ever-increasing rapidity ; the unemployed became a serious menace to public order, and the Government were at their wits' end.

For the moment the situation was relieved by the appointment of a young chemist Émile Thomas as *Directeur*

Émile
Thomas

des Ateliers Nationaux. Thomas could not provide work for the unemployed, but he could and did evolve order out of chaos. He opened a Labour Exchange; centralized the distribution of doles, and gave to the formless and undisciplined masses of the unemployed a quasi-military organization under trustworthy officers. But although he could organize the applicants for work into companies and squads, and could thereby diminish the chances of fraud and the risk of disorder, neither Thomas nor anyone else could provide them with work. But the numbers of his "army" increased with alarming rapidity. By April 16 he had enrolled 66,000 men, and before the end of May 120,000.

One thing, however, Thomas had done; he had gained for the Government the time they needed. As soon as the result of the elections became known the temper of the Paris workmen became perceptibly worse, and on May 15 a mob of 100,000 men assembled in the Place de la Bastille, rushed the Chamber and installed a new Provisional Government at the Hôtel de Ville. Lamartine and Ledru-Rollin were, however, equal to the occasion. They put themselves at the head of the troops, marched to the Hôtel de Ville, arrested the insurrectionary leaders, and dispersed the mob.

This easy victory greatly strengthened the position of the Government and they began quietly to prepare for the inevitable struggle. General Cavaignac was appointed Minister of War; a large body of regular troops was unostentatiously drafted into the capital and drastic changes were introduced into the administration of the *Ateliers Nationaux*: all workmen who could not prove that they had resided for at least six months in Paris were to be sent away from the capital under passport; task work was to be universally substituted for day work; registration offices for employers in want of workmen were to be opened, and all workmen who refused work under private employers, and all unmarried workmen between the ages of 18 and 25 who refused to enlist in the army, were to be immediately dismissed from the *ateliers*. On June 22 the first of these changes was enforced. An order was issued that 3000 of the provincial workmen, provided with journey-money and food, were to be sent home at once. Immediately that happened which Thomas had striven energetically to avert: the delegates of the *ateliers* made common cause with the delegates

of the Luxembourg ; the cry was raised : " Down with the Executive Commission," and before nightfall of the 22nd crowds collected in the streets, and everything pointed to a renewal of grave disorder.

The event was more terrible than the anticipation. The scenes enacted in the streets of Paris during the next four days have rarely been paralleled in that or any other civilized city. The " days of June "

On the 23rd the whole city was in tumult ; barricades were thrown up in the faubourgs with astonishing rapidity ; in one faubourg alone 500 barricades were counted ; many of them flew the red flag, and all were defended with extraordinary courage and tenacity. Fortunately, a large body of regulars had been massed in the neighbourhood of Paris ; the National Guard and the Garde Mobile not only stood firm, but behaved with conspicuous gallantry, and in the afternoon of the 23rd the command of the troops of all arms was entrusted to General Cavaignac. Slowly, the General made himself master of point after point, and at noon on the 26th he was able to announce to the Assembly that fighting was at an end and that the elements of disorder were quelled.

Thus did the Republic triumph over socialism, but in destroying socialism it destroyed itself.

Two days after his victory was consummated General Cavaignac laid down his dictatorial powers, but a grateful Assembly elected him, almost unanimously, to the Presidency of the Council. Until the election of the President of the Republic in December, he was virtually the ruler of France.

To the Republic Cavaignac was entirely loyal. His supreme object was to save it from Legitimists and Bonapartists on the one side and from the Communists on the other. The " national workshops " were abolished ; the more mischievous of the clubs were closed ; some journals were suppressed, and the command of the National Guard was entrusted to Chagnier. In consequence of the Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the causes of the " days of June," Louis Blanc went into voluntary exile, and several thousands of the rioters were, after trial, condemned to transportation. Cavaignac and the Republic

Meanwhile, the Constituent Assembly, elected in April, had appointed a Committee to draft a new Constitution, which after prolonged discussions in the Assembly itself The Constitution of 1848

finally became law on October 23. The Assembly declined, despite the advocacy of Ledru-Rollin, to affirm the abstract doctrine of the *droit au travail* or to abolish capital punishment. The question of the structure of the legislature evoked a violent discussion, but eventually, thanks mainly to the fervid oratory of Lamartine, it was decided, by a majority of 40, to have a single Chamber containing 750 paid members elected by the Departments and the Colonies by universal direct suffrage, and subject to a triennial dissolution. There was also to be a Council of State elected by the Assembly for the drafting of Bills. Even more important was the question of the Executive. Here again the eloquence of Lamartine prevailed. The Executive was vested in a President, elected directly by universal suffrage; he was to have a suspensive veto on legislation and to appoint his Ministers, though the latter were to be responsible to the Chamber and, like the President himself, answerable to a High Court of Justice. This proposal aroused acute controversy, and naturally; for to constitute two co-ordinate authorities, both issuing from the same popular mandate, was simply to invite conflict between them. If conflict did ensue, popularity and prestige would inevitably concentrate not on the Assembly but on the President. Nor was the danger either fanciful or remote. Mischievous in the abstract, the proposal was pregnant with peril, concrete and immediate. "Are you sure," said M. Grévy, "that an ambitious man raised to the throne of the Presidency will not be tempted to perpetuate his power? And if this man is a scion of one of those families which have reigned over France . . . will you answer for it that this man, this man of ambition, will not end by overthrowing the Republic?"¹

Grévy, accordingly, proposed that the President should be the head of a Council of Ministers, who, like himself, should be elected and removable by the Assembly. But not for the first time was a French Constituent Assembly deaf to the voice of reason. Carried away by Lamartine's rhetorical appeal to abstract philosophy it rejected Grévy's amendment by a majority of 500. That vote was the death-warrant of the infant Republic.

Books for reference, see chapter v.

¹ Dickinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 200-1.

CHAPTER IX

THE YEAR OF REVOLUTION

§ 1. THE HAPSBURG EMPIRE

THE history of the revolutionary year is so involved that I prefix to this chapter a chronological table designed to exhibit the sequence of events in the countries principally affected.

The spirit of unrest which revealed itself in 1848 was not confined to Paris or even to France. The February Revolution was not, indeed, typical of the general movement in Continental Europe. The driving power behind the short-lived Republic of 1848 was, as we have seen, the socialistic doctrine of the "Right to Work." That doctrine France repudiated, but in crushing socialism the Republic destroyed itself. The advent of Louis Napoleon was a challenge both to Republicanism and to Socialism. The challenge was declined.

The movements outside France were inspired not by socialism, but by two other sentiments which had been nourished, if not generated in France. The first French Revolution bequeathed to Continental Europe the idea of Liberty: the first Napoleon did more than any one man to evoke the spirit of Nationality. These were the sentiments which underlay the movement of 1848.

Of that movement Vienna was the real focus. The first ^{The} manifestations occurred, indeed, elsewhere: Palermo, Naples, ^{Hapsburg} Turin, Florence, and Rome, not to mention many German ^{Empire} States, all anticipated Vienna. None the less, it is to the dominions of the Hapsburg Empire—to Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, and Lombardo-Venetia—that we must look for the generating power of the insurrections by which in 1848 Continental Europe was convulsed.

Nor need this excite surprise. For thirty years Vienna

GERMANY	HUNGARY, BOHEMIA, ETC.	ITALY
1848	1848	1848
Feb. 27 Meeting at Mannheim demands German Parliament.		Jan. 2 Smoking riots at Milan. 12 Sicilian rising.
Mar. 3 Baden obtains Constitution. 13 Rising in Vienna. 13 Liberal Ministry at Dresden. 15 Metternich flies Vienna. 16 Rising in Berlin. 25 Assembly in Berlin. 31 <i>Vor-Parliament</i> at Frankfurt.	Mar. 3 Kossuth's speech at Pressburg. 11 Meeting at Prague. 16 Students' rising in Pesth. 23 Jellacić made Ban of Croatia.	18 Arrest of Manin at Venice. 29 Neapolitan <i>Statuto</i> . Feb. 8 <i>Statuto</i> in Piedmont. 17 <i>Statuto</i> in Tuscany. 22 Martial Law in Lombardy. Mar. 14 Martial Law in Rome. 18-22 Five days of Milan. 22 Rising in Venice. 23 Manin, President of Venetian Republic. 23 Charles Albert declares war on Austria. 26 Ferdinand deposed by Sicilian.
April 2 Karlsbad Decrees repealed. 16 Baden insurrection. May 15 Emperor leaves Vienna. 18 Frankfurt Parliament	May 13 Serbs meet at Carlowitz. 15 Rumanians meet at Blasen-dorf. 30 Slavonic Congress at Prague. June 2 Magyars fight Rumanians. 3 Provisional Government at Prague.	May 15 <i>Coup d'état</i> in Naples.
		June 16 Fall of Vicenza.
		July 25 Austrian victory at Custoza. Aug. 5 Capitulation of Milan. 8 Austrians expelled from Bologna. 9 Armistice of Vigevano.
	Oct. 3 Jellacić, Dictator of Hungary.	

Nov. 1	Windischgrätz enters Vienna.		Nov. 15	Rossi murdered.
Dec. 2	Emperor Ferdinand abdicates. Francis Joseph succeeds.		24	Pope flies Rome.
1849		1849		
Jan. 11	Frankfort Parliament excludes Austria from Germany.		Feb. 6	Ferrara reoccupied by Austria.
			8	Grand Duke flies Tuscany.
			9	Roman Republic proclaimed.
			Mar. 23	Battle of Novara. Charles Albert abdicates.
			Apr. 24	French at Civita Vecchia.
Apr. 3	Frederick William IV refuses German Crown.	Apr. 14	Hungary declares independence.	
		June 17	Russian victory in Transylvania.	
		18	Frankfort Parliament dissolved.	
		Aug. 5	Russians take Hermannstadt.	
		16	Görgei Dictator of Hungary.	
		16	Kossuth flies Hungary.	
		July 3	French enter Rome.	
		28	Papal government restored.	
		Aug. 28	Austrians re-enter Venice.	

had been the centre of European autocracy. From Vienna Metternich had issued the august decrees which, interpreted by his minions great and small, had kept the peoples of the several States in subjection to reactionary rulers. Yet the pedestal on which Metternich himself stood though lofty was narrow. The Hapsburg Empire was based upon no principle save that of expediency. That it did in some sort correspond if not to national necessity, at least to political convenience, we may suspect both from its long continuance, and from the confusion which has followed its overthrow. Had it not existed it might (according to the common saw) have been necessary to invent it. Yet it existed in defiance of all those principles which the modern world accepts as making for coherence and stability. Possessed of political adroitness amounting almost to genius, but not unaided by fortune, the Hapsburgs ruled for centuries over a mosaic of nationalities : Germans, Magyars, Slovaks, Czechs, Poles, Roumanians, Croats, Slavs, and Italians. But as soon as the national principle was recognized as the basis of statehood, once the right of small nations to an independent political existence was admitted, the conglomerate empire of the Hapsburgs was doomed. That time had not actually arrived in 1848. But the Europe of 1848 was not the Europe of 1815, or even of 1830. The new and heady wine, though put into the old bottles in 1815, had been fermenting. In 1848 the old bottles burst.

The Italian
States

The first manifestation of the phenomenon was in Sicily. The insurrection began in Palermo on January 12, and in less than a month, though the struggle was fierce, the whole island, save for the fortress of Messina, had emancipated itself from Neapolitan rule. To Naples itself King Ferdinand conceded a Constitution on January 29. On February 8 Charles Albert of Sardinia (Piedmont) drafted the basis of a parliamentary Constitution (published on March 5) and appointed a Liberal Ministry under Cesare Balbo. A similar Constitution was granted in Tuscany on February 17. All these events, it will be noted, preceded the outbreak of the revolution in Paris. Early in March Pope Pius IX appointed a Ministry, consisting for the first time mainly of laymen, and published a Constitution which, though compact of contradictions and incongruities, was greeted with limitless

enthusiasm by an inexperienced and indiscriminating populace. Thus far the Italian movement was wholly particularist. The several States in Italy were unanimous in their desire for political liberty; they had little thought, as yet, of achieving unity.

In Germany also the movement of 1848 was primarily Germany particularist: but in her case zeal for national unity did not lag far behind that for constitutional liberty. Baden, which enjoyed the most enlightened government in Germany, was the first to feel the impulse of the February Revolution in Paris. The news of the fall of the Orleans monarchy began to reach Germany on February 27. On March 3 the Grand Duke of Baden granted a new Constitution which formed a model for the other German States. Ministerial responsibility; freedom of the Press; religious equality; trial by jury, and equality of taxation, were among the concessions demanded and made. The rulers of Würtemberg, Nassau, Darmstadt, Hesse-Cassel, Weimar, and Brunswick followed suit; in Bavaria, King Lewis, despite the comparative liberality of his rule, was obliged to abdicate in favour of his son Maximilian II (March 20), and Saxony and Hanover ultimately followed the lead of Baden.

In Berlin disturbances broke out on March 18, and Prussia Frederick William IV at once conceded the whole Baden programme. An accidental collision between the troops and the people led to some serious street fighting (March 18-20), and Berlin was only pacified by the removal of the troops from the capital, and a promise from the King to assume the leadership "of a free and new-born German nation." The United Diet was to meet immediately, with power to summon a national Constituent Assembly which should draft a parliamentary Constitution for the whole of the Hohenzollern dominions.

It was not, however, in Berlin but in Vienna, so long the Hungary mainspring of European reaction, that the convulsion was most violent, though the immediate impulse to revolution came less from Austria than from Hungary.

Hungary, though it had formed an integral part of the Hapsburg Empire since 1699, had never been completely incorporated in "Austria"; it had preserved not only its own national Parliament (Diet) but, even more important,

those County Assemblies which enshrined the principle of local self-government. In recent years there had been a distinct revival of national spirit among the Magyars. Men like Count Stephen Szecsenyi (1791-1860), a great Hungarian noble, and Francis Déak (1803-76), also a man of ancient lineage, were foremost in promoting moderate Liberal reform : the use of the Magyar language ; parliamentary reform and a responsible Ministry ; equalization of taxation ; the abolition of serfdom ; the rights of free speech and public meeting, and so forth.

Louis
Kossuth

Bitterly opposed to these "Constitutional" Liberals was Louis Kossuth (1802-94), a nationalist agitator, an impassioned orator, a reckless demagogue. In 1837 Kossuth had been arrested on a charge of high treason, and suffered some years' imprisonment. On his release in 1841 he started the *Pesti Hirlap* (Gazette of Pesth) to advocate Hungarian independence. Elected to the Diet as member for Buda-Pesth in 1847, he was at once accepted as leader of the extreme reformers, and when at the end of February 1848 the news of the French Revolution reached Hungary, Kossuth proposed to address to the Emperor a demand not only for a responsible Ministry but for the "fraternization of the Austrian peoples" under the leadership of a liberated Hungary. In a famous speech delivered on March 3 he developed this idea : "The suffocating vapour of a heavy curse hangs over us, and out of the charnel house of the Cabinet of Vienna a pestilential wind sweeps by, benumbing our senses and exercising a deadening effect on our national spirit. . . . The future of Hungary can never be secure while in the other provinces (subject to Vienna) there exists a system of government directly opposed to every constitutional principle. It is our task to establish a happier future on the brotherhood of all the Austrian races, and to substitute for the union enforced by bayonets and police the enduring bond of a free Constitution."

Vienna

This speech was reprinted and sold by thousands, not merely throughout Hungary but in the streets of Vienna itself. Its effect was electrical. On the 11th the Estates of Lower Austria, though mainly representative of the territorial aristocracy, demanded the establishment of a parliamentary régime, a free Press, and reforms in local

government and the administration of justice. Two days later rioting began in Vienna, and on the 15th Metternich fled precipitately to England, where he found himself in the company of many of the victims of his prolonged ascendancy. The Emperor hastened to concede everything that was asked of him. In less than a week the whole edifice of absolutism had fallen like a house of cards.

To a deputation from Hungary, headed by the Archduke Stephen, Palatine of Hungary, and including Kossuth, similar promises were given, and before the end of March a Constituent Assembly had met in Hungary, and had drafted a Constitution which provided for annual parliaments, triennial elections, a responsible Ministry, manhood suffrage (with certain restrictions), equality of taxation, freedom of the Press, religious equality, a National Guard, and local control of the Hungarian army. The Emperor confirmed the new Constitution, and a "responsible" Ministry including Francis Déak, Szechenyi, and Esterhazy came into power.

Meanwhile the movement initiated in Vienna had spread rapidly to the provinces: to Salzburg, Linz, to Graz (the capital of Styria), to Agram (capital of Croatia), and to other parts of the Empire. In Bohemia the Czechs had long resented, though silently, the domination of the Germans, and shortly after the outbreak of the revolution in Vienna, they presented their demands to the embarrassed Emperor. They asked for recognition of the Czech nationality; for annual Diets, representative of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia; for equality in education and taxation as between Czechs and Germans; for freedom of the Press and of public meeting, for personal and religious liberty. Their demands were promptly conceded by the Emperor, but the promised Constitution was stillborn. In Bohemia there was no such racial solidarity as there was in Hungary (though even there it was far from complete), and the antagonism of the two races wrecked the hopes of the Czech nationalists. Alarmed by the proposal of the Germans in Prague to send delegates to the Constituent Assembly at Frankfort, the Czechs summoned a Pan-Slavic Congress to meet at Prague. This Congress, containing Czechs, Moravians, Silesians, Poles, Ruthenians, Serbs, and Croats, opened on June 2, formulated an ambitious project for the union of all the Slav peoples,

Pan-Slav
Congress at
Prague

and quickly proved itself even less practical than the Pan-German Convention at Frankfort. Excited by the windy rhetoric of the Congress delegates, the Czechs of Prague broke out into insurrection, attacked the palace of Prince Windischgrätz, the Austrian military commandant in Prague, and killed his wife. Windischgrätz exhibited great restraint, and by conciliatory measures restored comparative calm in the city. The rioters, however, broke faith: Windischgrätz was compelled to open fire, and after twelve hours' bombardment, the city made complete submission. A military Government was set up: the Bohemian insurrection was at an end (June). The victory of Windischgrätz at Prague had much more than a local significance; it foreshadowed, if it did not mark the turning-point in the Austrian revolution.

Vienna

Meanwhile, further outbreaks had taken place in Vienna; the Emperor withdrew from the capital (May 17); many of the aristocracy and even the *bourgeoisie* followed his example, and a Committee of Public Safety was set up (May 26). A month later the Archduke John was induced to accept the Regency. For a while, however, the centre of interest shifted, as we shall see, to other parts of the Empire; but on July 22 the General Diet (Reichstag), which had been summoned to draft the final form of the new Constitution, was opened by the Archduke John. Save for the commutation of all feudal burdens the Diet was practically sterile. On its advice the Emperor returned to Schönbrunn (August 12), but early in October an insurrection—the third—broke out in Vienna, and on October 7 the Emperor again withdrew from the capital, and took refuge in Olmütz, a fortress in Moravia. The revolutionaries in Vienna had, however, shot their last bolt. Help for the Hapsburg monarchy was at hand; but it came, with characteristic irony, less from its own friends than from the divisions among its subject peoples.

Magyars
and Slavs

The problem of minorities (as Europe has discovered since 1919) was not peculiar to the Hapsburg monarchy. If the Magyars formed a disruptive element in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Hungary itself was confronted by groups of Serbs, Croats, Vlachs, and Slovaks not less opposed to Magyars than were Magyars to Germans. Among the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes there were already stirring

aspirations after that Triune kingdom which was actually achieved in 1918. At the end of March the Croats approached the Emperor with a request for autonomy and for the appointment of a distinguished native of Croatia, Count Jellacić, as their *ban*. Autonomy was refused to them, but the election of Jellacić as *ban* of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia was confirmed.

Count Joseph Jellacić was equally distinguished as a Jellacić soldier and a statesman. The Magyars interpreted his appointment as a covert attack upon their own autonomy, and redoubled their efforts to avert the separatist movement among the Southern Slavs. Jellacić's attitude justified their suspicions. Anticipating the policy of the ill-fated Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Jellacić determined to oppose to the dualism already implicit in the relations of Austria and Hungary a federal system, which should bring in the Southern Slav as the third partner in a State based on trialism. He repudiated the authority of the Hungarian Diet, drove out the Magyar officials, and convoked a Croatian Diet at Agram which promptly proclaimed the independence of the Triune kingdom.

The Imperial Government, alarmed by these developments, and prompted by the Magyars, declared Jellacić a rebel, and deposed him from office. But the Croats were an indispensable element in Radetsky's army in Italy; Jellacić was able to convince the Emperor of his complete loyalty to the Empire; the increasing violence of Kossuth, who was daily gaining ground at the expense of the moderates in Hungary, intensified the tension between Vienna and Pesth, and on September 4 the Emperor, by reinstating Jellacić in all his honours, openly defied the Magyar extremists. On September 11 Jellacić at the head of 40,000 Croats and Serbs crossed the Drave and invaded Hungary. In a last hope of retrieving the situation the Emperor appointed Count Lamberg as Commander-in-Chief of both armies, Magyar and Slav, in Hungary. On September 27, however, Lamberg was murdered by a mob in Buda-Pesth. The Hungarian Diet condemned the murder, but was nevertheless dissolved by the Emperor; Hungary was placed under martial law and Jellacić was appointed dictator. The extremists alike in Vienna and Buda-Pesth regarded this

appointment as a challenge; and when certain Viennese regiments were ordered to go to Jellaciç's support in Hungary, the populace in the capital once more broke out into insurrection and murdered Latour, the Minister of War (Oct. 3). The Emperor thereupon fled to Olmütz, and appointed Windischgrätz Commander-in-Chief of all the forces of the Empire, except Radetsky's army in Italy. The Viennese rebels summoned the Magyars to their aid; that aid did not reach them. Meanwhile, Jellaciç at the head of his Slav army was advancing on the city from the south, and on October 13 reached Schönbrunn. Windischgrätz was at the same moment on the march from Prague; on the 20th he proclaimed a state of siege in Vienna and called upon the city to submit to his authority. Vienna refused, and put up a spirited though hopeless resistance. On the 23rd Windischgrätz gave the city forty-eight hours' grace; and on its expiry he opened the bombardment. On the 30th the Magyar army crossed the Leitha but were decisively defeated by Jellaciç's force; further resistance was then seen to be hopeless, and by the night of the 31st Windischgrätz was in possession of the capital.

The capture of Vienna was a turning-point in the history of the European Revolution. Less intrinsically important and much less interesting than the Italian movement, or even than the movements in Hungary and Bohemia, the insurrection in Vienna and the downfall of Metternich had attracted to the revolution the attention of the world, and had lent to it a significance which the scattered insurrections in the Italian States, in Hungary, and in Bohemia would never have possessed. The importance of its fall cannot, therefore, be over-estimated. The ringleaders of the revolution were brought to trial in November, and twenty-four of them suffered death. Prince Felix Schwarzenberg became head of a new administration. Schwarzenberg was the brother-in-law of Windischgrätz and was himself a man of considerable diplomatic experience and of iron will. His administration was destined to be the most brilliant in the recent history of the Hapsburg Empire. Before the close of the year the Emperor Ferdinand abdicated in favour of his nephew the Archduke Francis Joseph (December 2).

The new Emperor was only eighteen when he entered

upon a reign which did not close until after the outbreak of the World-War (1916). He at once announced his intention "with the assent of all his peoples to unite them into a single whole." How far he fulfilled it the sequel will show. The immediate prospects were not unpromising. The revolution in Vienna had been stamped out; the separatist movement in Bohemia had collapsed; nine months were indeed to elapse before the Austrian position in Italy was completely restored, but the veteran Radetsky had already inflicted a crushing defeat upon Charles Albert of Sardinia at Custoza (July 1848), to be presently followed up by a still more decisive engagement at Novara (March 23, 1849). To Italian affairs, however, we must return later.

The
Emperor
Francis
Joseph,
1848-1916

The Hungarian effort was not extinguished by the surrender of the Austrian capital: but Windischgrätz could now devote his undivided attention to the task of crushing it. The Magyars refused to acknowledge Francis Joseph as King of Hungary, on the plea that "without the knowledge and consent of the Diet no one could sit on the Hungarian throne," and thus enwrapped themselves in the cloak of legality as champions of their legitimate sovereign, King Ferdinand.

Hungarian
War of In-
dependence

Encompassed with enemies their chance of maintaining their independence was, however, slender. Kossuth's nationalism, as narrow as it was intense, had alienated all the Hungarian minorities. The Roumanian peasantry in Transylvania were as keenly opposed to Magyar domination as were the Southern Slavs. Moreover, there were grave dissensions among the war-chiefs in Hungary, notably between Kossuth and Arthur Görgei, an ex-officer in the Austrian army but a Hungarian by birth, who in December 1848 was appointed to the command of the Magyar army. Meanwhile, the advance of the Austrians towards Buda-Pesth caused panic in the city. The moderates, led by Déak and Batthyáni, made a final attempt to negotiate with Windischgrätz, but the latter refused to treat with rebels; the Hungarian Diet retired behind the Theiss and set up the Government of Debreczin (January 4); on the following day Windischgrätz occupied Buda-Pesth and proclaimed martial law. The methods employed by the Austrian Commander in Vienna were repeated at Buda-

Pesth. But Buda-Pesth was not Hungary, and though the Austrians inflicted a decisive defeat upon the Magyar forces at Kapolna (February 26-7) the Magyars rallied, and under the leadership of Görgei, who proved himself a master of guerilla warfare, won a series of brilliant victories. By the end of May the Hungarian capital was once more in their hands.

New Con-
stitution
for the
Hapsburg
Empire

To these efforts the Magyars had been further incited by the publication (March 4) of a new Constitution for the Hapsburg monarchy, "one and indivisible." Once again the whole administration of the Empire was to be centralized in Vienna, though the several nationalities—including the Magyars—were to have their provincial Diets.

Hungarian
Independence

Exasperated by the attempt to put the Magyars on an equal footing with other "subject provinces," and elated by the recent success of their army, the Hungarian Diet proclaimed the independence of Hungary, declared the "House of Hapsburg-Lorraine, as perjured and treacherous, to be forever excluded from the throne of the United States of Hungary and Transylvania" and elected Louis Kossuth President of the Hungarian Republic (April 14). Kossuth had fatally blundered. Despite the victories won by Görgei, the sands of the Hungarian hour-glass were running out.

Intervention
of Russia

The Czar Nicholas of Russia had already established an army of observation in Transylvania, and in May he agreed to send it to the help of the Austrians in Hungary. Under General Paskiévitsh the Russians, 150,000 strong, attacked from the east; General Haynau, who had succeeded Windischgrätz, advanced from the west. Caught between two fires the Magyars appealed in desperation to the Turks and even to the despised Slavs; but in vain. Kossuth himself fled to Turkey. Görgei fought on bravely, but on August 13 was compelled to surrender with the remnant of his army to General Paskiévitsh at Vilagos.

The Hungarian War of Independence was ended: the country was handed over to the tender mercies of Haynau, who stamped out the remnants of rebellion with a ferocity which earned him the name of "The Austrian butcher"; hundreds of Magyar patriots, including Batthyáni and thirteen generals, were sent to the gallows or shot; only those who, like Kossuth, fled the country, escaped. Hungary forfeited every vestige of its constitutional liberties, and was reduced to a state of simple vassalage.

Victorious over its foes in Hungary, in Bohemia, and (as we shall presently see) in Italy, and master in its own capital, the Austrian Government, now in the strong hands of Schwarzenberg, gave short shrift to its German subjects. The "March laws" were repealed and Metternich's autocratic and centralized system was restored. From Vienna the reaction spread to Berlin and the lesser German Courts; the revolutionary impulse of 1848 was spent; absolutism was once more supreme in Germany.

The German movement of 1848 was, however, as already indicated two-fold. So far as it was directed towards the attainment of constitutional liberty in the several States of Germany, it hopelessly miscarried. How had it fared as regards the attainment of national unity? That question, deferred for the sake of lucidity, now demands an answer.

§ 2. THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION

So far back as the autumn of 1847 meetings had been held at Offenburg in Baden and at Heppenheim near Heidelberg. At Offenburg the delegates were mostly democrats, with a strong inclination towards the republicanism which was, at this time, preached throughout Southern Germany by exiles from Switzerland, Poland, and France. The apostles of this republican movement were a certain Paul Struve, a doctrinaire journalist, and Friedrich Hecker, "a type of the careless poetical student who took his politics from Schiller and plunged into the revolution for the love of stir, movement, and generous ideas."¹ Much more important, because more practical, was the conference at Heppenheim. Composed of representatives from the States belonging to the *Zollverein*, this meeting was primarily summoned with the object of enlarging the scope of the *Zollverein* in a political direction; but the agitation which broke out in the spring of 1848 convinced the leaders that the time had come for the realization of a larger scheme.

Directly the news of the Parisian Revolution reached Germany, Heinrich von Gagern, the Minister of Hesse-Darmstadt, and subsequently famous as the President of

¹ H. A. L. Fisher: *Republican Tradition in Europe*, p. 220, and cf. chapter x, *passim*, for some suggestive remarks upon the influence of the "Poles of the dispersion."

the Frankfort Parliament, suggested to his own Government that it should move promptly in the direction of a provisional executive and a central legislature for the whole of Germany. On March 5 he met fifty progressive leaders, mostly drawn from the south-western States, at Heidelberg, and an invitation was issued to all the men in Germany who were or had been members of their respective State legislatures.

Frankfort
Vor-
Parliament

Nearly six hundred responded to the invitation and met at Frankfort on March 31. In this Convention, or *Vor-Parliament*, the majority were south Germans. Hesse-Darmstadt alone contributed 84, and Baden 72; Prussia sent 141; Austria only 2.

Hecker, Struve, and their followers desired the immediate proclamation of the German Republic, "one and indivisible." But though they were noisy, they were easily outvoted, and the majority resolved that the federal Government should consist of a single head, with a legislature of two chambers. All details were to be left to a National Constituent Assembly to be elected by universal suffrage on the basis of one representative for every 50,000 of the population.

The
Frankfort
Parliament

This Assembly—known to history as the Frankfort Parliament—met in the Pauluskirche at Frankfort, under the very nose of the Germanic Diet (*Bundestag*). Consisting at first of some 300 members, its numbers were gradually swollen to about 550. The first discussions revealed the existence of three distinct parties. All were agreed as to the necessity of a new central authority, but the Conservatives desired that it should come into being with the assent of the existing State Governments; the extreme democrats, represented by such men as Robert Blum of Leipzig, wanted a federal Republic; but the great majority looked for a constitutional monarchy. The choice of Heinrich von Gagern as President was indicative of the prevailing opinion, and in itself singularly felicitous. If the work of the Frankfort Parliament produced little immediate effect it was no fault of his.

That the Assembly should have consisted so largely of professorial doctrinaires and self-opinionated journalists was unfortunate but perhaps inevitable. As a consequence, time and temper were wasted on the discussion of first prin-

ciples, and the elaboration of a declaration of rights. Matters trivial and grave were discussed at equal length and with equal solemnity. The only practical step accomplished in the first six months was the appointment of a central executive. It was decided to appoint the young and popular Austrian prince, the Archduke John, to be Imperial Vicar (*Reichsverweser*), to carry on the Government provisionally, with the assistance of a Ministry selected by himself. On July 11 the Imperial Vicar made an official entry into Frankfort, and proceeded to the appointment of his Ministry. Into his hands the Imperial Diet resigned its functions, and for the time being ceased to exist.

Meanwhile the Parliament was talking much and moving slowly. By Christmas 1848 the fundamental rights of the German people were at last formulated. They were of the usual type: freedom of the Press, trial by jury, civil and religious equality, the abolition of feudal burdens, and so forth.

The constitutional question still remained. The difficulties in the way of any settlement were undeniably formidable. The most serious was the relation of the Hapsburgs, with their mosaic empire of Czechs, Italians, Magyars, and others, to the Germanic body. The "great Germans" stoutly opposed the exclusion of the non-German provinces of Austria. The "little Germans," on the contrary, starting from the idea of a glorified *Zollverein* and looking to Hohenzollern hegemony, insisted that the inclusion of Austria or any part of it would be fatal to the realization of German unity in any effective form. Ultimately the "little Germans" carried their point. Austria was to be excluded, and Germany was henceforward to form a federal State under an hereditary Emperor. There was to be a central Parliament of two Houses, with a responsible executive, to which was entrusted the command of the army, the conduct of foreign relations, and all questions of peace and war. On March 28 the Imperial Crown was offered to Frederick William IV of Prussia.

Temperamentally conservative, romantically loyal to the Hapsburgs, mistrustful of democratic forces, and religiously imbued with the idea of Divine Right, Frederick William found himself confronted with a cruel dilemma.

Germany
and the
Hapsburgs

Frederick
William
and the
Imperial
Crown

Could he, for the sake of German unity, ardently desired, demean himself by accepting a crown at the hands of those who, in his view, had no warrant to confer it? Even so, could the hostility of Austria be counted any longer as a negligible factor. The young Emperor was once again master in his own capital; the North Italian movement had been crushed at Novara (March 23); Prague had long ago submitted; Hungary had been incorporated into Austria. Frederick William hesitated, and Germany was lost.

On April 3, 1849, his fateful decision was announced. He would wear no "crown of shame"; he would not demean himself by becoming the "serf of the revolution"; Prussia would not merge herself in Germany.

The Frankfort Parliament refused to accept defeat, but the fiasco was now inevitable, and on June 18 it dissolved itself. A courageous experiment had disastrously miscarried, and Germany had taken the first step on the road destined to lead to 1870 and to 1914. Could Frederick William in 1849 have commanded the services of a Stein, Germany might have been united by parliamentary methods, and in time have been fashioned into a "constitutional" empire. The chance was lost; and the task, nobly but unsuccessfully attempted by the doctrinaires, was twenty years later accomplished by the man of "blood and iron."

Reaction,
1851-61

Ten years of reaction followed upon the failure of the Frankfort Parliament. During that period Austria regained not a little of the prestige which in 1848-9 she had lost. Her regeneration was largely due to the strong will and indefatigable energy of Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, who, as already noted, had been called to power in the dark days of 1848. Schwarzenberg took office with two objects: to weld the Hapsburg Empire into a centralized administrative unity, and to humiliate and destroy the upstart power of Prussia.

Schwarzen-
berg

Frederick William, by his honourable scruples, played, as we have seen, into Schwarzenberg's hands. But though opposed to the methods of the Pauluskirche Convention, the Prussian King heartily approved its objects. Early in 1849, therefore, he opened negotiations with Saxony and Hanover, who, like himself, had rejected the Frankfort

Constitution, and in May the three North German States accepted the draft of a Constitution prepared by the Prussian Minister, Radowitz. This *Dreikönigsbündnis* was afterwards joined by Electoral and Grand-ducal Hesse and by several of the smaller States. Prussia was to be the president of a college of princes, with a federal legislature of two chambers. Austria was to be excluded from the arrangement. In January 1850 elections took place in the States which adhered to this union, and in March 1850 a second German Parliament met at Erfurt. But the *Dreikönigsbündnis*, for all effective purposes, had been already broken up by the defection and withdrawal of Saxony and Hanover. This was Schwarzenberg's chance. A *Vierkönigsbündnis* was formed by Würtemberg, Bavaria, Saxony, and Hanover, which tacitly accepted the presidency of Austria and the inclusion of the whole Hapsburg Empire. Meanwhile the Erfurt Parliament approved the Constitution submitted by Radowitz, but the withdrawal of the two northern Kings had deprived it in advance of any moral sanction, and the scheme was virtually abandoned. Schwarzenberg, much emboldened by the Prussian fiasco, now concentrated all his endeavours upon a simple restoration of the old federal Constitution of 1815. In November 1850 he met the Prussian Minister, Manteuffel, at Olmütz to arrange a settlement of all differences outstanding between the two Powers. The "Union" was dissolved; the Bund restored the authority of the Elector in Hesse; Prussia came back into the fold of the Germanic Confederation, and sent a delegate to Frankfort (May 1851).

Schwarzenberg's triumph was complete. Reaction reigned supreme. The efforts of the last four years seemed to be entirely fruitless. It was not so in reality. Despite the fiasco in which it issued, the Frankfort Parliament gave a real impulse to the idea of national unity in Germany. Nor did the constitutional movement in the several States wholly evaporate.

This was notably true of Prussia. The work of the Constituent Assembly, which Frederick William IV had summoned in March 1848, proved, indeed, abortive. But after many disputes and vicissitudes a Constitution was eventually agreed upon and promulgated by Royal Edict (January 31, 1850).

Prussian
Constitution
of 1850

Under that constitutional instrument Prussia continued to be governed until the downfall of the Empire in 1918. The whole scheme presupposed the supremacy of the King, who had a veto on legislation and appointed the Ministers. The latter, who were chiefs of the principal administrative departments, formed a sort of Cabinet, but it lacked the characteristic features of an English Cabinet, for the Ministers were responsible not to the legislature but to the King, and there was little cohesion or mutual responsibility between them. The legislature (*Landtag*) was bi-cameral. The House of Lords (*Herrenhaus*) contained some 365 members, of whom 115 were hereditary, 200 official, and the rest nominated for life by the Crown. The Lower House contained 433 members elected by a process of double election on the ultimate basis of manhood suffrage. The legislative powers of the *Landtag*, though ample on paper, were in practice confined to the consideration and amendment of Bills initiated by the Crown. Still less conclusive was its control over the Executive. Yet the Constitution, unamended in essentials, lasted as long as the monarchy. With its promulgation the Prussian "revolution" ended. Its course was indeed affected by the insurrection in Prussian Poland, by the war with Denmark,¹ and most of all by the proceedings at Frankfort. The refusal of the Prussian King to revoke the Constitution thus outlined was the only check Schwarzenberg suffered in his reactionary career. In 1852, however, that brilliant and masterful statesman died, having succeeded in the short space of four years in raising the prestige and power of the Hapsburgs to a point at least as high as any attained in Metternich's best days.

But a star more brilliant than Schwarzenberg's was rising above the horizon in North Germany. In 1857 the old King, Frederick William of Prussia, fell a victim to the mental malady which had long threatened him. His brother, Prince William, became Regent,² and four years later ascended the throne as William I. One of the first acts of the new King (Sept. 1862) was to appoint as Minister-President Count Otto von Bismarck. For thirty years

¹ *Infra*, p. 227.

² Actually in 1857; formally October 7, 1858.

Bismarck ruled Germany, and for twenty he was the dominant personality in Continental Europe.

§ 3. THE REVOLUTION IN ITALY

From Germany we must now retrace our steps to Italy, Lombardo-Venetia where, as we have seen, the first manifestations of the revolutionary spirit were observed as early as January 1848. Constitutions, modelled on the French Constitution of 1830, had been already granted to the peoples of Naples, Tuscany, Piedmont, and Rome, before news of the exciting events in Vienna reached Italy. On March 17, however, Venice and Milan learnt that Vienna was in revolt and that Metternich had fallen. The Austrian Government in Italy immediately collapsed. The revolution broke out in Milan on the 18th, and for five days (the *Cinque Giornalè* of Milan) fierce conflict raged in the streets. At the close of it Marshal Radetsky, the veteran Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian forces in Italy, was compelled to retreat to the "Quadrilateral," the square of territory between the Adige and the Mincio, flanked by the great fortresses of Verona, Legnano, Peschiera, and Mantua. This great strategic position guarded the route into Italy from Vienna and Innsbruck by the Brenner Pass, and Radetsky had made it virtually impregnable.

On the receipt of the first news from Vienna, the Venetian The Republic in Venice populace had risen in insurrection and released the political prisoners, among whom were their heroes, Daniel Manin and Niccolo Tommasco. Manin was a Venetian jurist of Jewish origin, whose championship of Venetian grievances had led to his arrest on a charge of high treason on January 18. On his release (March 17) he at once took control of the situation. On the 23rd of March he proclaimed the Republic of St. Mark and was himself elected its President. Not a drop of blood had been shed, but the Austrians accepted the inevitable and evacuated the city. As the retreat from Milan involved the loss of the whole of Lombardy, so the surrender of Venice started an insurrection which spread so fast that before the end of the month there remained to Austria nothing but the Quadrilateral, tenaciously held by Radetsky.

"The hour of Austria has struck." That was the cry Charles Albert

that rang from "Alp to Etna." The rulers of Parma and Modena, scared by the fall of their patron Metternich, took flight. On the 23rd Charles Albert of Piedmont declared war on Austria. The Grand Duke of Tuscany followed suit, and published a stirring proclamation to the troops as they left to join the Sardinian army. "Soldiers! the holy cause of Italy's independence is now to be decided on the Lombard plain. The citizens of Milan have already bought with their blood their liberty. Already the Sardinian army led by its great-hearted King moves into the field. Sons of Italy, heirs of Tuscan glory shall not remain in slothful ease at such a moment. Fly, then, to the succour of our Lombard brothers." The Tuscans needed no bidding; they flew to join the troops of Piedmont. Even the wretched Bomba in Naples was forced to simulate sympathy with the universal enthusiasm, and Neapolitans and even Romans followed the Tuscans into Lombardy. No sooner had Milan and Venice flung off the Austrian yoke than they united themselves by plébiscite with Piedmont. Parma, Piacenza, and Modena did the same. The union of North Italy under the hegemony of Sardinia seemed to have been already achieved; the union of Italy seemed not remote. The spirit of those days was exactly captured by a gifted English poetess:—

"Italia Una!" Now the war-cry rang
From Alp to Etna: and her dreams were done,
And she herself had wakened into life,
And stood full armed and free; and all her sons
Knew they were happy to have looked on her,
And felt it beautiful to die for her."

Those were great moments in the history of the Italian *Risorgimento*; but the brutal fact remained; the Austrian power was essentially unbroken. Not even the enthusiasm of Garibaldi, not the ardour of Mazzini, who hurried back from exile to enrol himself as a volunteer in the Garibaldian legion, could avail against the strategic skill of Radetsky.

Moreover, the unity of Italy was as yet entirely superficial. Even the military cohesion in the war zone was loose; political unity was hardly skin-deep. The Pope, Pius IX, was the first of the rulers to draw back. On April 29 he addressed to his cardinals an allocution in which

he disavowed all participation in the war against Austria, declared that the Papal troops had been sent north only to defend the frontiers of the States of the Church, and definitely repudiated the Neo-Guelph idea of an Italian federation under the presidency of the Pope.

This declaration was a shattering blow to the hopes of Italian Catholics; for the moment, it gravely discouraged the movement towards Italian unity, and even towards Italian independence. In the long run, as we shall see, it served both causes well by compelling concentration upon the policy of Cavour, and the hegemony of the House of Savoy. Encouraged by the attitude of the Papacy, King Ferdinand, who at the end of March had been deposed by his Sicilian subjects, effected a *coup d'état* in Naples (May 15), and recalled the army which under the command of General Pepe was on the march for Lombardy. Pepe refused to obey, but his army melted away, and when he joined Charles Albert in Venetia he brought him less than fifteen hundred men.

With Charles Albert himself things were going none too well: he won a few skirmishes, but on June 10 Radetsky ^{Recovery of Austria} retook Vicenza; the capture of Vicenza was followed by that of other Venetian towns, and on July 25 Charles Albert was severely defeated at Custozza. The battle of Custozza really decided the campaign: Charles Albert retreated on Milan, but found it impossible to hold the city, which Radetsky entered on August 6. Three days later an armistice providing for the evacuation of Lombardo-Venetia by the Italian troops was signed at Vigevano.

The Milanese, driven to frenzy by the surrender of their city, turned upon Charles Albert; the unhappy King barely escaped from Milan with his life; even in Turin and Genoa his position was gravely impaired; in fine, the Sardinian hegemony was for the time being at an end.

Radetsky's brilliant generalship had not only saved ^{Radetsky} Lombardo-Venetia for Austria; it had gone far to re-establish the Hapsburg Empire. Throughout that Empire the reactions of the Italian victories were felt far and wide.

In Italy itself the failure of the Sardinian leadership ^{The Roman Republic} gave an immense impulse to the Mazzinians and Republicans; notably in Venice and Rome. In Rome the relations between

the Pope and his subjects became increasingly strained during the summer of 1848, until in mid-September Pio Nono called to his counsels Pellegrino Rossi who, though Italian by birth, had been French Ambassador in Rome, and was known as a man of strong character and enlightened views. Rossi, though mistrusted alike by Clericals and Republicans, did his utmost to bring order into the chaotic administration of Rome, but on November 15 he was foully assassinated. His murder dispelled all hope of a reformed or reforming Papacy. Pio Nono fled in terror to Gaeta, where he placed himself under the protection of King Ferdinand of Naples. Rome, left without government of any kind, was for the moment a prey to anarchy.

The
Triumvirate

Presently, however, a Constituent Assembly met, and on February 9 proclaimed the overthrow of the Temporal Power, and the establishment of the Republic, not only for Rome but for the whole of Italy. The immediate government of the city was at the same time entrusted to three triumvirs, of whom Mazzini was one. Mazzini, assured that the day of his dreams had dawned, hurried south to do his part in organizing the Government. But in the desperate plight of the Papacy the new President of the French Republic saw his chance. Louis Philippe's policy had alienated both the army and the Church. By one stroke Louis Napoleon hoped to win the affection of both. A French expedition was, accordingly, despatched to Rome to effect the restoration of the Pope. On April 25 General Oudinot landed with 8000 men at Civita Vecchia, and on the 30th attempted to capture Rome by surprise. But by this time the defenders had been reinforced by the arrival of Garibaldi who, on the outbreak of the Revolution, had hurried back from exile in South America to place his person and his sword at the service of his country. His offer was coldly received by Charles Albert (June 1848), and Garibaldi, therefore, went on to Milan where he was enthusiastically welcomed. From all parts of Italy volunteers flocked to the standard of the now famous chieftain, and in a short time he found himself at the head of 30,000 men. With this band, notwithstanding the armistice of Vigevano, Garibaldi carried on a desultory but harassing campaign.

Garibaldi

This guerilla warfare, though it did not materially improve

the political, or even the military, situation, succeeded in doing two things: it stimulated to an incredible degree the enthusiasm of the populations from which the volunteers were drawn, and it concentrated that enthusiasm upon the knight-errant who commanded them. Before the opening of the campaign of 1849 Charles Albert offered Garibaldi a regular command; but almost simultaneously news came from Rome which caused Garibaldi—to whom as to Mazzini Rome represented the embodiment of patriotic aspiration—to fly with a band of 1500 followers to her aid. He was immediately entrusted with the defence of the frontier which was menaced by Ferdinand of Naples.

In May Garibaldi and his legion covered themselves with glory in two battles at Palestrina and Velletri, where they inflicted crushing defeats on Bomba's Neapolitans. But the heroic struggle was drawing to a close. "The situation," wrote Garibaldi, "grows more difficult every day." An Austrian army was advancing through the Legations, and General Oudinot, largely reinforced from France, was preparing to assault the city. After a heavy bombardment his troops stormed the breaches, and on July 3 the French entered the Holy City.

Just before the entry of the French, Garibaldi, accompanied by his heroic wife and some 4000 followers, escaped from the city and took to the country, resolved, as he said, "to try our fate again rather than submit to the degradation of laying down our arms before the priest-ridden soldiers of Bonaparte." Dogged first by the French and then by the Austrians, Garibaldi and his band crossed the Apennines, and then, after a month of hairbreadth escapes (which the wise reader will follow in Mr. Trevelyan's brilliant narrative¹), embarked at Casenatico (August 1), meaning to make their way to Venice which was still maintaining its superb struggle against the Austrians. But in the Adriatic they were confronted by an Austrian squadron which compelled them to put back and land near Ravenna. "I leave it to be imagined," wrote Garibaldi, "what was my position at that unhappy moment: my poor wife dying, the enemy pursuing us inshore, and the prospect of landing on a coast where more

¹ *Garibaldi and the Defence of the Roman Republic*, by G. M. Trevelyan.

enemies probably awaited us." Many of the boats were taken, but Garibaldi with Anita and a few followers managed to reach the shore. Still the pursuers came on ; many of his friends, including Ugo Bassi, were captured and shot ; Garibaldi himself escaped, but not until he had seen his beloved Anita expire in his arms. For four years he was a wanderer ; but in 1854 he settled down in the island of Caprera, until he was again called forth from retirement by the events of 1859.

Campaign
of 1849 in
North Italy

Meanwhile the Roman Republic collapsed and the Pope was restored to his Temporal Power. But Venice still held out. On March 12 Charles Albert of Piedmont had denounced the armistice and taken the field with a mixed force of 80,000 men, but within a fortnight he suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of Radetsky at Novara (March 23). On the evening of that fatal day the old King resigned his sceptre to his son, famous to all time as the creator of Italian unity—Victor Emmanuel. The young King's first task, no easy one, was to negotiate a truce with the Austrian conqueror. Yet he showed characteristic courage throughout his negotiations with Radetsky. The latter offered generous terms, but on condition that the Parliamentary Constitution of Piedmont was abolished. Victor Emmanuel was adamant in his refusal. " Marshal," he said, " sooner than subscribe to such conditions I would lose a hundred Crowns. What my father has sworn I will maintain. If you want war to the death, be it so. I will call my people once more to arms. . . . If I fail, it shall be without shame. My house knows the road of exile but not of dishonour." Radetsky insisted on an indemnity, on the evacuation of all districts occupied by the Italian army outside Piedmont, on the occupation of certain places in Piedmont until the peace was concluded, and on the withdrawal of the Italian fleet from the Adriatic. These terms were perforce accepted ; but the Piedmontese Constitution was intact ; the son had kept his father's pledge inviolate, and all Italy could look, and came to look to *il re galantuomo*, to the man who kept his word, as the destined liberator of his country, the champion of Italian unification.

Reaction
in Italy.

Novara was followed by restoration ; restoration by re-

action. Bomba re-established autocracy in Naples, and Sicily was compelled again to submit to his rule; Leopold was reinstated in Tuscany; but Venice still held out. By the end of May, however, the devoted city was blockaded by land and sea; in July the bombardment began and continued for three weeks; within the city cholera was raging, the horrors of famine were added to those of plague, and at last on August 23 the capitulation was signed and the siege was at an end. Radetsky made a triumphal entry into the city on the 30th, and the Patriarch celebrated the restoration of Austrian rule by a *Te Deum* in St. Mark's.

To all outward seeming the triumph of Austrian absolutism was complete. The year of Revolution, at one time bright with hope for Italy, had come and gone, and had left Italy to all appearance as helpless and hopeless as ever. "The Pope," wrote Mazzini, "clutches the soul of the Italian nation; Austria the body whenever it shows signs of life; and on every member of that body is enthroned an absolute prince, viceroy in turn under one or other of those powers."

Well might Mazzini and the Republican zealots despair of the situation. Yet the Italy of 1850 was not the Italy of 1815 nor even of 1847. She had awakened from the death-sleep of centuries. The insurrections of 1820, 1831, and 1848, abortive as they appeared, had at least proved that the Italians were conscious of their degradation, that they had begun to dare to hope. Most of them had begun to hope for freedom; some of them to dream of unity; and gradually they had begun to realize, however provincial their patriotism, that the one was impracticable without the other, that liberty could only be attained through unity.

In the movements of 1848-9, whether in France or Germany, in Bohemia, Hungary, or Italy, there was much that must excite, in the mind of the detached observer, derision if not detestation. Yet there was something also of the heroic. Some of the leaders were prompted by egotism and vanity rather than fired by the pure flame of patriotism. No one, however, can read unmoved the tale of the defence of Venice and Rome, as it has been told in incomparable prose by Mr. Trevelyan. It was perhaps well for Italy that it was left

to Cavour and Victor Emmanuel to succeed where Mazzini and Manin had failed. It was perhaps well for the peace of Europe that the Hapsburg Empire found in its hour of peril defenders like Radetsky, Windischgrätz, and Schwarzenberg; yet the failure of the Frankfort Parliament, intelligible though it was, when its personnel is considered, sowed the seeds of a harvest which Germany and Europe had to gather, with infinite travail and sorrow, in 1914. What suffering to the world might not have been averted could Germany have achieved political unity by means of the protocols and parchments which Bismarck despised, instead of by the weapons which he cynically employed. But such reflections are inspired by retrospect, and indulgence in that luxury is permitted to the historian only within the narrowest limits.

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CHAPTER X

THE EASTERN QUESTION (1830-56)

MEHEMET ALI. RUSSIA AND TURKEY. THE CRIMEAN WAR

ALL reference to the affairs of the Near East has been deliberately excluded, in the interests of lucidity, from the preceding chapters. It is, however, all the more necessary to emphasize the truth that, in fact, the development of the Near Eastern Question powerfully reacted upon the relations of the Western Powers, and still more on the relations between those Powers and Russia.

We have seen that in the Greek War of Independence Sultan Mahmud had appealed for aid to his powerful vassal ^{Mehemet Ali} Mehemet Ali, the Pasha of Egypt. Their subsequent relations confirm the truth of the aphorism that in politics it is imprudent to confer a favour; and even more dangerous to accept one. Had it not been for the intervention of the Powers, Mehemet Ali and his son Ibrahim would undoubtedly have saved the Ottoman Empire from dismemberment. Crete seemed an inadequate reward for such signal services. Recent events had, moreover, revealed the weakness of the Ottoman Empire. The Greeks had achieved independence; France had seized Algiers (1830). If Algiers and Greece could be so easily detached from Constantinople, why not other portions of the loosely compacted Empire?

Mehemet Ali, half an illiterate barbarian, half a consummate statesman, was wholly a genius. Between 1805 and 1849 this brilliant Albanian adventurer was the real ruler of Egypt, and for the latter half of that period was one of the dominant factors in European politics. Having reorganized the administration of Egypt, and refashioned its army and navy, he proposed to himself a three-fold task: to make Egypt supreme over the adjacent lands, Arabia and the Soudan; to render it virtually independent of the Sultan;

and to use it as a stepping-stone to the conquest of Syria, perhaps of Asia Minor, it might be of the whole Ottoman Empire. Arabia and the Soudan had been reduced to obedience by 1823 ; from 1824 to 1829 he was busy, as we have seen, in the Morea ; in 1831 he despatched an expedition to Syria under the redoubtable Ibrahim. After a series of brilliant victories in Palestine and Syria, Ibrahim advanced into Asia Minor and, having inflicted a crushing defeat on the Turkish armies sent to bar his progress, was threatening Constantinople itself.

The Porte
and the
Powers

The Sultan, in his extremity, appealed to the Powers. But England was preoccupied (1832) at home with the Reform Bill, and abroad with Belgium. France had a traditional interest in Egypt and had recently developed a remarkable cult for Mehemet Ali, who was regarded, especially by the Bonapartists, as the inheritor of Napoleon's policy in Egypt. Only Russia, therefore, was at once able and anxious to go to the assistance of the Sultan. Sultan Mahmud was not unmindful of the danger involved in the acceptance of an enemy's gifts ; but his case was desperate, and, despite the opposition of the Western Powers, a powerful Russian squadron was despatched to the Bosphorus, and a Russian army was landed at Scutari.

France and England, greatly alarmed by the development of events, applied pressure to both combatants, in order to bring about peace, and on April 8, 1833, the Convention of Kutáya was signed, by which the Sultan reluctantly agreed to hand over to Mehemet Ali the whole of Syria, part of Mesopotamia, and the important port and district of Adana.

Treaty of
Unkiar-
Skelessi
(1833)

Mehemet Ali was thus bought off ; the debt to Russia had yet to be discharged. Russia was virtually in military occupation of Turkey. Count Alexis Orloff had been sent to Constantinople in April as " Ambassador-Extraordinary to the Porte and Commander-in-Chief of the Russian troops in the Ottoman Empire." He was instructed to use every endeavour to convince the Sultan that his one hope of salvation was to confide absolutely in the friendship of Russia ; to combat French influence at Constantinople ; to neutralize the perpetual ill-will of England by making it clear that the sole object of Russia was to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman

Empire ; and above all to resist any proposal for collective intervention at Constantinople.¹

The fruit of persistent pressure and prolonged negotiations was reaped by the signature (July 8, 1833) of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi.

This famous treaty marked the zenith of Russian influence at Constantinople. It placed the Ottoman Empire under the military protectorship of the Czar ; it guaranteed to Russia a free passage for her warships through the Straits, and it closed the door into the Black Sea against every other Power.

These provisions excited the liveliest apprehensions in England and France, and Lord Palmerston made it clear that at the first opportunity they must be revoked.

The opportunity did not tarry. On the one hand, the restless ambition of Mehemet Ali had been scotched, not killed. On the other, Sultan Mahmud was determined to retrieve what he had lost both in prestige and territory. His army was reorganized under a Prussian soldier, destined to fame as the conqueror of Austria and France, Helmuth von Moltke ; commercial treaties were concluded with Great Britain and other Powers, and an effort, apparently sincere, was made to introduce Western civilization into the Turkish Empire.

Meanwhile, Mehemet Ali chafed under the restrictions imposed upon him by the Convention of Kutáya, and was restrained from declaring his formal independence only by the pressure of the Powers. The Powers were less successful with Sultan Mahmud, who in the spring of 1839 launched an expedition for the recovery of Syria. In April a large Turkish force crossed the Euphrates, and on June 24 it was routed by Ibrahim at Nessib on the Syrian frontier. The disaster at Nessib was immediately followed by the destruction of the fleet, which was carried off by the admiral Ahmed Pasha to Alexandria and surrendered to Mehemet Ali. At this dark hour in the fortunes of his Empire, the old Sultan Mahmud died, with rage in his heart and curses on his lips, and was succeeded by his son Abdul Medjid, a youth of sixteen.

Not for the first or last time, however, the weakness of the Porte proved to be its strength. Louis Philippe was, indeed,

Turco-
Egyptian
War,
1839-41

France and
the Near
East

¹Serge Goriainow : *Le Bosphore and Les Dardanelles*, an invaluable work by the late Director of the Imperial Archives at St. Petersburg, p. 33 seq.

lavish in encouragement to Mehemet Ali. A firm alliance with the Egyptian adventurer seemed to open the prospect of a restoration of French prestige throughout the Near East. Strong in possession of Algeria, cordially united with Spain, France might even hope to convert the Mediterranean into a French lake, and by cutting a canal through the isthmus of Suez, might neutralize the advantage secured to England by the command of the Cape route to India.

England,
France, and
Russia

England, however, had in 1839 taken the precaution to occupy Aden, nor was she minded to permit the break up of the Ottoman Empire, the establishment of a Russian protectorate over Turkey, or of a French protectorate in Egypt. Lord Palmerston, who was then at the Foreign Office, was at once contemptuous of Louis Philippe, and mistrustful of the Czar Nicholas. As to the future of Turkey itself, he was far from pessimistic, and described as "pure and unadulterated nonsense all that was said about the decay of the Turkish Empire and its being a dead body or a sapless trunk and so forth." Given ten years of peace under European protection, coupled with internal reform, there seemed to him no reason why "it should not again become a respectable Power." For the moment two things were essential: Mehemet must be compelled to "withdraw into his original shell of Egypt," and the protection afforded to Turkey must be *European*, and not exclusively *Russian*. These were the keynotes of Palmerston's policy in the Near East, and they dominated the Treaty of London (July 15, 1840).

Treaty of
London,
1840

Under that treaty the Sultan agreed to confer upon Mehemet the hereditary Pashalik of Egypt, and, for his life only, the administration of Southern Syria, including the fortress of St. John of Acre. The rest of the contracting Powers, Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, undertook to force these terms upon Mehemet, to prevent communications between Egypt and Syria, to defend Constantinople, and maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

Would Mehemet accept the terms? If not, would France back him in his refusal? Louis Philippe and Thiers were profoundly chagrined by Palmerston's coup in the Quadruple Treaty. France had been bowed out of the European concert, and Thiers was all for defying Europe. Palmerston was undismayed; Bulwer (British Ambassador in Paris) was

instructed to tell Thiers "in the most friendly and inoffensive manner, that if France throws down the gauntlet we shall not refuse to pick it up." Palmerston knew his man. Thiers was allowed to resign, and the Anglophil Guizot replaced him.

Mehemet, however, refused the terms, and the Powers, accordingly, proceeded to impose their will upon him. An English fleet, supported by some Austrian frigates, bombarded Beyrout and Sidon, and compelled Ibrahim to retire from Syria. The capture by Sir Charles Napier of the great fortress of St. John of Acre, hitherto deemed impregnable, completed Ibrahim's discomfiture. Napier sailed on to Alexandria, compelled Mehemet to restore the Turkish fleet, and to accept the terms of the Quadruple Treaty. France, having been invited to come in to the general settlement, agreed, and on July 13, 1841, a second Treaty of London was concluded between the five Powers: England, Russia, France, Austria, and Prussia. Arabia and Syria were restored to the Porte; Mehemet Ali was confirmed in the hereditary Pashalik of Egypt under the suzerainty of the Sultan, and—most important of all from the European point of view—it was agreed that the Straits should be closed to *all* foreign ships of war, so long as Turkey was at peace.

English policy had thus achieved a notable triumph: the lopsided Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi was torn up; Turkey was rescued alike from the open hostility of Mehemet and from the interested friendship of the Czar; France was not permitted to break the concert, nor to pose as the exclusive protector of Egypt, and the will of England, acting as the champion of the European solidarity, was permitted to prevail; not least—the peace of Europe was preserved.

A triumph for England and for the Concert of Europe, the Treaties of London were a personal triumph for Lord Palmerston. His action in the Near East was in the best tradition of English Foreign Policy. On him had fallen the mantle of Canning, which Canning himself had inherited from Pitt. Like Pitt, Canning had grasped the truth that Great Britain was not less interested than Russia, and was much more interested than any other European Power, in the fate of the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, he enforced the principle that Russia must not be permitted to regard the Near Eastern Question as her exclusive concern. The Duke

of Wellington had indeed deserted Canning's principles, and had temporarily dissipated the hard-won fruits of his diplomacy. The Czar Nicholas had profited by the Duke's blunder in 1829, and was thereby tempted to an even bolder experiment in 1833.

Palmerston completely retrieved the position. But for his prompt action, the Black Sea would have remained a "Russian lake," and the Czar's fleets would have commanded the Eastern Mediterranean. The Treaties of London were a clear intimation to the Czar Nicholas that in the ultimate settlement of the Eastern Question Great Britain must have an influential voice.

Nicholas I
and Great
Britain

Nor was Nicholas slow to take the broad hint. His intellect may have been narrow, but it was singularly acute. He frankly recognized that England was hardly less interested than Russia in finding a satisfactory solution of the Near Eastern problem, and he endeavoured honestly, according to his lights, to assist her in the quest. In the summer of 1844 the Czar visited the English Court, and opened his mind freely to the English statesmen on public affairs, particularly those relating to the Eastern Question. He insisted that, in the event of the Porte giving to any one of the Powers just cause of complaint, that Power should be aided by the rest in its endeavours to have that cause removed; that all the Powers should urge on the Porte the duty of conciliating its Christian subjects, and should use all their influence to keep those subjects faithful in allegiance to the Sultan; and that, in the event of any unforeseen calamity befalling the Turkish Empire, Russia and England should agree together as to the course that should be pursued.¹ The Duke of Argyll, in recalling these views, added an expression of his own conviction that if Nicholas "had abided by the assurances" then given "the Crimean War would never have arisen."

To the outbreak and progress of that unhappy war we may now pass. The twelve years which preceded its outbreak marked one of those rare periods when the "Eastern Question" slumbered. After the second Treaty of London

¹ *Autobiography of the eighth Duke of Argyll*, i, 443. The Duke gives a vivid description of the Czar. Cf. also *Queen Victoria's Letters*, ii, 13-23, for the impression produced on the Court.

Mehemet Ali disappeared from the political stage on which for thirty-five years he had played so conspicuous a part.¹ The young Sultan, Abdul Medjid, relieved from external pressure, had an opportunity of putting his own house in order; nor did he neglect it. A large scheme of military reform was carried through; local government was reorganized; education was encouraged; an attempt was made to stop the antiquated system of tax-farming and to introduce religious equality: Moslems, Jews, and Christians were invited to regard themselves as equally under the protection of the Sultan. Such reforms, especially the last, were, however, deeply resented by the less enlightened elements in the Ottoman Empire, nor, to speak plainly, were they fully appreciated by the recipients of the benefits.²

Concession served only to whet the appetite for reform. The war of creeds blazed out more fiercely than ever, and each sect in turn applied to its external protector: the Orthodox to the Czar; the Catholics to France; the few Protestants to England. The quarrels of the Greeks and Latins were, indeed, not the least important among the many contributory causes which issued in the great European conflagration known to history as the Crimean War.

In 1850 Louis Napoleon took up with great zeal the cause of the Roman Catholics in the Near East. In 1852 M. de Lavalette, the French Ambassador at Constantinople, was instructed to insist upon the claims of the Latin monks to the guardianship of the Holy Places in Palestine. Ever since the sixteenth century France had enjoyed a privileged position in the Ottoman Empire. The original concessions made by Suleiman the Magnificent were renewed and guaranteed by the formal *Capitulations* of 1740. But in the later years of the eighteenth century the Latin monks had neglected their duties as custodians of the Holy Places in Palestine, and the Greeks had stepped into their shoes, with the tacit assent of Voltarian France. In 1850, however, Prince Louis Napoleon, lately elected to the Presidency of the French Republic, and anxious, then as always, to secure the support of the French clericals, took up with zeal the cause of the Latin monks, and

¹ He died in 1840, but some years previously his mind had given way.

² Marriott: *The Eastern Question*, chap. x, where further details of these reforms will be found.

insisted that they should be reinstated in the guardianship of the Holy Places. By the second *coup d'état* (December 1852) the Prince had transformed the Presidency into an hereditary empire. The complications of the Eastern Question gave him an opportunity of at once vindicating the wisdom, and retrieving the tarnished honour of France. Nor was a personal motive lacking. With studied contempt Nicholas had refused to accord the successful conspirator the courtesy which prevailed between crowned heads : he had addressed him not as "frère" but as "bon ami." The Greek monks at Bethlehem and Jerusalem were to pay for the affront put by the Czar upon the protector of the Latins.

England
and
Russia

If the prestige of France had suffered at the hands of Lord Palmerston, not less had that of Russia. Ever since the days of Peter the Great, Russia had set before herself two supreme objects : a virtual protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Sultan ; and the domination of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. These objects had been practically attained when the Sultan, in 1833, signed the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi. That treaty Lord Palmerston had torn up.

Great Britain, though tardy in realizing the significance of the Near Eastern Question to herself, was now deeply impressed with a sense of the danger to be apprehended, whether from a French protectorate over Egypt or from a Russian protectorate over Turkey. To repudiate the exclusive pretensions of both Russia and France was, therefore, the key-note of English foreign policy throughout three-quarters of the nineteenth century.

The Holy
Places

The demands made, on behalf of the Latin monks, by Napoleon, were supported by the other Roman Catholic Powers, Austria, Spain, Sardinia, Portugal, Belgium, and Naples ; and after some delay were, in substance, conceded by the Sultan. The concession roused bitter resentment in the mind of the Czar Nicholas, who demanded, from the Porte, its immediate rescission. Thus the Porte found itself, not for the first time, between the upper and the nether millstone ; and, in order to escape from that embarrassing situation, the Sultan played an old diplomatic trick. His decision on the points at issue was embodied in a letter to the French chargé d'affaires, and in a Firman addressed to the Greek patriarch at Jerusalem. The language of the two

documents was not identical : the letter laid stress upon the substantial concessions to France ; the Firman dwelt upon the claims denied. In the upshot France was satisfied, Russia was not.

Accordingly, in March 1853, the Czar despatched to Constantinople Prince Menschikoff, a rough and overbearing soldier, who was charged not only to obtain full satisfaction in regard to the Holy Places, but to demand from the Sultan a virtual acknowledgment, embodied in a formal treaty, of the Czar's protectorate over all the Orthodox subjects of the Porte. On the question of the Holy Places the Czar had a strong case ; his claim to a protectorate over the Greek Church in Turkey was, on the contrary, an extravagant extension of the vague and indefinite engagements contained in the Treaty of Kainardji, and in subsequent conventions concluded between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.

This demand appeared to the British Government to be wholly inadmissible.

"No sovereign," wrote Lord Clarendon, "having a proper regard for his own dignity and independence could admit proposals so undefined as those of Prince Menschikoff, and by treaty confer upon another and more powerful sovereign a right of protection over a large portion of his own subjects. However well disguised it may be, yet the fact is that under the vague language of the proposed Sened a perpetual right to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey would be conferred upon Russia, for, governed as the Greek subjects of the Porte are by their ecclesiastical authorities, and looking as these latter would in all things do for protection to Russia, it follows that 14,000,000 Greeks would henceforth regard the emperor as their supreme protector, and their allegiance to the Sultan would be little more than nominal, while his own independence would dwindle into vassalage."¹

Inadmissible in substance, the Russian demand was urged upon the Sultan by Prince Menschikoff with insufferable insolence. But Menschikoff had now to reckon with an antagonist in whose skilful hands the blustering soldier was a mere child. On April 5 Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who in 1848 had again become British Ambassador to the Porte,

¹ Lord Clarendon to Lord Stratford, May 31, 1853.

returned to Constantinople, and the whole diplomatic situation quickly underwent a complete change.

The Czar's
proposals

The Czar Nicholas, as we have seen, had always wished to settle the Eastern Question in accord with Great Britain, and in January and February, 1858, he had two memorable interviews with Sir Hamilton Seymour, then British Ambassador in St. Petersburg. Once more he expressed his anxiety to come to an agreement with England in regard to Turkey, "lest the sick man should suddenly die upon our hands, and his heritage fall into chaos and dissolution." Moreover, he was prepared with a specific scheme. Serbia, Bulgaria, and the Danubian Principalities were to be erected into independent States under Russian protection, and England, to secure her route to the East, might annex Egypt, Crete, and Cyprus. Russia, he declared, did not desire permanently to occupy Constantinople; but, if she did not, neither should England or France, or any other great Power. Least of all would Russia permit a revival of the Byzantine Empire in favour of Greece, or the "breaking up of Turkey into little Republics, as an asylum for the Kossuths, Mazzinis, and other revolutionists." The English Ministers refused to admit that the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was imminent, or to discuss a partition of the inheritance.¹ The Czar, therefore, proceeded to plough his lonely furrow at Constantinople.

Lord
Stratford
de Red-
cliffe at
Constanti-
nople

Lord Stratford, meanwhile, did not allow the grass to grow under his feet. He induced the Porte to give satisfaction to Russia on the question of the Holy Places. But the concession made by the Porte effected no improvement in the diplomatic situation. On the contrary, as the Porte became more conciliatory, Menschikoff became more menacing. Lord Stratford advised the Porte to refuse the protectorate claimed by Russia over the Christian subjects of the Sultan, and on May 22 Menschikoff and the staff of the Russian Embassy quitted Constantinople. A week later the Porte addressed to the Powers a Note announcing that "the question of the Holy Places had terminated in a manner satisfactory to all parties; that nevertheless the Prince Menschikoff, not satisfied with that, had demanded from the Porte a treaty to guarantee the rights and privileges of all kinds accorded by the

¹ *Eastern Papers*, Part v, 122 of 1854, and *Queen Victoria's Letters*, ii, 532-9.

Sultan to his Greek subjects." Nevertheless, the Porte, though bound to take measures of self-defence, did not abandon hopes of peace.

The hopes became fainter day by day. On July 21 a Russian army under Prince Gortschakoff crossed the Pruth, and occupied the Principalities. Russia thereupon announced to the Powers that the occupation was not intended as an act of war, but as a "material guarantee" for the concession of her just demands.

On October 5 the Porte demanded from Russia the evacuation of the Principalities within fifteen days, and on October 23 Turkey declared war. The British fleet had already been ordered up to the Bosphorus—an order of which Russia had some cause to complain as a technical infraction of the Treaty of 1841.

Nevertheless, Russia and the Western Powers still remained at peace, and the Czar declared that, despite the Turkish declaration of war, he would not take the offensive in the Principalities. The Turks, however, attacked vigorously on the Danube, and on November 30 the Russian Black Sea fleet retaliated by the entire destruction of a Turkish squadron in the Bay of Sinope. The "Massacre of Sinope" was the immediate prelude to the European War.

On January 4, 1854, the allied fleets entered the Black Sea, with instructions to "invite" all Russian ships in the Black Sea to withdraw into harbour. Even yet the Western Powers were not at war, but, on February 27, England and France, relying on a promise of support from Austria, called upon Russia "to restrict within purely diplomatic limits the discussion in which she has for some time been engaged with the Sublime Porte," and by return messenger to "agree to the complete evacuation of the Provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia by the 30th of April." Russia refused this ultimatum, and the Western Powers declared war.

Can the Crimean War be justified before the tribunal of impartial history? Sir Robert Morier, writing in 1870, perhaps expressed the current opinion when he described it as "the only perfectly useless modern war that has been waged."¹ Lord Salisbury, some twenty years later, enshrined in classical

¹ *Memoirs and Letters of Sir Robert Morier*, by his daughter, Mrs. Wemyss, ii, 215.

phrase the opinion that "England put her money on the wrong horse." Lord Cromer, on the contrary, steadily adhered to the opinion that "had it not been for the Crimean War and the policy subsequently pursued by Lord Beaconsfield the independence of the Balkan States would never have been achieved, and the Russians would now be in possession of Constantinople."¹ Kinglake has popularized the idea that England was an innocent tool in the hands of an unscrupulous adventurer, anxious to establish a throne unrighteously attained, by a brilliant war causelessly provoked. But that view is discredited.

The War
(1854-6)

To the war itself we must now turn. Early in 1854 a British fleet was sent to the Baltic, under the command of Sir Charles Napier, but though it captured Bomarsund, the results of the expedition were disappointingly meagre, and contributed little to the ultimate issue of the war. On April 5 a British force under Lord Raglan, who had served both in the field and at the Horse Guards under the Duke of Wellington, landed at Gallipoli. It was preceded by a French army under Marshal Saint-Arnaud, the fellow-conspirator of Napoleon III in the first *coup d'état*.

The Russians had already crossed the Danube (March 23) and had besieged Silistria, but on June 23 they suddenly raised the siege, and in July they commenced the evacuation of the Principalities. By the end of the first week in August there was no longer a Russian soldier to the west of the Pruth. The ostensible and immediate object of the European intervention might seem, therefore, to have been attained. But the allies had already reached the momentous decision (June) to "strike at the very heart of Russian power in the East—and that heart is at Sebastopol."²

The War
in the
Crimea

The Crimean War proper began in September 1854. On the 14th the allied army, more than 50,000 strong, disembarked in the Bay of Eupatoria to the north of Sebastopol. On the 19th the march towards Sebastopol began. On the 20th Menschikoff, in command of 40,000 troops, tried to stop the advance of the allies on the Alma—a stream about fifteen miles north of Sebastopol. After three hours of severe fighting the Russians were routed. The allies, though vic-

Battle of
the Alma

¹ *Essays*, p. 275.

² *The Times*, June 24, 1854.

torious, suffered heavily. But Lord Raglan, who commanded the Eighth Army, despite the lack of transport and the ravages of cholera, wanted to make an immediate assault upon Sebastopol. Had his advice been taken Sebastopol would almost infallibly have fallen. Saint-Arnaud, the French commander, who was in the grip of a mortal disease, vetoed the suggestion, and preparations were made for a regular siege.

For a regular investment of Sebastopol the allied forces were hopelessly insufficient, and a fortress which might at the outset have been taken by assault was rendered every day more proof against a siege by Colonel von Todleben, the greatest engineer of his day. On the heights above the town two brilliant battles were fought at Balaclava (October 25), and Inkermann (November 5), but they yielded no conclusive results. After Inkermann there were no operations on a large scale in the field until the middle of February. Meanwhile the lot of the besiegers was rendered miserable by a great gale (November 14) which destroyed much of the allied shipping and indispensable stores to the value of £2,000,000. That gale was the real beginning of the sufferings which have made the "Crimean Winter" a byword in the history of military administration.

While the soldiers toiled and suffered in the trenches, the diplomatists were busy at Vienna, and on December 28 the allied Powers, in conjunction with Austria, presented to the Russian plenipotentiary a Memorandum embodying the "Four Points." They were as follows :—

1. The exclusive protectorate exercised by Russia over Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia was to cease, and the privileges accorded by the Sultan to the Principalities were henceforward to be guaranteed collectively by the five Powers ; 2. The navigation of the Danube was to be free ; 3. The preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea was to be terminated ; and 4. Russia was to renounce all pretensions to a protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Porte ; and the five Powers were to co-operate in obtaining from the Sultan the confirmation and observance of the religious privileges of all the various Christian communities without infringing his dignity or the independence of his Crown.

A Conference to consider these terms formally opened on March 15, 1855, but before that date arrived two events had occurred, each, in its way, of profound significance. The first was the intervention of Sardinia; the second the death of the Czar Nicholas.

Interven-
tion of
Sardinia,
January,
1855

On January 26, 1855, Count Cavour signed a Convention with Great Britain and France, promising the adhesion of Sardinia to the alliance. Of good omen for the Western Powers, this step was incomparably the most momentous in the diplomatic history of modern Italy. The Convention excited bitter opposition in Piedmont, but by the end of April 18,000 Italians were on their way to the Crimea, under the command of General Alfonso La Marmora. "You have the future of the country in your haversacks," was Cavour's parting injunction to the troops. The response came from a soldier in the trenches, "Out of this mud Italy will be made." It was.

Death of
the Czar
Nicholas,
March 2,
1855

The adhesion of Sardinia came as a timely encouragement to the allies. To those who hoped for a speedy peace the death of the Czar Nicholas seemed of still happier augury. Nicholas was unquestionably the prime author of the war; he had sustained it with unflagging energy, and he was bitterly disappointed at his failure to bring it to a rapid and brilliant termination.

Conference
of Vienna

The accession of the new Czar, Alexander II, did not, however, render Russia more pliable. The real crux lay in the proposed limitation of Russian naval preponderance in the Black Sea, and on that point the negotiations, at the end of April, broke down.¹

Progress of
the war

The war was nearing its end. But there was still a great deal of hard fighting round Sebastopol during the spring and summer of 1855.

General Pélissier, who succeeded Canrobert in May, was not only a great soldier, but was possessed of the moral courage which Canrobert lacked. He soon infused fresh vigour into the operations before Sebastopol.

The Fall
of Sebas-
topol

Slowly but surely the allied armies pushed forward their lines towards the Russian fortifications, and on the night of May 15-16 the Russians were defeated on the Tchernaya in

¹The history of these negotiations may be followed in minute detail in Goriainow, *op. cit.*, chap. xi.

a gallant effort to raise the siege. To the allied victory the Sardinian contingent under La Marmora largely contributed. Thus were Cavour's calculations precisely fulfilled. In the waters of the Tchernaya the stain of Novara was wiped out for ever ; out of the mud of the Crimean trenches was modern Italy built up. Henceforward Cavour could speak with his enemies in the gate. The victory of the allies at the Tchernaya shattered the last hopes of relief for the gallant defenders of Sebastopol. For three weeks the allies kept up a continuous and terribly destructive fire upon the devoted fortress, and on September 9, after a siege of 349 days, occupied the burning ruins of Sebastopol.

On November 28 General Fenwick Williams, who had been sent to reorganize the Turkish forces in Armenia, was compelled to surrender the fortress of Kars. General Muraviev's success at Kars was a slight set-off against the surrender of Sebastopol, and predisposed the mind of the Czar Alexander to peace.

The Emperor Napoleon was even more anxious for peace. He had got all he could out of the war ; the French army had gained fresh lustre from its concluding passages ; the English army had not. Napoleon's restless mind was already busy with the future disposition of Europe. He was looking towards Russia and towards Italy ; for England he had no further use. Cavour too had got all he wanted. As soon as there was a chance of peace, Austria spared no effort to detach Napoleon from the English alliance. And she nearly succeeded ; but on January 16, 1856, the Czar (at the instance of his brother-in-law the King of Prussia) accepted as a basis of negotiation the " Four Points " (including a stipulation for the neutralization of the Black Sea), and on February 1 a Protocol embodying these terms was concluded by the representatives of the five Powers at Vienna. The definitive Peace was signed at Paris on March 30, 1856. The main terms were as follows :—

1. The Sublime Porte was formally admitted, on the invitation of the six Powers (including the King of Sardinia), to " participate in the public law and concert of Europe," and the Powers engaged severally to respect, and collectively to guarantee " the independence and the territorial integrity of the

Fall of
Kars

Treaty of
Paris,
March 30,
1856

Ottoman Empire "; 2. The Sultan announced his intention to ameliorate the condition of his subjects "without distinction of creed or race "; and the Powers repudiated the "right to interfere either collectively or separately," in the internal affairs of Turkey; 3. The Black Sea was neutralized, its waters and ports were to be open to the mercantile marine of every nation, but permanently "interdicted to the flag of war "; and there were to be no arsenals, either Russian or Turkish, on its coasts; 4. Kars was to be restored to the Turks, and the Crimea to Russia; 5. The navigation of the Danube was to be open on equal terms to the ships of all nations, under the control of an international commission; 6. Southern Bessarabia was to be ceded by Russia to Moldavia. The Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were to remain under the suzerainty of the Porte; Russia renounced her exclusive protectorate over them, and the contracting Powers collectively guaranteed their privileges; they were to enjoy "an independent and national administration with full liberty of worship, legislation, and commerce, and were to have "a national armed force." In each province a national Convention was to be held "to decide the definitive organization of the Principalities "; 7. The liberties of Serbia were to be similarly guaranteed.

Treaty
of Paris,
April 15,
1856

Under a separate treaty, concluded on April 15, Great Britain, Austria, and France agreed to guarantee, jointly and severally, the independence and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire; they pledged themselves to regard any infraction as a *casus belli*, and undertook to come to an understanding with the Sultan and with each other as to the measures necessary for rendering their guarantee effectual.

Declaration
of Paris

By an addendum to the treaty, known as the Declaration of Paris, it was agreed to abolish privateering, and to proclaim as permanently accepted principles of maritime war the concessions in favour of neutrals made during the recent war by England and France: (1) a neutral flag was to cover an enemy's goods, except contraband of war; (2) neutral merchandise, except contraband, was not to be seized under an

enemy's flag ; and (3) a blockade must be " effective," i.e. maintained by an adequate naval force. Such were the terms of the treaty which crowned the conclusion of the Crimean War.

What had the war achieved ? The most obvious result was the new lease of life secured to the Ottoman Empire. Results of
the war The Sultan was to have his chance, free from all interference, friendly or otherwise, to put his house in order. The Powers had expressly repudiated the right of interference. Yet the Sultan, if he were wise, could not fail to observe that the guarantee of independence and integrity vouchsafed to him by the Powers, imposed upon them a corresponding obligation. Morally, if not legally, they were bound to see to it that the Porte behaved in accordance with the unwritten rules of polite society. In repudiating the exclusive protectorship of Russia, they assumed a responsibility for the good government of the Christian subjects of the Porte which the Sultan could ignore only at his peril.

To Russia the Treaty of Paris involved, for the time being, Russia a bitter disappointment, if not a profound humiliation. For a century and a half she had pursued with singular consistency three main objects : to establish her naval and commercial supremacy on the waters and coasts of the Black Sea ; to secure a free outlet to the Mediterranean ; and to obtain from the Porte an acknowledgment of her position as champion of the liberties, political and ecclesiastical, of the Christian subjects of the Sultan. At times there had floated before the eyes of Russian rulers, notably those of the Czarina Catherine, dreams even more ambitious. The Treaty of Paris not only dissipated completely all ideas of partition, but involved a disastrous set-back to those more sober and prosaic aims which had inspired Russian policy from the days of Peter the Great to those of Alexander II.

The neutralization of the Black Sea was of special concern The Black
Sea
question to England, as the leading naval Power of the world. But from the Russian point of view it was an insolent and intolerable interference in the domestic concerns of the Russian Empire. It was, therefore, absolutely certain that Russia would seize the first favourable opportunity to get rid of the shackles imposed upon her by the Treaty of Paris.

The opportunity came with the outbreak, in 1870, of the

Franco-German War. Bismarck owed Russia a very heavy debt ; the time had come to discharge it.

The means were ready to hand. In October 1870 Prince Gortschakoff addressed to the Powers a circular denouncing on behalf of Russia the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris (1856), and declaring that the Czar proposed to resume his "sovereign rights" in the Black Sea.

The Russian circular evoked strong opposition both in England and in Austria. But Gortschakoff went on his way unheeding. Bismarck was behind him, and Bismarck was confident that though England might bark she would not bite. He had reason for his confidence.

Treaty of
London,
March 13,
1871

By the Treaty of London the Black Sea clauses (Arts. xi, xiii, and xiv) of the Treaty of Paris were accordingly abrogated ; but the Black Sea was to remain open to the mercantile marine of all nations as heretofore ; at the same time the closing of the Straits was confirmed with the additional proviso that the Sultan was empowered to open them in time of peace to the warships of friendly and allied Powers, if such action were necessary, to secure the execution of the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris.

That English prestige suffered severely from the emasculation of that treaty can hardly be denied. To the Black Sea clauses she had attached great importance ; from a selfish point of view she had little else to show for a heavy expenditure in men and money.

France
and
Sardinia

France had not much more. But though France gained little by the Crimean War, Napoleon gained much. In 1853 his position in Europe was far from assured ; the Crimean War established it ; and until the advent of Bismarck his influence upon the Continent was almost supreme. The war gained him, paradoxically, the friendship of Russia : the peace lost him the confidence of England.

The greatest gainer by the war, excepting the Porte, was Italy. The intervention of Sardinia in the war not only gave her a place in the Concert of Europe, but the right as well as the opportunity to champion the cause of Italian liberation. How well Cavour utilized the opportunity a later chapter will disclose.

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See also chapter iv.

CHAPTER XI

FRANCE (1840-59)

THE SECOND EMPIRE. NAPOLEON III

Failure of
the Orleans
Monarchy

LA FRANCE s'ennuie.—So Lamartine summarized the history of the July monarchy. In his view the throne of the Citizen King collapsed under sheer boredom. *L'Empire c'est la paix*. Thus Louis Napoleon referred to the tradition of the First Empire, and announced the programme of the Second. Whatever might be said of the First Empire, the promise was not implemented by the Second. Even before the hereditary Presidency had been transformed into the Empire, the Prince President was engaged in negotiations about the Holy Places which, as we have seen, supplied the prelude, if not the cause of, the Crimean War. Hardly was the ink dry on the Treaty of Paris before the Emperor embarked on the policy which led directly to the war of Italian liberation. Napoleon was not free of the entanglements involved in his Italian policy before he plunged into his crazy adventure in Mexico. The Empire was not twenty years old before it collapsed under the military disasters of 1870. The Empire did not then bring peace; but no one could pretend that it induced boredom. Napoleon III at least avoided the blunder which had proved fatal to Louis Philippe, even if he made others fatal to himself.

Louis
Napoleon

Nephew of the first Napoleon, and grandson of his wife, the vivacious ex-Empress Josephine, Louis Napoleon was born in Paris on April 20, 1808. His father, Louis Bonaparte, was at that moment occupying none too comfortably the throne of Holland. To him Louis Napoleon owed little; and after the separation of his parents he shared the home of his mother Hortense Beauharnais, near Paris. To her he owed much, and repaid the debt with affectionate devotion.

When the allied sovereigns occupied Paris in 1814, King Frederick William of Prussia brought his children to play with the children of the ex-Queen Hortense. That was the first meeting between Louis Napoleon and the future German Emperor. After Waterloo, Hortense and her children found refuge in Switzerland. During the insurrections of 1830 the young Princes were in Rome. Whether they actually joined the Carbonari is uncertain, but their notorious sympathy with the revolutionary movement led to their expulsion from Rome. The elder brother died in Italy, and in July 1832 the feeble life of his cousin, "Napoleon II," flickered out. Thus Louis Napoleon began to be regarded as the heir to the Bonapartist claims.

In 1836 he made his first attempt to assert them. Strasburg happened at that time to be garrisoned by the most strongly Bonapartist regiment in the French army—the 4th artillery—and mainly for that reason was selected as the *locale* of the initial attempt. Thanks to Colonel Vaudrey, the commander of the regiment, the attempt to raise Strasburg met with momentary success, but in less than three hours the Prince was under arrest. Louis Philippe, though secretly perturbed, wisely rendered the fiasco ridiculous by refusing to prosecute the young Pretender, who was summarily transported to the United States. His comrades, though tried, were acquitted, and the enthusiasm with which the verdict was greeted must be noted as a significant stage in the Pretender's progress. The Strasburg failure had provided a cheap advertisement.

Recalled to his mother's deathbed in Switzerland, the Prince again became an object of suspicion to the French Government, who formally demanded his expulsion. In order to relieve his hosts of embarrassment, the Prince withdrew to England, whence in 1839 he issued *Des Idées Napoléoniennes*. This little book obtained a wide circulation, and served to sustain the curiosity of his countrymen regarding the "exiled" author. The Napoleonic fever was further fed by Persigny's elaborate vindication of Louis Napoleon's claim to his uncle's inheritance (*Lettres de London*, 1840); and, more wonderful to relate, was not sensibly diminished by the Pretender's ignominious failure at Boulogne (August 5, 1840).

The Boulogne "expedition" was a repetition, on a somewhat more elaborate scale, but with even more slender

The
Strasburg
fiasco

*Des Idées
Napoléoni-
ennes*

The
Boulogne
"expedition"

chances of success, of the Strasburg experiment. The Prince himself escaped death by drowning, only to find himself a prisoner. Arraigned, with some twenty comrades, before a Court of Peers in Paris, Louis Napoleon made a brilliant speech in his own defence. "He rejoiced that for the first time in his life he was able to speak at large in France to Frenchmen; for the Boulogne attempt he assumed sole responsibility; he had no accomplices; but he had been constrained to make the attempt in fulfilment of a solemn duty to France." The peroration opened thus: "Un dernier mot, messieurs. Je représente devant vous un principe, une cause, une défaite; le principe c'est, la Souveraineté du peuple; la cause, c'est l'Empire; la défaite, Waterloo. Le principe vous l'avez reconnu; la cause, vous l'avez servi; la défaite, vous voulez la venger." This might not be peace, but it was magnificent. The orator was, however, sentenced to imprisonment for life in a French fortress.

Imprison-
ment at
Ham

Immured for nearly six years (1840-6) at Ham, Louis was not idle. His *Fragments Historiques* (1841) was designed to refute Guizot's attempted parallel between the English Revolution of 1688 and the July Revolution in France. A series of articles in French provincial papers was cleverly calculated to conciliate the support of the Clericals, the army and the Republicans—three classes which Louis Philippe was steadily estranging; while *The Extinction of Pauperism* (1844) formulated an ingenious plan for the relief of unemployment, a problem which, as already indicated, was just emerging in France, as a result of the transition from the domestic to the factory system. The death of his uncle Joseph, ex-King of Spain (July 1844), afforded the indefatigable author an opportunity for a memoir in the *Revue de l'Empire*, and an elaborate *History of Artillery* (1845) once more compelled the attention of students of war to the prisoner at Ham.

London,
1846-8

In May 1846 the prisoner effected his escape, and the daring episode endeared the Prince to all lovers of the romantic. Two years' residence in London ensued upon the escape from Ham. Social engagements were pleasantly diversified by a sedulous and business-like pursuit of English heiresses, among whom Miss Rowles of Camden Place, Chislehurst (a house destined to afford the pursuer his last earthly refuge), and Miss Burdett-Coutts, were the most conspicuous. All these

ladies eluded the pursuit, but the Prince did capture the irregular though not virginal affection of a Miss Howard, whose fortune, acquired from previous admirers, was not a matter of indifference to her latest lover. But his success earned him the life-long hatred of a rival who took an ample revenge in one of the most brilliant romances of the Victorian era. Whether or no Miss Howard was dearly bought at the expense of the *Invasion of the Crimea*, certain it is that Kinglake's mordant pen contributed largely to form the average Englishman's opinion of Napoleon III.

On the fall of the Orleans monarchy, Louis Napoleon ^{The Revolution of 1848} hastened to Paris, and offered his sword and services to the Republic. Both were declined, and he was bidden to quit France within four and twenty hours. Though protesting against the law of banishment, he did not stand at the election for the National Assembly in April, but his partisans worked steadily, and, in the ensuing June, he was elected in absence for no fewer than four out of the twenty-three Departments in which by-elections took place. A week later the Assembly in panic issued a warrant for his arrest should he attempt to land in France, but in twenty-four hours it reversed its decision and agreed to allow him to take his seat.

Thereupon the Prince wrote to the Assembly to "disavow all who ascribe to me ambitions which are not mine." "My name," he added, "is the symbol of order, nationality and glory, and it would be a great grief to me to see it used to increase the troubles which are rending our country." Rather than that he would remain in exile. Nevertheless, the letter contained a broad hint. "Should the people impose duties on me I should know how to fulfil them." The Assembly was divided between derision and alarm. But the inscrutable conspirator solved its difficulties and put his opponents hopelessly in the wrong by resigning his seat.

Then followed the days of June and the Cavaignac dictatorship. In September thirteen seats were vacated; for five of them Louis was elected, and on September 26 he took his seat. The first stage of the difficult journey was accomplished.

The second was reached in the election for the Presidency ^{President of the Republic} in December. Against the clause excluding from candidature members of houses which had reigned in France the Prince had successfully protested, but in a speech so halting that it

actually deluded the Assembly into the belief that the speaker was innocuous. "I thought this man was dangerous," said the Deputy who had proposed the clause. "After hearing him I perceive that I was wrong and I withdraw my amendment."

The election of President, as already indicated, was to be by direct manhood suffrage.¹ Intended to assure the election of Lamartine, the device played straight into the hands of Louis Napoleon. Cavaignac, on whose behalf all the pressure of the Government was exerted, received 1,448,107 votes; Lamartine, the hero of February, obtained only 17,910. The aggregate vote of the four Republican candidates amounted to less than 2,000,000; the fifth candidate, almost a stranger to France but the bearer of a magic name, polled no fewer than 5,484,226 votes. The "man of destiny" had arrived, and before the year 1848 closed a Napoleon was again established at the Elysée.

The Prince
President

Before he reached the summit of the Tuileries there was a difficult ridge to climb. The term of the Presidency was limited to four years, and there was no legal means by which the Constitution could be amended. True, Napoleon was now in the saddle, but unless the Constitution were revised or violated he would have to dismount in 1852.

Blunders
of the
Assembly

The situation called for the most cautious and adroit handling. The Assembly elected in 1849 contained only a handful of Bonapartists. Of its 750 members, 500 were Monarchists; perhaps 200 "Legitimists"; some 300 Orleanists. The minority were Republicans, moderate or red. Yet the lack of a party in the Chamber proved in the end a positive advantage to the President. The Assembly, by its policy of reaction, played into his hands. It prohibited public meetings; censored the Press; restored the supremacy of the Church in education by the *Loi Falloux*; voted salaries to its own members, and disfranchised no fewer than 3,000,000 electors out of 10,000,000. The position of all parties was evidently precarious, and the leaders were all preparing for the next development. Thiers and Broglie visited Claremont; the Legitimists gathered round "Henri V" at Wiesbaden. Meanwhile, leaving Paris momentarily to the Assembly, the President made tour after tour in the provinces, and, by

¹ Cavaignac realized that this vote was fatal to his hopes. Cf. *The Secret of the Coup d'État*, p. 54.

splendid military reviews, by modesty of mien and generosity of hand, he steadily won his way among the people of France. Every remnant of Bonapartist sentiment was sedulously cultivated. The army was caressed; the peasants were encouraged; even the urban Socialists were taught to look with hope to the author of *The Extinction of Pauperism*. Paris remained sullen, but the provinces, and in particular the soldiers and the peasants, welcomed the President with ever-increasing cordiality.

A Constitution virtually incapable of legal amendment; a Chamber distinctly hostile; a Ministry less in sympathy with the President than with the Chamber; an electorate which had spoken with one voice when electing the Legislature and with another when electing the Executive; a capital much behind the provinces in devotion to his person,—such was the situation which confronted the President. The Odilon Barrot Ministry was dismissed before he had been in office a year (Oct. 31, 1849), and had been replaced by a Cabinet of personal supporters, like Morny, Persigny, Fleury, and Saint Arnaud, under the nominal leadership of General d'Hautpoul. In the late summer of 1850 the President personally appealed to the provinces for a mandate in favour of revision; the Assembly, when it reassembled in November, declared open war upon him; the President retorted by the dismissal of General Changarnier, Commander of the National Guard and the Paris garrison, and the avowed champion of the Chamber (Jan. 9, 1851).

The significance of Changarnier's dismissal was not to be mistaken. An ostentatious illustration of the President's control of the army, it was at the same time a direct challenge to the Legislature. After this, matters hastened to a crisis. The President's term of office was to expire in 1852. Nor could he be re-elected except after an interval of four years. What was to happen? The Republicans were sinking lower and lower in public esteem. Would then the Monarchists "fuse"? Would the childless "Henri V" recognize an Orleanist heir? ¹ Or would the provinces force a Napoleonic Empire upon Paris? As far back as May 1849 M. de Morny ²

Preliminaries of the coup d'état

¹ Louis Philippe had died in August 1850.

² The son of the ex-Queen Hortense by the Comte de Flahaut, Morny was half-brother (illegitimately) to Louis Napoleon.

had written to Madame de Flahaut: "The Empire is the only thing that can save the situation."¹ Many people were beginning to share his views. "If," wrote an acute and detached observer, "there could be anything absolutely new under the sun it would be the spectacle which France offers to the world to-day. It is filled with Monarchists who cannot establish a monarchy, and who groan under the weight of a Republic which has no Republicans to defend it. In the midst of this confusion only two personages remain standing, Louis Napoleon and the Mountain, two things only are possible, a new Revolution or a Dictatorship. It is evident to me that force must bring about a solution."² The diagnosis was accurate.

A deadlock was now threatened. The Chamber passed a vote of want of confidence in the Ministry, and forced it to resign. The President refused to nominate a parliamentary Ministry. The Chamber refused to increase the President's allowance. The President reappointed the Ministry, which had been censured by the Legislature. A revision of the Constitution was proposed and carried by a large majority in the Chamber (446 to 278), but the majority was less than the three-fourths necessary to give it validity (July 19). Meanwhile the tide in favour of revision was rising rapidly in the provinces. In the spring of 1850 fifty-two Departmental Councils had petitioned in favour of it: in the autumn of 1856 the number rose to seventy-nine.³

The President had now made up his mind to act. His secret was shared by six persons only; his half-brother Morny, Saint Arnaud, Persigny, Maupas, Flahaut, and his confidential secretary Mocquard. On October 26 the Government was dismissed and all the administrative threads were gathered into the hands of these men. Saint Arnaud became Minister of War and Maupas Prefect of Police. On November 4 the Chambers met, and the President proposed to them the repeal of the Law of May 31, and a return to universal suffrage. It was an astute move; but by a majority of seven the project was defeated (Nov. 15). The Legislature then attempted to regain control of the army (Nov. 18).

Its failure removed the last impediment to the *coup d'état*. At midnight of December 1-2 the stroke long contemplated

The
coup d'état

¹ Lord Kerry: *The Coup d'État*, p. 62.

² Quoted by Dickinson, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

³ Out of 85.

fell. No detail which could ensure success was neglected. The plan devised with extraordinary skill was executed with perfect precision. Complete secrecy was maintained; the subordinate agents knew nothing of the general scheme; each performed his own allotted task in isolation, ignorant of the tasks allotted to others. When Paris awoke on December 2 it was to find the walls of the city covered with placards, each containing two proclamations, addressed by the President to the people and the army respectively, and a Decree. The Decree declared that the Assembly was dissolved, the May Law repealed and universal suffrage restored, and promised that a fortnight hence the people should express by plébiscite their approval or disapproval. The proclamations were cunningly calculated to secure the support of the army and the people.¹

Meanwhile every point of vantage had been occupied by the troops under the command of Saint Arnaud. The leaders of the opposition, seventy-eight in number, had been quietly arrested in their beds. Not a drop of blood had been shed. Perfect order prevailed. Men read the proclamations, and, with a shrug of the shoulders, went on their way. Not a shop put up its shutters; nor a bank; not a café or a theatre was closed.

Some 200 deputies, finding the doors of the Chamber barred to them, attempted to hold a meeting elsewhere. They were arrested, but, to their chagrin, were quickly released. On the evening of the Wednesday, the 3rd, a collision occurred between the soldiers and civilians, and two soldiers and Baudin, the President of the Assembly, were killed. On the 4th there was more serious fighting, resulting in a loss in killed and wounded of 500 to 600 soldiers and civilians.² The loss of life, though serious enough, was insignificant compared with the "days of June."

The country as a whole approved the *coup d'état*. Only ^{Opinion in France} in the south-east was there serious disorder. Paris expressed its satisfaction: *il a bien fait; c'est le vrai neveu de son oncle*. The plébiscite, taken on December 20, confirmed first impressions. The draft Constitution was approved by nearly 7½ million voters; only 650,000 votes were cast against it.

¹ The placard is reproduced in facsimile, ap. Kerry, p. 123.

² Estimates varied from 200 to 1200: for a critical discussion of the figures see Guedalla, Introduction to *The Coup d'Etat*, pp. 21, 22.

Broglie's comment, though cynical, was not unjust: "The people has the Government it prefers, and the bourgeoisie the Government it deserves." Proudhon, representing the opposite extreme, wrote of the event a year or two later: "Napoleon III est l'expression légitime, authentique, des masses bourgeoises et prolétaires. S'il n'est pas précisément le produit de la volonté nationale à coup sur il l'est de la permission nationale." The point was admirably put. At the lowest the nation acquiesced in the *coup d'état*. Napoleon's own excuse for the violent step was not without validity: "Je n'étais sorti de la légalité que pour rentrer dans le droit." This is, indeed, ever the plea, if not of the tyrant, at least of the dictator; and in the name of "droit" many things not merely illegal but immoral have been done. France formed no exception to this rule.

The
Constitution
of January
1852

On the conclusion of the plébiscite the Prince President transferred his residence to the Tuileries, and thence on January 14, 1852, he promulgated, on his own sole authority, a revised Constitution.

The President was confirmed in office for ten years, and was to have the right of sanctioning all laws and decrees. The Ministers were to be responsible solely and individually to him. A Council of State, nominated by him, was to draft laws, but only on the President's initiative. Legislation was to be in the hands of two Houses: a small Senate composed of the Marshals, Admirals, and Cardinals *ex officio*, and 150 other members nominated by the President; and a *Corps Législatif*, composed of 261 members. The latter could veto, but could neither initiate nor amend legislative projects. This was in fact the Consulate Constitution as amended by the first Napoleon. It was commended to the people as the "only Constitution adapted to the social and administrative institution of modern France, and calculated to secure the liberties of France and the maintenance of Napoleonic principles." But the second edition of the Consulate did not last even as long as the first.

The
Second
Empire

In November 1852 a second plébiscite pronounced, by a majority (7,824,129 against 253,149) even larger than that of December 1851, for the transformation of the Presidency into an hereditary Empire. On December 2 the new Emperor was proclaimed, under the style of Napoleon III, and two

months later he married Eugénie Comtesse de Téba, a Spanish lady of great beauty and charm, though not of royal birth. The Empress, despite her grace and beauty, never became popular even in Paris, and much less in the provinces. Her charities were large, but her heart was cold. The pride of the French people was hurt by the Emperor's failure to obtain the hand of a royal princess, and the personal qualities of the Empress were not such as to atone for her lack of royal blood. Like the Emperor, she captivated Queen Victoria and the Prince Consort, but except among the extreme Clericals she had few real friends in France, while her political influence was uniformly unfortunate.

With the birth of a Prince Imperial, however, the Second Empire seemed to be fairly established in France, as it had already attained a position of pre-eminence in Europe.

The Constitution of 1852 required but little amendment Autocracy to adapt it to the changed *status* of the individual in whose hands all effective power was already concentrated. Between 1852 and 1870 no fewer than sixteen Constitutional amendments were effected, either by *Sénat-Consultes* or Imperial Decrees, but most of them were of minor importance, and only the last two went any distance in the direction of liberalizing the institutions of the Empire. The earlier amendments served rather to render the position of the Emperor more absolute.

The Emperor had command of the forces by land and sea ; he could make peace and war and conclude treaties of commerce ; his was the prerogative of pardon ; he alone could initiate legislation and promulgate laws ; he defined the functions of the Senate and the Legislative body, and the constitutional relations between them ; and though the budget of each Ministry was voted by the Legislature, it was the Emperor who settled the detailed appropriation. Though the Emperor ostentatiously proclaimed his "responsibility" to the nation, it was he alone who could initiate a plébiscite and determine the terms of reference.

Like an American President, the Emperor had Ministers, but no "Ministry"—no Cabinet in the English sense. The Ministers, ten in number, were excluded from the Legislature ; they were individually responsible to the Emperor, but not to each other. Almost daily they waited on the Emperor,

made their reports, and received their orders.¹ The administration was, in short, personal and departmental. The President of the Council of State—a very important functionary—was nominated by the Emperor, as were the Presidents of the Senate and the Chamber.

The Chamber was elected by universal suffrage, but the constituencies were “gerrymandered” so as to secure the return of the “official” candidates. The addresses of these candidates were printed at the public expense, and were commended to the electorate by the Prefects. To unofficial candidates no facilities were afforded: public meetings were prohibited and permission to post placards had to be obtained from the Prefect, who generally refused it to opponents.

Local government was concentrated in the hands of the Prefects, who were themselves the nominees and creatures of the Emperor. Even the Mayors and Deputy-Mayors of the Communes were nominated by the Government.

The *Loi Falloux* had restored the supremacy of the Church over education, and the Emperor strove consistently to cement the alliance between the Throne and the Altar. At all the great festivals of the Church the Government was officially represented; encouragement was given to Catholic missions; grants were made to the churches, and many of their old privileges were restored to the “congregations.” Over the whole field of education, University, Secondary, and Primary, the Government was ultimately supreme, but much of its authority was delegated, in effect, to the Bishops and the “congregations.” Religious teaching, under the inspection of the Bishops, was made compulsory for all boarders in Secondary Schools, and the Church, through the “congregations,” rapidly regained control of Primary education.

Nevertheless, if political liberty was repressed, many admirable reforms, social, economic, and financial, were carried through. If the Empire did not bring peace to Europe, it did bring to France, during the first decade of its existence, great prestige and no little prosperity. Louis Napoleon had already in the Bordeaux speech adumbrated his programme. “There is a fear to which I ought to reply. In a spirit of suspicion some people say: the Empire is war. I say, the Empire is peace. . . . Yet I confess that I, like the Emperor, have many conquests to make. I wish, like him, to conquer

Napoleon
and the
Church and
education

Napoleon's
programme

¹ Albert Thomas, ap. *C.M.H.*, xi, 288-9.

to reconciliation warring factions, and to turn back again into the great popular river the angry side currents which are like to lose themselves without profit to anybody. I wish to conquer to religion, to morality, to prosperity, that part of the population, still so large, which in the midst of a country of faith and belief, are scarcely acquainted with the precepts of Christ, which, in the bosom of the most fertile country in the world, can scarcely procure for themselves the bare necessities of life. We have immense tracts of waste lands to bring into cultivation ; roads to open, harbours to deepen, canals to complete, rivers to render navigable, a network of railways to link up. Facing us, opposite Marseilles, we have a vast realm to assimilate to France. We have all our great ports of the West to bring near to France by developing the rapid means of communication which are still lacking. On all sides we have ruins to restore, false gods to overthrow, truths to make triumphant. This is how I should understand the Empire, if the Empire is, indeed, to be restored. Such are the conquests I contemplate, and all you who surround me who desire, like myself, the welfare of our country. You are my soldiers."

This speech was no impromptu utterance ; it was the expression of long reflection and genuine conviction, and the early years of the Empire went far to redeem the promises it contained. The forces of anarchy were repressed ; social order was restored ; every kind of encouragement was afforded to industry ; means of communication were improved ; roads, canals, and harbours were constructed, and the railway system of France, hitherto inchoate, was completed from north to south, from west to east. The credit resources of the country were mobilized in support of commerce, industry, and agriculture. Two great central banks, the *Crédit foncier* and the *Crédit mobilier*, were established ; and land-banks were set up both in Paris and in the provinces. Commerce and industry quickly responded to the stimulus. In twenty years industrial production doubled. The number of agricultural societies was increased ; horse breeding was encouraged ; land was brought into cultivation by draining the marshes. Paris was rebuilt, and made more spacious, more sanitary, and more splendid, if not more beautiful ; schemes were promoted for the provision of workmen's dwellings, for insurance against old age and accidents ; labour associations

Social and
economic
reforms

were legalized ; thrift was encouraged by the formation of benefit and co-operative societies ; industrial exhibitions were promoted on an imposing scale, and by the conclusion of the Cobden treaty a long step was taken—not to the entire satisfaction of French manufacturers—towards freedom of commercial intercourse between England and France. In all this the Emperor himself was the prime instigator. The misfortune was, as Dr. Fisher has well said, that although he “ had a certain gift of political perspective, and could paint on the canvas of the future with a bold sweep of the brush . . . his figures had no anatomy, and were like the creations of the dilettante artist who has excused himself from the tough and technical discipline of his craft. His judgment was unsteady, his head full of untested fanciful and contradictory policies ; his capacity unequal to the execution of his opaque and fluctuating designs.”¹

The
Emperor's
schemes

This acute analysis applies even more to his excursions into international affairs than to his schemes for domestic reform. “ Revolutionary schemes of foreign policy floated like storm-driven clouds across the surface of his unquiet spirit.” So writes Dr. Fisher. “ He appears,” wrote the Prince Consort, after a visit to the Emperor in France, “ to have thought much and deeply on politics, yet more like an ‘ Amateur Politician ’ mixing many very sound and many very crude notions together.”² “ His head,” said Lord Palmerston more bluntly, “ is as full of schemes as a warren is full of rabbits.” That Kinglake did him an injustice in making him the villain of the Crimean drama we have already seen. But the desire to set bounds to the ambitious designs of Russia in South-eastern Europe was the least fantastic of the schemes which his fertile brain conceived. In the course of conversations with the Prince Consort he suggested the union of Spain and Portugal, though whether Spain was to be given to Portugal or Portugal to Spain he seemed uncertain ; he wanted to turn Austria out of North Italy, but thought she might get compensation in South-eastern Europe, or perhaps in Syria ; Poland he was anxious to restore, but when pressed by Prince Albert to say whether it was to be the integral Poland of 1772, or the truncated Poland of 1793 he was less clear : the Grand Duchy of Warsaw would indeed

¹ *Bonapartism*, pp. 88-9.

² Martin : *Life*, iii, 109.

satisfy him ; England might take Egypt ; Morocco he assigned to Spain—and so on. On the Schleswig-Holstein question he confessed to Prince Albert “the same ignorance which is common with English statesmen,” but was “glad to receive” from his guest “a general condensed history of the whole transaction.” Was his policy in 1863-4 based on that history ? “When France is satisfied,” so Napoleon had declared at Bordeaux, “the world has rest.” The world had little rest during the Second Empire : though the unrest was not all due to the Emperor. Three years after the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris France was at war with Austria. But the war of 1859 belongs rather to Italian than to French history, and to explain its genesis we must retrace our steps.

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CHAPTER XII

THE ITALIAN *RISORGIMENTO* (1849-71)

VICTOR EMMANUEL. CAVOUR. GARIBALDI

After
1848-9

THE year of revolution (1848-9) had come and gone ; the *status quo ante* was restored ; to all outward seeming the Italy of 1849 was the Italy of 1815.' In reality it was far otherwise ; the body of Italy was unchanged ; its soul had been profoundly stirred. Italy was destined in the future to reap a rich harvest from the seed sown in 1848 ; but the time was not yet ; nor was the harvest to be reaped by the same men or the same methods. For the moment, however, reaction reigned supreme. Austria was re-established in Lombardy and Venetia ; the petty princedoms were restored in Central Italy ; the Pope was again master of the Romagna ; the Two Sicilies were once more in the clutches of a Bourbon despotism.

The
Mazzinians

The failure of 1848-9 had, however, taught the more thoughtful patriots one salutary lesson. Neither to the Papacy nor to the Mazzinian Republicans could Italy look for salvation. Mazzini had indeed accomplished a great work for Italy ; but by 1849 his life mission, little as he realized it, was fulfilled. It had been his to inspire young Italy with something of his own ardent temper ; to point the politicians to the goal of a united Italy. By his methods this goal would never have been reached. He had done his part ; his was the brain to conceive, his were not the hands to erect an enduring political structure. The prophet must give way to the diplomatist. The fiasco of 1848-9 shattered the Republican ideal ; and fortunate it was for Italy. Unity could never have been achieved, nor even federalism, under the flag of the Republic.

The Neo-
Guelphs

Nor was it only the Republicans who were discredited by the failure of 1848-9. The Neo-Guelphs, the party which, as

we have seen, looked to a reformed and reforming Papacy to lead the Italian *Risorgimento* were equally disappointed. In 1836 Niccolò Tommaseo, a Tuscan poet, exiled from Tuscany for his contributions to the *Antologia*, had published in Paris his *Delle nuove Speranze d'Italia*, a work in which he appealed to princes and priests to work for the regeneration of Italy under the banner of the Papacy. In 1843 Vincenzo Gioberti, a Piedmontese priest, and like Tommaseo an exile, published his *Il Primato morale e civile degli Italiani*, advocating an Italian federation under the presidency of the Pope.

Massimo D'Azeglio, who in 1849 became Prime Minister of Piedmont, mistrusted the Neo-Guelphic policy from the first, and as early as 1847 wrote from Rome: "I am convinced the magic of Pio Nono will not last. He is an angel, but he is surrounded by demons; he has a disordered State and corrupt elements, and he cannot overcome the obstacles." The truth of D'Azeglio's prediction was quickly confirmed. Pio Nono was incapable of putting the Papacy at the head of a national movement, even if he had approved its objects. After 1849 this was patent to all men, not least to the Neo-Guelphs themselves, and in 1851 Gioberti published his *Rinnovamento civile degli Italiani*. In this work he renounced his earlier views, and frankly accepted the principle of a Sardinian hegemony as the only possible hope for Italian independence, the inevitable basis of Italian unity. The Northern Campaign, as J. A. Symonds truly said, had "baptized the cause of Italian independence with the best blood of Piedmont; it gave it a royal martyr; and it pledged the dynasty of Savoy to a progressive policy from which it never afterwards deviated." And this fact was gradually recognized by all parties. "Except the young Sovereign who rules Piedmont, I see no one," wrote Gioberti, "who could undertake our emancipation. Instead of imitating Pius, Ferdinand (of Naples) and Leopold (of Tuscany), who violated their sworn compacts, he maintains his with religious observance—vulgar praise in other times, but to-day not small, being contrary to example."

The praise was not undeserved. Victor Emmanuel, undeterred by the terrible circumstances under which he took up the sceptre laid down by his father, set himself steadily to the task of industrial and fiscal recuperation and

liberalizing reform. The difficulties in the path of a Sovereign who desired to be "constitutional" were not slight. The Piedmontese had no experience of self-government; and during the first eighteen months of the new régime there were three Parliaments and no less than eight changes of Government. . But after many experiments, the young King had the wisdom to confide his affairs to the one man capable of guiding them to a successful issue.

Cavour

Count Camillo Benso di Cavour was born at Turin on August 10, 1810. He belonged by descent to one of the smallest and proudest aristocracies in Europe. His father was Michele Benso, Marquis of Cavour; and in his veins ran the blood of "twenty generations of Piedmontese ancestors." But Cavour owed more to his mother—a Genevan Calvinist—than to his Piedmontese father. As a younger son, he was destined for the army, and at the age of 10 was sent to the Military Academy at Turin. But a soldier's life was not congenial to him; while at home he found himself entirely out of sympathy with the reactionary views which rendered his father a *persona grata* at the sub-alpine Court of Carlo Alberto. In 1831 he got his discharge from the army, and was sent off by his father to manage one of the family farms in a remote country district forty miles from Turin.

For the next seventeen years Cavour devoted himself, mind and body, to agriculture, a pursuit which gripped his eminently practical mind.

But although he continued to make a large fortune out of farming, he never lost sight of the larger issues. In 1842 he helped to found the *Associazione Agraria*,—a society which afterwards became, as Acton says, "an important channel and instrument of political influence," and in 1847 he started, in conjunction with Santa Rosa, Cesare Balbo and others, *Il Risorgimento*—a journal devoted to the advocacy of constitutional reform. The programme of the constitutional party at this time was briefly but pregnantly stated as follows: "Independence of Italy, union between the Princes and the peoples, progress in the path of reform, and a league between the Italian States."

As yet, however, Cavour had had no opportunity of putting his principles to a practical test. The opportunity came with the Revolution of 1848. In February Charles Albert an-

nounced the concession of a "Constitution" for Piedmont, and in the first Parliament Cavour took his seat as member for the first college of Turin, but he was not re-elected in 1849, and was out of Parliament, therefore, in the dark days of Novara. On the evening of that fatal day Charles Albert resigned his sceptre to his son, Victor Emmanuel.

On his accession to the throne in 1849 Victor Emmanuel was a young man of 29. The prospect for Piedmont and for Italy was black indeed; yet there was nothing of undignified despair in his attitude. "All our efforts," he declared in the first proclamation he issued to his people, "must be directed to maintain our honour untarnished, to heal the wounds of our country, to consolidate our liberal institutions. To this undertaking I conjure all my people, to it I will pledge myself by a solemn oath, and I await from the nation a response of help, affection, and confidence." From the purpose indicated in this proclamation Victor Emmanuel never swerved.

In May 1849, as mentioned above, the new King appointed as Prime Minister Massimo D'Azeglio. D'Azeglio, like Cavour, was a Piedmontese of noble stock. To him, however, as to Cavour, the military career, natural to his breeding, was distasteful, and he sought to gain a living by his brush. But he was always something of a dilettante. Artist, novelist, man of fashion, politician—he played many parts, but none of them with complete success. He was, however, scrupulously honest, and his personal popularity and known moderation were of great value to his Sovereign during the early and more turbulent period of the reign.

His first business, on taking office, was to conclude peace with Austria. That disagreeable duty done, he turned to the urgent task of domestic reform. He had first, however, to deal with a rising organized in Genoa by the Republican irreconcilables who still followed Mazzini's lead. Mazzini and his friends did not scruple to impute to the Sardinian Government the basest treachery in connection with the events of the recent war, and the still more recent peace. "Better Italy enslaved than handed over to the son of the traitor Carlo Alberto." Mazzini was utterly intractable. Fortunately his work was soon taken up by hands more competent than his to carry it through to a reasonable consummation.

Interrupted though not deterred by sporadic disaffection,

Victor
Emmanuel

Massimo
D'Azeglio,
1798-1868

Ecclesi-
astical
reforms

D'Azeglio and Victor Emmanuel went steadily forward in the path of reform. Their first difficulty was in connection with ecclesiastical affairs. In the little kingdom of Sardinia there were at that time forty-one Bishopricks : over fourteen hundred Canonries, and eighteen thousand people who had assumed the monastic habit. Taking the whole population through, one person in every 214 was an ecclesiastic. These figures are the more significant when it is remembered that the Church still claimed exclusive jurisdiction over all "ecclesiastics," the right to afford asylum to malefactors, and all the rest of the anomalous privileges which in progressive and Protestant countries had long since been abolished. Victor Emmanuel, like our own Plantagenets, was anxious to reduce all men to an equality before the Civil Law. The continued existence of the clerical courts in all the plenitude of power, the vast pretensions of the Jesuits to the exclusive control of education, and the censorship of domestic morality were, however, utterly inconsistent with this reasonable ambition.

The
Siccardian
Laws

Victor Emmanuel, profoundly anxious to avoid friction between the civil and ecclesiastical authorities, despatched in the autumn of 1849 an envoy to the Pope—Count Siccardi. The Pope firmly declined to sanction any change in the relations between Church and State in Sardinia. "The Holy Father," said the Papal representative, "was willing to please the King of Sardinia as far as going into the antechamber of the devil, but into his very chamber he would not go."

Despite this check, the King, with the assistance of Siccardi, determined to push on the work of reform; the *Foro Ecclesiastico* (or chief clerical tribunal) was finally abolished, and the privileges and immunities of the vast army of ecclesiastics were drastically curtailed. The clerical organs thundered denunciations against the infidel King and his heretic Ministers, but the work of reform went steadily on. That work, unfortunately, involved a breach with the Papacy, which, widened by the events of 1870, was not healed until the statesmanship of Signor Mussolini found a solution in the conclusion of the Vatican Treaty of 1929.

The debates on the Siccardian laws brought for the first time into prominence the statesman with whose name the controversy between Church and State is imperishably associated, Count Camillo di Cavour. To the ministerial policy Cavour

gave strong support. Its value was recognized in 1850 by his appointment as Minister of Commerce and Agriculture. His commanding intellect, his soaring but strictly honourable ambition, his unbending will and slightly domineering temper, were already recognized. "Look out what you are doing," said the King to D'Azeglio, "Cavour will soon be master of you all ; he will dismiss you ; he will never be content till he is Prime Minister himself."

It was a shrewd forecast. In 1851 Cavour took over, in addition to the supervision of commerce and agriculture, the administration of the Navy and of the Finance Department. Everywhere his driving power was felt. To industry and trade he gave an immense impulse ; he cut down expenditure, and yet was able to meet La Marmora's requirements for the Army and for national defence. But he was not popular either with King or people, the general view being that, though able, he was crafty and unscrupulous. Detesting the extremes of revolution and reaction, he was mistrusted, like most moderates, by men of all parties ; but, despite all opposition, he rapidly pushed on the work of administrative, commercial, and fiscal reform, and in 1852 became Prime Minister of Sardinia. His programme on taking office is thus succinctly stated by himself :—

Cavour's
Ministry

" Piedmont must begin by raising herself, by re-establishing in Europe, as well as in Italy, a position and a credit equal to her ambition. Hence there must be a policy unswerving in its aims but flexible and various as to the means employed, embracing the exchequer, military reorganization, diplomacy, and religious affairs."

" Re-establish her credit in Europe." The chance came in 1854 ; but it needed a statesman of extraordinary courage and astuteness to seize it. Despite the opposition of his colleagues, but firmly supported by his Sovereign, Cavour determined to send a Sardinian army to fight side by side with the two Western Powers in the Crimea. It was seemingly a crazy enterprise. But Cavour's rashness was always the result of prudent calculation. That he was playing for high stakes he knew ; but he was confident of victory. " You have the future of the country in your haversacks"—so he wrote to La Marmora. Cavour's calculations were precisely fulfilled. In the battle of the Tchernaya the gallant Sardinians

Sardinia
and the
Crimean
War

covered themselves with glory. The stain of Novara was wiped out. In the Peace Congress of Paris Cavour claimed a place. The diplomatic position of Sardinia was established. Cavour's assurance was justified. "The Italian Question," he said, "has become for the future a European question. The cause of Italy has not been defended by demagogues, revolutionists and party men, but has been discussed before the Congress by the plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers." And again: "Two facts will remain, which are not without some importance. First, the stigma branded on the conduct of the King of Naples by France and England in the face of united Europe; and, second, the condemnation aimed by England at the Papal Government in terms as precise and energetic as the most zealous Italian patriot could have desired."

The Crimean episode was the turning-point in the fortunes of Cavour, of Sardinia and of Italy. Hitherto Sardinia had been regarded as one of many Italian States; not the largest, nor the wealthiest, nor the best established. Cavour himself had hardly been distinguished from the crowd of Italian "patriots" or revolutionaries who were anathema to the respectable European Courts and Chancelleries. After 1856 things were different. Sardinia was a "Power"; Cavour was recognized as among the ablest of European diplomatists. At Paris he had withstood Austria to the face, and had denounced in open Congress the hideous misgovernment which prevailed in Naples and in the Romagna. He had established the sympathy of England, and all but secured the alliance of France.

The seed sown at Paris in 1856 fructified in 1858 at Plombières where the astute diplomatist threw his net over the ex-Carbonaro who now sat upon the throne of France.

Napoleon III
and Italy

"What can I do for Italy" Napoleon asked Cavour. Cavour told him, and showed how it could be done. The motives which inspired the Italian policy of Napoleon III have been frequently canvassed, and still remain obscure. They would not have been Napoleon's had they not been complex and contradictory. He was not wholly the "vulpine knave" depicted and denounced by Garibaldi. He was not wholly anything, but that he was genuinely sympathetic towards Italian aspirations is undeniable. Equally undeni-

able is the cleverness of Cavour. He dangled the bait before Napoleon's eyes with consummate adroitness. Had not the Italian campaign of 1796 revealed to Europe the military genius of the first Napoleon? What better field for the display of the genius of his nephew? Napoleon I had posed as the "liberator" of Italy, and had actually gone far to promote its unity. Might not Napoleon III win still more enduring fame by accomplishing the purpose professed by his predecessor? Could the Third Empire be sustained without the perpetual glamour of successful war? And what foe man better worthy of the steel of a democratic Emperor than reactionary Austria?

The bait was swallowed; but the cordiality of the relations between the two men was temporarily interrupted by a painful episode. Early in 1858 Napoleon's life was attempted by some Italian exiles who had found refuge in England, where the conspiracy was hatched and the bombs prepared. Orsini's bombs killed 10 and injured 150 people who awaited the Emperor's arrival at the opera: the Emperor himself was untouched but unnerved. His anger blazed out fiercely against England; his army demanded to be led against the den of assassins; his Foreign Minister expressed to the English Government his opinion that France had a right to expect "from an ally" that the guarantees against a repetition of such outrages should be more effectual.

To Count Walewski's despatch no answer was returned: Lord Palmerston did, indeed, introduce a Bill to amend the law in regard to conspiracy to murder, but the Government was defeated and resigned. Orsini was an Italian, but, curiously enough, good relations between Napoleon and Cavour were little interrupted, and in the summer of 1858 they met at Plombières, a watering-place in the Vosges.

Terms were quickly arranged. Austria was to be expelled from the Peninsula; and Northern and Central Italy were to be united under the House of Savoy. In return, Savoy was to be ceded to France, and perhaps Nice; and Victor Emmanuel was to give his daughter in marriage to the Emperor's elderly and not too reputable cousin, Prince Jerome ("Plon-Plon"). Both sacrifices demanded from Victor Emmanuel were painful; but Cavour was convinced that the dead weight of the Austrian incubus could not be lifted without foreign help.

England, though prodigal of sympathy, was adamant against intervention; France was the only hope, and Napoleon's terms, therefore, had to be accepted.

Napoleon
and
Austria

In January 1859 Europe was startled by the news that Napoleon, at his New Year's Day reception, had addressed the Austrian Ambassador as follows: "*Je regrette que les relations entre nous soient si mauvaises.*" It was a bolt from the blue. Still more startling were the words of Victor Emmanuel when, on January 10, he opened Parliament at Turin: "Our country, small in territory, has acquired credit in the Councils of Europe because she is great in the idea she represents, in the sympathy she inspires. The situation is not free from peril, for, while we respect treaties, we cannot be insensible to the cry of anguish which comes to us from many parts of Italy." The significance of the words was instantly apprehended; and Massari—an eye-witness of the scene in the Chamber—declares the effect of it to have been electric. Diplomacy did its best to avert war—the English Court being particularly solicitous—but on April 23 Austria demanded that Sardinia should disarm; Cavour instantly accepted the challenge; three weeks (May 13) later Victor Emmanuel welcomed at Genoa the "magnanimous ally" who had come to "liberate Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic."

The Italian
War of
Liberation

The welcome accorded to the Emperor of the French was, naturally, enthusiastic. "It was roses, roses all the way," writes Mr. Thayer, "as befitted that May afternoon and the Maytime of hope in every Italian heart. Then, if ever, Napoleon might believe himself to be a benefactor of mankind."¹ Exactly nine weeks later he started home again. "Thank God, he's gone!" was Victor Emmanuel's exclamation, after bidding his ally farewell.

The campaign which intervened was represented at the time as a triumph of French arms. Superficially it had that appearance. For a month the allies carried all before them; on the 4th June they won a great victory at Magenta; on the 8th they entered Milan; on the 24th they won the double battle of Solferino and San Martino; and then, the "magnanimous ally" suddenly stopped short; the victor sought

¹ *Life of Cavour*, ii, 13.

an armistice from the vanquished ; Napoleon met the Emperor Francis Joseph at Villafranca, and personally negotiated with him, without the concurrence of Victor Emmanuel, the terms of an armistice.

Italy was to be free, not to the Adriatic, but only to the Mincio ; Austria was to retain Venetia and the Quadrilateral ; Lombardy was to be annexed to Piedmont ; Leopold of Tuscany and Francis of Modena were to be restored, " but without recourse to force " ; Italy was to be united in a confederation under the honorary presidency of the Pope.

To King Victor Emmanuel and Cavour, to the peoples of Venetia, Tuscany, Modena and above all of the Romagna, who had looked for speedy emancipation from their despotic rulers, the news of the armistice came as a bitter shock. Cavour could, at the moment, attribute its conclusion to nothing but deliberate treachery on the part of Napoleon,¹ and after heaping reproaches indifferently on both Sovereigns, he resigned office and retired to his farms. Victor Emmanuel, though not less deeply chagrined, looked at the matter more calmly, and estimated more justly the benefits likely to accrue to Italy. " The political unity of Italy," he said, " since Novara a possibility, has become since Villafranca a necessity."

Napoleon's motives in concluding the armistice have been endlessly canvassed. Cavour's bitter comment contains an element of truth : " He was tired ; the weather was hot." Tired he was, and horrified by the awful carnage which he witnessed at Solferino. But there were other reasons ; nor is it now disputed that they were substantial. French financiers were already grumbling at the enormous cost of the war ; the politicians saw no adequate recompense in sight ; the Austrians, though driven back behind the Mincio, were not really beaten, and the military outlook was less encouraging than Napoleon's critics have imagined ; above all, the diplomatic situation was difficult, not to say menacing. Much to his own disgust, Napoleon found himself abetting the Revolution in Italy ; to the dismay of the Empress and the French Clericals, his success in the North was endangering the position of the Pope ; the Courts of England, Belgium, and Prussia were regarding with increasing suspicion the

¹ This judgment he subsequently modified.

Italian adventure of the French Emperor ; Prussia was actually mobilizing with a view to an offer of " mediation." The last-named development was not less alarming to the Austrian Emperor than to Napoleon. It was, indeed, the determining factor alike in the offer and in the acceptance of the armistice. " The gist of the thing is," wrote Moltke to his brother, " that Austria would rather give up Lombardy than see Prussia at the head of Germany."

Napoleon's own explanation, given on his return to Paris, was concise and conclusive : " To secure Italian independence I made war against the wish of Europe ; as soon as the fortunes of my own country seemed to be endangered I made peace."

Union of
North Italy

Against the wish of Europe the Italian War of Independence had undoubtedly been made ; and while his master and Napoleon were fighting the Austrians, Cavour had a very delicate diplomatic campaign to conduct with the European Courts on the one side, and with the States of Central Italy on the other. No sooner was the war declared between Sardinia and Austria, than Tuscany, Modena, Parma, and Piacenza expelled their alien rulers, and declared for fusion with Piedmont. Bologna and the Romagna were not behind the Duchies in their enthusiasm. Cavour had a very difficult game to play. Nothing must be done to check the enthusiasm of the Duchies or of the Romagna, but nothing could be risked which would endanger the French alliance. Cavour more than half suspected Napoleon's design of setting up a separate kingdom in Central Italy—perhaps for Prince Napoleon, and he was fully aware of the susceptibilities of the French Clericals, and of his ally's dependence upon their support. But for Cavour's adroit diplomacy at this critical juncture, Napoleon's intervention in Italy might have had an entirely different sequel, and Italy might to-day present the spectacle of a loosely confederated State—perhaps Republican in form, instead of a unitary kingdom.

The
Central
Duchies

As to the wishes of the peoples of Northern and Central Italy there was no question. In 1860 Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and the Roman Legations had resolved by plébiscite to unite themselves with Lombardy-Piedmont under the House of Savoy. But would Victor Emmanuel venture to

accept such an accession of territory? Would the Powers permit the fusion? At this juncture Great Britain gave powerful moral support—not for the last time—to Italian aspirations. “Italy for the Italians,” was the motto of Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell, and though they could not directly intervene, they resolved to “keep the ring” for Italy. Europe suddenly accepted the accomplished fact. Northern and Central Italy were united under Victor Emmanuel, and on April 2 a Parliament, representing 11,000,000 Italian people, assembled, for the first time, at Turin.

But Napoleon’s bill had still to be paid. That he could permit so large an aggrandisement of Piedmont and himself face empty-handed his French subjects, already critical of his Italian enterprise, was unthinkable. The fulfilment of the bargain concluded at Plombières was accordingly demanded. “Plon-Plon” had got his bride; Savoy and Nice were to be ceded to France.

To surrender to France the “cradle of his race” was for Victor Emmanuel “the sacrifice most painful to his heart.” To give his young daughter in marriage to Prince Napoleon was a personal “humiliation”. But the services had been rendered: the account, though a heavy one, could not be disputed. Mazzini and Garibaldi regarded the cession as due to diplomatic chicanery. To them Cavour was a “low intriguer,” Napoleon nothing better than a “vulpine knave.” Garibaldi—a Nizzian—particularly resented the cession of Nice. “You have made me,” he cried, “a foreigner in the land of my birth.” But Cavour saw clearly that the sacrifice was inevitable, and with a heavy heart he made it.

More serious was the difficulty raised by the resolve of the Roman Legations to unite with the North Italian Kingdom. To the surrender of his Temporal dominions the Pope was inflexibly opposed. Austria naturally supported the Pope. The position of Napoleon, the “magnanimous ally” of Victor Emmanuel, the “Protector of the Papacy,” was particularly delicate. Victor Emmanuel as a “Catholic Prince” and a “devoted son of the Church” addressed to the Pope a petition at once dignified and dutiful. He besought the Holy Father to “take into consideration the necessity of the times, the increasing force of the principle

Cession of
Savoy
and Nice

The Pope
and the
Temporal
Power

of nationality, the irresistible impulse towards unity among the divided peoples of Italy," and frankly to accept a new order, which would reserve to the Church its high dominion and assure to the Supreme Pontiff a glorious position at the head of the Italian nation!

The dutiful petition of the King was met by a stubborn *non-possumus* from the Pontiff. From the Vatican there issued denunciations followed by anathemas, anathemas by excommunication. But the nationalist tide was flowing too strongly to be stemmed. Only with great difficulty could Victor Emmanuel and Cavour restrain the ardent Republicans from an immediate assault upon Rome. But we anticipate the sequence of events.

Garibaldi
and his
"Thou-
sand "

After his flight from Rome Garibaldi had been for some years a fugitive, but in 1854 he was allowed to retire to Caprera, a rocky islet off Sardinia, where he spent the next five years, labouring to turn the barren rock into a smiling garden.

The war of 1859 brought the chief once more out of his retirement; in the brief campaign of that year he added immensely to his reputation as a leader in guerilla warfare, and, on the sudden conclusion of the armistice, he was hailed as a national hero from end to end of Italy. He was now firmly resolved to see Italy united, with its capital at Rome, before he died.

Union of
North and
South

The first step towards that end was to expel the Bourbons from the south as the Hapsburgs had been all but expelled from the centre and the north. There was every excuse for putting an end to a despotism which was as cruel and corrupt as it was incompetent. After a visit to Naples in the winter of 1850-1, Mr. Gladstone had addressed to Lord Aberdeen, as leader of the Peelite section of the Conservative Party, three letters which, in his own words, "became a kind of historical document." Bourbon rule in Naples seemed to him to be "an outrage upon religion, upon civilization, upon humanity and upon decency." "Too true," was the phrase he had so often heard in Naples, "this is the negation of God erected into a system of government." Should the "huge mountain of crime" reared by the Government be permitted to remain, it is only too likely to lead to the downfall of the monarchy and the setting up a republic,

Mr.
Gladstone
on Naples

“ a political creed which has little natural or habitual root in the character of the people.”¹

Mr. Gladstone's indictment, though characteristically rhetorical, was sustained by the unimpassioned evidence of diplomatists.²

The harvest, then, was ripe for the sickle of the liberator. And the liberator was at hand. On September 29, 1859, Garibaldi wrote to the Sicilians: “ My brothers, the cause fought for by me and my comrades in arms is not the cause of a parish, but the cause of our Italy, from Trapani to the Isonzo, from Taranto to Nice. Therefore the work of the redemption of Sicily is the work of our own redemption, and we will fight for it with the same zeal with which we fought on the Lombard battlefields.”³ He kept his word. Cavour, too, was watching closely the progress of events in the south. On March 30, 1860, he wrote to Villamarina at Naples: “ Evidently events of great importance are preparing in the south of Italy . . . you know that I do not desire to push the Neapolitan question to a premature crisis. . . . It would be to our interest if the present state of things continued for some years longer. But I believe that we shall soon be forced to form a plan which I would like to have had more time to mature.”⁴ Cavour was right: but such considerations did not appeal to the impetuous and generous adventurer by whom the liberation of the south was actually accomplished.

In the spring of 1860 insurrections, organized by Francesco Crispi, broke out in Sicily. Garibaldi decided to fly to their assistance. He waited for no leave from the Government. Just before embarkation at Genoa he wrote to the King: “ I know that I embark on a perilous enterprise. If we achieve it I shall be proud to add to your majesty's crown a new and perhaps more glorious jewel, always on the condition that your majesty will stand opposed to counsellors who would cede this province to the foreigner, as has been done with the city of my birth.” As a fact, the Piedmontese Government was in complete sympathy with the objects of

¹ *Gleanings of Past Years*, iv, pp. 1-139.

² Cf. e.g. Sir Henry Elliot: *Some Revolutions*. J. Murray, 1922.

³ Ap. Trevelyan: *Garibaldi and The Thousand*, p. 143.

⁴ Chiala: *Lettere*, iii, 235-6 (quoted by Trevelyan).

Cavour's
instruction
to Persano

the expedition. Victor Emmanuel contributed 3,000,000 francs out of his private pocket towards the expenses ;¹ the public also subscribed generously ; the *National Society* supplied guns and ammunition, though in inadequate amounts ; and the Government turned a blind eye to the enlistment of volunteers and other preparations which went on busily at Genoa.

Cavour
and
Garibaldi

Cavour had a difficult game to play, but he played it with consummate skill ; so skilfully, indeed, that the Mazzinians, despite all the evidence to the contrary, have always asserted that he spared no pains to frustrate the objects of the expedition. Lord Acton describes his conduct as "a triumph of unscrupulous statesmanship," and evidently regards Garibaldi as his catspaw and dupe. Lord Acton's verdict seems to be as far from the truth as that of the Mazzinians. Mr. Trevelyan summarizes the facts with judicial impartiality. "Mazzini and his friends instigated the expedition ; Garibaldi accomplished it ; the King and Cavour allowed it to start, and when it had begun to succeed gave it the support and guidance without which it must inevitably have failed midway."² He would be a bold man who would appeal against this judgment. Cavour, as already indicated, would have postponed, if he could, the consummation of the union between north and south, and he would have been glad could it have been effected without the shock which Garibaldi's expedition administered to the Courts and Chancelleries of Europe. For in their eyes Garibaldi and his "Thousand" were no better than a band of brigands, who ought to have been arrested and shot.

Had Cavour attempted to stop Garibaldi it would probably have cost Victor Emmanuel his Crown, and neither King nor Minister were prepared to take that risk to prevent an enterprise, the success of which both desired.

The story of Garibaldi and his Thousand has been told, once for all, in imperishable prose,³ and must not be retold. Within two months Garibaldi was master of Sicily ; thence—protected by an English squadron—he crossed to Spartivento, and advanced, virtually unopposed, upon Naples. The Bourbon King left Naples for ever on September 6, and on

¹ Elliot, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

² *op. cit.*, p. 162.

³ Trevelyan : *Garibaldi and The Thousand*, Lond., 1909.

the following day Garibaldi, amid a scene of indescribable enthusiasm, entered the capital.

Cavour had been watching the progress of events during the last few months with mingled elation and anxiety. The crisis was indeed one to try the temper of a great statesman. On the flight of the King, Garibaldi was declared Dictator of the Two Sicilies and now demanded that the Piedmontese Government should confirm him. The Italian Parliament had approved of the annexation of Naples and Sicily to the Northern Kingdom. But it was a question whether Garibaldi would respect the vote. Garibaldi declared that he would not annex the Provinces to the Italian Kingdom until he could proclaim Victor Emmanuel King of Italy in Rome. Everything was now at stake: the life-work of Cavour; the life-work of Mazzini; the life-work of Garibaldi himself. Cavour in this supreme moment of his great career was equal to the crisis. By a masterly stroke of policy the control of the movement was taken out of the rash hands of the knight-errant and confirmed in those of sober statesmanship. He decided to despatch a Royal army to the Roman Marches with the two-fold object of warding off from the Romagna the attack threatened by the Papacy, and of obstructing, if necessary, the advance of the Garibaldians on Rome. "If we do not arrive on the Volturno," he wrote to the Italian Ambassadors abroad, "before Garibaldi arrives at La Cattolica, the monarchy is lost. Italy will remain a prey to revolution." Napoleon had given a qualified assent. "If Piedmont," he said, "thinks this absolutely necessary to save herself from an abyss of evil, be it so, but it must be done at her own risk and peril." Cavour accepted full responsibility, and early in September the Sardinian army was marching south. At Castelfidardo the Sardinians encountered and completely routed the mercenary forces employed by the Pope—for the most part Irish soldiers, commanded by a French General Lamoricière (Sept. 18). Directly afterwards (Sept. 29) Ancona surrendered; the whole of Umbria and the Marches were occupied. Meanwhile, at the moment when the Royal troops were marching south, the Garibaldians were marching north. "If you are not on your way towards Rome or Venice before three weeks are over your initiative will be at an end." That was

Garibaldi
and Rome

Mazzini's warning to Garibaldi, and it was sound. Luckily this danger was averted. Bombino and the Neapolitan army played Cavour's game for him. For nearly a fortnight (Sept. 19-Oct. 1) they had engaged Garibaldi on the Volturno without decisive issue, but on October 1 Garibaldi won a great victory; the Neapolitan army was scattered; King Francis II fled to Gaeta; and Garibaldi was left face to face with Victor Emmanuel, who had joined the army at Ancona on October 3. "Go to Naples," was Palmerston's advice to Cavour. Though all the rest of Europe was against him he needed no bidding. He urged upon his Sovereign "infinite consideration" for Garibaldi, but expressed his belief that the latter "will be overjoyed to lay his dictatorship at the feet of your Majesty." He judged his "fiercest enemy" aright. On October 21 the plébiscite on which Cavour insisted was taken; and Naples and Sicily declared, with few dissentients, for annexation to the Kingdom of Italy. At this supreme crisis Garibaldi proved himself hardly less great than Cavour.

The Two
Sicilies
annexed
to Italy.

"To-morrow," he announced, "Victor Emmanuel, the elect of the nation, will break down the frontier which has divided us for so many centuries from the rest of the country and . . . will appear amongst us. Let us worthily receive him who is sent by Providence. . . . No more political colours, no more parties, no more discords. Let Italy be one under the *re galantuomo*, who is the symbol of our regeneration and the prosperity of our country."

On October 26 Garibaldi and Victor Emmanuel met; on November 7 they rode into Naples side by side. Garibaldi's work was done. He had added to his master's Crown a "new and more brilliant jewel," and he had commended his Sovereign to his new subjects; and then, refusing all rewards and decorations, he went quietly away to his island home in Caprera. Francis II held out for some months at Gaeta, but on February 13, 1861, the town surrendered. On February 18 a Parliament representing all parts of Italy, save Venetia and the city of Rome, met at Turin. The union of north and south was formally cemented and Victor Emmanuel reigned over 23,000,000 Italian subjects.

Death of
Cavour

Four months later (June 5) the statesman who had made modern Italy passed away. Without the audacity of the

adventurer the great diplomatist might not have been able to accomplish his colossal task. Without the prudent guidance of Cavour the enthusiasm engendered by Garibaldi might have run to waste. Mr. Trevelyan holds the scales between the two great men with absolute impartiality. "If," he writes, "Cavour had succeeded in annexing Sicily in June, and if he had been relieved from the competition of the revolutionary bands, the great Powers would not have permitted him to attack either Naples or the Papal territory. If on the other hand the Garibaldini had succeeded in attacking Rome, Napoleon III would have been forced to undo all that they had accomplished for Italy. The principle of audacity and the principle of guidance, both essential for successful revolutions, had each in 1860 an almost perfect representative."

It is truly and admirably said.

The life-work of Cavour was just short of completion when he died. Rome and Venice still remained two gaping wounds in the side of United Italy. "I am confident that Italy will become a single State and that Rome will be her capital, but I do not know whether she is ready for this great transformation." So Cavour had written to La Farina in 1856. Curiously enough it was, as we shall see, through the action of Cavour's Teutonic counterpart that the wounds were ultimately healed.

Meanwhile there was a painful episode provoked by the impetuosity of Garibaldi—an episode which Cavour's steady hand might have averted, but the strong hand was gone and Cavour left no successor. Garibaldi was bent on making an immediate assault on Rome. He was led to believe that the Government would oppose his advance on Rome in the same sense as they had opposed his expedition to Sicily. But the diplomatic position was very different. Rome was under the protection of Napoleon III. No Government, least of all a Government situated as was that of Victor Emmanuel, could permit a subject to defy its orders and act independently in so delicate a matter. Garibaldi, however, would listen to no reason. In July 1862 he collected a body of volunteers in Sicily, and with some 4000 crossed to the mainland and marched northwards through Calabria. On August 29 he encountered a Royal army at Aspromonte, near Reggio. The chief himself

Garibaldi's
defeat at
Aspromonte

was wounded and carried a prisoner to Varignano, where, in honourable captivity, he proved a terrible embarrassment to a somewhat discredited Government. His followers were scattered far and wide.

After the declaration of a general amnesty Garibaldi visited England. Palmerston and Russell had already incurred the opprobrium of the orthodox diplomatists of the Continent for their support of the Italian *Risorgimento*. "Ce n'est pas de la diplomatie ; c'est de la polissonnerie." Such was Baron Brunnow's comment on British policy. Garibaldi was assured of a warm welcome in this country. It proved to be enthusiastic to the verge of hysteria, but the visit was somewhat abruptly curtailed, perhaps on a hint from Napoleon III.

Annexation
of Venetia
to Italy

Meanwhile one of the gaping wounds of Italy had been healed. In 1864 Napoleon III, partly perhaps in consequence of the unyielding attitude of the Papacy, had come to an agreement with the Italian Government. Italy was to protect what remained of the two States of the Church from external attack ; France was to remove all her troops within two years, and the Italian capital was to be transferred from Turin to Florence. This important step was taken in 1865. "Of course," said Drouyn de Lhuys, the French Foreign Minister, "you will eventually go to Rome, but a decent interval must elapse to relieve us from responsibility." Bismarck saw to that. But it was not his first service to Italy.

Bismarck
and Italy

On the eve of his decisive conflict with Austria, Bismarck, having temporarily beguiled the Emperor of the French by vague suggestions of aggrandizement for France, thought to make assurance doubly sure by a treaty with Victor Emmanuel. The latter, with some magnanimity, gave Austria the first chance. In 1865 he offered to help Austria against Prussia in return for the cession of Venetia. The Emperor Francis Joseph refused the offer—not unnaturally, but the refusal cost him dear. In April 1866 Victor Emmanuel came to terms with Bismarck, and in the Seven Weeks War Italy fought on the side of Prussia. The campaign in Germany was short but decisive. Within six weeks not Austria only but Germany lay prostrate under the heel of Prussia. Italy gave but feeble assistance to her ally. Both on land and at

sea she suffered severe reverses at the hands of Austria. Bismarck was faithful to the letter of his bond, but took good care that Italy got not one ounce more than the promised pound of flesh.

The Trentino is geographically nothing but "a prolonga- *Italia*
tion of the plain of Lombardy and Venetia ; all its gates are *Irredenta*
open to Italy."¹ But the gates which Nature left open, Austria with Bismarck's connivance continued to shut.

"Venetia" was in 1866 interpreted in the narrowest possible sense. The northern frontier of Italy was so drawn as to deprive Italy of a compact mass of 370,000 Italians in the Trentino, to exclude the industrial products of these Italian people from their natural market in the valley of the Po, and to thrust into the heart of an Italian province the military outpost of an unfriendly neighbour. Not until 1919 was the frontier rectified in a sense favourable to Italy. That rectification has indeed created another "minority" problem ; but we must not so far anticipate events. Istria, though it had formed an integral part of Venetia for centuries, was divorced from it in 1866 and retained by Austria. In 1914 Italy took ample revenge on Prussia. It was this question of *Italia Irredenta* that broke the Triple Alliance and brought Italy into the war against the Central Empires in the following year. For the moment, however, Italy had perforce to be content with the morsels which Bismarck tossed to her. Western Venetia was, by plébiscite, united with Italy (Oct. 1866).

Rome remained. Garibaldi was determined to take it or Rome die. In 1867 his son Menotti, having raised a band of volunteers, marched into the Papal States. Garibaldi himself escaped from Caprera, whither the Government had deported him, joined his son, and after hard fighting won a great victory over the Papal troops at Monte Rotundo. At Mentana, however, they encountered a French force hastily despatched for the defence of the Holy City ; the volunteers, ill disciplined and badly armed, were utterly routed and the French army re-entered Rome. Garibaldi, though the hero of the populace, was again arrested and ultimately deported to Caprera.

¹ Virginio Gayda : *Modern Austria*, p. 15.

But the final scene in the long drama was at hand. The Prussian attack on France (1870) necessitated the withdrawal of the French troops from Rome. Victor Emmanuel once more appealed to the Pope, "with the affection of a son, with the faith of a Catholic, with the soul of an Italian, to accept the position, at once dignified and independent, which the Italian Government was anxious to secure to him." But the Pope unflinchingly adhered to the position he had taken up, and committed his cause to God.

On the 20th September 1870, after a feint of resistance, the Royal troops entered Rome and the Italian Tricolour floated at last from the Capitol. A plébiscite was taken and yielded 40,788 votes for the King; for the Pope 46.

The capital
of Italy

Two months before the entry of the Italians into Rome the Vatican Council—the first Œcumenical Council to meet since the Council of Trent—had proclaimed the dogma of Papal Infallibility (July 20). Thus the triumph of the Ultramontanes coincided exactly with the end of the Temporal power of the Papacy.

At the end of 1870 the King paid a private visit to the city to demonstrate his sympathy with the distress of his new subjects who were suffering from a terrible inundation from the Tiber. On the 2nd June 1871, Victor Emmanuel made a triumphal entry into the city, henceforth to be the capital of Italy. The Pope withdrew to the Vatican, where, until the Lateran Treaty of 1929, he remained a "prisoner," but a prisoner in the enjoyment of every diplomatic privilege and "Sovereign" within his own restricted domain. "The work to which we consecrated our lives is accomplished. After long travail Italy is restored to herself and to Rome." So spake *il re galantuomo* to the first Italian Parliament which met in Rome. The unification of Italy was complete.

Books for reference, see chapter vii.

CHAPTER XIII

THE HOHENZOLLERN AND THE HAPSBURGS

SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN. THE SEVEN WEEKS' WAR.
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

THE luck of the Hapsburgs was, for many centuries, ^{The} proverbial. And not only in respect of their marriages. ^{resilience} Again and again their conglomerate Empire was ^{of the} threatened with dissolution. But their political resilience was ^{Hapsburgs} proof against every assault. From each crisis they emerged, if not triumphant, yet substantially unhurt and not infrequently with extended territories. In 1848 it seemed as though the fatal moment had at last arrived. But their luck had not even yet deserted them. By 1849 the *status quo ante* was everywhere restored. By 1852 they were again at the head of the Germanic Confederation, and their prestige in Europe stood higher than it had stood for years. This remarkable recovery must in large measure be ascribed to the happy discovery in Felix Schwarzenberg of a statesman of the highest order.

Schwarzenberg's brief Ministry marked, however, the apex ^{Rise of} of Hapsburg fortunes. Thenceforward there was a gradual ^{Prussia} decline culminating in the catastrophe of 1914-18. Meanwhile they had to face a rival in Germany. The Hohenzollern rulers of Brandenburg-Prussia had for a century past been threatening Hapsburg ascendancy. The rise of Prussia had indeed been phenomenally rapid; but she owed nothing to Nature; everything to the genius, the industry and the persistence of man. Most of all she owed it to man as a fighting animal. "La guerre est l'industrie nationale de la Prusse." So said Mirabeau, and he spoke the literal truth. The modern Kingdom of Prussia was a manufactured article, made by her soldiers, her Civil Service, and her Kings. Of those Kings Frederick William IV was one of the weakest. A brilliant German writer of to-day has said that he well deserved his

nickname of the "rope-dancer." "The part he played between people and throne was but a mummer's part. . . . He gave the people an instrument and then hurled threats at anyone who dared play on it."¹ In 1857 his brilliant but disordered brain finally gave way, and in his stead there ruled, first as Regent and then as King, his brother Prince William.²

William I,
1857-88

The reign of William I is the most splendid in Prussian, if not in German, history. Though not personally distinguished as a man, a soldier, or a statesman, he had the gift, most indispensable of all gifts for a monarch, of detecting capacity in others. Consequently he was served by the greatest soldiers and the greatest statesmen of the age. He had little of the mysticism of his father or his elder brother, but the foundation of his character was a simple faith in Divine Providence, and though not highly gifted he was industrious, conscientious, and entirely loyal to those who served him. Politically he was no bigot; he believed in the established order; but he combined liberal sympathies in detail with rigid conservatism in essentials. Above all he was unwaveringly convinced of the Divine Right of kingship, and of the Divine approval of Prussia's "German mission."

Army
reform :
Moltke
and Roon

One of the first acts of his regency was to install in office a moderate Liberal Ministry under Prince Anton von Hohenzollern, the head of the Roman Catholic branch of the family. Helmuth Karl Bernard von Moltke (1800-91) was appointed Chief of the General Staff, and in 1859 Albrecht Theodor Emil Count von Roon (1803-79) became Minister of War. The latter appointments were highly significant. They indicated that the Regent, himself a keen, capable, and experienced soldier, meant to take in hand, without delay, the reform of army organization. These were the men who were responsible for the perfecting of that most effective of

¹ Ludwig : *Bismarck*, p. 91.

² The Emperor William II received on his accession a sealed packet containing the Political Testament of his great-uncle, Frederick William IV. This testament, written in the King's own hand, advised each successor before taking the oath on his accession to cancel the Constitution granted by him. So impressed was the young Kaiser by the dangerous nature of this advice that he destroyed the document lest it might, at some future date, influence the policy of a "young and experienced ruler." These facts were revealed, evidently at the instance of the Kaiser himself, by Professor Hintze in a lecture given at the University of Berlin on the occasion of the Kaiser's Jubilee (June 16, 1913). Cf. *The Times*, June 17 and 18, 1913.

all fighting machines, the Prussian army, and they remained continuously in office until the final triumph was achieved in 1871.

The first principle of Roon's army reform was a strict-enforcement of the universal liability to military service. By this means Roon hoped to obtain an effective war force of 371,000 men of the line, 126,000 reserve, and 163,000 Landwehr. This great army Roon re-armed with the breech-loading needle-gun, a new weapon which, adopted first by Prussia, gave her the victory over Austria in 1866.

The military prestige of Prussia's rival suffered a considerable shock in 1859 when, as we have seen, the issue was at last decided between the young Italy and Austria.

War of
Italian
Independ-
ence, 1859

When the Emperor of the French proposed to the Austrian Emperor the terms afterwards embodied in the Armistice of Villafranca, the latter consulted the Prince Regent of Prussia. Prince William strongly advised his brother of Austria not to accept the terms. At the same time he offered the services of the Prussian army against France; but on one condition: that he himself should have command of the whole federal forces of Germany. The Emperor Francis Joseph refused the offer. He would accept the military support of Prussia only on condition that the Prussian army itself should be placed under the command of the general to be appointed by the Federal Diet. Prussia's refusal was a matter of course, and the moral was pointed by the Prince Regent in a conversation with the King of Bavaria.¹ "Prussia was on the point, at the head of her Army and at the head of the German Confederation, of carrying the war into France at a moment when the chances were all in our favour. Had we been victorious, Prussia would have come out with a heightened position in Germany and in the world at large. It was the task and *will* of Austria to prevent this, and for this purpose the sacrifice even of Lombardy did not seem too great."

The Italian war had, then, for Germany a three-fold significance: it dealt a heavy blow at the prestige of Austria; it embittered, at a critical moment, the personal and political relations of the Austrian and Prussian rulers, and, finally, by contributing to the unification of Italy under the House of

¹ Recorded in an important *Memorandum* by the former, dated June 20, 1860. Cf. Morier, *op. cit.*, i, 235.

Savoy, it encouraged those who were working for a similar consummation in Germany.

Constitutional
crisis in
Prussia

On January 2, 1862, the Prince Regent succeeded to the throne. Unfortunately, his accession synchronized with an acute constitutional crisis. The army proposals were exceedingly unpopular, and in Prussia provoked bitter opposition in the Landtag.

Bismarck

At this crisis the King called to his counsels the statesman who was destined to render his reign illustrious in German history.

Born on April 1, 1815, just a month after Napoleon's escape from Elba, Otto Eduard Leopold von Bismarck was now a man in the prime of life, some fourteen years the junior of his Sovereign. His father was a Junker, whose family had been established in Brandenburg long before the Hohenzollern. From him Otto inherited his magnificent physique. His brains he got, as do most men, from his mother. She was a Fräulein Mencken, daughter of a distinguished civil servant and grand-daughter of a professor at Leipzig. Educated at the gymnasium of Berlin and at the Universities of Göttingen and Berlin, Bismarck was destined for a diplomatic career. After a year or two in the civil service he undertook, with his brother, the management of the family estates in Pomerania, and thus, like Cavour, came into touch with those practical problems which, in the education of a statesman, are at least as valuable as the experience of academies and courts. In Pomerania he combined the study of Spinoza with the practice of agriculture; but to his neighbours he was known chiefly as a young man of great stature, strength, and courage; a hard-drinking, hard-riding, practical-joking Junker; "the mad Bismarck." Like Cavour he travelled extensively in England and France, being from childhood a master of both languages. In 1845 he became a member of the Provincial Diet of Pomerania, which he represented in the Imperial Diet of Berlin in 1847.

During the revolutionary year (1848) he revealed himself as a strong Conservative and devoted to the monarchical idea, whether represented by Hohenzollern or Hapsburg. Deeply hurt by the ignominious conduct of his Sovereign, and disgusted by the anarchy of the times, Bismarck withdrew for a while from the life of cities, but in 1849 he was returned to

the newly-elected lower chamber of Prussia, and in 1851 accepted the appointment of Prussian envoy to the Federal Diet at Frankfort. He took his place in the restored Diet ^{Frankfort, 1851-9} with "feelings of admiration, nay, of almost religious reverence for the policy of Austria." But residence at Frankfort was to Bismarck as the historic visit to Rome was to Luther. He learned to know the ways of Austria, and more particularly to appreciate her inveterate hostility to Prussia. "I have brought away as the result of my experience from the eight years of my official life at Frankfort the conviction"—thus Bismarck wrote to Schleinitz in 1859—"that the present arrangements of the Bund form for Prussia an oppressive and at critical times a perilous tie. . . . I see in our connection with the Bund an infirmity which we shall have to repair sooner or later *ferro et igni*, if we do not apply timely remedies to it at a favourable season of the year."¹

For the inevitable struggle with Austria, so clearly foreseen, he steadily prepared: cultivating the friendship of the minor Sovereigns; strengthening their economic ties with Prussia; urging upon his own King a more independent and bolder diplomacy in the wider European sphere. At least one fixed maxim of his later policy is already formed at Frankfort: "Prussia must never let Russia's friendship wax cold. Her alliance is the cheapest among all continental alliances, for the eyes of Russia are turned only towards the East." There must, therefore, be no alliance with England and France in the Crimean War. "We had absolutely . . . no interest in the Eastern Question that could possibly justify a war with Russia . . . we should, without provocation, be attacking our hitherto friend either out of fear of France or for the *beaux yeux* of England and Austria."² Of France he had no fear. A flying visit to Paris gave him the opportunity of taking the measure of the new Emperor. But France might be used to weaken Austria. Above all, no Prussian or German resources must be squandered to promote—or even to defend—the non-German interests of Austria.

In 1859 Bismarck was transferred to the Embassy at ^{Petersburg and Paris} Petersburg, and after three years usefully employed in Russia,

¹ Prince Bismarck's *Letters*, pp. 107-16. The whole epistle—a lengthy one—is deserving of attentive study.

² Bismarck's *Reflections and Reminiscences*, i, 124.

he became Ambassador at Paris. But for a few months only. In September 1862 he was recalled to Berlin as the only man capable of dealing with the constitutional crisis at home. From that day onwards, as Minister-president of Prussia, as Chancellor of the North German Confederation, and then of the German Empire, Bismarck was continuously in power until, in 1890, the young Emperor "dropped the pilot" who had guided the ship of State to safe anchorage.

Bismarck's first fight was with the Prussian Parliament. It was a fateful moment for Prussia; for the monarchy; for the Minister. But he never faltered. He purged the public service, the army no less than the civil service, of all who showed liberal inclinations; he carried through the army reforms, devised by Moltke and Roon; he spent money which had not been voted. "The great questions of the time are not to be solved by speeches and parliamentary votes, but by blood and iron." They were.

The Polish
Insurrection

In 1863 he got an opportunity which he turned to admirable account. In that year the Poles rose in revolt against Russia. The revolt was ill-advised, inopportune, and from the outset hopeless. But it gave Bismarck the chance of demonstrating the insidious and calculated friendship of Prussia for Russia. "Prussia," so the Czar was informed, "would stand shoulder to shoulder with him against the common enemy." Bismarck's support of Russia was not purely altruistic. He had long been afraid of Polish independence. "No one," he wrote in 1848, "could doubt that an independent Poland would be the irreconcilable enemy of Prussia." He was of the same opinion in 1863, and he never ceased to hold it. Bismarck's immediate object, however, was to establish a credit upon which he could draw at Petersburg.

That Austria and the Western Powers would oppose his policy in Poland Bismarck was well aware. But Napoleon was becoming more and more deeply involved in his disastrous Mexican adventure, and Lord John Russell, though prodigal in homilies on the virtues of constitutional liberty, was not ready to back his convictions in the only way which appealed to Prussia. For a hectoring diplomacy unbacked by force Bismarck had a profound contempt, and the opinion which he formed of French and English policy, in reference to

Poland, inspired him with fresh courage to pursue the path he had marked out for himself in regard to the Danish Duchies.

The acquisition of the Duchies of Holstein and Schleswig was the first move in the great diplomatic game, every move of which was carefully foreseen and planned by Bismarck. It is essential, therefore, that the bearings of the question should be clearly apprehended.

The
Schleswig-
Holstein
Question

In 1863 Frederick VII, King of Denmark and Duke of Schleswig and Holstein, died without heirs male. His death immediately raised, in an acute form, a problem which, intrinsically complicated, had already proved to be politically embarrassing to Germany, to Denmark, and indeed to Europe at large.

Holstein was a German duchy inhabited by Germans and forming an integral part of the Germanic body. Schleswig was largely, though less exclusively, German in blood and speech, but was legally a fief of the Danish Kingdom. The two duchies were, according to the German theory, indissolubly united. In 1460 Count Christian of Oldenburg, who in 1448 had become King of Denmark, was elected Duke of Schleswig and Holstein, by the Estates of those duchies. But the union between the Crown of Denmark and the duchies was not organic, and its personal nature was still further emphasized by the *Lex Regia* of 1665, which made the Danish Crown transmissible to males or females, while the Salic law was maintained in the duchies. The personal union continued until the death of Frederick VII in 1863.

The Danes, foreseeing difficulties, had made strenuous efforts to get the duchies organically incorporated in the kingdom. The duchies, however, resisted incorporation, and in 1848 rose under Frederick of Augustenburg, Prince of Schleswig-Holstein, and declared their independence. The Federal Diet acknowledged the Provisional Government set up under Prince Frederick and sent an army to his assistance. The Danes retorted by a blockade of the North German coasts, and inflicted great injury and still greater humiliation upon Prussia.

Mainly owing to the lack of a fleet, the war was halfheartedly pursued by Germany, and in August 1848 Prussia, acting on behalf of the Germanic body, concluded the truce

of Malmö. In April 1849, however, Denmark renewed the war, which was carried on with varying fortune until, under English mediation, a further armistice was arranged (July 10, 1849) and in 1852 the Treaty of London was concluded. The signatory Powers—Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Norway and Sweden—recognized the right of Prince Christian of Glücksburg to succeed to “the whole of the Dominions” then united under the Danish Crown. The claims of the Augustenburg family were at the same time liquidated by a money payment. The Germanic Bund was not a party to the treaty, and the Holsteiners from the first disputed its validity.

In 1855 King Frederick annexed Schleswig to the Danish Kingdom, and at the same time, without the assent of the Holstein Estates, conferred “Home Rule” upon Holstein. These arrangements were confirmed by Charter (March 30, 1863). His action was strongly resented alike by the Holsteiners, who were thus separated from Schleswig, and by the Germanic Bund.

On Frederick’s death (Nov. 15, 1863) Prince Christian of Glücksburg succeeded without dispute as Christian IX to the throne of Denmark. The question thereupon arose whether he could be permitted, in accord with the Treaty of London (1852), but in defiance of the *Lex Regia* of 1665, to succeed to the duchies as well?

The German Diet immediately asserted the claims of Prince Frederick of Augustenburg, and demanded that the Charter of March 30 should be cancelled. Denmark refused to cancel it, and thereupon an army of Saxon and Hanoverian troops marched into Holstein to occupy the duchy on behalf of the Germanic Bund and its candidate Prince Frederick.

Bismarck’s
policy

Bismarck now found himself in a very difficult position. He had made up his mind to acquire the duchies not for the “Bund” but for Prussia, who had no claim whatever to them. The harbour of Kiel, the possibility of uniting the North Sea and the Baltic by a canal under the control of Prussia, afforded motives sufficiently intelligible. In the background Bismarck perceived also a means of bringing to a final issue the secular rivalry of the two great German Powers. But how were all these objects to be achieved?

Bismarck could count, thanks to Poland, on the active

sympathy of Russia ; upon the stupidity of the Hapsburgs ; upon the anxiety of Lord Russell to avoid war at any price. Even Napoleon might look kindly upon Prussia's action if it was calculated to embroil her with Austria.

That Austria should have played into Bismarck's hands, Austria
and the
duchies that she should have consented "to pull the chestnuts out of the fire" for him in the duchies, that she should have left the Diet in the lurch and have wantonly sacrificed her cherished influence over the smaller States, is unintelligible, except on the hypothesis of political hypnotism. Bismarck, it is true, played his game with Machiavellian astuteness and consummate coolness and skill ; but all the cards were against him. The claims of the Augustenburg prince were recognized by the Diet, by the Prussian Parliament, by King William himself, by the Crown Prince ; even Roon could not deny them. Until he persuaded Austria to join him Bismarck was absolutely alone in refusing to recognize Prince Frederick. Austria was won over by shaking in her face the red flag of democratic revolution. "Under the insane persuasion that there was no other mode of checkmating German liberalism," Austria was induced to "grasp as friendly the hand that was prepared and destined to inflict deep humiliation" ¹ upon her Emperor and his Empire. The Emperor Francis Joseph was persuaded by Bismarck that to allow the Diet a free hand in the duchies was to open the floodgates of German democracy.

Accordingly, on February 1, 1864, Austria and Prussia, repudiating the action of the Diet, occupied the duchies, as signatories of the Treaty of London and as champions of the integrity of the Danish monarchy.²

The fighting in the duchies was soon over ; in August the Danes abandoned a hopeless struggle, and in October, by the Treaty of Vienna, Denmark renounced all her rights over the duchies to Austria and Prussia conjointly. The most difficult move in Bismarck's game was still to come. How was he to evict Austria, push aside Prince Frederick of Augustenburg, and confirm the duchies in the sole possession of Prussia ?

¹ Cf. for a contemporary view of these affairs by an accomplished diplomatist, Malet : *Overthrow of the Germanic Confederation*, pp. 75, 199, and *passim*.

² As an illustration of Bismarck's superb effrontery cf. note to Great Britain, *Parl. Papers*, 1864 ; *Denmark and Germany*, iii, 639, ap. Mowat : *Select Treaties* (Clar. Press), p. 70.

Convention
of Gastein
(1865)

Austria, at this point, warmly espoused the claims of the Augustenburgs, and proposed that the duchies should be handed over to Prince Frederick as a member of the Germanic Confederation. Bismarck agreed to recognize the Prince on terms which would have meant the complete subjection of the new principality to Prussia, in foreign affairs and military organization.¹ The Prince himself refused the offer on these conditions; war seemed imminent between the two great German Powers, but neither was quite ready, and on August 14, 1865, the Convention of Gastein was concluded. Austria, for the time being, was to have Holstein; Prussia to have Schleswig and Lauenburg, with the right to construct a canal through Holstein from the North Sea to the Baltic. Kiel was to become the base of a German Federal Fleet, though the harbour was to be under the control of Prussia.²

The Convention obviously avoided the real point at issue; it was merely intended "to paper over the cracks" until Bismarck was ready. Before delivering his blow at Austria he wanted to be quite sure of his ground in Europe. Russian friendship was, after 1863, assured. Great Britain could be ignored. France and Italy must be secured.

Bismarck
and
Napoleon
III

In October 1865 Bismarck had his famous interview with Napoleon III at Biarritz. The Emperor, smarting under a sense of recent failure in Mexico, and not happy as to the situation in France, lured by the bait of re-establishing his prestige at home and abroad, fell an easy prey to the astute bluntness of Bismarck. The Italian question had gravely compromised Napoleon's position with the French Clericals, yet he would gladly have furthered the cause of Italian unification, if Rome could be saved for the Pope. Bismarck was ready with the solution. Austria should be compelled to surrender Venice to Napoleon; Napoleon should bestow Venice upon Italy and Italy should help Prussia against Austria. Then as to France: when Austria and Prussia were mutually exhausted, Napoleon would naturally step in as mediator, and, as a slight acknowledgment of his good offices, would be pressed to accept—perhaps the Rhine frontier, perhaps Luxemburg, perhaps parts of Belgium or of Switzerland. Bismarck was prolific in hints, but cautious in promises;

¹ Full details in Malet, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-9.

² Mowat: *Select Treaties*, p. 71.

above all, he left no scraps of paper behind him at Biarritz to embitter the recollection of a well-spent holiday.

In April 1866 Victor Emmanuel came to terms with Bismarck. Italy was to declare war on Austria if war broke out between Prussia and Austria within the next three months.

Bismarck's preliminary preparations for the decisive conflict with Austria were now complete. He complained that Austria was encouraging the claims of the Augustenburgs in Holstein. Prussian troops were thereupon marched into the Duchy; Austria withdrew and appealed to the Diet. Bismarck denounced the Diet as the source of all the weakness of Germany: on June 14 the Diet agreed to mobilize the Federal army against Prussia; Prussia, on the same day, formally withdrew from the Bund, and on the next day (June 15) declared war upon Saxony, Hanover, and Hesse. On the 18th she declared war upon the other members of the Bund, including Austria.

The Seven
Weeks' War

The war was short and sharp. Within six weeks not Austria only, but Germany, lay prostrate under the heel of Prussia. By June 18 Prussian troops were in occupation of Hanover, Hesse, and Saxony. On the 28th the Hanoverian army, despite some initial success at Langensalza, capitulated to General Vogel von Falkenstein. The terms of capitulation involved the extinction of the Kingdom of Hanover and its incorporation in Prussia.

Meanwhile the main Prussian armies converged upon Bohemia. A week's brilliant campaign culminated (July 3) in the crushing defeat of the Austrian forces at Königgratz (Sadowa); before the end of the month the Prussians were within striking distance of Vienna, but Bismarck persuaded his master to forgo the triumph of an entry into the enemy's capital; terms of peace were arranged on July 26, and one of the most momentous wars in modern history was at an end.

The definitive peace was signed at Prague (Aug. 2, 1866). On two points Bismarck was adamant. Austria must acknowledge the dissolution of the "Germanic Confederation as hitherto constituted" and "consent to a new organization of Germany without the participation of the Imperial Austrian State" (Art. iv). Venetia narrowly defined, as we have seen, must go to Italy. For the rest, Bismarck wished to treat Austria with all the leniency which was compatible

The
Treaty
of Prague

with the attainment of the paramount objects of the war. The indemnity was a light one, and, at Austria's special request, the integrity of Saxony was respected. Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, the free city of Frankfort-on-the-Main, together with the Danish duchies, were annexed to Prussia ; but by Article v it was provided that the populations of the northern districts of Schleswig should be reunited to Denmark, if by a free vote they expressed a wish to be. All the States north of the Main were to form a North German Confederation under the hegemony of Prussia. The Southern States were to be permitted to form an association of their own. Their relation to the Northern Confederation was subsequently to be determined.

Though Austria was spared any territorial sacrifice, except that of Venetia, the results of the Seven Weeks' War were of high significance to her, to Prussia, and to Germany as a whole.

Austria's
Drang
nach
Osten

Austria ceased to form part of Germany. Her "gravitation towards Buda-Pesth," perceptible since 1648, was still further accentuated. If she was ambitious of expansion, it must be at the expense of Roumans or Slavs, not of Germans. But with the new Austria Bismarck desired the friendliest relations. He was already looking ahead to the next move in his game—the conflict with France. He was looking ahead still farther. The "dual alliance" was implicit in the Treaty of Prague.

For Prussia the result of the Seven Weeks' War was even more significant. For the first time the Hohenzollern were masters of a dominion stretching continuously from the Rhine to the Baltic ; they acquired nearly 25,000 square miles of territory and nearly 5,000,000 new subjects ; all, with the exception of some Danes in Schleswig, of the purest German blood ; they obtained in Kiel a magnificent naval harbour ; and, finally, they secured a position of undisputed supremacy in North Germany.

The
North
German
Confeder-
ation

In order to give formal effect to this supremacy, Prussia laid before the North German States the draft of a treaty which was eventually accepted by twenty-two States. A Constitution drafted by their plenipotentiaries at Berlin was approved by a Constituent Assembly, and was then submitted to and accepted by the Parliament of each separate State.

On July 1, 1867, the North German Confederation came

legally into being. It consisted of : Prussia, Saxony, the Grand Duchies of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and Strelitz, Oldenburg and Saxe-Weimar, the Duchies of Brunswick, Anhalt, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, the free cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck, with smaller duchies and principalities—twenty-two in all. The princes retained certain sovereign rights : they might still summon local Estates, levy local taxes, and be separately represented at foreign courts ; but the whole conduct of foreign affairs, the raising and control of the army, the decision of peace and war, were to rest with the President. The Executive was vested in the King of Prussia as hereditary President, assisted by a Federal Chancellor. The Legislature was to consist of (i) a Bundesrat, or Federal Council, composed of plenipotentiaries from the confederate States, and (ii) a Reichstag, elected by universal manhood suffrage. Military service was to be compulsory throughout the Confederation.

The first official act of the President was the appointment of Bismarck as Chancellor of the Confederation. And most significantly ; for the Chancellor was the key-stone of the new constitutional arch.

In the hands of the all-powerful Chancellor all the more important functions of the Confederation were gradually concentrated. His instrument was the Crown of Prussia, for the power of the President was essentially derived from the association of the Presidency with the Prussian Crown. Prussia had not merged itself in Germany. On the contrary North Germany was, in effect, absorbed into Prussia. This fact goes far to explain the facility with which, four years later, the North German Confederation was expanded and transformed into the German Empire. Meanwhile Bismarck had still further strengthened Prussia's dominion over Germany. The leading States of South Germany, Bavaria, Baden, and Würtemberg concluded a Convention by which their armies were placed at the disposal of Prussia in time of war, and in 1867 they entered into a new commercial union with the Northern Confederation. The affairs of the *Zollverein* were to be settled by a Customs Parliament sitting in Berlin, to which the Southern as well as the Northern States were to send deputies.

The Prussianization of Germany was all but complete. But the final consummation of German unity was to be

attained, by a certain dramatic irony, through the intervention of the hereditary enemy, who was even now watching with extreme jealousy the rapid growth of Hohenzollern power. That jealousy Bismarck skilfully turned to his own account. His philosophy taught him that one thing only was now needed to complete the edifice of German unity. He sought and found it in a successful war against France.

**Austria-
Hungary**

We must now turn to the reorganization of the Hapsburg dominions after the events of 1866. Excluded from Germany and expelled from Italy, Austria was at last compelled to come to terms with the Hungarian subjects who had been reconquered for her in 1849 by Russian arms. For the help then rendered, the Hapsburgs showed little gratitude. In answer to an objection that the acceptance of Russian aid would put the Hapsburg Empire under too great an obligation to its saviour, Schwarzenberg is said to have replied: "We will astonish the world by our ingratitude." The attitude of Austria in the Crimean War would have gone far to justify Schwarzenberg, were gratitude not a constantly absent quantity in politics.

The crisis of 1854 afforded a conspicuous illustration of this truth.

**Austria
and the
Crimean
War**

The Russian occupation of the Danubian Principalities¹ touched Austria on a tender spot. It barred her access to the Black Sea. But Austria was unwilling to fight Russia, and still less willing to associate herself with the adventurer who had made himself master of France and bade fair to exercise a decisive voice in the affairs of Europe. Nevertheless, she intimated to the Western Powers that she would support them in a demand for the evacuation of the Principalities before a given date. England and France promptly acted on this suggestion and demanded the evacuation of the Provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia by the 30th of April, 1854.

Russia at once refused this ultimatum, and when the Western Powers declared war it was (March 27) for the first time made manifest that Austria's promised support was merely diplomatic.

In the diplomatic sphere, however, she exhibited both

¹ *Supra*, p. 177.

shrewdness and tenacity. When, in June, the Russians were compelled to evacuate the Principalities, they were occupied by Austrian troops, and in August it was Austria who formulated the "Four Points" which were presented to Russia as a basis for the conclusion of peace. The Czar Nicholas refused to accept them, but on March 2, 1855, the Czar died, and a few days afterwards a Conference opened at Vienna. Of the "Four Points" two were of special importance to the Hapsburg Empire. Under the first, the Russian protectorate over Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia was to cease, and the five Powers were collectively to guarantee the privileges accorded by the Sultan to his subjects in those Provinces. The second required that the navigation of the Danube should be free. Directly the Conference of Vienna met in March, Prince Gortschakoff accepted these points, and when the Western Powers pressed for the remaining two, Austria deserted them.

This desertion was bitterly resented both by Great Britain and France. Without striking a blow in the common cause, Austria had by devious diplomacy secured all she wanted; but she emerged from the whole business without credit and without a friend.

Her friendlessness was revealed during the troubles which befell her in the next ten years. During that period the ties were cemented between Russia and Prussia, between France and Sardinia; between England and France there was no breach; Austria was isolated. Russia looked on complacently when Napoleon inflicted defeat on the Austrian forces in 1859, and again when Prussia finally expelled her from Germany and from Italy in 1866.

Completely isolated in European society the Hapsburgs ^{The Hapsburg dominions} were perforce compelled to try and put their own house, or houses, in order. In all the heterogeneous dominions of the Hapsburgs the triumph of 1849 had been followed by a régime of autocratic centralization commonly known as the Bach system.¹ The policy of the Emperor Joseph II was revived. Czechs, Magyars, Croats and the rest were to be Germanized in language and institutions. The ancient Kingdom of Hungary was to be reduced to the status of an Austrian Province. Even in the eighteenth century the policy had

¹ Alexander Bach, Minister of the Interior, 1849-59.

been a failure; and the intervening years had given an immense impulse to the spirit of nationalism. Where Joseph II had failed, it was in the highest degree unlikely that Francis Joseph would succeed. After the Italian war it was impossible.

Constitutional reform

The first step towards reform was taken in 1859 by the dismissal of Alexander Bach; the second in March 1860 when an enlarged Imperial Council (*Verstärkter Reichsrat*) for the whole Empire was set up in Vienna. It was intended that the *Reichsrat* should consist, at any rate in part, of members of Provincial Councils which were to be set up in the several Provinces of the Empire. So desperate, however, was the financial situation that the Emperor himself nominated the first members of the Council.

This experiment was particularly repugnant to the Hungarians, who demanded the restoration of their old system of local government both in the counties and the towns, and of their national Parliament. Only when the Emperor promised these concessions did his Hungarian nominees consent to take their places in the *Reichsrat* at Vienna.

The
October
diploma,
1860

The *Reichsrat* at once became an arena for a fierce fight on the constitutional question. From the welter of contending factions, three fairly well-defined parties and policies emerge. First, there were the Germanizing Liberals who wanted a unitary parliamentary Constitution for the whole Empire. Secondly, the Federalists who desired autonomy for the Provinces combined with a central federal authority in Vienna; and finally, the Hungarian autonomists who would accept nothing short of dualism, or complete equality between Hungary and "Austria."

The Charter promulgated by the Emperor on October 20, 1860, represented the triumph of the Federalists. Hungary was to have its old Constitution restored to it; representative assemblies, with large powers of local self-government, were to be set up in the other "Provinces," and in Vienna there was to be a Federal Council (*Reichsrat*) for the transaction of business common to the whole Empire, with certain legislative powers reserved to the non-Hungarian members for the Cis-Leithan portion of the Empire. Real control continued, however, to be vested in the Emperor. The experiment pleased nobody, least of all the Hungarian autonomists who

found themselves still governed from Vienna, and in 1861 yet another experiment was tried.

On February 26, 1861, a new Constitution was promulgated. Drafted by Anton von Schmerling, who had played a leading part in the Frankfort Parliament of 1848, this Constitution, while making some concessions to Provincial feeling, established a Central Parliament of two chambers sitting in Vienna. Consequently the Hungarian Diet refused to elect representatives to the Central Parliament and were followed in their refusal by the Croats. The
February
Parliament

Thus it became increasingly plain that nothing short of the frank recognition of equality and independence would satisfy the Hungarian autonomists. Francis Déak, the leader of the "Moderates," was as stubborn in insistence on Hungarian rights as the extreme followers of Kossuth.¹ Hungary must have its own King, its own laws, and its own historic system of local administration. On no other terms, despite its intense devotion to the monarchical principle, would it tolerate the continuance of the Hapsburg dynasty. The Emperor and Count Schmerling were, however, as firm as Déak, and, notwithstanding the "non-co-operation" of the Hungarians, persisted in giving the truncated Constitution of 1861 a trial. Not until the duel with Prussia was imminent did their resistance to the separatists weaken. But the possibility, however remote, of an alliance between the Hungarian malcontents and Bismarck, caused perturbation even in Vienna.

In June 1865 the Emperor paid a visit to Buda-Pesth; a Provisional Government was set up for Hungary; the Schmerling Constitution was suspended; in December a Diet was summoned to meet at Buda-Pesth, and was prorogued only on the eve of the war with Prussia.

The Seven Weeks' War ensued; Sardowa completed the Emperor's conversion to the principle of "dualism." Directly after the Treaty of Prague was concluded the Hungarian Diet reassembled, and in a very different atmosphere negotiations for a compromise with Austria were resumed.

The "Centralists" in Vienna were now compelled to acknowledge defeat; but the "Federalists" led by Count Belcredi, and the "Dualists" who now found a leader in Count Beust, The
Ausgleich
of 1867

¹ Kossuth himself remained in exile.

a Saxon statesman lately appointed to the Foreign Office in Vienna, still struggled for ascendancy. Beust prevailed; Déak came to Vienna, and a compromise was quickly reached.

Among constitutional formations, that which was inaugurated by the *Ausgleich* is unique.

Hungary was to have its own King, crowned in Buda-Pesth, its own Parliament with a Ministry responsible thereto, its own system of finance, and its own distinct nationality. Hungarians were henceforward to be aliens in Vienna; Austrians in Buda-Pesth. The Crown was to be the only link between Hungary and Austria; and that was to be merely personal, not organic. Such was the view of the extreme nationalists, but Déak so far prevailed as to induce them to consent to the establishment of three Ministries common to the two halves of the Dual Monarchy: for Foreign Affairs, War, and Finance. The necessary supplies for their support were to be voted by a joint delegation consisting of sixty representatives from each of the two Parliaments. The two delegations were to meet separately, and only to hold a joint session, in the event of disagreement. In the joint session a majority vote, taken without discussion, was to decide. This device avoided the language difficulty.

The *Ausgleich* provided a solution which lasted until the disintegration of the Empire in 1918. Déak, who must share with Beust the credit for the compromise, refused to become Prime Minister of Hungary or to accept any honour or reward. A Ministry was, however, formed under Count Julius Andrassy, and on June 8, 1867, Francis Joseph was crowned King of Hungary in Buda-Pesth.

Completely satisfactory to Hungary and reasonably so to German Austria, the *Ausgleich* contained no germ of a permanent solution for the Hapsburg Empire as a whole. It imposed, in effect, a German-Magyar despotism upon the congeries of nationalities of which the Empire was composed.

The attitude of the two ruling castes is well illustrated by a remark said to have been made by Count Beust to his Hungarian colleague: "Take care of your barbarians; we will take care of ours." That remark epitomized the problem of the "minorities" in Austria-Hungary. But one "barbarian" race was not in a minority. The Slavs largely outnumbered Germans and Magyars combined.¹ Moreover, in

Germans,
Magyars,
and Slavs

¹ Out of a total population of 51,000,000 (1910), 30,000,000 were Slavs.

Hungary, the Magyars, though faced by formidable minorities of Roumanians and Slavs, formed a compact block; in the Austrian Empire (save in the Archduchy of Austria) the Germans did not. A problem, already sufficiently acute, was accentuated by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Hapsburg Empire consequently became more and more deeply involved in Balkan politics. Berlin found it difficult to keep the peace between Vienna and Petersburg: the purblind diplomacy of Germany drove her into closer and more exclusive dependence upon Austria, and the Great War was the natural if not the inevitable consequence. But we anticipate events. Hapsburg policy after the *Ausgleich* will demand detailed analysis later on. Not only upon Austria-Hungary did the victory of Prussia powerfully react. "It is France which has been conquered at Sadowa." So said Marshal Randon. He summarized the sentiment of France. The humiliation of the Austrian Emperor was acute; it was hardly more acute than that of the Emperor of the French.

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See also chapters vi, xi and xxi.

CHAPTER XIV

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE SECOND EMPIRE

THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR

Sadowa and
France

THE Seven Weeks' War proved hardly less disastrous to France than to Austria. Nor was it an isolated event. On the contrary it was the latest of a long series of rebuffs to the diplomacy of Napoleon. Had the Emperor died at the close of the first decade of his reign contemporaries might have acclaimed him as more than fortunate. History in retrospect has condemned the Crimean War, and has detected in the Emperor's Italian policy the seeds of ultimate misfortune for Napoleon if not for France. But contemporaries, particularly in France, saw only that he had brought back to France something of the military prestige enjoyed under the great Napoleon; that after a period of revolution he had restored order; that thanks to his initiative France was leaving behind the "hungry 'forties" and was entering on a period of prosperity unexampled in her history; that Paris had been made more worthy than ever to be the "Capital of Europe"; that the artisans were better housed; that railway and road development, drainage schemes and credit facilities were improving the chances of trader, manufacturer, and agriculturist; in fine, that the Second Empire spelt prosperity for France, if not peace for Europe.

Hardly, however, had the tenth anniversary of the *coup d'état* passed before the sky began to darken, and cloud after cloud rolled up, until the storm burst in 1870.

The troubles began with the Italian expedition of 1859. The alliance with Sardinia revealed Napoleon as compounded of contradictory impulses; not guided by principle on the pursuit of a predetermined and well-thought-out policy.

The
Italian
Policy of
Napoleon

Bismarck may have lacked principle in the moral sense, but no one can deny that he aimed from the outset at a definite goal, that he chose the fittest means to attain it and employed them with undeviating tenacity and consistency. What was the goal of Napoleon's policy in Italy? That he was inspired by a genuine and generous sentiment for Italy is certain; but his policy showed no real apprehension of the problem to be solved. He sent troops to defend the Pope in his capital; he led an army to the assistance of Victor Emmanuel and put Sardinia on the path which led straight to Rome; all the gratitude which might have accrued to him from the expulsion of Austria from Lombardy he dissipated by shooting down the Garibaldians at Mentana. That he rendered an enormous, perhaps an indispensable service to the cause of Italian unity is undeniable; but United Italy remembers him less as the ally of Cavour than the opponent of Garibaldi.

Far more serious, however, was the reaction of his Italian policy upon the Emperor's position in France. The destruction of the Temporal Power of the Papacy was never forgiven by the French Ultramontanes; the expulsion of the Bourbons from the Two Sicilies was remembered against him by the French legitimists; the French democrats resented the havoc wrought by French chassepots at Mentana; while the annexation of Savoy and Nice, though flattering to French pride, did not enhance French popularity in Europe.

But this was only the beginning of Napoleon's difficulties. Poland Warsaw had been for generations one of the most promising fields of French diplomacy. The destruction of Polish independence was, therefore, a serious blow to French prestige, an inroad upon the symmetry of the diplomatic edifice which France had carefully erected.

In 1863 the embers of Polish discontent, never really extinguished, again burst into flame. The immediate cause of the outbreak was the seizure of 2000 young men, the flower of Polish manhood, as conscripts for the Russian army. The British Ambassador in Petersburg described the incident as "simply a plan, by a clean sweep of the revolutionary youth of Poland, to kidnap the opposition and carry it off to Siberia or the Caucasus." The action of the Russian Viceroy in Poland had results far exceeding anything he could have

The
insurrection
of 1863

foreseen. Bismarck, with a discontented Polish Prussia on his hands could not afford to dally with revolution in Russian Poland. But apart from that, he utilized the situation with consummate if cold-blooded adroitness to conciliate the goodwill of the Czar. He promptly offered a free passage, through Prussian territory, to Russian troops, and refused an asylum to Polish refugees.

The Polish insurrection, hopeless from the outset, was in truth ill-advised and inopportune. It served to set back a movement towards reform which, thanks to the good relations between the new Czar Alexander II and the Marquis Wielopolski, might have achieved considerable success; it deprived Russian Poland of her recently recovered autonomy; it sent the flower of her youth into exile; it gave the Czar an excuse for complete Russification; above all, (in the present connection) it gave Bismarck the chance, which he was the last man in the world to neglect, of putting Russia under an obligation to her neighbour, Prussia. It was, indeed, for Bismarck, as we have seen, the first stage on the road to Sedan. King Leopold of Belgium, writing to Queen Victoria, put the point clearly: "If a Poland such as the Garibaldians want could be restored, *it would be in close alliance with France*, and Prussia particularly, between the French on the Rhine and a French province on the Vistula, *could not exist*." King Leopold's diagnosis, though coloured by his German sympathies, was substantially accurate. "The future of Europe," so Napoleon I had declared, "really depends on the ultimate destiny of Poland." Hence the enthusiasm with which in 1914 Clemenceau greeted the historic proclamation of the Grand Duke Nicholas. "Poland," exclaimed the French statesman, "will live again! By the will of Czar Nicholas II, supported by France and England, an end will be put to one of the greatest crimes in History."¹ This crime France was not in a position to avert at the end of the eighteenth century. That Napoleon III, at the zenith of his career, should have failed to seize the opportunity of redressing the wrong, was humiliating to a country where tradition exercised an exceptionally powerful influence on foreign policy.

The Polish insurrection, as a French writer has said,

Napoleon
III and
Poland

¹ August 16, 1914; Marriott: *European Commonwealth*, pp. 184 seq.

"gave Napoleon a unique opportunity of rallying all parties. . . . The Catholics considered that nation a martyr to its faith ; for democrats its independence was a dogma ; while even Conservatives remembered the historic rôle of Poland as the ally of France against Austria." ¹ In April 1863 and again in July Napoleon did, indeed, address strong remonstrances to Russia ; but Russia, strong in the support of Bismarck, ignored them ; proceeded to crush the insurrection with relentless severity, and to wipe out every remnant of Polish autonomy.

In October Napoleon proposed a Congress of the Great Powers to settle a number of obstinate questions, that of Poland in particular. Unfortunately he based his suggestion on the ground that "*Les Traités de 1815 ont cessé d'exister.*" The assertion contained a large measure of truth, but that did not commend the suggestion to Lord Palmerston, who hotly denied that the Treaties of 1815 were torn up, and refused to take part in a Congress. That was the end of the Anglo-French *entente*. Both Palmerston and Russell were, however, now as always, well disposed to "oppressed nationalities" and anxious to give moral support to their aspirations. Russell, therefore, addressed to the Government of the Czar a characteristic homily on the sanctity of the Treaties of 1815 and the healing virtues of constitutional liberty. The Czar in reply told him, albeit politely, to mind his own business. He, like Bismarck, had taken the measure both of Napoleon III and of the English Whigs. "I do not desire war, but neither do I desire peace." Such was Napoleon's cryptic utterance in March 1863. Lord Russell genuinely desired peace ; but he also desired to secure results which only the application of force could have secured. Poland was left to its fate.

Poland was not the only sufferer by the rupture of the Napoleon Anglo-French *entente*. The rupture proved fatal also to the ^{Napoleon and} Danish claims on Schleswig-Holstein. This time England ^{Schleswig-Holstein} was the wooer of France, and it was the French maiden who was coy. In 1863 Palmerston declared, somewhat precipitately as events were to prove, that those who attempted to interfere with the rights guaranteed to Denmark by the

¹ Albert Thomas : *C.M.H.*, xi, 475.

Treaty of London (1852) would find that they had not to contend with Denmark alone. In 1864, accordingly, England proposed to France and Russia that they should join her, as signatories of the treaty, in offering mediation to the combatants. If Germany refused, a British squadron was to be despatched to the Baltic, and a French army to march on the Rhine. Bismarck, as we have seen, had already secured the friendly neutrality of the Czar. Napoleon, deeply annoyed by England's refusal to go into a Congress on the Polish question, declined to act with her in the matter of the duchies. A second proposal made by England to intervene actively on behalf of Denmark was turned down by Napoleon. According to M. Drouyn de Lluys, Napoleon would have joined England in war on behalf of Denmark, had England offered more than the co-operation of her fleet: but the Emperor was not prepared, even for the sake of the Rhine frontier,¹ to assume the whole responsibility for the war on land. But there were other reasons for the Emperor's refusal. He was himself suffering from a serious disease, and his Mexican adventure was increasingly unpopular in France among all parties except the Clericals and the speculators on the Bourse.

The
Mexican
adventure

The Republic of Mexico had for some years been in a state of chronic disorder, intensified by civil war between the two parties into which its politicians were divided. In 1861 the republican leader Benito Juarez overthrew Miramon, who represented the Clericals and Monarchists. Miramon appealed for support to the great Catholic Powers in Europe, and in this appeal Napoleon's vivid and fantastic imagination saw an opportunity for killing several birds with one stone. He determined to place on the throne of Mexico the Archduke Maximilian, brother of the Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria. In the choice of a candidate he displayed acumen. Maximilian was not only a member of a leading Catholic House, but was the husband of the Princess Charlotte, daughter of King Leopold of Belgium, and had won personal reputation as the Viceroy of Lombardy-Venice. His pro-

¹ England was said to have promised this to France, and Palmerston's letter to King Leopold (Ashley's *Life of Palmerston*, ii) makes it clear that so strong was English feeling about the duchies that she would not have raised a finger to save Rhenish Prussia from France, still less Venetia from Italy.

motion to an Imperial throne might therefore be expected to gratify Hapsburgs, Saxe-Coburgs, and Orleanists, and thus soothe the susceptibilities roused by recent French diplomacy. French Catholics would welcome an adventure which had something of the crusading spirit about it; the Empress Eugénie and her countrymen would rejoice in a monarchical triumph in Mexico; English, French, and Spanish commercial interests would be served by the restoration of order and the payment of debts.

Juarez gave Napoleon a pretext for interference by the repudiation of the Mexican debt. England, Spain, and France agreed to enforce payment, and a joint expedition was despatched for that purpose (January 1862). But as soon as they discovered Napoleon's ulterior designs, England and Spain withdrew, and France was left alone with an awkward job on her hands. Forty thousand French troops were poured into Mexico; opposition was crushed; an assembly of Mexican notables was induced to elect Maximilian as Emperor (July 1863), and in May 1864 that unfortunate prince arrived to take possession of his throne.

It soon became obvious that his throne and even his person was safe, only so long as French bayonets surrounded him. In 1865 the bayonets were withdrawn. Napoleon had been tempted to the Mexican adventure partly by the pre-occupation of the United States of America (1861-5). But the American Civil War ended in 1865, and one of the first-fruits of restored unity was an order to Napoleon to evacuate Mexico, and a refusal to recognize Maximilian. Napoleon obeyed the order in 1867, and Maximilian, deserted by his patron, was left to confront his subjects. After a short but brave struggle he was taken prisoner and shot.

The Mexican tragedy was a terrible blow to the prestige of Napoleon, and contributed largely to his downfall. But a political gambler cannot withdraw from play after a ruinous loss. If he had drawn something worse than a blank in South America, all the more was it necessary to effect a brilliant *coup* in Europe.

The imminence of the conflict between the two great German Powers seemed to offer him the chance. Napoleon had watched with some uneasiness, not unmingled with sympathy, the growth of the Hohenzollern power. Bismarck,

The
Emperor
Maximilian

Napoleon
and
Bismarck

however, had, as we have seen, skilfully dangled before his eyes more than one alluring bait at Biarritz. Napoleon had greedily swallowed them. But on the eve of the war, Napoleon had proposed to both parties his favourite device of a Congress. Prussia and Italy, though their armies were already mobilized, agreed ; Austria would come into a Congress only if her territorial integrity were guaranteed to her. The terms were impossible, and war ensued. As the Prussian army advanced into Bohemia, Austria implored Napoleon to mediate, and handed over to him Venetia to await his award. It was too late. Napoleon could promise only diplomatic support ; he confessed that he was not ready for war. But the rapidity of the Prussian triumph confounded all his calculations. He had anticipated a long conflict and an uncertain issue. After the exhaustion of both combatants he would step in as the magnanimous—but not ill-compensated—arbiter. So had his imagination figured the situation. The actual event dumbfounded him. After Sadowa, instead of dealing out even-handed justice, he found himself a humble suitor to Prussia for some unconsidered trifle, a territorial *pourboire*.

Even before the preliminaries of Nikolsburg had been signed, Benedetti, the French Ambassador to Berlin, had followed Bismarck to the Prussian headquarters ; insistent to secure a “ compensation ” for France. Bismarck put him off with fair words, and quickly made his peace with Austria.

Negotiations were resumed at Berlin, and Benedetti formally demanded Mainz, and the Bavarian Palatinate. Bismarck flatly refused, and caused both the French demand and his own refusal to be published in *Le Siècle*. Napoleon dropped the question ; but the mischief was done. The first impulse towards the dreaded union of South and North had been given. As soon as Bismarck opened his arms, Bavaria was ready to jump into them.

Then followed the incident in regard to which we are still without precise information. If Count Benedetti's report may be accepted, Bismarck, while refusing to cede any part of Western Germany to France, suggested that Napoleon might like to help himself to Luxemburg and even Belgium, in return for his recognition of the union of North and South Germany. This was, in fact, the basis of the famous *Projet*

de Traité which Bismarck sent to *The Times* and which appeared there on July 25, 1870, on the eve of the Franco-German War. France was to agree to recognize a federal union between all the German States except Austria, and in return Prussia was to facilitate the purchase of Luxemburg by France from the King of the Netherlands, and was further, in case Napoleon should "be drawn by circumstances to send troops into Belgium or to conquer it" to assist him with the whole of her land and sea forces, against any Power who should declare war upon him.

Bismarck's motive in publishing the "Project," and at that precise moment, is not ambiguous. He counted upon it to alienate English sympathy from France.

The Times, inspired from Berlin, pointed out that the proposal had obviously proceeded from France. Benedetti, the Duc de Gramont, and the Emperor promptly repudiated Bismarck's version, and declared that the terms of the *Projet de Traité* had been dictated by Bismarck to Benedetti, and that when the latter communicated them to Paris, the Emperor immediately refused to entertain the proposal.

The precise truth may never, perhaps, be ascertained. The draft was admittedly in Benedetti's handwriting and was written on the paper of the French Embassy. There can be no doubt that Bismarck would have been delighted to see Napoleon make a grab at Belgium. Whether he would have allowed him to keep it is another matter. It is not impossible that he might have done so, in return for the recognition of a German Empire, and the annexation thereto of Holland and Alsace-Lorraine.¹

Meanwhile Bismarck had made Prussia's position doubly secure. He had concluded the Treaty of Prague with Austria; had satisfied Alexander of Russia; had closed the "period of conflict" in the Prussian Parliament, and had fortified his own political position by a bill of indemnity; and, finally, he had concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with the four South German States. Under the terms of this Treaty Prussia guaranteed their territorial integrity, while they agreed to support Prussia if attacked, and to put their forces under the command of the King of Prussia.

¹ See *Morier II*, chaps. xxiii, xxiv, xxv.

Bismarck
and South
Germany

Reorganiza-
tion of the
Zollverein

Germany was now all but "made." In 1867, another stage in the process was registered by the organization of a tariff-parliament in Berlin. For fiscal purposes, the Southern States were to send their deputies and representatives to join with those of the North German Confederation in a *Zollbundesrat* and a *Zollparlament*.

Luxemburg

The relations with France, however, were still unsettled. Thwarted in his desire for a Rhine province, doubtful as to Belgium, Napoleon, in 1867, fell back upon a request for "the road to Brussels, in default Belgium itself." The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg occupied an anomalous position in the European economy. In 1815 it had been assigned to the King of the Netherlands in return for the Orange dominions in Germany, the latter being annexed to Prussia. As Grand Duke of Luxemburg the King was a member of the German Confederation. When Belgium revolted against its union with Holland in 1830, Luxemburg threw in its lot with Belgium. A period of confusion followed, but by the Treaty of London (1839) the larger part of Luxemburg was retained by Belgium, the smaller was restored to Holland. The capital of the Grand Duchy, the city of Luxemburg, had ever since 1815 been garrisoned by Prussia. In January 1867 a bargain was concluded between France and the Netherlands. The latter agreed to sell Luxemburg to Napoleon, provided Prussia would withdraw her garrison from the capital. The King of Prussia assented to this condition, but in March Bismarck, genuinely alarmed by demonstrations of popular disapproval, repented, and vetoed the conclusion of the transaction. War would have broken out, but neither Napoleon nor Bismarck was quite ready, and they agreed, therefore, to refer the question to a Conference in London, where, in May 1867, a solution of the problem was arrived at. Under the Treaty of London the Grand Duchy was retained by the Netherlands: but its perpetual neutrality was guaranteed by Great Britain, Austria, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Prussia, and Russia. The fortifications of Luxemburg were to be destroyed; the Prussian garrison was to be withdrawn, and the Grand Duke undertook that no military establishment should be maintained or created.

The compromise was a reasonable one, and the conditions were observed by the contracting parties until 1914, when the

neutrality of Luxemburg, like that of Belgium, was violated by Prussia. For the time being the peace of Europe seemed to be assured, and during the summer Paris was *en fête* for the great exhibition of 1867. Among the guests of the Emperor was the King of Prussia, who brought with him his Chancellor. To Bismarck the Emperor showed particular attention, and did him the honour of consulting him on problems of domestic politics. The next meeting of the two Sovereigns was when Napoleon surrendered his sword to the King of Prussia after Sedan.

Meanwhile Napoleon was confronted by an anxious situation at home. His own health was failing rapidly; if he was to bequeath the Imperial Crown to his son, the Crown must be untarnished by the memories of the *coup d'état*, and must be bejewelled by triumphs won, whether by diplomacy or by arms, over the external rivals of France. To erase the memory of the *coup d'état*, the Empire must be transformed into a Constitutional Monarchy; to wipe out the humiliation suffered at the hands of Bismarck France must wage a successful war against Prussia. Bismarck knew it. Hardly had the victory at Königgratz been won when he avowed his belief that a war with France "lay in the logic of history." Without that war, the final unification of Germany would never, he was convinced, be achieved. He steadily prepared for it. But he could bide his time. Napoleon could not.

It was necessary first, however, to complete the political reconstruction of the Empire. That reconstruction had been in progress for some years. As far back as 1860 the Emperor informed M. Rouher that he meant to "liberalize the institutions of the Empire." Speaking of his subjects he said, "*Je veux les mener à une liberté sage.*" In lighter mood he asked: "How can you expect my Government to go on? The Empress is a Legitimist; Morny is an Orleanist; Prince Napoleon is a Republican; I am a Socialist. Only Persigny is an Imperialist—and he is mad." Plainly, then, the Empire must be "liberalized."

For nearly ten years after the *coup d'état* the Government of France was purely personal. Bonapartism had always stood for a highly centralized autocracy. Napoleon III was faithful to the tradition of his house. The whole machinery of government was controlled by a single lever. The lever

The transformation of the Empire

Constitutional reform in France

was in the Emperor's own hands. The Ministers, selected less for their ability than their willingness to subordinate their wills to that of the Emperor, were his servants. Through them he issued his orders to the Prefects, who, in turn, controlled the local machinery. With Louis XIV Napoleon III might have said, "*L'état c'est moi.*" Autocracy is not unpopular so long as all goes well. Prosperity at home must be continuously supplemented by success abroad. Any check to domestic prosperity, any reverse, diplomatic or military, spells ruin to autocracy.

Napoleon was wise enough to take time by the forelock. His prestige was at its zenith when he initiated the policy of reform. He began by issuing (April 17, 1859) a complete and unconditional amnesty for all political offences. This brought back to France many Republicans, and more Orleanist Liberals. The latter, at any rate, might prove a useful counterpoise to the malcontent Clericals.

"*Les Cinq*" An opposition party immediately began to organize itself in the Legislative Body. "*Les Cinq*" constituted themselves an "opposition" in 1859 under Jules Favre as leader. His followers were Émile Ollivier, Ernest Picard, and MM. Darémon and Hénon. By the General Election of 1863 the "Five" were increased to thirty-five, of whom seventeen were Republicans. The "opposition" polled no fewer than 1,954,369 out of a total of 7,262,623, figures ominous for the future of the "Empire" if not of the dynasty. Meanwhile the Emperor has himself gone a considerable way along the path of constitutional concession. He had estranged the Clericals by his Italian policy and the manufacturers by the Cobden Treaty with England, why not try the Liberals?

Decree of
Nov. 24,
1860

The Decree of November 24, 1860, was in effect a large "revision of the Constitution." The Senate and the Legislative Body were henceforth to be allowed to debate and vote an annual address in reply to the speech from the Throne; verbatim reports of parliamentary debates were to be published, and though the Executive was still vested solely in the Emperor and his servants, the Legislature was to be kept informed of the policy of the Government by Ministers without portfolio, who were specially delegated to attend the sittings of Parliament for this purpose.

This decree was a long step towards "constitutional"

government in the English sense, but the cardinal feature of the English Constitution—a responsible Ministry—was still lacking. A further and important step followed in 1861, when, by a Decree of November 14, the Emperor conceded to Parliament the right to vote the budget by sections, thereby accepting, at any rate in theory, the vital principle of “appropriation of supply.”

Nevertheless, at the General Election of 1863, the Republicans swept Paris; Jules Simon, Thiers, Jules Ferry, and Gambetta, being among the members returned. The Provinces, thanks to the steady pressure of the Prefects, returned a large Government majority, but the Opposition were strong enough in the new Parliament to formulate, with some hope of success, an extensive programme of reform. Personal liberty was to be guaranteed by the repeal of a Coercion Act; freedom of writing and speech was to be guaranteed; Parliament was to have complete control over legislation and finance; elected municipal councils were to be set up in Paris and one or two other large towns; and members of Parliament were to be freely elected, without pressure from the Government in favour of “official” candidates.

In 1866 Monsieur Émile Ollivier definitely gave in his adhesion to the idea of *L'Empire Libéral*, and founded a party to promote it. Asked, in 1860, by M. Morny whether he was satisfied, Ollivier replied: “Yes: the Empire is either established or doomed; established if this is a beginning; doomed if it is both the beginning and the end.” He soon made up his own mind, however, that it might be accepted as a “beginning,” and that the goal should be not a Republic but a liberalized Empire. Such a compromise was not in the tradition of France. Still, as Ollivier said, “*Mieux vaut vivre dans une constitution illogique que de mourir pour la logique.*”

In 1867 the Emperor announced the “crowning of the edifice erected by the will of the nation.” Only the façade, however, was completed. The Press censorship was to be relaxed; a limited right of public meeting was conceded; and Ministers were to attend the Legislature to answer questions and take part in debates. The Opposition pressed for complete parliamentary Government with a responsible Ministry. But Monsieur Rouher who was now almost (but

Control
of the
Purse

General
Election of
1863

Ollivier

not quite) in the position of a Prime Minister, retorted that the Empire was based on the direct vote of the whole adult population, and that the principle of the plébiscite was incompatible with parliamentary Government. Logically his position was unassailable, least of all could it be assailed by Thiers who, under the July monarchy, had refused to concede adult suffrage, as incompatible with the parliamentary system which he was then attempting to establish.

Responsible
Government

The General Election of 1869, however, broke down all the barriers of logic. Not only did Ollivier's party return 115 strong, but the nucleus of a Socialist party appeared. Henri Rochefort had started *La Lanterne* in 1868 to advocate the principles of the "International," and, though compelled to fly to Belgium, was elected to Parliament in 1869. After the election of 1869 the "edifice" was indeed completed. Rouher was dismissed, and Ollivier was entrusted with the task of forming a Ministry. The new Ministry, Liberal in complexion, was to be responsible to Parliament; the Legislature was to have complete freedom of debate to control public finance and to legislate without restraint. It was, said Ollivier, "the most truly liberal constitution which France had enjoyed since 1789."

The new Chambers were opened by the Emperor on November 29, 1869. In the speech from the Throne he referred to the recent manifestations of subversive passions, but declared that attacks had only proved the solidity of the edifice built on universal suffrage. France, he declared, "evidently desires liberty but liberty united with order." "I will answer for order; assist me, gentlemen, to save liberty." To that end he outlined a further programme of reforms: authority was to be decentralized; mayors were to be selected, except in special cases, from the municipal councils; popular election of councils, except in Paris where the council was to be elected by the Legislative Body; the institution of Cantonal councils; improvement of gratuitous primary education; the reduction of law costs; regulation of child-labour in factories; the extension of savings banks to rural districts and other measures of social and economic amelioration.

These reforms, together with a measure for the modification of the powers of the Senate, passed through Parliament and

were then submitted to the direct vote of the people. They were approved by 7,257,379 votes to 1,530,000. Large as was the majority, the size of the minority was still more significant, especially in view of the fact that it indicated the existence of a large majority against the Emperor in Paris, Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, Nantes, and some other considerable towns. More significant still was the number of abstentions : 3,000,000. Worst of all, the minority included 50,000 military votes. The plébiscite was taken on May 8. Exactly four months later the Empire was abolished : the Republic was proclaimed.

The downfall of the Empire was due, however, less to domestic revolution than to a crushing military disaster. Beguiled by Bismarck at Biarritz, derided by him after Sadowa, Napoleon had to face France, after the collapse of Austria, empty-handed. Disappointed of Belgium, of the Rhenish Palatinate, finally of Luxemburg, Napoleon now tried to persuade himself, and to persuade his people, that the victory of the Hohenzollern over the Hapsburgs did not necessitate "compensation" for France ; that, on the contrary Prussia was intrinsically weakened rather than strengthened by the events of 1866. But the commercial and military *rapprochement* between the North German Confederation and the Southern States proved the hollowness of such professions.

The compromise reached in the Treaty of London (May 1867), in regard to the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, seemed, indeed, to have given Europe an assurance of peace for some time to come. No war-clouds could be discerned on the horizon. But despite the pleasant courtesies exchanged between the Emperor of the French and the King of Prussia at the Paris Exhibition of 1867, the relations of France and Prussia became steadily worse during the next three years. Bismarck had no desire to force the pace. On the contrary, he had plenty to do in assimilating the States lately annexed to Prussia, and in getting the new Federal Constitution into working order. The reorganization of the Federal army on Prussian lines was, in itself, a task of sufficient magnitude. Time was needed, also, to bring the Southern States more completely into line with the Northern. In fine, Bismarck had everything to gain by hastening slowly.

Consequently when, early in 1870, the Grand Duke of

Baden, himself a son-in-law of King William of Prussia, made formal application to be admitted into the North German Confederation Bismarck deemed it prudent to refuse. He frankly told the leaders of the national party that "to concede their most moderate wishes was to declare war on France." That war could not, indeed, be indefinitely postponed. The situation is thus analysed by a close and very competent observer: "Things had got to that pass in Germany that the work of union must be proceeded with *coûte que coûte* or the work of 1866 fall to pieces, but every one felt that to proceed with the work of unification meant war with France."¹ Still Bismarck could bide his time.

With Napoleon it was otherwise. Every day made his position relatively worse. His health was failing rapidly.² The French birth-rate was declining; that of Germany rising; Germany was getting 58,000 recruits more per annum than France. Feverishly he set to work to form alliances for the inevitable war. Negotiations were opened with Russia, with Italy, with Austria. But Russia was already engaged to Prussia, and in regard both to Austria and Italy, Rome was still the stumbling-block. But in June 1870 Lebrun was sent on a secret mission to Vienna, and an understanding was reached. France was to march on Kehl, make for the heart of Bavaria, and proclaim the liberation of South Germany from the yoke of Prussia. The French fleet was to threaten Lübeck and Stettin, and detain the Prussian army in the north; then, three weeks after France had taken the field, Austria was to come in and put 80,000 men on the Bohemian frontier. Such was the plan; but no treaty was actually concluded. When the storm actually burst, France was without an ally in Europe.

The
Hohen-
zollern
candidature
in Spain

Bismarck, not less convinced than Napoleon that the struggle was inevitable, was supremely anxious that France should appear as the aggressor. He found or made his opportunity in the Spanish Succession question. In 1868 the Spaniards deposed their disreputable Queen Isabella, and General Prim looked out for a successor. The throne was declined by the Duke of Genoa, nephew of Victor Emmanuel,

¹ *Morier II*, 217, Jan. 5, 1870.

² Mr. Asquith (*Genesis of the War*, p. 12) writes, but perhaps too strongly, of "the limp and listless hands of a decrepit dreamer."

and by others to whom it was offered. Bismarck thereupon procured the offer of it to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a cadet of the Prussian House, but even more closely connected with the Bonapartes. The latter fact particularly commended the candidature to Bismarck's master, who was entirely guileless in this matter. As to Bismarck's complicity there can be no question. Lord Acton has proved the accusation to the hilt.¹ Prince Leopold twice declined the Crown in 1869. In 1870, £50,000 of Prussian bonds found their way to Madrid.² The offer was renewed, and on July 4, 1870, was accepted.

Émile Ollivier, who in January 1870 had, as we have seen, become Prime Minister of France, shrank from war; so did the Emperor. But there were two people in France who did not: the Empress, and the Duc de Gramont, who in May 1870 had been recalled from the Embassy at Vienna to take over the Foreign Office. Their counsels prevailed, and, on July 6, a formal intimation, couched in provocative terms, was sent to Prussia, declaring that the accession of a Hohenzollern to the throne of Spain would be regarded by France as a *casus belli*. Bismarck was triumphant; he had now only one obstacle to fear: the honesty and candour of his own Sovereign. Secretly, King William counselled the withdrawal of Prince Leopold. On July 12 the Prince revoked his acceptance of the Crown. The French were hilarious. "*La Prusse cane*," was the comment of their Press. Bismarck was in despair; the diplomatic structure, constructed with infinite patience and pains, was like to fall about his ears; he decided to resign.³

Bismarck's luck, however, did not desert him. France had won a great victory over Prussia. With egregious folly she now determined to add to defeat, humiliation. The Duc de Gramont telegraphed to Benedetti, who had followed King William to Ems, that simple renunciation was insufficient and that the King must pledge himself never to allow Prince Leopold's candidature to be revived. The King, conscious of complete straightforwardness, was stung by the insult, and

¹ Acton: *Historical Essays*.

² Acton (p. 214) knew the banker through whose hands they passed.

³ Cf. for Bismarck's own account of these days: *Reflections and Reminiscences*, ii, 93 seq.

courteously, though with some warmth, refused. The Foreign Office official in attendance, Herr Abeken, then despatched to Bismarck the historic "Ems telegram."

"ABEKEN TO BISMARCK

"Ems, July 13, 1870. 3.40 p.m.

"His Majesty writes to me: 'Count Benedetti spoke to me on the promenade, in order to demand from me, finally in a very importunate manner, that I should authorize him to telegraph at once that I bound myself for all future time never again to give my consent if the Hohenzollerns should renew their candidature. I refused at last somewhat sternly as it is neither right nor possible to undertake engagements of this kind *à tout jamais*. I told him that I had as yet received no news, and as he was earlier informed from Paris and Madrid than myself, he could see clearly that my Government had no more interest in the matter.' His Majesty has since received a letter from Prince Charles Anthony.¹ His Majesty having told Count Benedetti that he was awaiting news from the Prince, has decided, with reference to the above demand, on the suggestion of Count Eulenberg and myself, not to receive Count Benedetti again, but only to let him be informed through an aide-de-camp: 'That his Majesty has now received from the Prince confirmation of the news which Benedetti had already received from Paris, and had nothing further to say to the ambassador.' His Majesty leaves it to your Excellency to decide whether Benedetti's fresh demand and its rejection should be at once communicated both to our ambassadors abroad and to the Press."

On the 13th Roon and Moltke were dining with Bismarck in Berlin. All three were profoundly dejected by the impending resignation of the Chancellor. In the middle of dinner the telegram from Ems arrived. Bismarck's chance had come. In a few minutes his message was ready for the Press. He read it to his guests. It ran as follows:—

"After the news of the renunciation of the hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern had been officially communicated to

¹ Father of Prince Leopold.

the Imperial Government of France by the Royal Government of Spain, the French Ambassador further demanded of his Majesty, the King, at Ems, that he would authorize him to telegraph to Paris that his Majesty, the King, bound himself for all time never again to give his consent should the Hohenzollerns renew their candidature. His Majesty, the King, thereupon decided not to receive the French Ambassador again, and sent the aide-de-camp on duty to tell him that his Majesty had nothing further to communicate to the Ambassador."

Dejection was transformed into jubilation. "Now," said Moltke, "it has a different ring; before, it sounded like a parley; now it is like a flourish in answer to a challenge." Bismarck had deliberately converted acquiescence into defiance. "It will have the effect of a red rag upon the Gallic bull." Roon's comment was equally laconic: "Our God of old lives still, and will not let us perish in disgrace."

As far as Prussia was concerned the die was cast. In Paris there was the wildest excitement among the populace; in the Cabinet there was still justifiable hesitation. For two days the issues of peace and war hung in the balance. It was Morier's deliberate opinion that one Power only could have averted war. But English foreign policy was at the lowest ebb of ineptitude. Lord Clarendon, to the infinite loss of Europe, had died on June 27, "in the very act" of trying to bring about disarmament. "Never in my life," said Bismarck to Lady Emily Russell, "was I more glad to hear of anything than I was to hear of your father's death . . . he would have prevented the war." For once Bismarck was more polite than accurate. Truly the war lay in the logic of history. Clarendon might have postponed it; Granville and Gladstone conspicuously failed to do so. Napoleon would gladly have yielded to the slightest pressure. Gramont and the Empress were bent upon war: but it was carried in the Cabinet only by one vote. On July 19 the French declaration reached Berlin.

The one chance for France would have been a dash into The South Germany. But on July 20 Bavaria decided to join Franco-German Prussia; the cohesion between South and North was complete; 150,000 men were thus added to the troops at Moltke's disposal, and the back door into Germany was slammed in

the face of France. Bismarck had squared the Czar Alexander by the hint that this would be the convenient opportunity for tearing up the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris. Russia, therefore, made it known that she would protect Prussia's flank on the side of Austria. France was without a friend.

Within three weeks from the French declaration of war the Prussian preparations were completed. On August 2 the war began : precisely a month later the first stage of it was over. Roon put over 500,000 men into the field, and had another 500,000 in reserve. The Prussian organization was superb, and carried everything before it. The French troops fought with their accustomed gallantry, but generals, commissariat, transport, were all lacking, and the end was never doubtful. The Germans advanced in three armies. The first under Steinmetz, 102,000 strong, concentrated on Coblenz and marched up the Moselle on Metz ; the second, consisting of 244,800 men, commanded by Prince Frederic Charles (the " Red Prince "), moved from Mainz also on Metz ; the third under the Crown Prince of Prussia, 220,400 strong, moved from Mannheim on Strasburg. On August 4 the Crown Prince drove in Marshal MacMahon's advance guard at Weissenburg, and two days later inflicted a crushing and costly defeat upon the main army at Wörth, compelling MacMahon to retreat in disorder upon Châlons. On the same day (August 6) Prince Frederic Charles and Steinmetz stormed the heights of Spicheren, held by General Frossard, who was left unsupported by Bazaine, and compelled " the army of the Rhine " under the Emperor himself to fall back on Metz. The Emperor resigned the command to Bazaine and joined MacMahon and the army of Alsace. By a series of brilliant though dangerous manœuvres the first and second German armies got between Metz and Paris ; and after three battles (Aug. 14, 16) culminating in the bloody conflict of Gravelotte (Aug. 18), Bazaine had made the fatal blunder of letting himself be shut up, with 180,000 of the pick of the French army, in Metz. MacMahon with the army of Alsace was now ordered, against his own judgment, to advance from Châlons to the rescue of Bazaine. The Crown Prince, with the third German army, caught him, and surrounded a fine French army of 180,000 men at Sedan. On

September 2, after desperate fighting, Napoleon surrendered to the King of Prussia. The Emperor himself with 80,000 Frenchmen became prisoners of war.

Sedan brought the Second Empire with a crash to the ground. The Empress fled with the Prince Imperial to England; the Emperor was deposed, and the Republic was proclaimed (September 4). A "Government of National Defence," including Gambetta, Jules Favre, and General Trochu, the Governor of Paris, was hastily set up, and Thiers started off on a mission to the Great Powers to persuade them to mediate on behalf of France. His mission achieved no success; but Bismarck was seriously alarmed. On September 19 he met Jules Favre at the Château de Ferrières, but Bismarck was not a public meeting nor even a Senate, and Favre's eloquence left him quite unmoved. Bismarck would not grant an armistice, even for the election of a National Assembly, unless France would cede Alsace and part of Lorraine immediately. Favre on his side had sent a note to the Powers, declaring that the Government would not yield an inch of French soil, nor a stone of French fortresses.

Within three weeks after the surrender at Sedan, Paris was invested by the Crown Prince. As the autumn wore on, Bismarck became impatient of the slow progress of the siege, fearing "the possibility of a European intervention."¹ Yet on every hand the German arms were successful. Gambetta escaped from Paris in a balloon on October 7, and, with immense energy, organized the national defence. But on October 11, the Germans defeated the army of the Loire, and occupied Orleans. On the eastern front things were going equally badly for the French. Strasburg, after a splendid resistance, was compelled to surrender on September 28, and, just a month later, the great fortress of Metz, with 150,000 men and immense stores, was delivered up to the enemy by the shameful pusillanimity, if not the actual treachery, of Marshal Bazaine. These disasters served only to redouble the energy of Gambetta and to reinvigorate the determination of France. Orleans was retaken (November 9), and the army of the Loire, after some success in the open, made a desperate attempt to relieve Paris. But notwithstanding all the efforts

¹ *Reminiscences*, ii, 119.

of the French, the Germans gradually closed in upon the capital, and on January 28, 1871, Paris capitulated.

National
Assembly
at Bordeaux

An armistice was then arranged to permit the election of a National Assembly. The Assembly met on February 12. Its complexion was not unambiguous. The Provinces were still monarchical, and out of some 750 members only 350 could be counted Republicans; the rest were mostly Legitimists or Orleanists with only a sprinkling of Bonapartists. But no reconciliation could be effected between the Comte de Chambord, who represented the elder, and the Comte de Paris, who represented the younger, line. The laws which condemned to exile the Bourbon and Orleanist princes were indeed repealed by a large majority in July, and the Assembly refused to proclaim the Republic. The Republicans were, however, a sufficiently compact party to elect Jules Grévy, a moderate Republican, as President of the Assembly, and to elect Thiers as "Head of the State." No decision was reached as to the ultimate form of Government. That could wait. The first business was to make peace with the Germans. Negotiations began at once between Thiers and Bismarck, and on February 26 preliminaries of peace were arranged. As to Alsace there could be no question. "Strasburg," said Bismarck, "is the key of our house and we must have it." The case of Lorraine and the great fortress of Metz was different. If Strasburg is the sally-port for France against Germany, Metz is a sally-port for Germany against France.¹ Every argument urged by Bismarck for the cession of Strasburg was an argument for the retention of Metz. And there is reason to believe that Bismarck, if Moltke had not overborne him, would have left Metz in French hands. As it was, the utmost Thiers could wring out of him was Belfort, and to get back Belfort he had to agree to the triumphal entry of the German army into Paris. It was worth the price.

On March 1 the Assembly ratified these terms by 546 votes against 107. It also formally deposed Napoleon III, who had issued from Wilhelmshöhe a manifesto denouncing the Republic, and declared him to have been responsible for the ruin of France.

¹ For discussion of the problem of Alsace-Lorraine see *supra*, c. ii.



CENTRAL AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE, 1871

Treaty of
Frankfort

The terms ratified by the Assembly on March 1 were embodied in a definitive Treaty of Peace signed at Frankfort on May 10.

France agreed to cede the whole of Alsace except Belfort, and Eastern Lorraine together with the fortresses of Metz and Strasburg.¹ The indemnity was fixed at five milliards of francs, and was to be paid within three years. German troops were to remain in occupation of defined French districts until the indemnity was paid.

The new
Empire

Bismarck had not, however, gone to war with France for the sake of Alsace-Lorraine. That a bloody war would some day be fought for them had been predicted by Hardenberg in 1815. Nor did any one doubt that Strasburg would be the forfeit paid by France for the first German victory on French soil. But this was primarily a question for soldiers. Bismarck, in making the war of 1870, had other ends in view. The war was, in his view, necessary to consummate German unity.

In the autumn of 1870 the staff of the Wilhelmstrasse had been transferred to Versailles, and there in the great palace of Louis XIV, the final stages in the building of a stupendous political edifice were completed. Baden was only too anxious to join the North German Confederation. Bavaria was much more tenacious of its independence, and ultimately came in only on the understanding that certain rights (*sonderrechte*) were to be strictly reserved to it. Würtemberg came in on similar terms, and by November 1870 the difficult diplomatic work was done. "The unity of Germany," said Bismarck, "is completed and with it Kaiser and Reich."

The
Imperial
Title

As to the title of *Kaiser* there was considerable difference of opinion. Bismarck laid great stress upon the assumption of the Imperial title; he regarded it, indeed, as "a political necessity." Still more did the Crown Prince of Prussia, whose views were even more unitary than those of the Chancellor. The older Prussian nobility and the King himself were, on the contrary, averse from the change. The southern Kings would, moreover, brook no superior. It was agreed, therefore, that the Prussian King should become, not Emperor of Germany or of the Germans, but *Kaiser in Deutschland*—German Emperor.

¹ Cf. Junon : *La Bavière et l'Empire Allemand*.

This title King William agreed to accept from his brother Sovereigns in Germany,¹ and by this title he was acclaimed in the Hall of Mirrors in the Palace of Versailles on January 18, 1871. It was 170 years to a day since Frederick, Elector of Brandenburg, had assumed at Königsberg the kingly crown of Prussia. That the final act in the evolution of a long drama should have been played at Versailles is a fact not lacking in dramatic irony.

The conclusion of Peace with Germany did not end the troubles of France. There was a large party in Paris who deeply mistrusted Thiers and his colleagues in the Provisional Government. "Just as those who made the revolution of September 4 imputed all the earlier disasters of the war to the sins of the Second Empire, so those who prepared the way for the Commune imputed the capitulation of Paris solely to the treachery of the false Republicans who, having sold Paris to the Prussians, were now going to sell the Republic to the Royalists."² Their patriotic feelings were further exasperated by the sight of the German army marching through the streets of Paris and bivouacing in the Champs Élysées (March 1, 1871). But the insurrection of the Commune was not inspired solely by patriotic sentiment. Fanaticism and cupidity played the larger part.

The Paris
Commune

Even while the Germans were at the gates of the capital, an attempt was made to overthrow the Government of National Defence. "The *infâme* Trochu had [now] made way for the still more *infâme* Thiers, and only the Sacred Legion of National Guards (who had been permitted, when the city capitulated, to retain their arms) stood between an 'indomitable people' and its betrayal to all the old tyrannies of Church and State."³ Before the preliminaries of Peace were ratified Paris broke out into insurrection; the Provisional Government withdrew to Versailles (March 18), and the capital was handed over to the tender mercies of the Commune.

A curious situation ensued. The German flag still waved over St. Denis; the tricolour of the Republic over Versailles; the red flag over Paris. France was compelled to reconquer

¹ The offer was actually conveyed in a letter (drafted by Bismarck) from King Ludwig of Bavaria. *Annales de l'École Libre des Sciences Politiques*, 1892.

² Sir Valentine Chirol: *Fifty Years in a Changing World*, pp. 14, 15. Sir Valentine was in Paris during the Commune and his account of it is the most vivid I have read.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

its own capital. For six weeks Paris was again besieged, and when MacMahon at last forced an entry (May 21) he found the devoted city in ruins and ablaze. For seven days (May 21-8) there was fierce fighting in the streets. The insurgents massacred their hostages—including the Archbishop and many priests, and burnt to the ground the Tuileries, the Hôtel de Ville, and some of the finest public buildings in the capital. The reprisals of the Regular Army were terrible in their severity. Some 20,000 persons at least were put to the sword; nearly 40,000 were arrested. Courts Martial were set up and did not complete their work until 1876. More than 18,000 persons in all were sentenced; 270 were condemned to death and 7500 to transportation. But France was saved.

Character
of the
Commune

The exact character and meaning of the insurrection thus successfully suppressed, still remain something of an enigma. In its initial stages it represented a patriotic protest against the weakness or treachery of the "bourgeois republic" in the face of the enemy. But, as invariably happens, the movement was more and more dominated as it progressed by wild revolutionaries. Among them were Social Democrats who found their inspiration in the doctrines of '48, and others whose Communism anticipated, with curious exactitude, that of the Union of Soviet Republics of Russia. In a sense the Commune represented the revolt of Paris against France; of the progressive cities against the reactionary provinces. France was to be divided into a number of autonomous Communes, each of which was to send representatives to a federal council representative of their common interest. Liberty was to be guaranteed, as Rousseau would have wished, by the direct and continuous intervention of the citizens in Communal affairs. A general council of the Paris Commune was, indeed, elected on March 26, and divided itself for purposes of administration into ten "commissions."¹ As regards the rest of France, the Communal scheme was still-born. In Paris the Commune reproduced, on a small scale, many of the most horrible features of Danton's Reign of Terror, but without Danton's excuse. Fortunately for France, Paris was isolated and the infection could not

¹ Cf. the *Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic* (1918).

spread. Even in Paris the disease, though acute in its onset, was successfully arrested. But the treatment to which it yielded was necessarily drastic, and the application of it embarrassed, weakened, and impoverished France at a critical juncture in her political history. Not for four full years after the close of the Franco-German War was the Republic definitely established.

Books for reference, see chapter xi.

CHAPTER XV

ENTR'ACTE

*Welt-
Politik*

WE have now reached the watershed indicated in the Prologue, and at this stage of our journey we may fitly halt for a moment to look back over the way we have travelled, and glance at the path which lies ahead.

The events recorded in the last few chapters have evidently closed an epoch in history; they have opened another. History, from this point, takes on a new orientation. We have hitherto dealt almost exclusively with the affairs of Europe, but European history must henceforward merge in world-history. "The future," wrote Seeley in 1883, "is with the big States, States of the type of Russia, the United States, and the British Empire." Lord Beaconsfield had already apprehended the truth of this aphorism, and had shaped British policy in accord with it. The purchase of the Khedive's shares in the Suez Canal (1875); the proclamation of Queen Victoria as Empress of India (1876); the annexation of the Transvaal (1887); the acquisition of Cyprus, (1878) were perhaps mere straws on the surface of the stream, but they indicated unmistakably the direction in which it was flowing. Disraeli had the imagination to perceive, long before the truth was revealed to the great mass of his countrymen, that a new era was dawning. It was the era of *Welt-Politik*.

Welt-Politik was a sphere congenial to Lord Beaconsfield and natural to an English statesman. Bismarck's outlook was essentially European, nay, continental. But he was fain to recognize at the close of his career that a new era had dawned. "Yes," he said, "this is a new age; a new world."

The dividing line between the old era and the new is to be discerned, be it repeated, in the 'seventies. The character-

istic work of the nineteenth century was by then accomplished. Europe was at last exhaustively parcelled out into a large number of independent, self-conscious, self-contained nation-states.

The year which witnessed the fall of the Second Empire ^{The} in France, the completion of German unity, and the entry of ^{Papacy} the Italians into Rome, witnessed also the final extinction of the Temporal Power of the Papacy, and the promulgation of the Dogma of Papal Infallibility.

Since the dissolution of the Council of Trent (1563), no ^{The} General Council of the Catholic Church had met. The idea ^{Vatican Council} of another Council to deal with modern errors and to formulate afresh the eternal dogmas of Catholic truth had long been present to the mind of Pius IX. The Council eventually met in December 1869. Despite much preliminary discussion at the gatherings of bishops at Rome in 1854, 1862, and 1867, there was acute division of opinion and prolonged debate before the Dogma of Papal Infallibility was finally approved by a majority of five to one. "The Roman Pontiff, when he speaks *ex cathedra*, that is, when in the exercise of his office as pastor and teacher of all Christians, he defines by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the Universal Church, is by the Divine assistance promised to him in the person of St. Peter possessed of the Infallibility wherewith the Divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be endowed in defining doctrine concerning faith or morals; . . . therefore such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are unalterable of themselves and not by reason of the consent of the Church."

Such was the famous dogma. It was the authentic voice of autocracy; but it re-echoed through a world which was moving fast towards democracy. The promulgation of this Decree fitly closed an epoch in world-history.

Natura nihil facit per saltum. There are no gaps in the ^{The} process of historical evolution. The advent of the new era ^{"Shrink-} coincides with the close of the old one. Of the new era ^{age of the} the dominating characteristic is, as already indicated, the shrink- ^{globe"} age of the globe. The world has become a unity in a sense never realized since the dissolution of the Roman Empire: Asia, America, Australia, and Africa have come within the

ambit of European politics ; the Continental Chanceries are as much concerned with the Pacific as with the Mediterranean. The era of *Welt-Politik*, dimly discerned by Bismarck, clearly apprehended by Disraeli, has arrived.

The remaining chapters of this book will essay to illustrate this development in detail. They will be largely concerned with problems which overstep the limits of Europe. The failure to solve them will ultimately involve not Europe only, but the world, in a war, the operations of which will extend "from pole to pole." But the centre of gravity has remained in Europe ; in Continental Europe the new Germany is, throughout this half century, dominant. To the organization of the new Germany, therefore, we first turn.

CHAPTER XVI

IMPERIAL GERMANY: THE RULE OF BISMARCK
(1871-90)

THE Franco-German war meant more than the “recti-
fication” of the historic frontier between France and
Germany; it meant more than the fall of the Second
Napoleonic Empire; more even than the completion of Ger-
man unity under a Hohenzollern Emperor. These issues were
peculiar to the immediate combatants. From a European
point of view the events of 1870-1 signified the transference of
the capital from Paris to Berlin. For more than two hundred
years Paris had been the capital not merely of France, but of
Continental Europe. That pride of place was now lost to
her. “Europe,” it was wittily remarked, “has lost a mistress
and gained a master.” The master’s home was in Berlin.

Significance
of the
Franco-
German
War

After he had dictated the terms of the Peace of Frankfort
to France, Bismarck was confronted by a two-fold task: he
had still to confirm and consolidate the position of Prussia in
Germany, and to consolidate the position of Germany in
Europe. To the accomplishment of these tasks he conse-
crated the remainder of his ministerial life.

Bismarck’s
task

His first business was to give Imperial Germany a Con-
stitution. Nor was it an arduous task. The Constitution of
the North German Confederation needed little amendment to
adapt it to Germany as a whole. The *Instrument* of the new
German Constitution was accordingly laid before the *Reichstag*
on April 14, 1871, and two days later was formally promul-
gated.

The Con-
stitution
of the
German
Empire

By the Treaties concluded at Versailles, Bavaria, Baden,
Württemberg, together with the southern portion of the Grand
Duchy of Hesse had joined the North German Confederation.
That Confederation, transformed into a Federal Empire under
the presidency of the King of Prussia, now included the whole

of Germany, except Austria, Luxemburg, and the little principality of Lichtenstein.

The
Kaiser

The Executive was vested in the Emperor, assisted by an Imperial Chancellor, appointed by, and responsible solely to him. The Kaiser's position was constitutionally peculiar. He was not strictly an hereditary Sovereign. He was not indeed "Sovereign" at all. There was no German Crown, no German civil-list; sovereignty was vested in the aggregate of the German Governments as represented in the *Bundesrat*. In the *Bundesrat* Prussia was all-powerful, and through the *Bundesrat* the King of Prussia technically exercised his powers as German Emperor. No provision was made in the Constitution for succession to the Empire; the Empire was to follow the rule of the Prussian Kingdom. The Emperor represented the Empire in relation to Foreign Powers and to the constituent States; he controlled, with the aid of a committee of the *Bundesrat*, foreign affairs; concluded alliances; received foreign envoys, declared war and made peace; but for every declaration of an offensive war the consent of the *Bundesrat* was essential.

The
Chancellor

The Chancellor was the only federal Minister, though he was subsequently assisted in his work by a number of subordinate officials, such as the Foreign and Colonial Secretaries. Bismarck refused to have a Cabinet. The Chancellor was the sole responsible official of the Empire; only the Kaiser could get rid of him.¹ As Imperial Chancellor he presided in the *Bundesrat*; if he voted in the *Bundesrat* or spoke in the *Reichstag*, it was not as Chancellor, but as one of the Prussian delegates to the *Bundesrat*.

On its administrative side the Empire as equipped under the Constitution was extraordinarily weak. For the execution of federal laws it had to depend upon State officials. Only in foreign affairs and in military and naval matters did it exercise effective control. In legislation, on the other hand, it was all-powerful.

The
Legislature

The Legislature consisted of (i) the *Bundesrat* or Imperial Council; and (ii) the *Reichstag*.² The latter had little real

¹ The position of the Executive was not legally affected by the Bülow incident of 1908.

² Whether the Imperial Legislature was technically bi-cameral or unicameral was a moot point; for discussion of which cf. Marriott: *Second Chambers*, pp. 116 seq.

power. Elected for five years by universal manhood suffrage, it had a veto on legislation and, constitutionally, the right of initiative. But, as a fact, legislation, including the annual Budget, originated as a rule in the *Bundesrat*.

Far more extensive, at anyrate on paper, were the powers of ^{The} *Bundesrat*. Like the American Senate it represented not the people of the Empire, but the States. Unlike the American Senate, however, it represented them unequally. Prussia claimed seventeen votes in her own right; Bavaria six; Saxony and Würtemberg four each; Baden and Hesse three; and the rest one apiece. The delegates voted according to instructions from their respective Governments; the vote of the State was "solid"; and might actually be given by a single delegate whose vote was raised to the power of the State representation.¹

In regard to legislation the *Bundesrat* had both the first and the last word. It fixed the Imperial Budget, audited the accounts between the Empire and the States, and supervised the collection of Customs and revenue generally. It had the power, with the Emperor, of declaring war, of dissolving the *Reichstag*; it had a voice in the conclusion of treaties, and the appointment of judges of the Supreme Court and other officials.

In many respects the *Bundesrat* itself acted as an administrative court; it had the right, by issuing ordinances, to remedy defects in legislation; it acted as Supreme Court of Appeal from the State Courts, and decided points of controversy between State and State, and between the Imperial Government and individual States. No revision of the Constitution could take place, if fourteen negative votes were cast against the amendment in the *Bundesrat*. Thus any constitutional amendment could be defeated by Prussia alone; or by the combined vote of the middle States; or by the vote of the single-member States, acting with tolerable unanimity.

Apart from the *Bundesrat* there was one great federal ^{The} supreme court (which was not created until 1877), the *Reichsgericht*. ^{Judiciary} It exercised original jurisdiction in cases of treason, and was a court of appeal on points of imperial law from the State Courts. It seems, however, to have lacked the important

¹ Thus a single Bavarian delegate could give six votes.

function assigned to the Supreme Court of the United States, for it had no power to decide whether an Act of the Legislature was or was not "constitutional."

German
Federalism

Nor was that the only respect in which the new German Constitution fell short of the genuine federal type: the exceptional power of the central legislature; the weakness of the central authority in administration; most of all the inequality of the component State were among its characteristic defects as a type of federalism. In sober truth, Prussia, instead of being as the Frankfort Parliament desired, merged in Germany, had virtually absorbed the whole of Germany, except the German portion of the Hapsburg Empire.

The identification of Prussia with Germany was the work of Bismarck. He was supported, though not without occasional misgivings, by his honest, simple-hearted, and courageous master, and he could command the technical skill of Moltke and Roon. But his was the directing genius. The Constitution of 1871 embodied his conception of the German *Reich*.

But although the constitutional framework was complete, much still remained to be done to complete the edifice. The material fabric of imperial unity had still to be built up; time was needed to create the moral, spiritual, and economic cohesion without which the constitutional framework must needs remain an empty shell. That was the work of the next twenty years. By 1890 the foundations of the new nation had been laid so solidly as to withstand even the storms of 1918.

Upon the autocratic authority of the chief architect there were, however, two limitations. Germany had been made by the sword, and the sword was not wielded by the Imperial Chancellor. All the Ministers on the civil side of the Government were his servants; but over the army, its chiefs and its administration, neither he nor the *Reichstag* (save in the matter of finance) exercised any control. The military Cabinet, the General Staff and the War Ministry were co-ordinate in authority with the Chancellor. They formed an autocracy within the autocracy. Nor was Bismarck complete master of the *Reichstag*. The Government of Germany was not in any real sense "Parliamentary"; there was no Cabinet in the English sense; the administration was departmental and

independent of the *Reichstag*. Nevertheless many of Bismarck's legislative projects were largely modified and even defeated by the *Reichstag*.

Of all the domestic difficulties which Bismarck had to face, Church and State the most obstinate were those which centred round the age-long problem of "Church and State." If it had been found difficult in the Middle Ages to reconcile the claims of the Empire and the Papacy, it was hardly more easy to adjust those of the New German Empire and the New Papacy. The "syllabus" of 1864, followed by the Decree of Papal Infallibility, seemed to indicate, on the part of the Roman Church, a renewal of propagandist activity. Political Ultramontanism had lately been gaining ground notably in Austria, in Bavaria, and in France. The relations between the French Empress and Rome were notoriously close, and the hostility of the Papacy to the unification of Germany was as intelligible as it was undoubted. Equally distasteful to Bismarck was the activity of the Roman Church among the Poles of Prussian Poland. Most of all was he incensed by the demand put forward by the Ultramontane Bishops in Germany that the dogma of Papal Infallibility should be taught in the universities and schools. This was to touch the traditional policy of Prussia on the raw. The schools were the nurseries of patriotism; the higher studies of the universities had long been devoted to the cult of Hohenzollern hegemony. Nor was the contest simply one between Cæsarism and Catholicism. The "Old Catholics," led by Dr. Döllinger, one of the greatest of German scholars, were not less reluctant than the Imperialists to accept the Vatican Decrees, or to put liberal education in Germany under the heel of the hierarchy. On the theological side the Old Catholics were, after a long and bitter struggle, compelled to acknowledge defeat. Constrained to choose between a Liberalism allied with secularism and an Ultramontanism which they mistrusted, the German Catholics chose the latter.

But, on the civil side, Bismarck refused to accept defeat. He was no iconoclast, but his political creed excluded the idea of a divided supremacy. "There is," he said, "only one standpoint for Prussia, constitutionally as well as politically; that of the Church's absolute liberty in matters ecclesiastical, and of determined resistance to her every encroachment upon

State-rights." In this spirit the legislation known as the "May Laws" was conceived.

The "May
Laws"

Strictly speaking the "May Laws" applied only to the group of Acts proposed by Von Falk in the Prussian Diet and promulgated in May 1873. But it is commonly and conveniently applied to the whole legislation on this subject. The scope of that legislation was comprehensive. Between 1872 and 1876 the Jesuits were expelled; civil marriage was made compulsory; the Pulpit Paragraph, by which priests were forbidden to interfere officially in political matters, was added to the Imperial Penal Code; the Catholic Bureau in the Ministry of Education was suppressed, and the inspection of schools was withdrawn from the clergy and placed in the hands of State inspectors; priests were forbidden to abuse ecclesiastical punishments, e.g. excommunication: all ecclesiastical seminaries were placed under State control; no priest was to hold office in the Church unless he were a German, educated in a German university, and had passed a university examination in history, philosophy, literature, and classics; exercise of office by unauthorized persons was made punishable by loss of civic rights, and power was given to suspend in any diocese where the bishop was recalcitrant, the payment to the Roman Church authorized since 1817.

Bismarck was convinced that firmness would break down the opposition of the Clericals as it had broken that of the Liberals in 1862, and he announced in a famous phrase that "we will not go to Canossa either in the flesh or in the spirit." But he had miscalculated the strength and determination of his opponents. The Empress and the Court were against him; the Emperor viewed with dismay the schism which clove Germany into two camps of embittered opponents; many Protestants resented and disliked the extreme claims for the secular power embodied in the "May Laws"; the old Conservatives broke away and reproached Bismarck with deserting the principle of a Christian State, and the power of the National Liberals drove many Bismarckians, who hated Liberalism and all its works, into the arms of the opposition. Most formidable of all was the stubborn refusal of Roman Catholics to obey the law. They defied the Executive, with the result that in 1876 six bishops (including the Cardinal Archbishop of Posen, Ledochowski, the Archbishop of Cologne,

and the Bishop of Trier), were in prison, and 1800 parishes were left without any public worship. The Roman Catholic population, in fact, was in open revolt, and the most drastic police measures and the penalties of the Courts failed to diminish its spirit, or weaken its refusal to accept the law as valid. In the *Reichstag*, the Centre Party, led by Windthorst, the ablest Parliamentarian whom Germany had yet produced, attacked and opposed the Chancellor, his Ministers, and their measures. In the General Election of 1874 the Clericals increased their numbers from sixty-three to ninety-one, and could point to a poll of a million and a half of voters on their side.

Thus by 1878 Bismarck was confronted with a dangerous and a difficult situation. The Conservatives, after a split in 1876, had reunited. Bismarck's heart was with them. He was sick of the *Kulturkampf* which he chose to regard as hopelessly mismanaged by Falk and the National Liberals. Only by a coalition with that party could he have carried through his anti-clerical programme. Their terms, however, were extravagantly high, even had Liberalism retained its former vigour. Bismarck rightly believed it to be, on the contrary, a spent force. The death of Pio Nono (1878) and the election of Leo XIII inaugurated a new era at the Vatican. Negotiations with the Ultramontanes were commenced. So Bismarck went to Canossa, though by a slow and circuitous route: but he went there, and then described his journey as a compromise. Falk resigned, and Puttkamer, a Conservative, took his place. In 1881 the Government was granted a discretionary power in the enforcement of the penal legislation; in 1886 the State examination of priests was given up, as was also the State control of seminaries, while from 1881 onwards a series of arrangements with the Vatican, by which ecclesiastical appointments were to be made by agreement between Pope and King-Emperor, brought the struggle to an end. In return, Bismarck obtained a general though not an unvarying support from the Centre Party.

Meanwhile Bismarck, having broken with the National Liberals, had entered on a comprehensive policy of high protection and State Socialism. For this new departure there were several reasons. In Germany as in England there set in, towards the end of the seventies, a period of agricultural

A Change
of System,
1878

Protection
and State
Socialism

depression which hit the landed interest, closely identified with Prussian Conservatism, very severely. The agriculturists demanded protection against the competition of the new world, and protection for agriculture involved protection for industry. Moreover, the Imperial finances were as hard hit as those of individuals. The French indemnity had proved a very doubtful blessing to Germany; it had inflated the currency, raised prices and had induced unwholesome speculation. Bismarck accordingly had recourse to a tariff, alike to give him a revenue and to afford protection to agriculture and industry. Very moderate duties were imposed on food-stuffs and raw materials, and high duties on manufactured articles.

The results were apparently not unsatisfactory. Wages rose; employment increased notably in the iron and steel industry; the output of shipping increased and exports rose. How far these results were attributable to the tariff, and how far to the industrial revolution through which Germany was passing at this time cannot be precisely determined. The industrialists were well content. Not so the agrarians; prices continued to fall and Bismarck was driven to increase the duties on food-stuffs in 1885, and again more drastically in 1887. The last dose of protection effected its immediate purpose. It gave substantial encouragement to agriculture; but the rural districts were helped at the expense of the industrial towns. High protection gave a powerful stimulus to the rising party of Social Democrats.

State
Socialism

Bismarck was thus confronted with a new danger. Characteristically he decided that he must fight Social Democracy with its own weapons, and prove to the town artisans that paternal despotism could do more for them than their loud-voiced representatives in the *Reichstag*. A series of elaborate measures were accordingly introduced, and after prolonged discussion were passed into law. An Act for compulsory insurance against sickness (1883) was followed in 1884 by another against accidents in the course of employment. An Old-Age Pension Act was passed in 1889, so comprehensive in its scope as to bring no fewer than 12,000,000 workpeople within its ambit. Thus did Bismarck endeavour to stem the rising tide of Socialism; but with indifferent success. By 1890 Social Democracy had become a very formidable force, alike on the political and the economic side. With pater-

nalism Bismarck combined the weapon of coercion, but repression served only to stimulate its growth. In 1872 Bebel and Liebknecht—the two representatives of Social Democracy in the *Reichstag*—were sent to prison for two years. But in 1874 there were nine Social Democrats returned, in 1877 twelve. The attempt on the Emperor's life by Nobiling in 1878 was unjustly attributed to the Socialists, and a ferocious law was passed prohibiting Socialist books, meetings, or unions, and empowering the *Bundesrat* to proclaim a state of siege in any town, and this law was thrice renewed in 1881, 1886, and 1888. It was rigorously applied; the whole Socialist organization was broken up and its members punished, harassed, and ruined by the police—but with the result that in 1881 the Socialist Democrats secured twelve, in 1887 thirty-five, in 1893 forty-four, in 1898 fifty-six, in 1903 eighty-one, and in 1913 one hundred and sixteen seats in the *Reichstag*. But as long as Bismarck remained in office his supremacy, though spasmodically attacked, was unshaken.

From the domestic politics of Germany we must now turn to the larger field of European diplomacy.

Bismarck's
Ascendancy
in Europe

Upon European politics Bismarck exercised an influence greater than that of any ruler since Napoleon I, perhaps since Louis XIV. The principle of his policy during the twenty years which followed on the Franco-German war was simplicity itself: *Divide et impera*. France, despite the disastrous defeat of 1870-1, was still the enemy; France, therefore, was to be kept weak at home and isolated in Europe. To attain the former object Bismarck favoured the Republican party in France, thinking, unlike Thiers, that the Republic would divide France most. As for the place of France in Europe the utmost vigilance must be exercised to prevent any *rapprochement* between France and England (Egypt came handy for this purpose), between France and Italy (Tunis would serve here), most of all between France and Russia.

A secondary object of Bismarck's policy was to prevent any undue cordiality between Vienna and Petersburg, while himself maintaining intimate relations with both. It was an accepted aphorism of Prussian policy that "the wire between Berlin and Petersburg must always be kept open," but to do this without sacrificing the friendship of Austria

The Drei-
kaiserbund,
1872

was a task which demanded all Bismarck's vigilance and skill. The task was, however, facilitated on the one hand by the prudent generosity with which, ever since the Prussian victory at Sadowa, Bismarck had treated Austria; on the other by the excellent personal relations which the Emperor William had always maintained with the Czar Alexander II, and which he succeeded, after 1871, in establishing with the Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria. In August 1871 the German Emperor paid a ceremonial visit to his brother of Austria at Ischl, and the latter returned it in the following year.

At Berlin the Czar was also present, with his Chancellor Gortschakoff, and there the "league of the three Emperors" was arranged. Bismarck always maintained that "the liaison of the three Emperors, though habitually termed an alliance, rested on no written agreement," and involved no mutual obligations. That there was no written document is likely enough; nevertheless, the understanding was complete, and it formed the solid bed-rock of German diplomacy, until it was dissipated by the clash of Russian and Austrian interests in the Balkans. The three Emperors cordially agreed to maintain the territorial *status quo* as established in 1871; to find, if possible, a solution of the Near Eastern problem mutually acceptable to the three Empires, and above all to suppress in their respective countries the growing power of revolutionary Socialism. Such were the terms of the new Holy Alliance, confirmed by annual meetings, between the august Allies at Vienna and Petersburg (1873), at Ischl (1874), and again at Berlin in 1875.

The friendship between Germany and Russia was severely tested by the attitude assumed by the Czar during the "scare" which threatened a renewal of war between France and Germany in the spring of 1875.

But before proceeding to examine this significant episode it will be convenient to recapitulate events in France since the conclusion of the Treaty of Frankfort.

The
Recovery of
France

By that treaty France was humiliated and dismembered, but she was not crushed. The losses in men and money which external war and internal strife inflicted upon France were, indeed, enormous: 1,597,000 citizens were transferred from the French to the German flag; 491,000 persons were

killed in the war and the Commune ; while the loss in money is reckoned at £614,000,000.¹ Hardly, however, was the Treaty of Frankfort signed, before the thrifty and patriotic citizens of France set themselves to the grim task of staunching the wounds inflicted by the enemy and rebuilding the body politic. Even the outbreak of the Commune, crushing as this culminating disaster seemed at the moment, hardly interrupted the accomplishment of their task.

The rapidity with which France repaired the havoc was, indeed, marvellous. The enthusiasm and energy of Thiers, now a veteran of seventy-four, infected the whole nation. Nominated as Head of the National Executive in February, 1871, Thiers in August exchanged the title for that of President of the Republic. This was a broad hint to the Monarchists and Imperialists who, could they have composed their domestic differences, would have found little difficulty at this time in re-establishing in some form a monarchical régime. Between the Legitimists, the Orleanists, and the Bonapartists, feeling still, however, ran high. The National Assembly, elected during the war, was predominantly monarchical and, in July 1871, repealed by a large majority the laws which condemned to exile the Bourbon and Orleanist princes. In the same summer an effort was made to effect a reconciliation between the Comte de Chambord, who, as the son of the murdered Duc de Berri, and grandson and heir of Charles X, represented the elder line, and the Comte de Paris, grandson and heir of Louis Philippe. But nothing came of it.

The country proved itself decidedly more Republican than its elected representatives. In the by-elections of July 1871 the Republicans captured 100 seats out of 111, and of the candidates elected in the Departmental elections (October) two-thirds were of the same persuasion. Thiers, therefore, with his superb instinct for politics, moved, though very slowly, towards the Left, and with the help of men like Casimir-Périer and Rémusat was able to form gradually a Left Centre Party pledged to the support of a Government "which though republican in form was conservative in policy." Such a Government could most effectively carry through the immediate task of recuperation—political, financial, military, social, and commercial.

¹ Hanotaux : *Contemporary France*, i, 328-7.

Thiers and
his Task

In the short space of four years that task was accomplished. The German indemnity was paid off by instalments, and with each payment the area of occupation was reduced. A loan of £80,000,000 issued in June 1871 was covered two and a half times; a second, for £120,000,000 in July 1872 was covered twelve times. By the autumn of 1873 not a German soldier remained on French soil, and Thiers was deservedly acclaimed as "The Liberator of the *Patrie*." Financial equilibrium was restored by fresh taxation, mostly indirect. Meanwhile, by the Constitutional Laws of August and September 1871, a Provisional Constitution was established; executive power was vested in a President of the Republic, who was to appoint and dismiss the Ministers. But the latter, like the President himself, were to be "responsible" to the Assembly which was to sit at Versailles. Local government was reorganized by the Municipal Act of 1871—a skilful compromise which kept the larger towns under Prefects appointed from Paris, while permitting towns with less than 20,000 inhabitants the democratic luxury of election. The new frontier was re-fortified, and in 1872 compulsory military service was introduced. Every citizen of France (with certain exceptions, e.g. in favour of those who had specially distinguished themselves at the Lycées), was to serve for five years with the colours, four years in the reserve, and a further term in the territorial army. Only Thiers could have persuaded France to such a tax on her young manhood. His success affords further proof of his unique authority, of the confidence reposed in his judgment by France, and of the splendid and self-sacrificing patriotism of the French people.

Presidency
of Mac-
Mahon,
1873-9

The services rendered to France by Thiers were, indeed, beyond computation; yet his power rested on a dangerously narrow base. Confronted, on the one hand, by the Monarchists, numerous though divided; attacked on the other, by the extreme Republicans who, lacking numbers, found in Gambetta a leader of brilliant parts and proud patriotism, Thiers with difficulty maintained his position until May 1873. Defeated in the Assembly on a vote of confidence, Thiers, instead of dismissing his Ministers, preferred to resign the Presidency, and Marshal MacMahon, an avowed Royalist, was elected in his stead. Thiers had always refused to accept the principle of ministerial responsibility, on the ground that

"though it was perfectly consistent with the dignity of a constitutional king, it was for him, a little bourgeois, entirely out of the question." Conformably with this view of his position, he accepted his dismissal at the hands of the Assembly.

MacMahon appointed a Ministry representative of all the monarchical parties under the leadership of the Duc de Broglie, and frantic efforts were made to consolidate the monarchical forces. But in vain. The Comte de Paris was, indeed, induced to pay a ceremonial visit to the Comte de Chambord, and the latter being childless, recognized the Comte de Paris as heir-presumptive in return for a promise of Orleanist support to the Legitimist claims during his own lifetime (August 1873); but there was no real reconciliation. Still there is little doubt that if "Henry V" could have been persuaded to acknowledge the tricolour, the monarchy would have been restored. How long it would have lasted is another question. The obstinacy of "Henry V" forbade the experiment; he preferred the "White Flag" to the throne of France, and, as though determined to dissipate the last hope of the Legitimists, he declared in favour of a restoration of the Temporal Power of the Papacy.¹ On January 9, 1873, Napoleon III at last succumbed at Chislehurst to the disease which during the last years of the Empire had racked his body and weakened his will. The Prince Imperial was not yet of an age to be a serious claimant to the throne.² Everything seemed to conspire in favour of the Conservative Republic which Thiers had decided would "divide France least." In May 1874 Broglie's Ministry was defeated owing to monarchical dissensions; the Republicans, encouraged by a series of consistently favourable by-elections, felt themselves strong enough to demand revision, and on January 30, 1875, the principle of a Republic (though only by a majority of one) was definitively accepted by the Assembly.

A series of "constitutional" laws, passed in the year 1875, ^{The Constitution of 1875} defined the Republican Constitution under which, with some few and unimportant modifications, France is still governed.

The President is elected for a term of seven years by a ^{(a) The Executive}

¹ Yet Pope Pius IX was very contemptuous of the "White Flag": "Et tout cela pour une serviette."

² Born 1856. Killed in South Africa 1878.

National Assembly, and is a "constitutional" chief of the State. As M. Raymond Poincaré writes: "The President presides, but does not govern; he can form no decision save in agreement with his Ministers; and the responsibility is theirs. . . . The President, therefore, exercises no power alone."¹ Sir Henry Maine declared, with some exaggeration, that there was no living functionary who occupied a more pitiable position than a French President. It is true that he neither reigns nor governs, but his position plainly depends largely on his personality; and many French Presidents, not excluding M. Poincaré himself, have played not merely a dignified but an important part in the public life of France. The President is "responsible" only in case of high treason, and acts invariably on the advice of Ministers responsible to the Legislature.

(b) The
Legislature

The Legislature consists of two Houses: a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. Together they form the National Assembly by which the President is elected and the Constitution revised. The Senate was to consist of 300 (now 317) members. Of the original 300 Senators 75 were elected for life by the National Assembly, and the remaining 225 for nine years by electoral colleges, in the Departments and Colonies. The Chamber, comprising 597 members, is elected for four years, virtually by manhood suffrage. The President can dissolve the Chamber before the expiration of its legal term only with the concurrence of the Senate. The prerogative thus attaching to the Senate is plainly one of great importance, since it gives it great influence over the Executive. Only by its leave can the Executive make a special appeal to the electorate.

This Constitution has stood the test of experience with singular success, only four amendments of any importance having been carried in forty-five years. In 1883 the Republican form of Government was declared to be fundamental and not subject to revision; in 1884 the principle of Life-Senatorships was denounced, the places of the Life-Senators being filled, as vacancies occurred, by indirect election; in 1886 members of families which had reigned in France were declared ineligible for the Presidency of the Republic; and

¹ *How France is Governed* (Eng. trans.), p. 178.

in 1889 single districts were re-established for the election of deputies, and multiple candidatures were prohibited. In December 1875 the National Assembly was finally dissolved, and the elections of 1876 gave to the Republicans an overwhelming majority in the Chamber and a large party in the Senate. The Third Republic was established.

To its establishment the Constitution as devised in 1875 made a not unimportant contribution. Regarded as a whole it represented a compromise between the Conservative majority, who were too divided to procure the restoration of any form of monarchy, and the Republican minority. They combined to draft a simple form of Constitution which neither party imagined would be other than temporary. Both the extreme parties have been disappointed in their expectations : the Constitution of 1875 has already lasted more than twice as long as any Constitution in France since the outbreak of the Revolution in 1789.

Bismarck watched the rapid recuperation of France with astonishment and chagrin. The indemnity which was intended to cripple France for a generation had been paid off in three years, and the payment had inflicted less harm upon France than upon Germany. The acquisition of Alsace and Lorraine had not only contributed immensely to the economic prosperity of Germany, but had opened the French frontier to German attack. Would France permanently acquiesce in the loss of these Provinces ? Would the inhabitants permanently accept the harsh rule of Prussia ? What might not happen if the recovery of France should proceed with the same rapidity as it had exhibited in the half-decade since the débacle ? France, it is true, could do little without allies ; but might not the Republic succeed better than the Empire in the field of diplomacy ? A day must come when Germany would have to choose between the friendship of Austria and that of Russia. If she chose Austria, would not Russia be flung into the arms of France ? And England ? England, in 1874, had thrown off the domination of the Manchester School, and the old aristocracy in alliance with the newly-enfranchised artisans had placed the Conservatives in power for the first time since 1830. Under Disraeli England might emerge from her splendid isolation, and again take a hand in continental diplomacy.

Under these circumstances might it not be the wisest policy for Germany to attack France before she recovered her strength, and while she was still isolated in Europe? This time, if fortune favoured German arms, France should be "bled white"; the "French mortgage" should be once for all cleared off. France had indeed given no sort of pretext for attack; she had more than punctually discharged all her obligations, and had wisely heeded Gambetta's warning: "to think of *Revanche* always, and never to speak of it." Despite this, there is little doubt that Bismarck in the winter of 1874-5 tried to pick a quarrel with France. His own master confided to Prince Hohenlohe: "I do not wish war with France . . . but I fear that Bismarck may drag me into it little by little." "Bismarck," wrote Lord Odo Russell from Berlin to Lord Derby, "is at his old tricks again." On April 15, 1875, there appeared in the *Berlin Post* an article, obviously inspired: "Krieg in sicht?" On May 4 the Duc Decazes, the French Premier, informed de Blowitz, *The Times* correspondent in Paris, that Germany intended to "bleed France white," to demand from her a fine of ten milliards of francs (about £400,000,000), payable in twenty instalments, and to keep an army of occupation in her eastern Departments until the fine was paid. Similar reports appear to have reached the Czar Alexander in Petersburg, and to have been privately transmitted to Queen Victoria by her daughters in Berlin and Darmstadt. The Queen wrote to Alexander begging him to use his influence with the Emperor to avert war, and the Czar, accompanied by Gortschakoff, hurried to Berlin. In June the Queen wrote a personal letter to the German Emperor offering her mediation. The Emperor assured her in reply that her fears were groundless. It was true. Bismarck had been outplayed by Decazes and Gortschakoff at his own game. The scare was over.

The
Eastern
Question
again

Hardly, however, had the fear of renewed war in Western Europe been averted, when the rumblings of a coming storm began to be heard in the Near East. The rumblings deepened, and for the next three years the centre of political interest shifted from Berlin and Paris to Petersburg and Constantinople. The *Eastern Question* was reopened.

Books for reference, see chapter xiii.

CHAPTER XVII

RUSSIA, POLAND, AND THE NEAR EAST

RUSSIA occupies a peculiar place in the European polity. Though in some respects less European than Asiatic in tradition and structure, she has nevertheless played, during the last century and a half, an important part in the game of European diplomacy. Peter the Great gave to his country a veneer of Western civilization; he opened a window towards the west by his Baltic campaigns and the foundation of Petersburg; he opened a window to the south by the conquest of Azov. The latter, indeed, was temporarily closed, but it was soon reopened and formed the starting-point of a forward policy, pursued with remarkable consistency for a full century. The success of Russian policy in South-Eastern Europe reached its zenith, as we have seen, in 1833 when the Czar Nicholas dictated to the Sultan the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi.

Constantinople was the goal of Russian ambition in South-Eastern Europe. But the command of the narrow Straits would at best make Russia a great Levantine power. If Russia was to play the part in Western Europe to which Peter and Catherine aspired, the most convenient avenue was by way of Poland.

Under the settlement of 1815 the Congress Kingdom of Poland (Napoleon's Grand Duchy of Warsaw) was, as we have seen, claimed by the Czar Alexander; and successfully. But Polish nationality was to be respected. Large concessions, modelled upon the French Charter of 1814, were, accordingly, granted to the new "kingdom" by the Czar: a bi-cameral Legislature; a Senate consisting of Nobles and Bishops selected by the Crown, and an elected Chamber of Deputies; biennial Parliaments; a "responsible" Ministry; a separate Budget; liberty of person and of the Press; a national army under the national flag; municipal self-government for the

towns, and the use of the Polish language for official purposes. On paper the guarantees for the recognition of a separate Polish nationality were ample, and that the Czar genuinely meant to observe them is unquestionable. The Vice-royalty and the command of the army were offered to Kościuszko, leader of the insurrection of 1794, and, on his refusal, the former office was conferred upon General Zajaczek, a native Pole who had served under Napoleon, while the command of the army was given to the Czar's brother the Grand Duke Constantine.

Three years later (1818) the Czar Alexander presided in person at the opening of the First Diet, and earnestly exhorted his new subjects to "prove to contemporary kings that the liberal institutions which they associated with doctrines threatening the entire social system with a frightful catastrophe were not a dangerous illusion."¹ Unhappily the Polish aristocracy seemed bent only upon proving that, like the restored Bourbons, they had learnt nothing and forgotten nothing during times of adversity. The natural leaders of the people were mutually suspicious and agreed only in factious opposition to the Sovereign. Consequently the Second Diet (1820) was compelled to acquiesce in severe curtailment of liberty, and the reign of Alexander closed (1825) in gloom, disappointment, and disillusion.

His Polish kingdom, despite exceptional economic prosperity, was seething with political discontent. With very little encouragement discontent would blaze out into insurrection. The July Revolution in Paris (1830) sufficed for the purpose, and towards the end of November revolution broke out in Warsaw. The Czar promptly sent into Poland a Russian force of over 110,000 men under Marshal Diebitsch who had lately brought the Turks to their knees. Diebitsch was less successful in Poland; the Poles, who had a well-trained army of 60,000 men, fought with magnificent courage and for a time with conspicuous success. But in council they showed themselves incapable of eradicating the faults and weaknesses which had been their undoing in the past: suspicion, jealousy, faction; and the insurrection ultimately collapsed. Prussia had carefully guarded Russia's northern flank, and Lord Palmerston had been too much concerned

¹ Skrine: *Expansion of Russia*, p. 65.

with Belgium to interfere in Poland. The collapse of the revolution was followed by a policy of Russification. The Congress Kingdom became a Russian province ; the Constitution of 1815 was replaced by an Organic Statute ; the Polish army was suppressed ; the Universities of Warsaw and Wilna were abolished, and the official use of the Polish language was prohibited.

For twenty-five years the system of repression was consistently and, to all appearances, successfully pursued. The reign of the Emperor Nicholas (1825-55) was, in the phrase of a competent English critic, " one long conspiracy on the part of a monarch to denationalize a people." ¹

The accession of Alexander II brought some amelioration Alexander II in the lot of this unhappy people. The pressure of religious persecution was sensibly relaxed ; the Universities were re-established ; a considerable measure of autonomy was restored ; above all the serfs were emancipated. But the Poles displayed no gratitude towards the liberator. According to some critics they owed none : the serfs were emancipated, it is argued, simply to establish a counterpoise against the separatist tendencies of the Polish nobility. Be that as it may, the fact remains that these healing measures failed to heal, and that in 1863 the embers of discontent, never really extinguished, again burst into flame. The insurrection of that year was, as we have already observed, from the outset hopeless. It did nothing to advance the cause of Polish independence. On the contrary it deprived that unhappy country of the measure of autonomy so recently conceded. The Poles did indeed manage to maintain a fierce though futile struggle for twelve months, but the result was never in doubt. Poland was virtually incorporated in the Empire of the Czar. Meanwhile the insurrection gave Bismarck the chance of demonstrating afresh the insidious and calculated friendship of Prussia for Russia. As a consequence, Russia was still further enmeshed in the toils of the Prussian alliance, and Bismarck, relying upon the friendly neutrality of Russia, could play with the completer confidence the clever but hazardous game which by the three stages of 1864, 1866, and 1870, at last led to the attainment of German unity. Bismarck's friendship gave Russia the opportunity, as we

¹ Day : *Russian Government in Poland.*

have seen, of denouncing in 1870 the Black Sea Clauses of the Treaty of Paris, but otherwise Russia paid dearly for Prussian assistance. A discontented Poland deflected Russia from her natural policy, alienated her natural friends, and subordinated her interests to those of Berlin.

Russia utterly failed to conciliate the Poles under her rule : she placed every obstacle in the way of their advancement, intellectual or economic ; yet despite every discouragement the economic development of the country during the nineteenth century was remarkable. The Polish peasant-proprietors proved themselves to be among the most progressive agriculturists in Europe ; they adopted co-operative methods similar to those which met with marked success in Denmark and Ireland ; they established credit-banks ; they promoted, not perhaps without ulterior motives, every form of economic association. Even more marked was the progress of industry. Warsaw, in the course of a century, increased in population from 40,000 (1815) to 800,000 (1915) ; Lodz, which in 1792 was a village with less than 200 inhabitants, developed into a town of over 500,000.

Perhaps on this account they had the more energy for political agitation. Never since 1815 was there any prolonged abstention from it. The national spirit was invincible.

But only in Austrian Poland was there any approach to contentment, and there only in the last half-century. Between the "restoration" of 1815 and the revolution of 1848 Metternich's rule was as harsh and repressive in Poland as elsewhere. The annihilation of the republican independence of Cracow (1846) and its absorption into Galicia, was at once a breach of faith and an affront to Polish sentiment. But after 1876 there was a marked change for the better in the administration of Austrian Poland. The Poles under Hapsburg rule enjoyed virtual autonomy under their own elected Diet ; the administration and the schools were alike "native," the people were free to use their own language and to worship according to their own faith, which was also, be it noted, the faith of their rulers. Small wonder, therefore, if the Poles of Russia showed tepid zeal in a fight against Austria in the Great War.

But we anticipate the sequence of events and must return to Russia.

Russia, though partially *in* Europe, had never been of Europe, and had not shared in the march of Western civilization. In respect of Government, of social structure, and of economic development, Russia was purely medieval. The Czar was not merely "Emperor" but "Autocrat of all the Russias"; nor did his official title belie his actual powers. The administration was a highly centralized autocracy; power was concentrated in the hands of the Czar. The "little Father" was head also of the Orthodox Church, which in its turn enjoyed the unquestioning obedience of the people. The population, though large, was thin, and scattered over a vast area. The towns were few, there was little trade, and a middle class hardly existed. Down to the middle of the eighteenth century the structure of society had been wholly feudal. The nobles held vast estates, but on condition of military service. The serfs held land from the nobles on condition of menial service. The structure was solid, and if discontent existed it was inarticulate.

In 1763, however, the Czar Peter III released the nobles from the obligation of military service, but left untouched the menial obligations of the serfs. Reforms of
Peter III

Serfdom reached its climax, indeed, under his successor, the great Empress Catherine II. Instead of carrying to its logical completion the policy of her predecessor by abolishing the obligations of the serfs, Catherine increased the power of the proprietors.

The Czar Paul (1796-1801) did nothing to improve the position of the serfs. On the contrary he looked to the great lords as the guardians of public order—his "police-masters"—and not only confirmed their privileges but increased their numbers by extensive grants of State lands.

Alexander I came to the throne with very different ideas. From his Swiss tutor Laharpe he had imbibed liberal if not revolutionary notions, and encouraged by his "young friends" (as they were called) Prince Adam Czartoryski, Stróganov, an ex-Jacobin; Novosiltsov, his cousin; and Kochubey, who had enjoyed an English education, Alexander embarked enthusiastically on a scheme of reform. He set up a Council of the Empire, and modernized the whole administrative system; he reorganized the existing universities of Moscow, Dorpat, and Wilna, and founded new ones at Kazan and Kharkov; he Alexander I
(1801-25),
his reforms

established technical and primary schools; he abolished capital punishment for nobles, clergy, and merchants, and actually made a beginning with the reform of serfdom. In 1803 he issued a Decree permitting the landowners to liberate their serfs, if they pleased. But it was a permissive measure, and little came of it. Under Decrees issued in 1816, 1818, and 1819 the peasants of the Baltic Provinces were relieved from the obligations of personal servitude, but remained in economic dependence on their masters. Alexander was also contemplating their complete, though gradual emancipation, and actually ordered a scheme to be prepared to effect that object.

Reaction

The later years of the reign witnessed, however, a sharp reaction. The pupil of Laharpe and the friend of Czartoryski came entirely, as we have seen, under the domination of Metternich. Metternich regarded reform as an incentive to revolution. Stern repression was the only means of averting a repetition of the horrors which France had witnessed, and which Europe had escaped only at the cost of twenty years of war.

Among the officers who had fought in that war were many who had come, for the first time, into contact with the liberalism of Western Europe. They returned to Russia full of the ideas which they had imbibed on service. In those ideas we have the germ of the Nihilist movement in Russia, though their demonstration was deferred.

The "Decem- brists"

On the death of Alexander there was a brief interregnum due to the refusal of the heir, his brother Constantine, to accept the succession to the throne. His rights consequently devolved on his younger brother Nicholas. The confusion which ensued on Constantine's renunciation gave an opportunity to the malcontents. Nor was it neglected. Disaffection was rife, both among officers and men in certain of the Guards' regiments. They refused to accept Nicholas, and called on Constantine, who was supposed to favour constitutional reform, to assume the Crown. On December 26 the disaffected regiments assembled in the Square before the Senate: crowds of civilians gathered in support of them, and raised cheers and cries for Constantine. Though called upon to disperse, they fired on the Grand Duke Michael and mortally wounded the military Governor of Petersburg. The loyal

troops then opened fire on them ; many mutineers and civilians were wounded, some were killed, and the crowds dispersed in disorder.

The December conspiracy had no possible chance of success. Hatched in the salons of the capital, headed by officers of the Guards, and inspired much more by doctrinaire philosophy than by practical grievances, it had no popular support behind it, and collapsed at the first sign of vigour on the part of the Government. Nevertheless, Nicholas was seriously alarmed, not least by the revelation of a mutinous temper in the army, and took strong action to stamp out the embers of insurrection. Five of the ringleaders were executed ; and many more were sentenced to penal servitude or exile in Siberia.

Nicholas I was a much stronger man than his predecessor. Shrewd but uncultured, he never dallied with philosophical radicalism nor gave way an inch to the threats of revolution—above all he was a Russian to the core. Primarily a soldier he was a strict disciplinarian ; in politics he was a stern realist. That the administration of the country was at once chaotic and corrupt he clearly recognized ; that the conversion of Alexander to the views of Metternich had deeply disappointed those who had hopefully looked for reform was made manifest by the December conspiracy. From reform Nicholas was not averse, provided it came as a gift from benevolent autocracy. At the time of his coronation (July 25, 1826) he issued a manifesto in which he declared that “ not by insolent, and always destructive dreams are the institutions of the country to be perfected, their shortcomings made good, and abuses corrected. We shall,” he added, “ accept with goodwill every modest expression of a desire for improvement, if it implies that improvement shall be gradual.” But above all reform must “ issue from a legally constituted authority.”

Nicholas was thus in the direct line of succession to the paternal despots of the eighteenth century. “ Everything for the people ; nothing by the people.” The only solid achievement of the reign in the domestic sphere, was a codification of the law carried out under the direction of Alexander’s friend Michael Speránsky, though the financial reforms of Kankrin, who for nearly twenty years (1823-44) was Finance Minister, and in particular his reorganization of the Currency, gave a considerable impulse to commerce and industry.

Collapse
of the
“ Decem-
brists ”

Nicholas I,
1825-55

Foreign
Policy

Nicholas, however, is best remembered in European history for his policy towards Poland,¹ for the assistance which he gave to Austria in repressing the revolutionary movement of 1848-9,² and not least for the part he took in advancing the interests of Russia in the Near East.³ English readers should not need to be reminded that, sharply as he came into conflict with Great Britain over the Eastern Question, he did not fail to recognize the legitimate interests of Great Britain in that regard nor to suggest a method by which they might be reconciled with those of Russia. The definite proposal made on the eve of the Crimean War that England should occupy Egypt and Cyprus may have been somewhat cynical in its realism, but had it been adopted it would not only have averted the Crimean War, but have saved much suffering to the Christian subjects of the Sultan.⁴ Russia would have established a virtual protectorate over the Balkans; England would have permanently established herself in Egypt, and secured for all time her communications with her Indian dependency and her Pacific colonies. How France and Austria would have regarded such a solution of a problem in which they also were vitally interested is a matter of speculation; that Napoleon III would have acquiesced is unlikely; and Austria would almost certainly have supported his protest against any such disposition of the "sick man's" estate.

Effect of
Crimean
War

The Crimean War killed the Czar Nicholas; it definitely averted the progress of Russia towards Constantinople; and it also had an important effect upon the domestic situation in Russia. An autocracy is safe only so long as it can command success; a military empire cannot withstand the shock of defeat. The Crimean failure led directly to the emancipation of the serfs, and the other notable reforms effected by Alexander II. The amazing victory won by Japan against the Russian colossus brought the Duma into being. The disastrous defeat inflicted upon Russia by Germany in the Great War was the prelude to the Bolshevik revolution and the establishment of the Federation of Soviet Republics. It is with Russia after the Crimean War that we are now concerned.

Alexander II,
1855-81

In the middle of that war Alexander II succeeded to his father's throne. His reign falls into two sharply contrasted

¹ *Supra*, p. 287.

² *Supra*, p. 62.

³ *Supra*, p. 152.

⁴ *Cf. supra*, p. 176.

periods. Between 1855 and 1865 he carried through a series of remarkable reforms; from 1865 until his tragic death in 1881 he was the victim of fear, and the embodiment of reaction. The new Czar was not an outstanding personality: his character was, as a distinguished critic has observed, rather representative than commanding.¹ Nevertheless, he himself initiated and superintended the reforms which made the first ten years of his reign perhaps the most illustrious period in the modern history of Russia. The impulse, however, came in the first instance, as already indicated, from the military reverses in the Crimea. "Under the sting of the great national humiliation," writes a close observer of Russian life, "the upper classes awoke from their optimistic resignation. They had borne patiently the oppression of a semi-military administration and for this! . . . Those administrative fetters which had for more than a quarter of a century cramped every spontaneous movement had failed to fulfil even the narrow purpose for which they had been forged."²

The condition of Russia on the accession of Alexander II is thus sketched by Professor Vinogradoff, himself one of the leading "intellectuals" in the latter years of the nineteenth century: "The huge mass was sorely deficient in the production and circulation both of material goods and of ideas. The majority of the people were riveted to the soil by serfdom and ignorance; the means of communication were in such a state that it took occasionally a year to send convoys and relays from the north to Sebastopol, and social intercourse was so sluggish that when the price of corn stood at 1·50 roubles in the province of Kursk it fetched 15 roubles in the province of Pskov. The ruling class was mainly represented by the landowners described in Gogol's *Dead Souls*, vegetating in sloth on the back of their 'christened property' as the peasants were called. . . ." But the situation was not without its redeeming features. Of these the most remarkable was the existence of a group of intellectuals who made the University of Moscow a "centre of humanitarian and philosophical thought, and through the medium of literature the Press made its influence felt throughout the Empire."

¹ D. M. Wallace: *Russia*, pp. 444-5.

² Vinogradoff, ap. *Lectures on the History of the Nineteenth Century*, Cambridge, 1902, p. 237. To Professor Vinogradoff's lecture the following paragraphs owe much.

The "Czar
Liberator"

Directly after the signature of peace at Paris (1856), the new Czar issued a manifesto expressing his hope that "the internal order of the State may be settled and brought to perfection ; that justice and mercy may reign in our Law Courts ; that the desire for education and all manner of useful activity may spread and grow stronger." He at once relaxed some of the restrictions imposed by his father on the freedom of the Press, on the independence of the Universities, and on foreign travel. But he quickly turned to a still more important task, and tackled the great social and economic problem, by the solution of which he holds his place in history.

Abolition
of Serfdom

Despite the partial reforms effected by Alexander I, the great mass of the peasants were still enmeshed in the toils of an agrarian and social system which had been common to the greater part of Europe in the Middle Ages. Serfdom was a relatively recent institution in Russia ; but serfdom, it must be remembered, represents more often an advance on slavery than a reaction against freedom. In England serfdom or villeinage did not, in practice, survive the social and economic upheaval of the fourteenth century ; but the English peasant, if he gained his freedom, lost his land. To the serfs of France and other continental countries emancipation came much later, but when it came it did not, as in England, involve the divorce of the peasant from the land. The abolition of villeinage in England brought into being the great landowner, the tenant farmer, and the landless labourer. In France, in Prussia and elsewhere, a peasant proprietary emerged from the wreck of feudalism.

The Russian serf owed his emancipation not to revolution, but characteristically to reform initiated by an autocrat. The emancipating edict of Alexander followed, in some degree, the precedents set by Stein and Hardenberg in Prussia ; in others it anticipated the schemes associated with the names of Lord Ashbourne and Mr. George Wyndham in Ireland. Broadly speaking the peasants secured their personal freedom ; they were no longer tied to the soil by obligations to their lords ; but they paid for freedom (like the English peasant) by the loss of the greater part of the land they had cultivated. Such proportion of the holdings as they retained—and the proportion varied greatly in different districts—ultimately became their own in unfettered ownership ; but only after

it had been redeemed by a series of annual payments made either to the lord, or to the State, by whom the redemption money was advanced and to whom it had to be repaid. Both as regards the price ($16\frac{3}{4}$ years' purchase) and the period of repayment (49 years), the Russian scheme almost precisely anticipated the terms of the bargain by which the mass of the Irish tenants have become the proprietors of the land they tilled. But the Irish holdings are, as a rule, far larger than those of which the Russian serfs became possessed. The latter varied from about $2\frac{1}{2}$ acres, on private estates, to from 12 to 25 acres in the case of serfs on Crown lands.

There was, however, one feature of the system in Russia which differentiated it from the systems of Western Europe. Throughout Great Russia the ownership of the land remained vested not in the individual but in the village community, which had the right—after the ancient Teutonic fashion—of redistributing the holdings periodically among the members of the community. In the south and west of the country ownership was not communal but personal. In the latter districts emancipation was real and complete. In Greater Russia the individual serf did, in a sense, get rid of an individual lord, but only to fall under the tyranny of the village community, in which he was a unit. Nevertheless, the Emancipating Edict marks the beginning of a social and economic revolution. It not only effected a profound change in the agrarian system, it shook to its foundations the whole social and economic fabric. It necessitated, therefore, a wholesale reconstruction.

Local government was reorganized by the Zemstvo Law of 1864. Under this law European Russia was eventually divided into 360 districts, each of which had its elected Council with an Executive Board responsible thereto. Similarly each of the thirty-four Provinces had its Provincial Council composed of deputies elected by all the District Councils in the Province, and its permanent Executive Board. The *Zemstvos* were entrusted with all the ordinary functions of local government: primary education, poor relief, hospitals and charities, the maintenance of roads, and so forth. They could make by-laws and impose local rates, though the rates were collected for them by the police, which remained, perhaps inevitably, in the hands of the central government.

The Edict
of February
19, 1861

The
Zemstvo
Law,
January 13,
1864

Municipal
government

Not until 1870 was any measure of self-government conferred upon the towns, which were mostly in a very backward condition. Councils elected by the ratepayers, on a franchise which gave effective control to "property," were set up; but the towns, in even greater degree than the country districts, remained to all intents and purposes in the grip of the central bureaucracy.

Law and
justice

By the law of November 20, 1864, the administration of justice was completely remodelled. The old inquisitorial system was abolished and judicial proceedings were to be public. Public prosecutors were appointed, but the interests of defendants and of suitors in civil cases were protected by a new order of barristers. Locally, justice was to be administered by Justices of the Peace who were to be appointed by the District and Town Councils. Judges of the higher Courts were declared to be independent of the Government, and irremovable save by the decision of a Court of Law. All classes were to be equal before the law and, except where the offence was political or committed by an official, trial by jury was in criminal cases to be the rule.

Thus, at a single step, Russia placed herself, in the all-important matter of law and justice, in line with the progressive nations of Western Europe, from whose system her own was largely copied. On paper the new system left little to be desired, but, unfortunately, daily practice did not correspond with enlightened precept. Nevertheless, Alexander II deserves a place alongside such legal reformers as our own Plantagenets, a Henry II or an Edward I.

The Press
and
Education

The legal reform of 1864 was followed in 1865 by a slight relaxation of the rigid censorship exercised by the Government over the Press; but Press prosecutions continued to be numerous, and newspapers and journals showing Liberal sympathies were suppressed on slight provocation. The Government had a measure of excuse in the attitude of the more "advanced" parties. Reform, instead of appeasing discontent, served only to stimulate the demand for more fundamental changes in the structure of Government. This is inevitable; but that it should encourage the reactionaries is not less natural. Nevertheless, a new University code restored autonomy to the Universities in 1863. This was followed, in 1864, by a new Secondary Education code, classical and technical gymnasia

were established, and, in the same year, the control of elementary education was committed to the *Zemstvos* and town councils.

On April 16, 1866, an attempt was made to assassinate the "reforming" Czar. During the preceding decade things had moved so fast that the extreme reformers were disappointed that they had not moved faster. "Nihilism" was as yet, however, an insignificant force. The doctrines of Karl Marx, who, in 1862, had founded *The International*, had, indeed, found some response among the students of the Universities, and the teaching of *Bakunin* made an even wider and deeper appeal. Michael Bakunin was a Russian nobleman, who, after being exiled to Siberia, found a refuge in Switzerland. He preached the gospel of "Anarchy"—the destruction of every existing institution: Emperors and Kings, Churches and Parliament, capitalists and landowners—all must be destroyed before the foundations of a better world could be laid. His creed found its adherents in Russia, and the attempts, finally successful,¹ on the life of the Czar were the natural result.

Grieved and alarmed by the attempt on his life, Alexander lent an attentive ear to the counsels of reaction. During the latter half of his reign, much, though not all, that had been accomplished in the earlier part was thrown away. But to follow in detail the progress of reaction would be tiresome; the more so as the Czar, during the last ten years of his reign (1871-81), was largely absorbed in European affairs.

This was due partly to Bismarck's anxiety to keep open the wires between Berlin and Petersburg; partly to the re-emergence of the perennial problem of the Near East. With Bismarck's diplomacy this narrative has already dealt. We must turn once more to the Eastern Question.

The Crimean War registered, as we have seen, a definite set-back to the policy of Russia in the Near East. It also gave the Sultan an opportunity to put his house in order, had he been minded to do so. For twenty years he was relieved of all anxiety on the side of Russia. The event proved that the Sultan's zeal for reform was in direct ratio to his anxiety for self-preservation. To relieve him from the one was to remove the only incentive to the other. Consequently little

¹ Alexander II was assassinated in 1881.

or nothing was done to ameliorate the lot of the subject populations, and towards the end of the nineteenth century those populations began to take matters into their own hands. Crete, "the Great Greek Island," had been in a state of perpetual revolt ever since it had been replaced under the direct government of the Sultan (1840). In 1875 the unrest spread to the Peninsula, and the whole Eastern Question was again reopened by the outbreak of insurrection among the peoples of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Thence it spread to their kinsmen in Serbia and Montenegro.

The
Balkan In-
surrection,
1875

How far this insurrection was spontaneous, how far it was stimulated from Petersburg, is a question which it is not easy to decide. Plainly, Russia was not sorry to have the opportunity of fishing again in troubled waters. The rising of the Southern Slavs in 1875 gave the Czar his opportunity.

Turkish
misgovern-
ment

Turkish misgovernment in the European Provinces had become a crying scandal. The subject peoples groaned under the oppressiveness and uncertainty of a fiscal system which was as ruinous to the sovereign as it was hurtful to the subject. The inherent extravagance of a bad system combined with the peculation of an army of officials to bring disaster upon Turkey, and in October 1875, the Sultan was compelled to inform his creditors that he could not pay the full interest on the debt. Partial repudiation complicated an international situation already sufficiently embarrassing. The three Emperors took counsel together, and on 30 December, 1875, the Austrian Chancellor, Count Andrassy, issued from Buda-Pesth the Note which bears his name.

The
Andrassy
Note

The Andrassy Note expressed the anxiety of the Powers to curtail the area of the insurrection, and to maintain the peace of Europe; it drew attention to the failure of the Porte to carry out reforms long overdue, and it insisted that pressure must be put upon the Sultan effectually to redeem his promises. In particular, the Sultan must be pressed to grant complete religious liberty; to abolish tax farming; to apply the direct taxes, locally levied in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to the local needs of those Provinces; to improve the condition of the rural population by multiplying peasant owners, and, above all, to appoint a special commission, composed in equal numbers of Mussulmans and Christians, to control the execution not only of the reforms now demanded by the Powers, but also of those spontaneously promised by the Sultan.

The Note was presented to the Porte at the end of January 1876, and the Sultan, with almost suspicious promptitude, accepted four out of the five points—the exception being the application of the direct taxes to local objects.

The friendly efforts of the diplomatists were foiled, however, by the attitude of the insurgents. The latter refused, not unnaturally, to be satisfied with mere assurances, or to lay down their arms without substantial guarantees. The Sultan insisted, not without reason, that it was impossible to initiate a scheme of reform while the Provinces were actually in armed rebellion. Meanwhile the mischief was spreading. Bulgaria broke out into revolt in April; on May 7 a fanatical Muhammadan *émeute* at Salonika led to the murder of the French and German Consuls; the Sultan Abdul Aziz was deposed on May 30, and on June 4 was found dead, “having apparently committed suicide.” More drastic measures were obviously necessary, if a great European conflagration was to be avoided.

On May 11 the Austrian and Russian Chancellors were in conference with Prince Bismarck at Berlin, and determined to impose an immediate armistice upon the Porte. France and Italy assented to the Note, but the British Government regarded the terms as unduly peremptory; they resented the independent action of the three Imperial Powers, and declined to be a party to the Memorandum. Accordingly the proposed intervention was abandoned.

Mr. Disraeli's refusal created, as was inevitable, profound perturbation abroad, and evoked a storm of criticism at home. There can be no question that the European Concert, whatever it was worth, was broken by the policy of Great Britain. On the other hand, it is clear that the Imperial Chancellors committed an inexcusable blunder in not inviting the co-operation of England before formulating the demands of the Berlin Memorandum.

Meanwhile events were moving rapidly in the Balkans. On June 30, 1876, Serbia formally declared war upon the Porte, and on July 1 Prince Nicholas of Montenegro followed the example. Nor was the insurrection confined to Slavs of the purest blood. On May 1 some of the Bulgarian Christians defied the orders of the Turkish officials, and put one hundred of them to death. The Porte, already engaged in war with

The
Berlin
Memoran-
dum

Attitude of
the English
Government

Spread of
the Balkan
Insurrection

Serbia and Montenegro, was terrified at the idea of an attack upon the right flank of its army, and determined upon a prompt and terrible suppression of the Bulgarian revolt. A force of 18,000 regulars was marched into Bulgaria, and hordes of irregulars, Bashi-Bazouks, and Circassians were let loose, to wreak the vengeance of the Sultan upon a peasantry unprepared for resistance, and mostly unarmed. Whole villages were wiped out, and in the town of Batak only 2000 out of 7000 inhabitants escaped massacre.

Bulgarian
atrocities

How much of exaggeration there was in the tale of atrocities with which England and the world soon rang, it was, and is, impossible to say. But something much less than the ascertained facts would be sufficient to account for the profound emotion which moved the whole Christian world.

Turco-Serb
War

Meanwhile another complication had arisen. At the end of June, Serbia and Montenegro, as we have seen, had declared war upon the Porte. How far would that conflict extend? Could it be confined within the original limits? The Serbian army consisted largely of Russian volunteers and was commanded by a Russian general. How long would it be before the Russian Government became a party to the quarrel? The Serbian army, even reinforced by the volunteers, could offer but a feeble resistance to the Turk, and in August Prince Milan, acting on a hint from England, asked for the mediation of the Powers. England, thereupon, urged the Sultan to come to terms with Serbia and Montenegro, and suggested to the Powers some heads of proposals (September 21): the *status quo* in Serbia and Montenegro; local or administrative autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina; guarantees against mal-administration in Bulgaria, and a comprehensive scheme of reform, all to be embodied in a Protocol concluded between the Porte and the Powers. Russia then proposed (September 26) that, in the event of a refusal from Turkey, the allied fleets should enter the Bosphorus, that Bosnia should be temporarily occupied by Austria, and Bulgaria by Russia. The Turks persisted in their dilatory tactics, but Russia's patience was almost exhausted; General Ignatieff arrived at Constantinople, on a special mission from the Czar, on October 15, and on the 30th presented his ultimatum. If an armistice were not concluded with Serbia within forty-eight hours, the Russian Embassy was to be immediately withdrawn. On

November 2 the Porte gave way; Serbia was saved; a breathing-space was permitted to the operations of diplomacy.

The interval was utilized by the meeting of a Conference of the Powers at Constantinople. The Powers agreed to the terms suggested by Great Britain in September, but the Sultan, though prodigal in the concession of reforms, on paper, was determined that no one but himself should have a hand in executing them. On this point he was inexorable. Thereupon General Ignatieff, refusing to take further part in a solemn farce, withdrew from the Conference, and on April 14 the Czar, having secured the friendly neutrality of Austria, declared war.

Meanwhile the armistice arranged in November between Turkey and Serbia had been further prolonged on December 28, and on February 27, 1877, peace was concluded at Constantinople. But on June 12 Montenegro, encouraged by the action of Russia, recommenced hostilities, and on June 22 the Russian army effected the passage of the Danube.

No other way towards Constantinople was open to them, for the Russian navy had not yet had time since 1871 to regain the position in the Black Sea denied to it in 1856. The co-operation of Roumania was, therefore, indispensable. The Roumanian army held the right flank for Russia, but an offer of more active co-operation was declined with some hauteur by the Czar. From the Danube the Russians pushed on slowly but successfully, until their advanced guard suffered a serious check before Plevna on July 30. On the following day Osman Pasha, strongly entrenched at Plevna, inflicted a very serious reverse upon them.

Instead, therefore, of carrying Plevna by storm the Russians were compelled to besiege it, and the task proved to be a tough one. In chastened mood the Czar accepted, in August, the contemned offer of Prince Carol, who was appointed to the supreme command of the Russo-Roumanian army. For five months Osman held 120,000 Russians and Roumanians at bay, but at last his resistance was worn down, and on December 10 the remnant of the gallant garrison—some 40,000 half-starved men—were compelled to surrender.

Four days later Serbia, for the second time, declared war upon the Porte, and recaptured Prizrend, the ancient capital of the kingdom. The Russians, meanwhile, were pushing the

Conference
at Constantinople,
Dec. 1876

Russo-Turkish
War

Siege of
Plevna

Re-entry
of Serbia
into the
War

Turks back towards Constantinople ; they occupied Sofia on January 5, and Adrianople on the 20th. In the Caucasus their success was not less complete ; the great fortress of Kars had fallen on November 18 ; the Turkish Empire seemed to lie at their mercy, and in March, Russia dictated to the Porte the Treaty of San Stephano.

Treaty of
San
Stephano,
March 1878

A basis of agreement had already been reached at Adrianople (January 31) ; the terms were now embodied in the Treaty of San Stephano (March 3). Montenegro, enlarged by the acquisition of some strips of Bosnia and the Adriatic port of Antivari, was to be recognized definitely as independent of the Porte ; so also was Serbia, which was to acquire the districts of Nish and Mitrovitza ; the reforms recommended to the Porte at the Conference of Constantinople were to be immediately introduced into Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to be executed under the conjoint control of Russia and Austria ; the fortresses on the Danube were to be razed ; reforms were to be granted to the Armenians ; Russia was to acquire, in lieu of the greater part of the money indemnity which she claimed, Batoum, Kars, and other territory in Asia, and part of Dobrudja, which was to be exchanged with Roumania (whose independence was recognized by the Porte) for the strip of Bessarabia retroceded in 1856. The most striking feature of the treaty was the creation of a greater Bulgaria, which was to be constituted an autonomous tributary principality with a Christian Government and a national militia, and was to extend from the Danube to the Ægean, nearly as far south as Midia, (on the Black Sea) and Adrianople, and to include, on the west, the district round Monastir but not Salonika. The Ottoman Empire in Europe was practically annihilated.

Attitude of
Great
Britain

These events caused grave disquietude in Great Britain. Before the Russian armies crossed the Danube, the Czar had undertaken to respect English interests in Egypt and the Canal, and not to occupy Constantinople or the Straits (June 8, 1877) ; but the Russian victories in the closing months of 1877 excited in England some alarm as to the precise fulfilment of his promises. Accordingly, in January 1878, Lord Derby, then Foreign Secretary, reminded the Czar of his promise, and warned him that any treaty concluded between Russia and Turkey which might affect the engagements of 1856 and 1871

“ would not be valid without the assent of the Powers who were parties to those treaties.” (January 14.)

In order to emphasize the gravity of the warning, the fleet, which had been at Besika Bay, was ordered to pass the Dardanelles (January 23), and the Government asked Parliament for a vote of credit of £6,000,000.

A fortnight later the British Cabinet, in response to urgent telegrams from Mr. Layard, the British Ambassador in Constantinople, decided to send a detachment of the fleet into the Sea of Marmora, for the protection of British subjects in Constantinople. Russia retorted, that if British ships sailed up the Straits, Russian troops would enter Constantinople, for the purpose of protecting the lives of Christians of every race. But the Sultan, equally afraid of friends and foes, begged the English fleet to retire, and it returned, accordingly, to Besika Bay.

The extreme tension was thus for the moment relaxed. Austria then proposed that the whole matter should be referred to a European Congress, and Great Britain assented, on the express condition that all questions dealt with in the Treaty of San Stephano “ should be considered as subjects to be considered in the Congress.”

To the demand that the treaty in its entirety should be submitted to a Congress, Russia demurred. Great Britain insisted. Again peace hung in the balance. Apart from the dispute between England and Russia there was a great deal of inflammable material about, to which a spark would set light. Greece, Serbia, and, above all, Roumania, who with incredible tactlessness and base ingratitude had been excluded from the peace negotiations, were all gravely dissatisfied with the terms of the Treaty of San Stephano. Greece had indeed actually invaded Thessaly at the beginning of February, and only consented to abstain from further hostilities upon the assurance of the Powers that her claims should have favourable consideration in the definitive Treaty of Peace.

Disraeli, now Lord Beaconsfield, next announced that he had ordered 7000 Indian troops to embark for Malta. The *coup* was denounced in England as “ sensational,” un-English, unconstitutional, even illegal ; but if it alarmed England it impressed Europe, and there can be no question that it made for peace.

Russia,
Germany,
and
Austria

The operation of other forces was tending in the same direction. The terms of settlement proposed by Russia were not less distasteful to Austria than to England. An Austrian army was mobilized on the Russian flank in the Carpathians, and on February 4 the Emperor Francis Joseph demanded that the terms of peace should be referred to a Congress at Vienna. Austria might well take a firm line, for behind Austria was Germany.

Bismarck's
Policy

Bismarck had made up his mind. He would fain have preserved in its integrity the *Dreikaiserbund* of 1872; he was under deep obligations to Russia, and was only too glad to further, and even to stimulate, her ambitions so long as they conflicted only with those of Great Britain or France. But when it came to a possible conflict between Russia and Austria matters were different. It was true that Russia had protected Prussia's right flank in 1864, and her left flank in 1866, and—highest service of all—had "contained" Austria in 1870. The Czar thought, not unnaturally, that the time had arrived for a repayment of the debt, and requested Bismarck to contain Austria. Bismarck was still anxious to "keep open the wire between Berlin and Petersburg," provided it was not at the expense of that between Berlin and Vienna. He replied, therefore, to the Czar that Germany must keep watch on the Rhine, and could not spare troops to contain Austria as well. The excuse was transparent. Bismarck had, in fact, decided to give Austria a free hand in the Balkans, and even to push her along the road towards Salonika. His attitude was regarded in Russia as a great betrayal, a dishonourable repudiation of an acknowledged debt. It is not, however, too much to say that it averted a European conflagration. The Czar decided not to fight Austria and England, but, instead, to accept the invitation to a Congress at Berlin.

The Treaty
of Berlin

On May 30 Lord Salisbury and Count Schouvaloff came to an agreement upon the main points at issue, and on June 13 the Congress opened at Berlin. Prince Bismarck presided, and filled his chosen rôle of "the honest broker"; but it was Lord Beaconsfield whose personality dominated the Congress. "Der alte Jude, das ist der Mann," was Bismarck's shrewd summary of the situation.

Little time was spent in discussion; the treaty was signed on July 13. Russia's sole acquisition in Europe was the strip

of Bessarabia which had been retroceded to Roumania in 1856, and was now, by an act of grave impolicy and base ingratitude, snatched away from her by the Czar. In Asia Russia retained Batoum, Ardahan, and Kars. Bosnia and Herzegovina were handed over for an undefined term to Austria, who was also to be allowed to occupy for military, but not administrative, purposes, the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar. England, under a separate Convention concluded with Turkey on June 4, was to occupy and administer the island of Cyprus, so long as Russia retained Kars and Batoum. Turkey was to receive the surplus revenues of the island, to carry out reforms in her Asiatic dominions, and to be protected in the possession of them by Great Britain. France sought for authority to occupy Tunis in the future; Italy hinted at claims upon Albania and Tripoli. Germany asked for nothing, but was more than compensated for her modesty by securing the gratitude and friendship of the Sultan. Never did Bismarck make a better investment.

The Cyprus
Convention

Greece with no false modesty claimed Crete, Thessaly, Epirus, and part of Macedonia; but Lord Beaconsfield, in resisting the claim, suggested that Greece being "a country with a future could afford to wait." Two years later (1880), the Powers suggested to the Porte the cession of Thessaly and Epirus; and at last, in 1881, the tact and firmness of Mr. Goschen wrung from the unwilling Sultan one-third of the latter province and the whole of the former. Macedonia was still left, fortunately for Greece, under the heel of the Sultan. Lord Beaconsfield did not exhibit much positive benevolence towards Greece, but negatively she, like Serbia, owes him a considerable debt. If he had not torn up the Treaty of San Stephano, Bulgaria would have obtained a commanding position in Macedonia, Serbia would never have got Uskub and Monastir, Greece would still be sighing for Kavala and perhaps for Salonika.

The Balkan
States

At the moment, however, the Southern Slavs were bitterly disappointed by the terms of the settlement. Serbia did indeed gain some territory at the expense of Bulgaria, but the gain was more than off-set by the position assigned to Austria. The Sanjak of Novi-Bazar, still governed by the Turks but garrisoned by Austrians, cut off the Southern Slavs of Serbia from their brethren in Montenegro, while the Austrian

The
Southern
Slavs

"occupation" of Bosnia and Herzegovina made a further breach in the solidarity of the Jugo-Slavs, and brought the Hapsburgs into the heart of Balkan affairs.

Roumania

Roumania was equally dissatisfied. Treated with discourtesy and gross ingratitude by Russia at San Stephano, she fared no better at Berlin. Bismarck, indifferent to the dynastic ties which united Prussia and Roumania, was not sorry to see Russia neglecting a golden opportunity for binding Roumania in gratitude to herself. A Roumania alienated from Russia would be the less likely to quarrel with the Dual Monarchy, and to press her claims to the inclusion of the unredeemed Roumanians in Transylvania and the Bukovina. For the loss of Southern Bessarabia, Roumania deemed herself ill-compensated by the acquisition of part of the Dobrudja, but she secured complete independence from the Porte, as did Serbia and Montenegro, who received most of the districts promised to them at San Stephano.

Bulgaria

Bulgaria did not. And herein lay the essential difference between the Treaty of Berlin and that of San Stephano.

"Bulgaria," as defined at Berlin, was not more than a third of the Bulgaria mapped out at San Stephano. It was to consist of a relatively narrow strip between the Danube and the Balkans, and to be an independent State under Turkish suzerainty. South of it there was to be a province, Eastern Roumelia, which was to be restored to the Sultan, who agreed to place it under a Christian governor approved by the Powers. By this change the Sultan recovered 2,500,000 of population and 30,000 square miles of territory; Bulgaria was cut off from the Ægean; Macedonia remained intact.

Significance of Treaty of Berlin

Such were the main terms of the Treaty of Berlin. That treaty forms a great landmark in the history of the Eastern Question; but its most important features were not those which at the time attracted most attention. The enduring significance of the treaty is to be found, not in the fact that Lord Beaconsfield snatched from the brink of destruction a remnant of the Ottoman Empire, but that he left a door open to the new nations which were arising upon the ruins of that Empire. The official attitude of Great Britain during the critical years 1875-8 might seem to have committed the English people to the cause of reaction and the Turkish misgovernment. In effect, the policy of Lord Beaconsfield,

whatever its motive, was far from obstructive to the development of the Balkan Nationalities. Two of them at least have reason to cherish the memory of the statesman who tore up the Treaty of San Stephano. Had that treaty been allowed to stand, both Greece and Serbia would have had to renounce their ambitions in Macedonia, while the enormous accessions of territory secured by that treaty to Bulgaria might ultimately have proved, even to her, a doubtful advantage.

The partition of Bulgaria was, however, manifestly an artificial arrangement, and did not long survive the death (in 1881) of its real author, Lord Beaconsfield. But Bulgaria proper had in the meantime to be provided with a Constitution and a ruler. A single-chamber Legislature and a responsible Executive were bestowed by the Organic Law of 1879 upon a people entirely unfitted for "constitutional" government. That business accomplished, the Czar recommended, and the Assembly in April 1879 elected as ruler Prince Alexander of Battenberg, a scion by a morganatic marriage of the House of Darmstadt, a nephew by marriage of the Czar, and an officer in the Prussian army. It was hoped that the "Battenberg" would prove a pliant instrument of Russian diplomacy; but during the years which succeeded the Treaty of Berlin a remarkable change took place in Bulgaria. The accession of the new Czar Alexander III (1881) altered for the worse the personal relations between Petersburg and Sofia; the arrogance of the Russian officials towards the Bulgarian peasants obliterated the remembrance of the service rendered to them by their "liberators" in 1877; above all, a "strong man" had appeared in Bulgaria in the person of Stephen Stambuloff, who in 1884 became President of the Sobranje. In the two Bulgarias there was a keen desire for union, and Stambuloff ardently espoused the cause.

In September 1885 Gamil Pasha, the Turkish Governor of Eastern Roumelia, was expelled, and the Province announced its union with Bulgaria proper. Prince Alexander at once agreed to the union of the two Bulgarias. The diplomatic position was, however, curiously paradoxical: the parts were reversed; Russia was now indignant; Great Britain not merely acquiescent but approving. Nor is the explanation obscure. Russia had played her cards in Bulgaria as badly as they could be played. In opposition to her high-handed

and self-seeking methods, there had grown up a strong national party. The "Greater Bulgaria" of 1878 would have been a Russian Province, within striking distance of Constantinople. The Bulgaria of 1885 was, as Lord Salisbury (again in office) clearly perceived, a sure bulwark against Russia. It is only fair to remember that but for Lord Beaconsfield's action in 1878 that evolution would have been impossible.

Prince Alexander waited for no leave from the Powers. Stambuloff had bluntly told him "that there were only two paths open to him : the one to Philippopolis, and as far beyond as God may lead ; the other to Darmstadt." Alexander's choice was soon made, and on September 20 he announced his acceptance of the throne of united Bulgaria. Meanwhile Bulgaria was threatened with a new danger.

Serbo-
Bulgarian
War

On November 14, King Milan of Serbia, who in 1882 had followed the example of Prince Carol of Roumania and had assumed a royal Crown, suddenly seized an obviously frivolous pretext to declare war upon Bulgaria. Whether Austria actually instigated this attack, it is impossible to say. The Serbian attack was, however, repulsed by Bulgaria, which in its turn took the offensive against Serbia. Thereupon Austria intervened, and the Bulgarians were informed that a further advance would bring them "face to face no longer with Serbian, but with Austrian troops." Serbia was saved, but so also was the union of the two Bulgarias. Early in 1886 the Porte formally recognized the union of the two Bulgarias, and appointed Prince Alexander to be "Governor-General of Eastern Roumelia." Alexander did not long enjoy his new honour. Alexander III was deeply mortified by the turn events had taken in the Balkans, and inspired by implacable enmity against his cousin determined to dethrone him. On August 21, 1886, Prince Alexander was kidnapped by a band of Russian officers and carried off into captivity. A Provisional Government was hastily set up at Sofia under Stambuloff, and its first act was to recall the kidnapped Prince. Permitted temporarily to return to Bulgaria, Alexander played his cards badly, and on September 7, under renewed pressure from the Czar, he abdicated, and left Bulgaria for ever. The Bulgarians were obliged to seek a new Prince, and after several mishaps eventually found a ruler in Prince

Russian
coup at
Sofia, Aug.
1886

Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, a grandson of King Louis Philippe. Russia refused to recognize Ferdinand, but strong in the support of Bismarck and the Emperor Francis Joseph, the young Prince defied the opposition of Russia, and on August 14, 1887, ascended the Bulgarian throne. His reign was destined to be the most memorable in the history of his adopted country.

For the next seven years Bulgaria was ruled by Stephen Stambuloff Stambuloff, a rough, coarse-grained peasant of indomitable will, strong passions, and burning patriotism. In 1894, however, he was dismissed by Prince Ferdinand, and in July 1895 was finally removed from the scene by assassination.

Prince Ferdinand was now master in his own house, and the first use he made of power was to effect a reconciliation with Russia. But the centre of interest in the Near East had by this time shifted from Bulgaria to Greece.

Handed back to the Porte in 1840, Crete had been for more than half a century in almost perpetual insurrection. All these insurrections had one supreme object--the reunion of the "Great Greek Island" with the Greeks of the mainland. In the spring of 1896 the islanders were once more in arms. Civil war broke out between Moslems and Christians in Canea, and the Powers, to prevent the spread of disturbances, put pressure upon the Sultan to make concessions. But neither Moslems nor Christians took the Sultan's promises seriously, and in February 1897 war again broke out at Canea, and the Christians again proclaimed union with Greece. No power on earth could now have prevented the Greek patriots from going to the assistance of the islanders. Prince George, the King's second son, was accordingly sent (February 10) with a torpedo-boat flotilla to intercept Turkish reinforcements, and three days later an army was landed under Colonel Vassos. The admirals of the Powers then occupied Canea with an international landing party, and compelled the insurgents to desist from further fighting.

Interest then shifted back to the mainland. The "patriots" believed that the moment for decisive action against the Turks had at last come, and King George yielded to the warlike sentiments of his people. But if the Greek hot-heads wanted war, the Sultan was prepared for it, and his august ally at Berlin urged him to put to the test the new weapon which German soldiers had forged for him, and, once for all,

The
problem
of Crete

Cretan In-
surrection,
1896-7

The
"Thirty
Days' War,"
April 17
to May 20,
1897

teach the insolent Greeks their place. On April 17 the Porte accordingly declared war. "The Thirty Days' War" ensued. It was all over before the end of May. Russia had warned her friends in the Balkans that there must be no intervention. The Greeks were diplomatically isolated; they made no use of their superior sea-power, and on land the forces which had invaded Thessaly were quickly pushed back over their own frontiers. The Turkish army under Edhem Pasha occupied Larissa, and won two decisive victories at Pharsalos and Domokos. So disorganized were the Greek forces that Athens became alarmed for its own safety, and turned savagely upon the King. The Powers, however, having no mind to embark, for the third time, upon the tedious task of providing the Greeks with a King, imposed an armistice upon the combatants (May 20). The definite peace was signed in December.

The war was nothing less than disastrous to Greece: it discredited the dynasty; it involved the retrocession of a strip of Thessaly; and it imposed upon a State, already on the verge of bankruptcy, the burden of a considerable war indemnity. Nor was Greece spared the further humiliation of International Control, exercised by means of a mixed Commission, over her external finance. On the other hand, the war brought to Crete final, though not formal, emancipation. In 1899 a new Constitution on liberal lines was approved by a Constituent Assembly. Its author was a young lawyer destined to fill a conspicuous place in the history, not merely of Greece, but of Europe, Eleutherios Venizelos, and thanks largely to him Crete enjoyed real self-government. In 1905 the islanders, led by Venizelos, proclaimed the union of Crete with the Hellenic Kingdom; but it was not until after the whilom rebel had become Prime Minister of Greece (1910) that the union was formally acknowledged.

Long before this the Eastern Question had entered upon a new phase, and the Ottoman Sultan had found a new ally in the German Emperor. But much was to happen in Germany and elsewhere before the German factor became dominant in the Balkan problem, and to the intervening events we must now turn.

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 See also chapters iv, x.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE

THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA

A New Era

MORE than once, in the course of this narrative, it has seemed well to labour the commonplace that with the last quarter of the nineteenth century we enter on a new era of history. Ever since the sixteenth century the relations of the European Powers—notably those of Spain, England, France, and the United Provinces—had been materially affected by their rivalry in distant oceans and in non-European continents. But the continents and oceans were distant, and the reactions they evoked in European affairs were relatively feeble. It was otherwise in the last years of the nineteenth century. The uttermost parts of the earth were no longer distant from Europe, but were in close and almost continuous contact with the nerve-centres of world-affairs : with London, Paris, and Berlin.

From the 'seventies onwards, therefore, we must be prepared to give a larger interpretation to "European History" and "European Politics." Africa and Asia, the Atlantic and the Pacific, begin to react upon Europe in a way they had never done before. The most obtrusive manifestation of the new spirit was the scramble for additional territory, largely in tropical lands. Men called this "Imperialism." But "Imperialism"—the lust for territory—was in large measure the outcome of economic necessity. The industrialization of the great European countries, in particular Great Britain and Germany, brought in its train, as we have seen, three results : a demand for food for the new town populations, a demand which even German agriculturists could barely meet, and which British agriculturists entirely failed to supply ; a demand for raw materials, most of which were produced only in non-European lands, and a demand for markets for the disposal

of surplus manufactured products. Had the dream of the Manchester School materialized : had

The wise who think, the wise who reign,
From growing commerce loose(d) her latest chain,

the competition among the European peoples for commodities and for markets, might have been peaceable, if not entirely friendly. The reaction against Free Trade, and the advent of high Protectionism rendered it practically certain that the struggle would be bitter, and probably not bloodless.

The scramble began in Africa. Africa was near ; Africa was full of wealth ; it offered strategical points of immense potential importance, and though it teemed with native peoples it was, in a European sense, "almost unoccupied." From this description the northern coast must be excepted ; but in the rest of Africa European enterprise was represented by a fringe of settlements and trading stations. The Portuguese had been at Delagoa Bay for nearly four hundred years ; the Dutch, at the Cape of Good Hope for nearly two hundred and fifty ; the English, in Cape Colony and Natal during the greater part of the century ; while French, Dutch, British, and Portuguese trading stations had been dotted along the coasts from Senegal round to the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb.

The
scramble
for Africa

The beginning of the new era in African, nay in world-politics, was announced by the opening of the Suez Canal (1869). The idea of joining the waters of the Mediterranean with those of the Red Sea by means of a canal is as old as the Pyramids. Traces still remain of a canalized waterway dug by Rameses the Great within half-an-hour's walk of the western bank of the present canal. Though restored by the Emperor Trajan it was filled in towards the end of the ninth century ; but the tradition of it survived, and the idea of a canal persisted through the ages.

The Suez
Canal

Venice considered the scheme as a means of restoring her lost supremacy after the discovery of the Cape route to India ; but Venice had fallen into irreparable decay, and such an enterprise was beyond weakened powers. From the sixteenth century onwards France was, of all the European Powers, most closely and continuously interested in Egypt and Syria, and the idea of cutting the Isthmus of Suez was repeatedly considered by her statesmen and scientists. Liebnitz recommended it to Louis XIV, and Colbert gave serious considera-

France and
the Canal

tion to the project. D'Argenson, one of the most brilliant of French diplomatists in the eighteenth century, published (1788) an elaborate scheme for the construction of the canal. Napoleon went so far as to have the ground surveyed, but it was to the vision, the genius, and the persistence of Ferdinand de Lesseps that the consummation of the project was actually due.

Ferdinand
de Lesseps

Lesseps obtained a concession for the construction of the canal from the Khedive in 1854, and four years later a company was floated with the totally inadequate capital of 200,000,000 francs.¹ Lesseps, who was a staunch friend of the Anglo-French *entente*, did his utmost to interest English statesmen and financiers in the scheme. But in vain. Goethe had in 1827 expressed the hope that he might live to see a Suez Canal cut, and England in possession of it. But England was entirely blind to the advantages of the scheme and would have none of it. Not one share was subscribed in England. Financiers thought the scheme would never pay; Lord Clarendon regarded it as a device to make the Egyptian Pasha independent of the Porte; Palmerston thought that it was conceived wholly in the interests of France, and urged the Sultan to refuse his sanction to it.

But Lesseps, undaunted by difficulties and undeterred by opposition, won through, and after fifteen years of toil and anxiety he had his reward. In 1869 the canal was opened by his kinswoman, the Empress of the French, and the whole world at last recognized the splendour and significance of his achievement.

Disraeli and
the purchase
of the
Khedive's
shares

Official England looked on coldly. But in 1874 Disraeli came into power. He was the first English statesman to recognize the significance of the new era that was dawning and the new forces which were beginning to operate in world-politics: "We have," he said, "a new world, new influences at work, new and unknown objects and dangers with which to cope. . . ." Disraeli perceived that the Suez Canal was a vital link in the Imperial communications of Great Britain. In November 1875 he learnt that the 176,602 shares in the Canal Company, held by the Khedive Ismail, were being offered for sale in Paris. He decided to buy them. His Foreign Secretary, Lord Derby, and Northcote, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, were against him; but the Queen supported him;

¹ Say £8,000,000. The canal ultimately cost nearly £30,000,000.

he persisted ; the Rothschilds found the money—£4,080,000, and on November 25 the Prime Minister wrote to his Sovereign : “ It is just settled ; you have it Madam.” The Queen was jubilant ; the Crown Princess of Prussia wrote congratulations to her mother from Berlin and quoted a letter from her school-boy son, “ I know you will be so delighted that England has bought the Suez Canal. How jolly ! ” So “ Willy ” thought in 1875 : his thoughts had not yet turned to the Near East. King Leopold of Belgium described Disraeli’s *coup* as “ the greatest event in modern politics.” In English text-books this “ greatest event ” has received scant notice ; but King Leopold judged not untruly. Financially the purchase proved an excellent bargain. Shares bought for £4,000,000 are now worth over £50,000,000 and yield about 37½ per cent. on the money invested. But that is the least significant of the results achieved by Disraeli. His *coup* marked the advent of a new era in English diplomacy, and in England’s relation to world-politics.

The sale of the shares was due to the increasing financial embarrassments of the Khedive Ismail, a grandson of Mehemet Ali. The debt which at his accession (1863) stood at £3,293,000, had increased by 1876 to £94,000,000. To this “ carnival of extravagance and oppression ”¹ we may trace the European intervention in the affairs of Egypt, and thus the whole of the latest phase in its long history. The English and French creditors of the Khedive, naturally alarmed as to the security of their loans, sent out Mr. (afterwards Lord) Goschen and M. Joubert to look after their interests. The immediate result was the establishment of the *Caisse de la dette* (May 2, 1876) and incidentally of a Dual Control. Lord Salisbury accepted French partnership with regret and only as preferable to British renunciation or French monopoly. “ Renouncing would have been to place the French across our road to India. Monopolising would have been very near the risk of war. So we resolved to share.”² The international Commission was originally empowered only to receive the revenue set apart for the service of the debt, and to sanction or veto fresh loans ; but its functions were rapidly enlarged to embrace the whole financial administration of the country.

¹ The phrase is Lord Milner’s.

² Salisbury to Northcote. Salisbury’s *Life*, ii, 331-2.

France, Austria, and Italy appointed official Commissioners. Lord Derby refused to follow their example, but Mr. Goschen, devoid of Lord Derby's official responsibility, suggested at the Khedive's request the name of Captain Evelyn Baring, a member of the famous financial house and until recently Private Secretary to Lord Northbrook in India, as the English representative on the Commission. In this characteristic fashion there was introduced into Egypt the man destined to be the regenerator of the country, "the Great Pharaoh of Modern Egypt."

" 'The state of Egypt,' says Lord Sanderson, quoting Lord Cromer's own words, 'at this time was deplorable.' About one-fifth of the arable land of the country had passed into the hands of the Khedive, was administered directly by him, and cultivated to a great extent by forced labour. There was no appeal from the arbitrary demands of the officials charged with the collection of the taxes, and these demands were enforced with the most pitiless severity. In addition to the heavy payments required for the service of the funded debt, large sums were due to contractors and others for goods supplied to the Egyptian Government, and the pay of most of the employees was greatly in arrear." ¹

By 1879 Ismail's tyranny and extravagance had become insupportable, and on June 26 his suzerain the Sultan was induced by the Powers to procure his abdication. His abdication, writes Lord Cromer, "sounded the death-knell of arbitrary personal rule in Egypt." ² But his son and successor, Tewfik, though honest and well-meaning, was not the man to cope with the situation by which he was confronted.

The country, and more particularly the army, was seething with discontent. Of this discontent an obscure Colonel, named Arabi Bey, became the mouthpiece and representative. It is not easy to determine the precise character and significance of the movement which Arabi led. Primarily a military revolt, it was directed partly against Turkish suzerainty, partly against Occidental intervention. "Egypt for the Egyptians" was the battle-cry of the rebels, but how far either Egypt or the Egyptians would have profited by their success it is difficult to say.

Rebellion
of Arabi
Bey, 1881

¹ Lord Sanderson : *Evelyn, Earl of Cromer*, p. 10.

² *Modern Egypt*, i, 145.

Europe became more and more uneasy at the situation. Order must be restored in Egypt; but how? By Turkey? By the European Concert? By France and England conjointly, or by either of these alone? At this moment a difficult situation was not rendered easier by a change of Government in France. In November 1881 the Ministry of Jules Ferry fell, and Gambetta came into power. In regard to Egypt, Gambetta was confronted with three courses: to go on in full and friendly accord with England, and to see the thing through; to invoke the intervention of the Powers and so "internationalize" the Egyptian situation; or to abandon Egypt altogether, and, in return for a free hand for France in Tunis and Morocco, to leave England to work her will in Egypt. Gambetta himself strongly favoured the first course, joint action with England, but a fresh obstacle then presented itself. Bismarck, anxious on the one hand to ingratiate himself at Constantinople, and on the other to set England and France by the ears, encouraged the Sultan to assert his suzerain authority, and to inform the Powers that the restoration of order in Egypt was his business, and his alone. Meanwhile, Gambetta had fallen (January 1882), and been replaced by Freycinet, who favoured internationalization. It was decided, therefore, to summon a European Conference. The Conference met in Constantinople at the end of June and proved entirely abortive. Meanwhile an *émeute* at Alexandria precipitated the crisis. On June 11 the Arabs attacked the European population and slaughtered fifty or more of them, mostly Greeks, in cold blood. Tewfik was powerless to restrain the fanaticism aroused by Arabi, now one of his "responsible" Ministers. The Concert of Europe was equally impotent. Great Britain decided to act, if necessary, alone. Sir Beauchamp Seymour, commanding the British fleet off Alexandria, was instructed to demand that the construction of fortifications should cease.

The demand being ignored, the Admiral proceeded (July 11) to bombard and demolish the forts. Arabi let loose the convicts, and then with his troops abandoned the town, which for two whole days was delivered up to fire, pillage, and massacre. At length the British Admiral landed a body of bluejackets and marines, and order was tardily restored in the ruined city.

From the moment it became clear that decisive action was

Bombard-
ment of
Alexandria

The
Egyptian
expedition

necessary, France refused to co-operate, and her fleet left Alexandria for Port Said. England had, therefore, to go through the task alone, and the first units of an expeditionary force left England on July 27. Almost simultaneously troops were despatched from India, and among these the Government, following the precedent set by Lord Beaconsfield, decided to include a native contingent. Sir Garnet Wolseley, debouching not from Alexandria but from Port Said, landed in Egypt on August 19, and marching on Cairo across the desert, inflicted a crushing defeat on Arabi, storming the formidable lines of Tel-el-Kebir on September 18. On the 14th, Cairo surrendered to a couple of squadrons of British cavalry. The "series of military operations," to adopt Mr. Gladstone's characteristic periphrasis, was now complete. Arabi was captured, brought to trial, sentenced to death, and finally deported to Ceylon. England was *vis-à-vis* the Khedive, and to all intents and purposes mistress of Egypt. France had abdicated, and on attempting to resume *condominium* was politely informed that she had forfeited her rights. The fact was indisputable, and no candid Frenchman could deny it. "En somme," writes Débidour, "l'Egypte était perdue pour nous, par notre faute et nous étions brouillés avec l'Angleterre, comme nous l'étions depuis 1881, avec l'Italie."¹


The res-
toration
of order

A British army was left in occupation of Egypt in order to complete the restoration of order, or, in official phrase the "authority of the Khedive." When that task had been accomplished the occupation would cease. That such was the genuine desire and intention of the Government, there is not a shadow of doubt.² Lord Granville's famous despatch on January 3, 1883, announced that policy to the Great Powers, and intimated that "the position in which Her Majesty's Government is placed towards His Highness, (the Khedive) imposes upon them the duty of giving advice, with the object of securing that the order of things to be established shall be of a satisfactory character and possess the elements of stability and progress." "Giving advice" is, as Lord Milner observes, a "charming euphemism of the best Granvillian brand";³ but Lord Granville was at one with his colleagues in his anxiety that the function should be temporary.

¹ *Hist. Diplomatique*, i, 67.

² Hansard, cclxxvi, 41.

³ *England in Egypt*, p. 33.



SCALE 0 100 200 300 400 Eng. Miles

The
Soudan

The anomaly of the whole position was strikingly illustrated by the events which ensued in the Egyptian Soudan. The Arabs of the South, as of the North, had long groaned beneath the burdens imposed upon them by their Egyptian taskmasters. Colonel Charles Gordon, who had acted as Governor of the Soudan under Ismail, retired in 1879, and from that moment the condition of its inhabitants was pitiful. Consequently, when Muhammad Ahmed announced himself as the Mahdi or promised Messiah, the Soudanese rallied to his standard and drove the Egyptian troops into the fortresses. In September 1883, General Hicks was despatched by the Khedive, in command of a wholly inadequate Egyptian force, to reconquer the Soudan. In November, Hicks Pasha, his European staff, and his Egyptian soldiers were cut to pieces by the Mahdi near Shekan. Sir Evelyn Baring, who, in September 1883, had returned to Egypt as Consul-General, advised the abandonment of the Soudan. Lord Dufferin, in his report of 1883, had advised that the Western Soudan should be abandoned, and that Egypt should be content to hold Khartoum and Sennaar. Lord Wolseley concurred in this opinion. After the Hicks disaster, however, Lord Wolseley urged that a strong garrison should be established at Assouan, and that reinforcements should be sent to Suakin, Berber, and Khartoum.

Gordon's
mission,
January
1884

Uncertain as to the wisest course to follow under these difficult circumstances, the British Cabinet sought the advice of General Gordon. Gordon replied: "I should send out myself." The distracted Cabinet caught at the idea, and on January 18, 1884, General Gordon was sent out to Khartoum to report on the situation with a view to immediate evacuation.¹ The Khedive appointed him Governor-General of the Soudan, the Home Government acquiesced in the appointment, and in that capacity he started for Khartoum. Meanwhile the facts of the local situation were hardening. Gordon had hardly left Cairo for Khartoum when Colonel Valentine Baker, the head of the Egyptian Gendarmerie, was defeated in an attempt to relieve Tokar, near the Red Sea coast (February 4). Gordon presently found himself besieged by

¹ There is still some confusion as to whether Gordon's orders were to "report" merely, or to "evacuate." For text of instructions, cf. Morley: *Gladstone*, iii, 554; but see also Holland: *Life of Duke of Devonshire*, i, 417 seq.

the Mahdists in Khartoum. Lord Wolseley was quick to perceive the danger of the situation, and urged upon Ministers the immediate despatch of reinforcements to Suakin, and the advance of an English Brigade to Wady Halfa.

Weeks and even months were, however, allowed to pass before any decision was arrived at. The miserable troops on whom alone Gordon could rely were defeated outside Khartoum on March 16, and it became clear that if ever Gordon was to leave Khartoum alive he would have to be succoured by his own countrymen. Berber, the half-way house between Suakin and Khartoum, was captured by the Mahdi (May 26)—an event which still further jeopardized Gordon's position in Khartoum. Gordon at Khartoum

Not until August did the Gladstone Government decide to send out an expedition, under Wolseley's command, to rescue Gordon. Wolseley made all the haste possible under circumstances of great difficulty, but the procrastination of the Cabinet had delayed the expedition until it was too late. On reaching Korti (December 29), Lord Wolseley despatched Sir Herbert Stewart with a small force by land to avoid the wide bend of the Nile. Stewart, after a hard fight at Abu Klea (January 17, 1885), forced his way to the Nile, not far below Khartoum, but on January 19 was mortally wounded. The command then devolved on Sir Charles Wilson. Exactly a week later (January 26) the Mahdi stormed Khartoum and General Gordon was killed. Wilson came in sight of the city two days after it had fallen.

The news of the tragedy caused mingled grief and indignation in England, but the Government, after many vacillations, decided in April 1885 to abandon the Soudan south of Wady Halfa, and, though retaining the port of Suakin, to abandon the construction, already commenced, of a railway from Suakin to Berber. This resolution was due to the threat of danger in another quarter. On March 30, Russia, quick to take advantage of England's preoccupation, had occupied Penjdeh on the frontier of Afghanistan. The relations of England and Russia in Central Asia will engage attention later on. Death of Gordon

Egypt was not the only part of Africa in which British interests were deeply involved. For a century and a half we had been almost as indifferent about the Cape route to India Britons and Boers in South Africa

as we were about Egypt. Two adventurous Englishmen, Shilling and FitzHerbert, determined to be beforehand with the Dutch, had hoisted the English flag at the Cape of Good Hope in 1620, but by order of James I it was hauled down again, and from 1652 until the end of the eighteenth century Cape Colony was governed as a dependency of the Dutch East India Company from Java. In 1795 the United Provinces became a dependency of the French Republic, and to save Cape Colony from a similar fate it was, on the suggestion of the Stadtholder, then a refugee in England, occupied by a British force. Handed back to the Batavian Republic at the Treaty of Amiens, 1802, it was on the renewal of the war, reconquered, and at the final Peace, (1814) was purchased for £6,000,000 sterling from the Dutch Government.

The Boer
trek

The Cape Colony was now, by virtue of two conquests and a purchase, British property ; but its white inhabitants were mainly Dutch. From the first there was friction between the Dutch farmers, intensely conservative in instinct and tradition, and a "progressive" Government in Whitehall, and in 1836-40, the Dutch farmers determined to quit the Cape Colony and set up their independent Republics in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. In 1852, by the Sand River Convention, the British Government recognized the Independence of the Transvaal and in 1854 that of the Orange Free State. Subject to two conditions : an open door to all-comers on equal terms, and the complete abandonment of slavery.

Natal

For more than twenty years the policy of non-interference was consistently maintained. But, meanwhile, the British Colony at the Cape had been steadily advancing towards the goal of self-government which was finally reached in 1872. Moreover, a handful of British colonists had, in 1824, established themselves, despite the opposition of the Boers to the north and west of them, and were recognized as a British colony in 1843. Down to 1856 Natal formed part of Cape Colony, but in that year it was declared independent and in 1893 attained to the dignity of "responsible" government.

Sir George Grey, a man of wide and clear vision, who was Governor of Cape Colony from 1854 to 1861, perceived the dangers ahead of these British and Dutch colonies in South Africa. He was convinced that the only path of safety lay

in some form of federation. The State Paper in which, in 1858, he submitted his views to the Home Government is one of the ablest documents in the history of our Colonial Empire. Grey had the support of the Boers of the Orange River Sovereignty. Their Volksraad resolved in 1858 "that a union or alliance with the Cape Colony, either on the plan of federation or otherwise, is desirable." But the Colonial Office would have none of it. The influence of the Manchester School was at its zenith, and in that school there was no room for men of Grey's vision. The only reply to his despatch was the recall of Grey for exceeding his instructions. He was restored by the personal intervention of the Queen, but returned to Cape Town with tarnished prestige, and with gravely impaired authority.

Whitehall could not, however, alter the hard facts of the situation in South Africa. Among those facts the most obstinate and the most constantly obtrusive is the existence of coloured races which vastly outnumbered both European races combined.¹ Rarely quiescent, the native problem again obtruded itself, when in 1868 the Boers on the Orange River became involved in a dispute with the Basutos to the east of them. The Basuto Chief addressed a prayer to the British Government: "Let me and my people rest under the large folds of the flag of England." His prayer was heard, and in 1869 British Sovereignty was proclaimed over Basutoland.

In 1871 Griqualand West, a native territory to the west of the Orange State, was similarly annexed to the Crown. This important acquisition gave us the diamond fields of the Kimberley district. But its importance was not measured only in diamonds. The annexation meant a new turn in the wheel of policy: the definite abandonment of the *laissez-faire* attitude which for the last thirty years had been characteristic of British policy in South Africa, as elsewhere. The acquisition of the Kimberley diamond field meant also a new strain in the social life of South Africa. "The digger, the capitalist, the company-promoter jostled the slow-moving Dutch farmer and quickened the pace of life."²

Such was the condition of affairs in South Africa when, in 1874, Lord Carnarvon took up the reins at the Colonial Office.

Expansion
in South
Africa
Lord Carnarvon's
policy,
1874-7

¹ For details cf. Marriott: *Mechanism of the Modern State*, i, 258.

² Lucas: *South Africa*, p. 246.

Lord Carnarvon had been officially responsible for the enactment of a Federal Constitution for British North America, and was anxious to confer a similar boon upon South Africa.

In 1875 he proposed that the several States of South Africa should be invited to a Conference to discuss native policy and other points of common interest, and to ventilate "the all-important question of a possible union of South Africa in some form of confederation."¹ The proposal was not welcomed in Cape Colony, but despite this discouragement, Lord Carnarvon sent out to South Africa (in December, 1876) the draft of a permissive Confederation Bill, which in the session of 1877 was passed into law by the Imperial Legislature. This enabling Act contained the outline of a complete Federal Constitution. It was for the South African colonies to fill it in if they would. Sir Bartle Frere, one of the most experienced and trusted servants of the Crown, was at the same time sent out as Governor to help them in their task. But the fates were again unkind. Less than a month after Sir Bartle Frere reached Cape Town (March 31, 1877), another agent of Lord Carnarvon's took a step which opened a new chapter in British policy in South Africa. Sir Theophilus Shepstone had been sent out in October 1876 as "Special Commissioner to enquire respecting certain disturbances which have taken place in the territories adjoining the colony of Natal," and was authorized, at his discretion, and provided it were desired by the inhabitants, "to annex to the British dominion all or part of the territories which formed the scene of his inquiry."² The scene was the Transvaal Republic. At the moment, the Boers of the Transvaal were in serious danger of annihilation at the hands of their native neighbours. They had incurred the bitter enmity of Cetewayo, King of the powerful tribe of the Zulus, as well as of the Matabele Chief, Lobengula. With another Chief, Sekukuni, they were, in 1876, actually at war. Morally and materially the Boers were bankrupt, and their native enemies were only awaiting the opportunity to "eat them up." That process might begin with the Boers; it was not likely to end with them. Under these circumstances Shepstone decided that annexation was the only remedy for the disease, and on April 12, 1877, took over the administration of the Transvaal in the Queen's

Annexation
of the
Transvaal,
1877

¹ Lucas, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

² Egerton: *Federations, etc.*, p. 274.

name, promising to the Boers complete self-government under the British Crown. The Boers protested against annexation, and tried to persuade Lord Carnarvon to reverse the policy of his agent. This the Colonial Secretary declined to do.

That the annexation saved the Boers of the Transvaal from destruction is hardly open to question. But it left the British Government face to face, in a more acute form than ever before, with the native problem. A series of disputes with the Zulus led in January 1879 to the outbreak of war. The war was brief but full of incident. At Isandhlwana (January 22) a British force of 800 whites and 500 natives was literally cut to pieces, but this disaster was more than half redeemed by the heroic defence of Rorke's Drift, where for eleven and a half hours, less than 100 men of the 24th, under two subalterns, Bromhead and Chard, held the Drift against 4000 Zulus. The defence of this post on the Buffalo River saved Natal. The final victory was won by Lord Chelmsford at Ulundi in the Zulu territory on July 4. The Zulu Chief, Cetewayo, was afterwards captured and sent as a prisoner to Cape Town, and the power of his people was finally broken. In the course of the war, the exiled Prince Imperial of France, the heir of Napoleon III, who had volunteered to serve with the British force, was unfortunately killed in a reconnaissance (June 1). Before the year 1879 closed, a British force destroyed the power of Sekukuni, and this inveterate enemy of the Boers joined Cetewayo in captivity.

The Zulu
War, 1879

The Boers could now breathe freely; the English had destroyed their enemies. The Dutch leaders had never ceased to protest against annexation, and their visits to London led them to hope much from the rapid vicissitudes of party government. Nor were their hopes destined to disappointment. In 1879 Sir Garnet Wolseley, who was sent out as High Commissioner, had declared in the Queen's name that it was the will and determination of Her Majesty's Government that the Transvaal should remain for ever "an integral portion of Her Majesty's dominions in South Africa." Her Majesty's Government was about to change hands, but on coming into power in 1880 Mr. Gladstone declared that "under no circumstances can the Queen's authority in the Transvaal be relinquished." Bitter was the disappointment of the Boers, and on December 16, 1880, Messrs. Krüger, Pretorius, and

The Boer
War, 1880-1

Joubert issued a proclamation declaring the independence of the Transvaal Republic. The moment was well chosen. The Basuto rebellion was in full progress; the Transvaal was almost denuded of British troops, and on December 10 some companies of the 94th were surprised and cut to pieces at Bronker's Spruit, a place about forty miles from Pretoria. Sir George Colley, who had succeeded Wolseley in July, hurried up to Newcastle in January (1881). Checked with heavy loss at Laing's Nek and again at Ingogo he met his death in the disastrous defeat at Majuba Hill (February 26). Ireland combined with South Africa to compel an early meeting of Parliament (January 6, 1881), and the Queen's Speech emphasized "the duty of taking military measures with a view to the prompt vindication of my authority." Sir Frederick Roberts was sent out in command of a considerable force, but he arrived in South Africa only to find that Sir Evelyn Wood, who succeeded Colley, had signed an agreement with the Boers acknowledging their right to complete self-government under the suzerainty of the Queen (March 23). The Convention of London (February 27, 1884) acknowledged the "South African Republic," and, while retaining the control of external relations, deleted all reference to the suzerainty of the Queen. The whole policy of retrocession was violently assailed by the Conservative opposition in England, and, as we shall see, it signally failed to achieve a final settlement in South Africa.

The French
in Tunis

England was not the only European Power whose activities in the early 'eighties were largely concentrated on the African Continent. The French had long been interested in North Africa, which they regarded as within the sphere of their Mediterranean influence. The conquest and organization of Algeria (1830-47) was the most notable achievement of the Orleans monarchy. The administration of their Algerian colony brought the French into inevitable contact with Tunis, then ruled in virtual autonomy by its Beys, under the suzerainty of the Sultan. For some years past the economic penetration of Tunis had proceeded apace. Most of the public works, railways, telegraphs, and aqueducts had either been constructed or were maintained by French capitalists, and of the 123 millions of public debt, 100 was held in France. The native administration was shockingly bad, and on several occasions France, and Italy also, had to intervene to save the

State from bankruptcy. As early as 1878, Bismarck had broadly hinted to Italy that the Tunisian pear was ripe ; but Italy, out of regard for French susceptibilities, refused to pluck it. If Italy could not be made to quarrel with France, France must be induced to offend Italy. At the Congress of Berlin, Bismarck suggested to Lord Salisbury that an offer of Tunis to France might smooth the path for England in the Near East. Lord Salisbury accordingly assured France that if she wished to establish a Protectorate over Tunis she would encounter no opposition from England.

Bismarck's policy was inspired by a variety of motives. ^{Bismarck and Tunis} He was supremely anxious to divert the attention of France from Alsace-Lorraine, and hardly less anxious to stir up strife between France and Italy. If he could at the same time bring Italy into the bosom of the Triple Alliance, set England and France by the ears, sow the seeds of discord between England and Russia, his diplomatic purpose would be finally achieved. Tunis served to secure the first three ends ; Egypt the fourth ; the Near and the Middle East the fifth.

Jules Ferry, who had become Prime Minister of France in September 1880, cherished large colonial ambitions, and proved, therefore, an easy prey to the wiles of Bismarck. Pretexts were not wanting to the French for an attack on Tunis. The undisciplined tribesmen who owned the suzerainty of the Bey were troublesome neighbours to the rulers of Algiers. Reparations were demanded ; the Bey appealed to the Sultan Abdul Hamid ; the latter showed a disposition to fight, but, having no friends in Europe, restrained his ardour. Italy entered a strong protest against the action of France, and appealed to the Powers. The Czar Alexander III, who had but now (1881) succeeded to the unsteady throne of his murdered father, was not in a position to respond ; England was morally pledged to France ; Germany, therefore, seemed to be her only possible friend, but friendship with Germany meant friendship with Austria ; and between Austria and Italy there was an antagonism of interest (as the outbreak of the World War was to make manifest) too fundamental to be overcome, even by the mingled honey and gall of Bismarck's diplomacy. But Bismarck was exceedingly anxious to repair the breach made in his diplomatic edifice by the alienation of Russia. From 1872 to 1877, as we have seen, the *Dreikaiser-*

The Crisis
of 1877-8

bund had formed the pivot of his foreign policy. But the interests of two out of the three Emperors had in 1877 come into sharp conflict in the Balkans. It is true that in July 1876 the Emperors of Russia and Austria had met at Reichstadt, and that the Emperor Francis Joseph had agreed to give the Czar a free hand in the Balkans, on condition that Bosnia and Herzegovina were guaranteed to Austria. But by 1878, Russia, in occupation of Bulgaria and Roumelia, was in less complaisant mood than in 1876; an immense impulse had been given to the idea of Pan-Slavism by recent events; the Southern Slavs were beginning to dream of the possibility of a Jugo-Slav empire in the west of the peninsula. Under the new circumstances, Bosnia and the Herzegovina might easily slip from Austria's grip; the *Drang nach Osten* might receive a serious set-back; the road to the Ægean might be finally barred; even access to the Adriatic might be endangered. Thus Bismarck had virtually to choose between his two friends. At the Berlin Congress he played, as we saw, the rôle of the "honest broker." For aught he cared, Russia might go to Constantinople, a move which would have the advantage of embroiling her with England; but Austria must have Bosnia and Herzegovina. Austria got them, and the road to Salonika was kept open.

The Dual
Alliance,
1879

After the Treaty of Berlin, Europe was in a condition of very unstable equilibrium; no single Power, except perhaps Austria-Hungary, was satisfied with the "settlement"; least of all Russia. Russia cherished not unnatural resentment against all the Great Powers; primarily against Great Britain and Austria, but most deeply against Germany, who had been guilty not merely of betrayal, but of the basest ingratitude. Even France did not entirely escape; for Russia imagined that France was lukewarm in support of Russia's pretensions in the Near East. Two other factors not to be neglected were, on the one hand, the embarrassments caused to England by events in Afghanistan, in South Africa, and in Ireland; and, on the other, the increasing tension between France and Italy.

In August 1879 Bismarck met Count Andrassy, the Austrian Chancellor, at Gastein, and on October 7 an alliance between the two Empires was concluded. Bismarck's greatest difficulty in effecting this most significant arrangement arose, not on the side of the Austrian, but of the German Emperor.

Early in September he met the Czar Alexander in Poland, and returned from the interview convinced of his nephew's good faith, and resolved to take no step calculated to cause a breach in the good relations between the two countries. But Bismarck was inexorable; there was no room either for eternal hatreds or for eternal gratitude in politics. He was convinced that there had been negotiations between Petersburg and Paris, and that the Czar, partly to pay Bismarck out for his conduct in regard to the Balkans, partly to divert the attention of his own subjects from questions of domestic reform, partly to lay the spectre of Nihilism by a brilliant feat of arms, was contemplating an attack upon Germany. At last the Emperor William reluctantly and regretfully gave way, and gave his consent to the momentous treaty with Austria (October 15). Its terms were to be kept secret, and not until 1888 were they officially published. The compact provided that if either ally were attacked by Russia, the other must assist it with all its forces; if any Power, other than Russia, were the assailant, then the ally was to observe neutrality, and was not bound to mobilize until Russia entered the field. In plain English, if France attacked Germany, Austria must contain Russia.¹

Bismarck was not, however, satisfied with a Dual Alliance. The Triple Alliance Could not Italy be brought in? The omens were not un- hopeful. Italy sorely needed a friend. Except in Germany, where was she to find one? England, her traditional friend, was, on the Tunisian question, irrevocably committed to France. The compact was signed on May 20, 1882, and the Dual was converted into the Triple Alliance. Concluded in the first instance for five years, it was renewed in 1887, and again in 1891, 1902, and 1912. A year later the Hohenzollern King (Carol) of Roumania was virtually admitted as a sleeping partner into the same firm.

The conclusion of the Triple Alliance constituted a verit- Bismarck's Diplomacy able triumph for the Iron Chancellor. Germany was now as safe as friendships carefully cultivated, and enmities sedulously fomented, could make her. "Henceforward," as Bismarck's biographer has said, "German hegemony in Central Europe moved securely on the pivotal point of the Triple Alliance, which gradually and naturally grew into the one grand

¹ P. Albin : *Les Grand Traités Politique*, pp. 58-60.

combination in the European State System, with which all other possible combinations or *ententes* had to reckon.”¹

Of such counter-combinations there seemed at the moment little probability.

Germany's
Colonial
Ambitions

Bismarck, therefore, could feel reasonably safe, and in 1884 he made his position still more secure by the “Reinsurance Treaty” with Russia. By that compact the three Emperors renewed, in effect, the *Dreikaiserbund*. They mutually bound themselves, if any one of the three made war upon a fourth Power, to maintain a benevolent neutrality, and, in particular, stoutly to resist any assault upon the institution of monarchy. This treaty was a conspicuous triumph for Bismarckian diplomacy. The Czar was tied to the tail of the Triple Alliance, without being fully admitted to the confidence of the triple allies.

Having thus arranged matters so completely to his own satisfaction in Europe, there was no longer any reason why Bismarck should not turn a more friendly eye upon the younger enthusiasts in Germany, who were beginning to complain that the old Fatherland was too “cribb’d, cabined, and confined,” and that Germany was as much entitled to a place in the sun as any of her European neighbours. “I am not a Colony man,” Bismarck was wont to say when pressed to overseas enterprise by German merchants. But by 1884 he was confronted by the inexorable facts of a new economic situation, the significance of which he could not gainsay.

The
Industrial
Revolution
in Germany

Much later than England, or even than France, Germany had at last felt the impulse of the new industrialism. Hamburg, Bremen, Cologne, and Frankfort—to name only a few of her great cities—had long been among the most important commercial and financial centres in the world; but Germany as a whole was predominantly a rural community. After 1871 a change set in, and during the next thirty years the social and economic life of Germany was revolutionized.

Urban and
Rural
Population

In 1871 the population of Germany was 41,000,000; it had risen by 1910 to just short of 65,000,000. During the same period the ratio of urban to rural population was completely altered. In 1871 the percentage of urban inhabitants was 23·7, of rural 76·3; in 1890, 32·2 and 67·8 respectively; and in 1910, 48·8 and 51·2 respectively. In 1871 the popula-

¹ Robertson : *Bismarck*, p. 407.

tion of Berlin was 800,000 ; in 1890, 1,578,000 ; while in 1910 the number of " large " towns, which in 1871 was only eight, had risen to forty-eight, of which six had over half a million, and seventeen over a quarter of a million, of inhabitants. The statistics of the occupation censuses of 1882 and 1895 reinforce these results. It has been calculated that in 1871 about 60 per cent. of the population earning a livelihood were engaged in agriculture and kindred occupations, and 40 per cent. in industry, trade, and commerce. In 1895 the 60 per cent. had fallen to 37·5. The occupation census of 1907 showed that broadly 9,750,000 of the population were engaged in " agriculture," while 14,750,000 were engaged in industry, mining, trade, and commerce—a complete reversal of the distribution obtaining in 1871.

The statistics of foreign trade tell the same tale. In 1880 ^{Foreign Trade} the imports were valued at £141,000,000, the exports at £144,800,000—interesting figures, for in that year Germany was still a debtor country, exporting more than she imported. By 1907 the imports were £443,000,000 and the exports £356,000,000. Germany thus became a creditor country, balancing the excess of her imports by her invisible exports, interest on capital invested abroad, and profits of her shipping, etc. In 1871 German shipping was only 892,000 tons, and her share of the mercantile marine of the world was 5·2 per cent. ; in 1905 she had 2,200,000 tons of shipping, representing 9·9 per cent. of the world's mercantile marine. In 1913 the tonnage had risen to over 5,000,000 tons, and Germany had attained the second place in the shipping of the world.

Bismarck saw only the beginning of these things, but he saw enough to convince him that an entirely new situation had arisen ; that the increase of Germany's overseas trade justified the demand for a development of sea-power ; that the steady outflow of German capital for investment abroad made her economic interests world-wide ; and that her increasing dependence on the import of raw materials and upon foreign markets for the disposal of her surplus manufactured products rendered irresistible, if they did not actually justify, the cry for a forward Colonial policy.

There was another reason which appealed even more powerfully to Bismarck. Of all forms of capital, human capital was in his eyes the most valuable. The rapid growth

of population stimulated the tide of emigration. After 1876 Germans began to leave the homeland at the rate of about 200,000 a year, and on leaving Germany they were mostly lost to Germany. Bismarck deplored this: "A German who can put off his Fatherland like an old coat is no longer a German for me." The Fatherland therefore must be expanded to receive its citizens. Where was the new Fatherland to be found? The first inclination was to look towards Brazil, where there was already a large and increasing German population; but the entrance to South America was barred by the Monroe doctrine. Germany therefore turned to Africa.

Colonial
Enterprise

Africa offered everything which Germany was seeking: untold wealth in raw material; inexhaustible man-power, which, if brought under German discipline, might well be utilized for European warfare; strategical points of immense significance—especially in relation to the eventual conflict with the British Empire, to which the thoughts of far-seeing Germans were already beginning to turn. The way was carefully prepared. In December, 1882, there was founded at Frankfort the *Deutscher Kolonialverein*. The idea was taken up with immense enthusiasm and was carefully fostered by an elaborate Press campaign. "Africa," wrote the *Kölnische Zeitung*,¹ "is a large pudding which the English have prepared for themselves at other people's expense, and the crust of which is already fit for eating. Let us hope that our sailors will put a few pepper-corns into it on the Guinea Coast so that our friends on the Thames may not digest it too rapidly."

The Ex-
ploration
of Africa

Germans had, in fact, taken their full share in African exploration. In 1860 Baron Karl von der Decken performed a notable service to geographical science by his survey of Mount Kilimanjaro. As Mr. Lewin points out, von der Decken was one of the first to conceive the idea of a Germany colony in East Africa. "I am persuaded," he wrote, "that in a short time a colony established here would be most successful, and after two or three years would be self-supporting. . . . It would become of great importance after the opening of the Suez Canal. It is unfortunate that we Germans allow such opportunities of acquiring colonies to slip, especially at a time when it would be of importance to the Navy."² German

¹ April 22, 1884.

² Quoted by Evans Lewin: *The Germans in Africa*. A work to which I am, in the following paragraphs, much indebted.

explorers were equally active in South Africa. In 1869 Mohr undertook a remarkable journey to the Victoria Falls, and about the same time Karl Mauch was travelling in the Zambesi regions. Nor did these and other explorers conceal their chagrin that England was ahead of Germany in South Africa.

England, however, was not the only European Power which showed interest in the development of Africa. In 1879 the Belgians began their occupation of the Congo. In 1880 the French resumed their activities in West Africa, and in 1881 established their Protectorate over Tunis. In 1882 England established a virtual Protectorate over Egypt. In the same year the Port of Assab, on the Abyssinian coast, was transferred from a private trading company to Italy. In 1883 the French began to occupy Madagascar. In 1885 Massowah was occupied by the Italians, and was subsequently developed by them into the colony of Eritrea. Meanwhile the English, as we have seen, had resumed their advance in South Africa.

Under these circumstances it is small wonder that the Germans, having established their position in Europe, should have declined to be left in the shade in Africa. The notorious unrest among the Dutch in South Africa seemed to offer a favourable opportunity for German activities. To this opportunity Ernst von Weber had called attention in 1879. He strongly advocated the acquisition of Delagoa Bay from Portugal, and the economic penetration of the Transvaal and British South Africa. "In South-East Africa we Germans," so he wrote in the *Geographische Nachrichten*, "have a peculiar interest, for here dwell a splendid race of people nearly allied to us by speech and habits . . . pious folk with their energetic, strongly marked, and expressive heads, they recall the portraits of Rubens, Teniers, Ostade, and Van Eyck . . . and one may speak of a nation of Africanders or low-German Africans which forms one sympathetic race from Table Mountain to the Limpopo. What could not such a country become if in the course of time it were filled with German emigrants? The constant mass immigration of Germans would gradually bring about a decided numerical preponderance of Germans, and of itself would by degrees effect the Germanization of the country in a peaceful manner."

Von Weber was not writing in the sand. Paul Krüger had already visited Berlin to seek German intervention at the

Brussels
International
Conference,
1876

Germany
and South
Africa

time of the first British annexation of the Transvaal. He visited it again in 1884, and was cordially welcomed both by the Emperor and his Chancellor. Meanwhile a resolute attempt had been made by Germany to secure a footing at Delagoa Bay, at St. Lucia Bay, and in Pondoland, and it was subsequently stated by Sir Donald Currie, speaking with knowledge, that "the German Government would have secured St. Lucia Bay, and the coast-line between Natal and the possessions of Portugal, had not the British Government telegraphed instructions to despatch a gunboat from Cape Town with orders to hoist the British Flag at St. Lucia Bay."¹

German
Africa

In 1884 German effort in Africa was abundantly rewarded. In the course of less than two years (1884-5), Germany leapt into the position of the third European Power in Africa. She established a Protectorate over Damaraland and Namaqualand, a district with an area of 332,450 sq. miles, which was afterwards known as German South-West Africa. A second German colony was established by the annexation of Togoland and the Cameroons. Most important of all, however, alike from the point of view of strategy, of man-power, and of raw materials, was the great province on the East Coast with an area of 384,180 sq. miles and a population of 7,645,770 persons, mostly belonging to strong fighting races. This province became known as German East Africa.

Germany
in the
Pacific

Simultaneous with these German annexations in Africa was the establishment of German possessions in the Pacific. The northern coast of New Guinea, subsequently known as Kaiser Wilhelm's Land, and the group of islands collectively known as the Bismarck Archipelago, were acquired by Germany in 1884.

The
Colonial
Empire
of Germany

The achievement of Germany, though destined to be transitory, was nevertheless remarkable. In the space of less than two years, Germany had become a great world-power. Colonies in the English sense, however, she did not seek, and never obtained. "My aim," said Bismarck in 1885, "is the governing merchant and not the governing official in those regions. Our privy councillors and expectant subalterns are excellent enough at home, but in the Colonial territories I anticipate more from the Hanseatics." In one sense the hopes of Bismarck were disappointed. The German colonies

¹ Quoted by Lewin, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

were never self-supporting, they never became the home on any considerable scale of German colonists ; they were exploited to the great profit of German capitalists and merchants, but from first to last they were the affair of the German Government, and never really evoked the interest of the German people.

One further observation must be made. It has become fashionable to assert that Great Britain obstructed the fulfilment of Germany's ambition to obtain a "place in the tropical sun."¹ That was not the case. On the contrary, the German Colonial Empire came into being with the express sanction, if not with the blessing, of the dominant Colonial Power. The German settlements in South Africa and in the Pacific were not, indeed, effected without loud protests from the Englishmen on the spot. But to these protests the Government at home refused to listen. "If Germany is to become a great colonizing power, all I say is, God speed her. She becomes our ally and partner in the execution of the great purposes of Providence for the advantage of mankind." So spake Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons. The natives of Africa, after a few years' experience of the German rule, entertained very different sentiments. "The Germans," wrote Bishop Weston of Zanzibar to General Smuts, "rule entirely by fear, and cruel punishments are their means of spreading terror throughout the land."² There was universal testimony from the late German colonies in Africa that "their return to German rule would be regarded by every native tribe in Africa as the greatest disaster in their tribal history."

In 1884, however, this could not be foreseen, and in November of that year an International Conference met at Berlin, under the presidency of Prince Bismarck, to discuss the whole African situation. The General Act of the Conference, which is contained in a long and elaborate document, was approved by Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Portugal, as well as other Powers. The Act laid down regulations as to the traffic in slaves ; in regard to freedom of trade in the Congo Basin ; to the neutrality of territories in the same region ; to

The Berlin
Conference,
1884-5

¹ Cf. e.g. Erich Brandenburg : *From Bismarck to the World War* ; and Harold Nicolson : *Life of Lord Carnock*.

² For German aims in Africa cf. E. Zimmerman : *The German Empire of Central Africa* ; for her treatment of natives cf. Cd. 9210 (1919) ; *The Black Slaves of Prussia*, p. 5.

the navigation of the Congo and the Niger ; and finally in regard to the treatment of the native populations.¹ The Congo State under King Leopold was recognized, and in 1908 was transferred to the Belgian Kingdom.

Anglo-
German
Agreement,
1890

Six years later, an even more comprehensive agreement was concluded between Germany and Great Britain. Great Britain transferred to Germany the island of Heligoland, and recognized German claims to the land north of Lake Nyassa. On the other hand, Germany acknowledged the claims of Great Britain to the northern half of the shores and waters of Lake Victoria Nyanza, to the valley of the Upper Nile, and to the coast of the Indian Ocean about Vitu and thence northwards to Kismayu. Germany also recognized the British Protectorate over the islands held by the Sultan of Zanzibar.

Partition
of Africa

The final partition of Africa left France in a territorial sense the largest of African Powers—her territories, including the Sahara Desert, extending over an area of 3,804,974 miles. British territory, excluding Egypt and the Soudan, covered before the World War an area of 2,713,910 square miles. Germany came third, with something less than 1,000,000.² Statistics of area give, however, a very false impression of relative values. In any scientific or qualitative computation the advantage unquestionably rested with Great Britain. For the British possessions, as Sir Charles Grant Robertson has pointed out, have three distinctive features. Firstly, “they are grouped on the shores of each of the waters that wash the continent, the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Atlantic, and at four critical points. aided by possessions outside Africa proper, they control strategic lines of the first importance. Gibraltar, Aden, and Socotra, Zanzibar, St. Helena, and Cape Town have and confer a military and naval significance indisputable and incompatible. Secondly, in the solid block of British South Africa, Great Britain possesses the one great area fitted to be a colony for the White races. Thirdly, of the four great African rivers, the Nile, the Niger, the Zambesi, and the Congo, British territory controls or shares in the control of the three first. Mastery of the arterial rivers of a huge continent, as the

¹ For text of the *General Act* cf. P. Albin : *Les Grands traités politiques*, pp. 368-406.

² These are the figures of Mr. Scott Keltie, ap. *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

history of the American continent proves, is a brief expression of the great truths that political power follows and rests on the trunk waterways. What the Danube, the Rhine, and the Vistula have been to the Europe of the past, the Nile, the Zambesi, the Niger, and the Congo will be to the Africa of the future, for a great river can be the perpetual cradle of a great civilization." ¹ It is truly said—but we anticipate the sequence of events, and must return to Europe.

Close of
Bismarck's
reign, 1890

Before the Anglo-German agreement of 1890 was concluded, the greatest figure had been removed from the stage of European politics. In 1888 the Emperor William I had died, and after a few months' interval, during which his son, the gifted but stricken Emperor Frederick, nominally reigned, had been succeeded by his grandson, the Emperor William II. The young Emperor had taken to heart the advice given by his ancestress to his great-great-grandfather, George III of England, "George, be King." As in England there was no room for George III and William Pitt, so in Germany there was no room for William II and Bismarck. In 1890 the young Emperor dropped "the old pilot." Bismarck's long reign was ended.

Bismarck's
place in
history

In the history of the nineteenth century, Bismarck will always claim a foremost place; in the sphere of diplomacy no one except Cavour could dispute his claim to the first place. That he was a great patriot will be denied only by those to whom patriotism is an exploded superstition. He desired to see Germany united, and after the tragic failure of 1848, he believed, rightly or wrongly, that it could never be united by parliamentary action; that it must be made by blood and iron. These were the traditional instruments, if not of German, of Prussian statecraft, and Bismarck was primarily a Prussian patriot. Germany must be made not by the merging of Prussia in Germany, but by the merging of Germany in Prussia. That was Bismarck's supreme aim, and that was his remarkable achievement. The end was reached by methods which no plain man can approve: by diplomacy, which was a masterpiece of bluff duplicity, and by overwhelming force unscrupulously applied. Every move in a complicated game was carefully planned from the outset: calculated assistance to Russia in Poland in 1863; a quarrel

¹ *Historical Atlas*, p. 21

picked with Denmark, for the two-fold purpose of acquiring Kiel, and of estranging his master from Austria, and from the Germanic Confederation; the rupture with Austria and the dissolution of the *Bund*; the formation of a North German Confederation under the presidency of Prussia; the luring of the Emperor Napoleon III to his fate; the Hohenzollern candidature in Spain; the quarrel fastened upon France in 1870; the crushing German victory; the formation of the new German Empire; the undisputed hegemony of Prussia in Germany; the almost undisputed ascendancy of Germany in Europe—the sequence was logical and unbroken. Did Bismarck ever look beyond Europe? The question has been often asked. It cannot yet be authoritatively answered. He himself declared that “the Colonial business would be for us in Germany like the wearing of sabres by Polish noblemen who had no shirts to their backs.” As late as 1889 he repeated: “I am still no Colony man.” Lord Odo Russell always maintained that Bismarck’s discouragement of Colonial enterprise was not mere diplomatic bluff, but represented his genuine conviction; and a recent writer agrees with him. “Bismarck,” he writes, “was a realist and a materialist. He did not indulge like Talleyrand in visions of a distant future, in dreams of a German Oceana. . . . Bismarck’s ambition was to control the Continent, to establish a Napoleonic Empire in Europe.”¹ Mr. Lewin, on the other hand, insists that when Bismarck was convinced that the time for action had arrived, he was as eager for expansion as the most advanced exponents of Colonialism.² But with or without Bismarck, the leaven of Imperialism was already working in Germany, and was destined to produce results of world-wide significance. Bismarck had made Prussia supreme in Germany, and Germany supreme upon the continent of Europe. The young ruler who dismissed him in 1890 was determined to make Germany supreme in world-politics.

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See also references to chapter xiii.

CHAPTER XIX

THE EXPANSION OF RUSSIA—WEST AND EAST

UPON the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890, three important results ensued. In the first place, the young and impetuous ruler of Germany made it clear to the world that a new era had dawned; that the old ways and old methods were to be abandoned; that Germany was no longer to be content with supremacy upon the continent of Europe, but was determined to assert her position as a World-Power. Secondly, Russia drew further and further apart from Germany; and, thirdly, after a prolonged courtship, Russia and France contracted a regular and lasting alliance.

Upon the character of the young man who in 1888 succeeded to the splendid inheritance prepared for him by Bismarck, history has not yet pronounced a final judgment. That he was highly gifted, many-sided, omnivorous for work, restless and ambitious; that for a quarter of a century he was the most conspicuous figure in the world; that under his rule Germany reached a place never before attained by her among the nations; that he ultimately brought his country to ruin; that he himself, a fugitive from justice, bankrupt in reputation, an object of hatred and contempt to his former subjects, sought and found safety in flight and exile—all this is known. But it cannot yet be said how far the third German Emperor was the architect of his own misfortune, or how far the slave of circumstances which he was powerless to control. Materials for a judgment are indeed accumulating apace; but not yet can a final verdict be delivered. Meanwhile, contemporaries have the choice of two contradictory portraits: the one delineating a strong-willed, clear-sighted ruler, a true scion of the stock which produced a Great Elector, a Frederick William I, a Frederick the Great; the other showing us a man of baffling character and curiously contradictory impulses; impetuous rather than strong; prodigal of fine

The
Emperor
William II

words but barren in achievement; imagining himself a master-craftsman in diplomacy, but in truth a sorry bungler; at once generous and crafty; pious but unprincipled; a fervent believer in the Divinity which hedges kingship, but a regular worshipper at the shrine of Moloch; the captain of great armies, the creator of a great navy, but the professed apostle of peace, and in face of danger a poltroon; a proud autocrat, but the slave of a military clique and a Court camarilla; *au fond* a "double-minded man," and consequently in all his ways unstable.

Russia and
Germany

On ascending the throne at the age of twenty-nine,¹ after his father's brief and tragic reign, the young Emperor proclaimed himself, at once and pointedly, as the successor of his grandfather. But one of his first acts was to repudiate his grandfather's friendship with Russia, and to refuse to renew Bismarck's reinsurance treaty with that country. Only by virtue of that treaty had Russia in recent years been connected with the politics of Western Europe. Ever since the Treaty of Berlin (1878), Russia, geographically cut off from the West by the solid block of the Central Empires, and diplomatically isolated in Europe, had concentrated her attention upon Asia. It was, indeed, part of the deliberate but defensive tactics of Bismarck to thrust Russia eastward, partly in order to divert her attention from Western politics—from a possible *rapprochement* with France—, and partly in order to involve her, if possible, in a quarrel with England in Central Asia. The Penjdeh incident was indicative of his partial success; but even Bismarck could not for an indefinite period play fast and loose with Russian susceptibilities, and between 1885 and 1888 many circumstances combined to weaken the good accord between Berlin and Petersburg.

The
Schnaebeli
incident

Among these, two in particular may be emphasized. The first was the Schnaebeli incident, which aroused the suspicions of the Czar Alexander in regard to the pacific intentions of Germany. On April 20, 1887, Schnaebeli, a French police commissioner, was, with every circumstance of insolence and brutality, arrested by two German agents on the Alsatian frontier, and flung into prison. The affair created intense excitement in France, which had lately exhibited unmistakable signs of a desire to abandon the colonial activities in

¹ b. 27 January, 1859.

which she had been involved by the policy of Jules Ferry, and once more to concentrate all her efforts upon the reversal of the verdict of 1870. Jules Ferry fell in 1885, and in 1886 there took office in the Freycinet Cabinet a man who for some years gave a new direction to French policy, and might well have involved Europe in a great war. General Boulanger was an adventurer of mediocre ability, to whom the changes and chances of French politics under the Third Republic almost gave a great opportunity. Fortunately for Europe, and on the whole for France, he was not big enough to redeem it. Boulanger seems to have aspired to play the part of Monk, and to effect through the Army a restoration of the monarchy, but the details of his dealings with the exiled princes are obscure. Certain it is, however, that Boulanger was one of the first to proclaim in France the necessity of a better understanding with Russia.

Nor was Russia indisposed towards closer relations with France. On February 20, 1887, there appeared in *Le Nord*, the organ of the Russian Minister, de Giers, a remarkable article containing the following passage: "Henceforth Russia will watch the events on the Rhine, and will relegate the Eastern Question to the second place. The interests of Russia forbid her in the event of another Franco-German war to observe the same benevolent neutrality which she previously maintained. The Cabinet of Petersburg will, in no case, permit a further weakening of France. In order to keep her freedom of action for this event Russia will avoid all conflict with Austria and England, and will allow matters to take their course in Bulgaria." Two months later, after the news of the Schnaebeli incident had reached Petersburg, the Czar Alexander III addressed an autograph letter to the Emperor William, in which he formally announced to his august kinsman that he no longer regarded himself as bound by the "Reinsurance Treaty" of 1884, and in particular that he held himself under no obligation to maintain neutrality in the event of a war between Germany and France. The Emperor William was so far impressed by the communication as to give orders, without even consulting his Chancellor, for the prompt release of the French police commissioner, Schnaebeli. So the immediate incident was closed. The Czar's letter had, however, a larger significance. Taken in

conjunction with the article in *Le Nord*, it showed clearly enough in what direction the wind was blowing in Petersburg.

Russia and
Bulgaria

Not less disquieting to the Czar than the Schnaebele incident was the turn which events were taking in Bulgaria. Here again he insisted upon tracing the hand of Germany, ever at work to destroy the prestige and undermine the influence of Russia.

After the abdication of Prince Alexander, the Bulgarian Sobranje stoutly refused to elect the Czar's nominee, the Prince of Mingrelia, and offered the throne to a German prince, Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, by whom, as we have seen, it was accepted. Prince Ferdinand was a son of Princess Clementine of Orleans, and a grandson, therefore, of King Louis Philippe, but he had served in the Austrian army, and was to all intents and purposes an Austrian prince. The Czar was deeply mortified by the election, and refused to recognize Prince Ferdinand; but strong in the support both of Berlin and Vienna, and urged to the task by an exceedingly able and ambitious mother, Prince Ferdinand adhered to his decision to accept the throne (July 1887).

A year later, during the brief reign of the Emperor Frederick, a further slight was inflicted upon the Czar, by the betrothal of a German princess to Prince Alexander of Battenberg, whom the Czar had virtually dismissed from the Bulgarian throne. The ill-advised project was peremptorily and even brutally vetoed by Bismarck, but the mischief was done. The Czar deemed himself to have been deliberately insulted by the German Court, and never forgave the offence.

It is evident then, even before the fall of Bismarck, that forces were operating in the direction of an entirely new combination in European politics.

The rela-
tions of
France and
Russia

Between France and Russia there had not hitherto been any real tradition of political friendship, but the defeat of France in 1870, and the rapid rise of Germany, entirely altered the balance of diplomatic forces. Dimly perceived during the régime of Bismarck, it was unmistakably apprehended after the accession of William II. But the first overt indication of the new orientation of Russian policy dates from the years between 1889 and 1891. The new intimacy had a financial origin: Russia, as usual, was badly in want of money. Berlin had in January 1888 refused to lend to Russia, but

French
loans to
Russia

from 1888 onwards, a series of Russian loans were issued in Paris, and very largely taken up by French financiers. A 4 per cent. loan for 500 million francs, issued at 86·5 in December 1888, was so largely over-subscribed that in 1889 two further loans were issued, the one for 700 millions, the other for 1200 millions. In 1890 there were three issues: one of 260 millions, one of 360, and one of 41. In 1891 there were two loans aggregating 820 millions. In 1893 another of 178 millions, in 1894 over 5 millions, and in 1896 400 millions. After the turn of the new century a Russian loan was issued in Paris with almost tiresome regularity every few years. The financial assistance thus rendered to Russia was invaluable. It enabled her to convert the whole of her external debt into a 4 per cent. denomination, to improve the equipment of the Army and the Navy, and to extend her gravely defective railway system.

The Trans-Siberian Railway, projected some twenty-five years before, was at last put in hand, and in 1891 work commenced on seven sections simultaneously. Another railway enterprise was rapidly pushed on. The construction of a line intended to connect the Caspian with Merv was authorized in April 1885. By 1888 the line was carried as far as Samarkand, the ancient capital of Tamerlane, and in 1898 extensions of the Trans-Caspian Railway from Samarkand to Tashkent and Andijan were opened to traffic, while another branch running south from Merv to the frontier of Afghanistan was completed.¹ The primary motive for the construction of these railways, particularly the Trans-Caspian, was no doubt strategic, but their economic significance must not, on that account, be overlooked.

The *rapprochement* between France and Russia was, however, more than financial and economic. Russia was becoming more and more alarmed by the menacing tone adopted by German statesmen. In 1888 Bismarck thought that the time had come for publishing the text of the Triple Alliance. Russia was startled and alarmed by the terms of a document to which in 1884 she had almost made herself party. Nor were her fears removed by a speech made by Bismarck only a few days after the publication of the text. "God," said the Chancellor, "has given us on our flank the French, who

¹ F. H. Skrine: *Expansion of Russia*, pp. 314-16.

are the most warlike and turbulent nation that exists, and He has permitted the development in Russia of warlike propensities which until lately did not manifest themselves to the same extent. . . . By means of courtesy and kind methods we may be easily, too easily perhaps, influenced, but by means of threats, never. We Germans fear God and nothing else in the world.”¹ The terms of this speech were no doubt carefully calculated to give both to France and to Russia serious pause in any steps they might be contemplating towards a closer understanding, diplomatic or military. But in 1890 Bismarck was removed, and power passed into the hands of the young Emperor.

French
Fleet at
Cronstadt

In the next few years, things began to move rapidly towards a Franco-Russian Alliance. In July 1891 a French fleet, under the command of Admiral Gervais, paid a ceremonial visit to Cronstadt. It was received by the Russian authorities with the greatest enthusiasm. The Czar dined on board the French flagship, and stood uncovered while the French national anthem was played. The French Admiral and his officers were magnificently entertained at Cronstadt by the Russian fleet, and by the Czar and his officials when they subsequently visited Petersburg and Moscow. And the welcome came not only from the Government, but from the people. Nowhere since 1871 had the representatives of France received so cordial a welcome abroad, and the French people were deeply touched.

Franco-
Russian
Alliance

Nor was the ceremonial visit empty of diplomatic consequences. On August 21 an Alliance was concluded ; it was followed in 1892 by the signature of a military convention of a purely defensive character, and in June 1893 by a commercial treaty of far-reaching importance. The cordial relations between the two countries were further emphasized in the same year by a visit paid by the Russian Mediterranean squadron to Toulon.

Exchange
of visits

In 1894 the diplomatic position of Russia was rendered rather more uncertain by the premature death of the Czar Alexander III, and the accession of Nicholas II. The young Czar was passionately devoted to the cause of peace. He became the husband, in November 1894, of a German princess (Princess Alice of Hesse-Darmstadt), and made no secret of

¹ Quoted by Seymour : *Diplomatic Background of the War*, pp. 47-8.

his admiration for the German Emperor. His accession was not, however, permitted to interrupt the cordial relations between France and his own country. On June 10, 1895, Monsieur Hanotaux, who had succeeded to the Foreign Office in 1894, made public reference to the Franco-Russian Alliance, and in the following year the Alliance was officially acknowledged. In the autumn of 1896 the Czar and his young bride paid official visits to Berlin, to Queen Victoria (the bride's grandmother), and finally, in October, to Paris. The welcome accorded to the Czar and Czarina in the French capital was unprecedentedly enthusiastic. The French people acclaimed their visitors not merely as a bridal pair, but as honoured allies. The Czar reviewed 100,000 French troops on the plain of Châlons, and subsequently declared that the army whose manœuvres he had witnessed was "a powerful support of the principles of equity upon which peace, order, and the well-being of nations were founded," and declared that the Empire and the Republic were united in indissoluble friendship. Ten months later, in August 1897, these courtesies were reciprocated by a visit paid by President Faure to Cronstadt. The significance of this visit was enhanced by the presence at Cronstadt of the French Minister, M. Hanotaux. In a speech on board the French flagship at Cronstadt, the Czar pointedly referred to France and Russia as "friendly and allied powers," and insisted that "they were equally resolved to maintain the world's peace in a spirit of right and equity." M. Tardieu has emphasized the significance of the Franco-Russian Alliance from the French point of view in the following words: "It assured us in Europe a moral authority, which since our defeats had been wanting to us. It augmented our diplomatic value. It opened to us the field of political combinations from which our isolation had excluded us. From mere observation we could pass to action, thanks to the recovered balance of power. . . ." ¹

If the results of the Alliance were important to France, ^{The Foreign Policy of Russia} they were certainly not less significant for Russia. For two hundred years Russia had pursued a foreign policy of singular consistency. Nor is this remarkable, since the hard and unchanging facts of physical geography dictated her policy. The dominant facts of Russian geography are: First, the

¹ France and the Alliances.

absence of a coast-line open to the warm water. Secondly, a great river system tending to the disintegration of the country ; and thirdly, a vast expanse of wind-swept plain ; the absence of any natural barriers except the Urals and the Caucasus, and the consequent liability of Russia to invasion, alike from the east, whence the Tartars in distant days had come, and from the west, where, in the days of Polish greatness, she had been open to the attacks of the Poles, and since the destruction of Poland, of Germany. Policy, therefore, was dictated by geography, and the policy of Russia during the last two hundred years may be summarized in the two words " Unification " and " Expansion." To those two ends a succession of remarkable rulers from Peter the Great to Alexander II had devoted themselves. The supreme object of Russia's expansion was to reach an ice-free water-way. The obvious door was through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles ; but that door had, as we have seen, been thrice banged in her face by England : by the Treaties of London in 1840-1, by the Treaty of Paris in 1856, and by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. For the check to her ambition imposed by the Treaty of Berlin, Russia could forgive neither England nor Germany. But Bismarck, with great subtlety, pointed out to the Czar that England, though not open to attack by Russia in Europe, was by no means invulnerable in Asia. The idea was not, indeed, original to Bismarck. It formed the basis of the accord which had been established at Tilsit between Napoleon I and Alexander I. But, thanks to the development of railway communication, Alexander III was in a position far more favourable than his predecessors to carry the idea into effect.

The
expansion
of Russia

The expansion of Russia has, during the last century, proceeded upon three main lines : first, the Caucasus or Cis-Caspian ; secondly, the Trans-Caspian ; and thirdly, the Trans-Siberian. Russia, as we have seen, had established her hold upon the Black Sea in the latter part of the eighteenth century. Later on, the north-eastern and eastern shores of the Black Sea were secured by a gradual advance towards the Caucasus and the Caspian. " In 1725 the Russian frontier ran in an irregular line from Azof to the river Terek on the Caspian ; by 1815 Kuban (1784), Derbend and Baku (1806), Georgia, Mingrelia and Karabagh (1803) had been annexed, so that the western shore of the Caspian as far as the Persian

frontier was Russian. The nineteenth century has witnessed a steady progress and consolidation. In 1828 Erivan was ceded by Persia; the conquest and absorption of Kuban, Circassia, and Daghestan were completed between 1859 and 1864, and though Kars was captured in 1855 its final cession with the free port of Batoum was not made until the Treaty of Berlin of 1878.”¹ By this advance Russia was brought into immediate contact with two of the greatest Muhammadan Powers, Persia and the Ottoman Empire in Asia.

More significant, however, was the Trans-Caspian advance of Russia, since it was destined to raise in an acute form the relations between Russia and England. The probability of a conflict in Central Asia between the two great European Powers had long been foreseen by Russian diplomatists. In 1844 the Czar Nicholas visited England with the avowed intention of reaching some agreement with her in regard to outstanding questions in the Near and the Middle East. With his proposals in regard to the future disposition of the Turkish heritage in Europe we have already dealt. His proposals, however, were not confined to Europe; on the contrary, he suggested that it would be to the interest of both empires to arrive at a frank understanding in regard to their relations in Central Asia. The Czar undertook to refrain from any movement against the Khanates of Turkestan, and to leave them as a neutral zone in order to keep the Russian and British possessions in Asia from “dangerous contact.” The overtures of the Czar, which were, it would seem, inspired by a genuine desire for peace, were at the time coldly received by English statesmen; nor was their reception more cordial when renewed on the eve of the Crimean War. Denied access to European waters by way of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, Russia renewed her activities in Central Asia. The tendency at Calcutta in the 'sixties was to regard those activities with a careless eye, and Lord Lawrence² expressed the opinion that Russia “might prove a safer neighbour than the wild tribes of Central Asia.” For the time being, therefore, Russia was left free to fish in the troubled waters of Central Asian politics. Constant strife among the Turkoman and Kirghiz tribesmen of Turkestan, and between the Muhammadan Khanates of Bokhara, Khiva, Samarkand, and Khokand, gave

Russian
Central
Asia

The
Khanates
of Turke-
stan

¹ Robertson, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

² Governor-General of India, 1863-9.

Russian emissaries an opportunity which they did not neglect. Russian troops occupied Tashkent in 1864, and four years later captured Samarkand, the capital of the Khanate of Bokhara, and once the capital of the famous empire of Tamerlane. After the capture of his capital, the Khan of Bokhara ceded to Russia the whole province of Samarkand.

Afghani-
stan

Russian agents had meanwhile been showing considerable activity in Afghanistan. One of the first acts of Lord Auckland, as Governor-General of India (1836-42), was to despatch Captain Alexander Burnes on a mission to Kabul. On arriving at Kabul, Burnes found that his mission had been anticipated by a Russian envoy, Vicovitch. Vicovitch had the ear of Dost Muhammed, the brilliant Afghan adventurer who had recently made himself master of the fierce tribes of Afghanistan, and was then ruling them with an iron hand as Amir of Kabul. Burnes could offer him nothing but the platonic friendship and half-hearted diplomatic support of England. Lord Auckland thereupon decided to withdraw the Burnes Mission, and to replace Dost Muhammed on the throne of Afghanistan by a puppet of his own. An expedition was despatched from India, and in May 1839 legitimacy was restored in Afghanistan in the person of Shah Suja. The inwardness of Auckland's policy is clearly revealed by a despatch from Lord Palmerston. "By taking the Afghans under our protection," he wrote, "and in garrisoning if necessary Herat, we shall regain our ascendancy in Persia. . . . British security in Persia gives security on the eastward to Turkey, and tends to make the Sultan more independent, and to place the Dardanelles more securely out of the grasp of Nicholas." The immediate enterprise in Afghanistan proved, however, a terrible failure, issuing in the tragedy which, opening with the assassination of two distinguished Englishmen, Burnes and Macnaughten (1841), ended in the costly and humiliating retreat from Kabul.

British
policy in
Central
Asia

After the disasters of the early 'forties, the English Government pursued for some thirty years a consistent policy of masterly inactivity in Central Asia. Russia employed the opportunity for steady though stealthy advance. The Afghans did not understand the policy of masterly inactivity, and again and again applied to Calcutta for assistance. Successive English rulers at Calcutta were profuse in professions of

platonic good-will, but nothing more substantial was forthcoming. Meanwhile the conquest of Samarkand had brought Russia up to the northern frontiers of Afghanistan, and accordingly the Governments of Great Britain and Russia deemed it wise to make some attempt to delimit the frontiers between the two Powers. In January 1873 the frontiers were formally defined by treaty; but the ink upon the treaty was hardly dry when the news arrived that Russian troops had occupied Khiva (June 1873). Count Schouvaloff assured the British Government that the occupation was a purely temporary expedient, but the moment of evacuation has not yet arrived. At Khiva, Russia was within four hundred miles of the north-western frontier of British India. Russians
at Khiva

On the eve of his departure from India (1869), Lord Lawrence indited a despatch which seemed to indicate a change of attitude, if not of policy; he suggested that we ought to have a "clear understanding with the Court of Petersburg as to its projects and designs in Central Asia," and advised that Russia should be warned "in firm and courteous language, that it cannot be permitted to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan, or in those of any State which lies contiguous to our frontier." Such an intimation to Russia was clearly inconsistent with the policy of masterly inactivity to which Lawrence had previously adhered. But that policy still commended itself to the Home Government. Sher Ali, the ruler of Afghanistan, was seriously alarmed by the advance of Russia, and when, in 1873, the Russians were marching on Khiva, he tried to persuade the Viceroy that "the interests of the Afghan and English Government are identical, and that the border of Afghanistan is in truth the border of India." The Government in Whitehall thought otherwise, and instructed the Viceroy to inform the Amir that the British Government could not share his alarm, and considered that there was no cause for it. Nevertheless, we promised to "maintain our settled policy in favour of Afghanistan if the Amir abides by our advice in external affairs." Repulsed by Calcutta, Sher Ali threw in his lot with Russia. British
policy in
Afghani-
stan

Russia was steadily advancing. In January 1874 she went out of her way to inform Great Britain that she "continued to consider Afghanistan as entirely beyond her sphere of action." Her deeds, however, appeared to belie her words,

with the result that Lord Lytton, who in 1876 had been appointed by Disraeli to the Viceroyalty of India, attempted to induce the Amir of Afghanistan to receive British residents at Kandahar and Herat. The Amir demurred. Meanwhile the Russians had made themselves masters of Khokand, while the British Government had concluded with the Khan of Kelat in Baluchistan the important Treaty of Jacobabad (Dec. 1876), which gave us the right of garrisoning the key-position of Quetta. The Treaty of Jacobabad alarmed the Amir, but not sufficiently to induce him to receive a British resident, though he deemed it not inconsistent to receive in 1878 a mission from Russia. Under these circumstances there could be but one answer to the Amir's refusal. A large British force marched into Afghanistan, and in May 1879 dictated the Treaty of Gandamak. Sher Ali, realizing the hopelessness of resistance, had fled into Turkestan with such members of the Russian mission as lingered at Kabul. His son, Yakub Khan, agreed to receive a permanent British Embassy, with a suitable escort, at Kabul; to conduct his foreign policy under the advice of Great Britain; to give facilities for trade, and to allow such a rectification of the north-western frontier as was demanded by the scientific school of British strategists. In return, he was to be supported against external aggression, and to receive an annual subsidy of six lacs of rupees.

Cavagnari's
mission and
death

The circumstances of Burnes' fatal mission were then almost precisely reproduced. Sir Louis Cavagnari, having accepted the mission to Kabul, arrived in the city in July 1879. In September he and all his comrades were murdered by the mutinous soldiery of the Amir. The news reached Simla on September 4, and two days later Major-General Roberts left Simla to take command of the Kabul Field Force. Roberts reached Kabul early in October. He found Kabul "much more Russian than English, the officers arrayed in uniform of Russian pattern, Russian money in the Treasury, and Russian wares in the bazaar." Before he left, he brought to light much evidence as to Russian designs in Afghanistan, and he placed it on formal record that in his opinion the recent rupture with Sher Ali had "been the means of unmasking and checking a very serious conspiracy against the peace and security of our Indian Empire."

Nevertheless, Afghanistan remained a problem. To retain

it in perpetuity was out of the question. Only two alter-
 natives presented themselves : either to erect Afghanistan Alternative policies in Afghani-
 stan into a strong buffer State, or to maintain English influence in the country by breaking it up among several rulers. The latter policy was favoured by Lord Lytton, but the attempt to carry it out proved unexpectedly difficult. A strong ruler having appeared in Afghanistan in the person of Abdur Rahman, the British Government ultimately decided to evacuate Kandahar (which had in the meantime been relieved after a superb march by General Roberts) and to rely upon the friendship of Abdur Rahman and the policy of the buffer State.

Meanwhile Russia, simultaneously headed off both from Merv Afghanistan and from Constantinople, mainly by England and her minions, again turned her activities towards Central Asia. A disastrous campaign against the Tekke-Turkomans in the autumn of 1878, was followed in 1879 by an unsuccessful attack upon the strong fortress of Denghil-Tepe, and a disorderly retreat to the Caspian. These disasters were, however, amply retrieved in 1881 by the brilliant campaign of General Scobelev : by the capture of Denghil-Tepe, and by a terrible punishment inflicted upon the predatory tribes which had found in it their stronghold. This renewal of Russian activity excited serious alarm both in London and in Calcutta. There were rumours that Russia was preparing to occupy Merv. Russia disavowed the intention ; but early in 1884, Russia, relying upon England's pre-occupation in the Soudan, occupied Merv and Saraks, and thus came within 200 miles of Herat. This step was in direct violation of Gortschakoff's assurance given to the British Government in 1882, that Merv "lay outside the sphere of Russian influence."¹

Nevertheless, the British Government assented, somewhat tamely, to the proposal for the appointment of a joint Commission to delimit the northern frontier of Afghanistan. The British Commissioner, Sir Peter Lumsden, arrived punctually at the appointed meeting place ; his Russian colleague made excuse after excuse for delay. The Russians usefully employed the interval by occupying various eligible points in dispute.

Matters came to a crisis when, in March 1885, the Russians

The
Penjdeh
affair,
1884-5

seized Penjdeh, a village about a hundred miles due south of Merv. The news of the seizure of Penjdeh aroused public excitement in England to the highest pitch. "We know," said Gladstone, "that the attack was a Russian attack; we know that the Afghans suffered in life, in spirit, and in repute; we know that a blow was struck at the credit and authority of the Sovereign, our protected ally, who had committed no offence . . . we must do our best to have right done in the matter." The British Government acted with unusual promptitude. They called out the Reserves, and moved a vote of credit for £11,000,000, £4,500,000 of which was for the Soudan Expedition. The Vote was agreed to without a dissentient voice—a broad hint to Russia which contributed not a little to a peaceful issue. Lord Dufferin, who had become Viceroy in 1884, exercised all his great diplomatic skill to the same end, and converted Abdur Rahman, who fortunately happened to be at the moment his guest at Rawal Pindi, to a similar view. "My country," the Amir afterwards wrote, "is like a poor goat on whom the lion and the bear have both fixed their eyes, and without the protection of the Almighty Deliverer the victim cannot escape very long." For the moment, however, war between England and Russia was averted. Penjdeh, for which Abdur Rahman cared comparatively little, was left in the hands of Russia, but in compensation the Amir secured the exclusive control of the Zulfikar Pass, for which he cared much.

Anglo-
Russian
Agreements,
1887-1907

Between Russia and Afghanistan the matter was thus satisfactorily adjusted. Between Russia and England, on the contrary, negotiations were protracted until July 1887, when a Protocol between the two Powers was signed at Petersburg. By the agreement then reached a definite check was put upon Russian advance towards Herat, and the frontier was settled up to the line of the Oxus. The same year witnessed the annexation to India of the Quetta district under the designation of British Baluchistan. Checked on the western frontier of Afghanistan, the Russians continued their advance northwards and eastwards, and in 1895 annexed the Pamirs. Their frontier thus came to march with that of Chinese Turkestan to the east, and on the south with that of the British North-West Frontier Provinces, the frontier being defined by another Anglo-Russian Convention signed in 1895.

"The boundary pillars," wrote Sir Alfred Lyall, "now set up by British and Russian officers on the Hindu Kush and by the Oxus, record the first deliberate and practical attempts made by the two European Powers to stave off the contact of their incessantly expanding Asiatic Empires." Not, however, until the conclusion of the comprehensive Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 was a complete understanding reached between the two Empires. Afghanistan was then definitely recognized by Russia as falling within the British sphere of influence; Russia undertook that all negotiations with the Amir should be conducted through Great Britain, and Afghanistan at last became what one school of British statesmen had always desired to make it, a real buffer State, calculated to resist the impact of Russia on the one side and Great Britain on the other, though "protected" by the latter.

Russian activities were not confined to Central Asia and the borders of Afghanistan. For a century past she had been pushing steadily on towards the Pacific. By the beginning of the nineteenth century the whole of Siberia up to the frontiers of the Chinese Empire had been brought under the sovereignty of the Czars. A further period of advance was marked by the appointment, in 1847, of one of the most remarkable of Russian soldier-adventurers, General Muraviev, as Governor-General of Eastern Siberia. In 1849 Muraviev constructed on the eastern shore of Kamtskatka the fortress of Petropavlovsk, and so well was his work done that the fortress resisted the attack of an Anglo-French squadron in the course of the Crimean War (1854). In 1850 Nikolaievsk was established at the mouth of the Amur, and eight years later, by the Treaty of Aigun (May 1858), Muraviev obtained from China the cession of the entire Pacific seaboard between the rivers Amur and Usur. Two years later (Oct. 1860) a war between England and France, on the one hand, and China on the other, resulted in large commercial concessions to the Western Powers (Oct. 1860). Muraviev promptly claimed similar concessions for Russia. "Hitherto inland trade between the two Empires had been confined to a point south of Lake Baikal. By a treaty with China, signed in November 1860, this restriction was swept away in the case of caravans of less than 200 persons, and the previous agreement of Aigun was confirmed. The Amur became a Russian

Russia in
the Far
East

Vladivostok

river, and was protected by a chain of fortresses. At the southern bend of the Pacific seaboard, the Russians founded Vladivostok,"¹ which despite the ice which blocks it during the winter months, became an important naval base, and gave to the Russians a firm grip upon the Northern Pacific. Conformably with their traditional policy, the Russians proceeded to connect the extreme points of their vast land empire by an elaborate railway system. Among these enterprises the most ambitious was that of the Trans-Siberian Railway, which was opened for through traffic in 1902.

China and Japan

Long before the Trans-Siberian Railway was complete, a new and very significant factor had entered into the problem of the Far East. It was for the first time clearly revealed to the European Chancelleries by the crushing defeat inflicted by Japan upon the Celestial Empire of China (1894-5).

East is East and West is West
And never the twain shall meet.

Ethnically and intellectually that may still be true; politically it ceased to be the case in the last years of the nineteenth century. The shrinkage of the globe brought the Far East into the ambit of Western diplomacy. In the East the Portuguese had been in the forefront of European enterprise. They established a Christian mission in Japan before the middle of the sixteenth century, and were followed by the Dutch and English East India Companies. Early in the seventeenth century, however, a domestic revolution broke out in Japan, all foreigners were expelled, Christianity was exterminated, and from that time until the middle of the nineteenth century the Japanese were able to maintain a policy of complete isolation.

Hardly less complete was the isolation of China. The diplomatic segregation of the Chinese Empire had been absolute, but since 1771 foreigners had been permitted to trade, though under severe restrictions, and at great personal risk, at Canton. As the nineteenth century went on, a lucrative but unsavoury trade in opium was developed between the East Indies and China. The Chinese Government greatly disliked this development, but the foreign merchants persisted in their activities. Friction inevitably ensued, and between 1840 and 1860 more than one regrettable war was fought.

¹ Skrine, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

Meanwhile the isolation of Japan was broken down, ^{Transformation of Japan} mainly by the persistent efforts of the United States, and diplomatic agents representing Great Britain, France, Russia, Portugal, and the U.S.A. were in 1858 admitted to reside in Yedo. Certain Japanese ports were at the same date opened to foreign trade. Ten years later Japan herself initiated a revolution, which, in the short space of a quarter of a century, was destined absolutely to transform an ancient and conservative people. Down to 1868 Japan had been a purely Asiatic nation, entirely medieval, alike in social and economic structure, and in political institutions. Within twenty-five years it was transformed into an up-to-date Europeanized State. The old feudal system of land tenure and of local government was abolished, a brand-new constitution on English lines was adopted, and in 1890 a Japanese Parliament, consisting of two chambers, met for the first time. Popular education was introduced, and developed with feverish haste; universities were established at Tokio and Kioto; compulsory military service was introduced, the whole military system of Japan was reorganized on German models, and a fleet was constructed and manned, under the supervision of English officers. Economic reorganization kept pace with social and political reconstruction; the first line of railway, connecting Tokio with Yokohama, was only begun in 1870; Japan proper now possesses nearly 11,000 miles of railways. The whole apparatus of the industrial revolution with which the European had painfully provided themselves in the course of a century, was set up in Japan in the course of a few years. Mills sprang up as though by magic, the most modern textile machinery was imported from Lancashire, and cheap and abundant labour, combined with high technical skill, soon made Japan a formidable competitor with England. Her foreign trade in 1928 reached the amazing total of £416,000,000 or £6 10s. per head of the population, while between 1914 and 1928 her ocean tonnage increased from 12,000,000 to nearly 84,000,000 tons. The total tonnage cleared at open ports is nearly 200,000,000 tons.

The fruits of this remarkable revolution were made manifest to the world in the war waged by Japan against the Celestial Empire in 1894-5. The "hermit" kingdom of Korea had long been a bone of contention between Japan and ^{China-Japanese War}

China, with Russia as a keenly interested spectator. A long and narrow peninsula, dividing the Sea of Japan from the Yellow Sea, Korea occupied a strategical position which invited the attentions of Japan on the one side, and on the other of the Chinese in Manchuria, and of the Russians at Vladivostok. The political position of Korea was ambiguous. China claimed it as a dependency when it suited her purpose to do so, but was quick to repudiate any inconvenient responsibility when the Koreans got into trouble with their neighbours. Japan refused to recognize Korea as in any sense a dependency of China, and in 1894 continuous friction between the young Power and the old issued in a declaration of war. Both by land and sea the Japanese were decisively victorious, and on the 18th of April 1895, the Chinese agreed to accept the terms imposed by Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki.

Treaty of
Shimonoseki

By that treaty the absolute independence of Korea was formally recognized by both parties. China ceded to Japan the peninsula of Liao-Tung, with the fortresses of Port Arthur and Talienwan, together with the islands of Formosa and Pescadores, and further agreed to pay Japan an indemnity of 200 million taels (about £50,000,000) and to allow her to occupy Wei-Hai-Wei until the indemnity was paid. Japan further stipulated that four additional cities should be opened by China to foreign traders, and that Japanese vessels should be allowed to navigate Chinese waters. Never was the victory of one Power over another more complete, and never was complete victory more clearly reflected in the terms of peace. At one bound Japan had advanced to the foremost place in the Far East.

That place had its dangers. The Far East having come into the ambit of European diplomacy, victorious Japan was now confronted by the jealousy of Russia, and in less degree of Germany and France. Russia had long looked upon Southern Manchuria with envious eyes, and the conquest of it by Japan raised a formidable obstacle to the fulfilment of her ambitions in the Far East. Germany and France were in this matter temporarily in accord with Russia and with—as was more remarkable—each other, and the three European Powers insisted that Japan must not be permitted permanently to occupy the territories on the mainland of China, ceded to her by the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The possession of Port Arthur

Intervention
of Russia,
France, and
Germany

would, they contended, dominate Peking, and so would prove detrimental to the maintenance of peace in the Far East. Japan, therefore, yielding ostensibly to "the dictates of magnanimity" but in reality to stern necessity, accepted the advice of the three Powers, and surrendered Port Arthur and the Liao-Tung Peninsula. She received as a solatium an increased indemnity, but no money could compensate for the loss of her territorial acquisition, and she withdrew, only to cherish in her heart a bitter animosity against the Power which had been primarily instrumental in robbing her of the fruits of victory, and to prepare for the struggle *à outrance* which was bound sooner or later to come.

Political cynicism was never more strikingly illustrated than by the sequel to this episode. Russia and her allies had intervened partly on behalf of the integrity of China, partly in order to preserve the balance of power in the Pacific, so dangerously menaced by the victory of Japan.

Russia promptly took advantage of her new position as protectress of the integrity of China. First of all she obtained the concession for the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Next, in return for financial assistance she was permitted to establish in China the Russo-Chinese Bank, with very extensive fiscal powers, including the receipt of taxes, the management of local finances, and, under concessions by the Chinese authorities, the construction of an extended system of railway and telegraph lines. Even more important was the conclusion (1896) of a secret treaty of alliance between Russia and China, under the terms of which Russia obtained the right to make use of any harbour in China, to levy Chinese troops in the event of a conflict with any Asiatic State, the free use of Port Arthur or, if the other Powers should object, of Kiaochow in time of peace, while the whole of Manchuria was thrown open to Russian officers for purposes of survey, etc.; and it was agreed that on the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway a line should be constructed southwards to Talienwan, or some other point mutually agreed upon, under the joint control of Russia and China.

Germany could not regard without apprehension the advantages secured by her ally. Thus far most of the benefits of the coercion applied to Japan had gone to Russia. Germany craved a corner for herself. The chance of getting it was

Russia and
China

European
outposts in
China

Kiaochow

afforded by the murder of certain German missionaries in the province of Shantung in 1897. As a compensation for this brutal indignity, Germany demanded and, (March 5, 1898) obtained, a ninety-nine years' lease of the harbour of Kiaochow, with the surrounding territory, together with large commercial and financial privileges in the province of Shantung. She also stipulated for a considerable money indemnity, the repayment of all her expenses, and the infliction of condign punishment upon the actual murderers, and upon the officials under whose jurisdiction the murders had occurred. The English Government was naturally perturbed by the action of Germany. Lord Salisbury frankly told the German Ambassador that "the mode in which the purpose of Germany had been attained impressed him more unfavourably than the purpose itself." Count von Bülow, on the other hand, had the impudence to tell the British Ambassador in Berlin that Germany had selected Kiaochow "precisely because it was far removed from the regions in which England was directly interested," and that as to her commercial interests England need have no fears.¹

Port
Arthur

Hardly was the German lease of Kiaochow signed, when Russia concluded an arrangement with China, by which Port Arthur and Talienwan were granted to her on a twenty-five years' lease. It was further agreed between the two Powers that these important harbours should be opened only to the ships of war of Russia and China. The scramble for China having thus begun, Great Britain could hardly look on unmoved. Moreover, the Chinese themselves intimated to Great Britain that as soon as the Japanese evacuated Wei-Hai-Wei, (still held as security for the payment of the indemnity) Great Britain might if she chose have a lease of it. The suggestion was, from the Chinese point of view, a shrewd one; for Japan was still in possession of Wei-Hai-Wei, and in view of the Russian and German acquisitions, so flagrantly defiant of the considerations which had prompted the demand that Japan should surrender her acquisitions on the Chinese mainland, Japan might be disposed to stay where she was. Great Britain agreed to take Wei-Hai-Wei on lease, for so long a period as Port Arthur should remain in the hands of Russia. Accordingly, Wei-Hai-Wei was evacuated by the Japanese on

Wei-Hai-
Wei

¹ *British Documents*, i, 330.

May 24, 1898, and on the 25th it was taken over by Great Britain.¹

Nor was foreign penetration in China by any means limited to those territorial acquisitions. Russia was gradually fastening a financial, military, and commercial grip upon the Celestial Empire. But perhaps nothing did more to alarm the Conservative party in China than the publication of an edict by the Chinese Government conferring, at the instance of France, considerable privileges upon the French Catholic missions in that country. The Catholic Bishops were, under this edict, placed on an equality with the native Viceroy and Governors of Provinces. So large a concession to the Catholic Church raised a suspicion that it might have been made by the Chinese Government actually in order to provoke hostility to all foreigners.

Whatever the motive, such was unquestionably the result. Not, of course, that these concessions were the sole cause of that hostility. The events of the last few years naturally tended to create in the minds of a conservative and suspicious people profound resentment against those who seemed to be bent, not only upon the dismemberment of the Empire, but also upon a transformation of its social, religious, and industrial life. Such feelings led to the explosion known to foreigners as the rising of the Boxers. Early in 1900 the situation became so menacing, that the Foreign Ministers at Peking made a formal demand to the Chinese Government for the immediate dissolution of all secret societies. As the Chinese Government did nothing in the matter, the Foreign Ministers requested their own Governments to despatch naval squadrons to China. The arrival of their squadrons at Taku merely served to increase the exasperation against the foreigners. In June, massacres on a large scale began in Peking, and on the 20th of that month the German Ambassador, Baron von Ketteler, was assassinated at Peking. Thereupon his colleagues fortified their several Legations as best they could, and appealed for protection to the European squadrons at Taku. The fleets attacked the Taku forts at the end of June and captured them. The Chinese Government then threw off the mask, and published an edict for the enrolment of the Boxers, and the declaration of war against "the foreign

¹ Evacuated in 1930.

Inter-
national
expedition
to Peking

devils." Tienstein and the Peking Legations were now entirely isolated, and for two months the British Embassy, in which the other Ministers and their suites had taken refuge, was besieged. Meanwhile an international relief force was organized, in which Great Britain, France, Russia, and Germany were joined by the United States and Japan. The relief column reached Peking in August, and raised the siege of the British Embassy. Condign punishment was meted out to the ringleaders, a large indemnity was imposed upon China, but the territorial integrity of China was specifically guaranteed by the Powers. These terms were embodied in a definitive treaty which was signed in September 1901.

The Anglo-
Japanese
Treaty,
1902

During the decade thus ended, events in the Far East had moved with tremendous rapidity; how rapidly the world had hardly perhaps realized, when, in 1902, it learnt to its astonishment that the island Empire of the West had emerged from the "splendid" isolation which had so long characterized its foreign policy, only to conclude an actual treaty with the island Empire of the Far East. On January 30, 1902, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was signed. The motives which inspired Japan to seek an alliance with England call for no elaborate analysis. The action of Russia, France, and Germany in 1895 had naturally created deep resentment in Japan. To England, therefore, Japan turned, not only as the European country which had the greatest interest in the Orient, but as the one Great Power which had stood aloof from her neighbours, when, in her hour of victory, they inflicted injury and humiliation upon Japan. The Japanese had, as Count Hayashi¹ told Lord Lansdowne,² "a strong sentimental dislike to the retention by Russia of [Manchuria] from which they had at one time been expelled." Manchuria, however, was of secondary importance to Japan. Her real concern was for Korea. Korea "could not possibly stand alone—its people were far too unintelligent—and sooner or later it would have to be decided whether the country was to fall to Russia or not." The Japanese "would certainly fight in order to prevent it, and it must be the object of their diplomacy to isolate Russia, *with which Power, if it stood alone, they were prepared to deal.*"³ The italicized words provide

¹ Japanese Ambassador in London. For the whole matter, cf. *Secret Memoirs of Baron Hayashi*. Lond., 1915.

² Foreign Secretary, 1900-5.

³ *British Documents*, ii, 80-8.

the key to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, at any rate from the Japanese side. "Japan," as Lord Lansdowne's biographer has said, "was prepared to fight Russia for Korea single-handed, but not if other Powers such as France and Germany were to intervene. Hence the necessity for a British alliance."¹

With England the alliance was less a matter of necessity than of convenience. She was drawn to Japan by common suspicion of the designs of Russia and Germany in the Far East, by anxiety to maintain the "open door" into China, and by a desire to ease the pressure on her naval resources in the Pacific. Moreover, the hostility displayed towards her, during the South African War, by her European neighbours had opened her eyes to the fact that her boasted "isolation" was perhaps more splendid than safe. The last point will, however, demand more detailed examination in the appropriate place.

The terms of the treaty carried out precisely the objects which the contracting parties had in view. Repudiating any ideas of aggression aimed either at China or Korea, they expressed their anxiety to maintain the *status quo* in both countries. If either Power should find it necessary to safeguard its interests when threatened by the aggressive action of a third Power, or by internal disturbances, the other Party undertook to maintain a friendly neutrality, and endeavour to isolate the conflict. If, notwithstanding that endeavour, one or more other Powers intervened, the hitherto neutral ally would come in.

The significance of this treaty can hardly be exaggerated—more particularly from the point of view of Japan. At one stride Japan was admitted to terms of equality by the greatest of the world empires, and she was assured that, in the event of an attack upon her by Russia, the British fleet would keep the ring, and would intercept any possible intervention on the side of her antagonist. If Germany or France came to the assistance of Russia, Great Britain would come in as an active belligerent. On her part, Great Britain secured a powerful naval ally in the Pacific, and converted into a friend a Power which her Australasian Colonies were beginning to dread. The treaty, as Lord Lansdowne insisted, had been concluded

Significance
of the
Treaty

¹ Lord Newton : *Lord Lansdowne*, p. 220.

"purely as a measure of precaution"; it in no way threatened "the present or the legitimate interests of other Powers," it would "make for the preservation of peace, and if peace were unfortunately broken, would "have the effect of restricting the area of hostilities."¹ The Anglo-Japanese Treaty was concluded for five years; but before the period expired it was revised in two important particulars. It was agreed that each country should come to the assistance of the other if attacked even by a single Power, and the scope of the alliance, which was officially described as aiming at "the consolidation and maintenance of general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India," was by these additional words significantly and definitely extended to embrace British India. The alliance was to last for ten years. In 1911, however, the agreement was, at the instance of Great Britain, again revised, in order to remove any danger of England being involved in a war between the United States and Japan. To meet this possible danger the 4th Article of the revised Treaty of 1911 was to run as follows: "Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with the third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this agreement shall entail upon such contracting party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is enforced."

Reception
of the
Treaty
abroad

The news of the signature of the treaty excited, naturally enough, various feelings in different European capitals. The terms of it were privately communicated to Germany before publication. The Kaiser was pleased and flattered by this act of courtesy, and he told the British Ambassador that he had received the communication "with interest and satisfaction," but with some surprise that the agreement had not been concluded sooner. Some far-seeing Germans regretted, indeed, that Germany had not been brought in as a third party in the alliance, and King Edward was himself favourably disposed at one time towards her inclusion. According to Baron Hayashi, however, the King became convinced that "nothing could be done with the Kaiser and his Ministers."²

¹ Lansdowne to Sir C. Macdonald, January 30, 1902.

² Eckhardstein: *Memoirs*, p. 230. Baron von Eckhardstein was one of those who regretted the omission of Germany. "Germany," he writes, (p. 227), "after missing this best and last opportunity of a firm friendship with Great Britain and Japan, vacillated and oscillated like a straw in the wind." On King Edward's attitude, cf. Lee, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-5.

Italy and Austria were cordial in their congratulations, and expressed the hope and belief that the treaty would make for peace in the Far East. France and Russia "made little attempt to conceal their disappointment." M. Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, remarked to Lord Lansdowne that "there was far too much *méfiance* in England as to Russian designs in various parts of the world," while Count Lamsdorff, the Russian Foreign Minister, declared, with an air of injured innocence, that he knew of no Powers which had any intention of threatening the *status quo* in the Far East.¹

Before the treaty had been in force for two years Japan was involved in a war of the first magnitude with Russia.

Towards that end things had been tending for at least a quarter of a century. The potential antagonism of Russia to Japan was plainly announced, when in the year 1875, Russia in high-handed fashion seized the island of Sakhalin, loftily conceding to Japan the Kurile Islands, which indisputably belonged to the latter Power. Japan did not forget; still less did she forgive Russia for the intervention by which she had in 1895 deprived Japan of the fruits of her victory over the Chinese Empire. When, in 1898, Russia had herself seized Port Arthur, and had immediately begun to convert it into a strong fortress, and to utilize as a naval station the port, which in the hands of Japan she had denounced as a menace to Peking, the indignation of the Japanese knew no bounds. Japan, however, knew well how to wait until her military and naval reorganization was complete. Meanwhile Russia was pushing forward with hot haste her military and railway penetration in Manchuria. In 1900 the Russian Viceroy, Admiral Alexieff, concluded an agreement with the Chinese commander at Mukden, providing that China should resume her authority in Manchuria only under a Russian Protectorate. By 1903 it became evident that Russia intended to extend her occupation from Manchuria to Korea. Between August 1903 and February 1904 continuous negotiations proceeded on these and other disputed points, between Tokio and Petersburg, until at last, when all her preparations were complete, Japan required Russia to name a specific date for withdrawal from Manchuria. Negotiations were finally broken off on February 5. By February 8 Admiral Togo, in command of

Russo-Japanese
War,
1904-5

¹ Lord Newton : *Lord Lansdowne*, pp. 225-7.

the Japanese fleet, was on his way to Port Arthur, and on the night of February 8-9, the Japanese torpedoed the Russian fleet off Port Arthur, and proceeded straightway to invade Korea. The first Japanese army under General Kuroki, having safely landed at Chemulpo, pushed on to the line of the Yalu, and cleared Korea of Russian troops. General Oku with the second Japanese army landed on the Liao-Tung Peninsula, cut off the communications of Russia with Port Arthur, and having opened up that fortress to the attack of a third Japanese army under General Nogi, again turned north and drove the Russians back towards Mukden. On January 1, 1905, Port Arthur, after suffering a terrible bombardment, on the top of a ten months' siege, surrendered to the concerted attacks of the Japanese forces on sea and land. Oku, now reinforced by the army which had been besieging Port Arthur, resumed the advance on Mukden, and after tremendous fighting, inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Russian forces at the Battle of Mukden (March 6-10). In the three days' battle, 120,000 men were killed and wounded. As a result, Russian forces evacuated Mukden, leaving 40,000 prisoners in Oku's hands.


The Baltic
fleet and
the Dogger
Bank
incident,
Oct. 21,
1904

Two months later the Russian Baltic fleet, under the command of Admiral Rodjestvensky, made its belated appearance in Japanese waters. It had sailed from the Baltic in October, and on the 21st of that month, finding itself in the midst of a flotilla of British fishing smacks and trawlers off the Dogger Bank, had opened fire upon them with fatal results. The incident created intense excitement in England, and might easily have led to the outbreak of war. The British Government, however, behaved with admirable restraint, and the incident was referred to an international commission, by whom it was established that the Russian admiral had mistaken the British trawlers for Japanese torpedo boats, and had fired upon them in panic. Russia was required to apologize to Great Britain and to compensate the fishermen.

Battle of
Tsushima
Straits,
May 27,
1905

Hardly had Rodjestvensky's fleet reached Japanese water, when Togo fell upon it, and annihilated it in the Straits of Tsushima (May 27, 1905). The Battle of Tsushima finished the war. Through the friendly offices of the United States, negotiations between the belligerents were opened at Portsmouth (New Hampshire), and on August 23, 1905, the Treaty of Portsmouth was concluded. Russia agreed to restore to

Treaty of
Portsmouth



FAR EAST: POLITICAL DIVISIONS AFTER RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

Japan the Island of Sakhalin which she had seized in 1875 ; to surrender to Japan her lease of the Liao-Tung Peninsula and of Port Arthur, to evacuate Manchuria, and to recognize Korea as falling within the Japanese sphere of influence. Korea, however, was declared to be independent, and Russia and Japan mutually agreed to evacuate Manchuria. Five years later, Japan put an end to ambiguities in Korea by a definite annexation (1910).

Results of
the war
in Asia ;

The Russo-Japanese War was an event of resounding significance, and its reactions were far-reaching. In Asia the victory of Japan imposed a definite check upon the advance of Russia, and placed Japan herself in a position of unquestioned pre-eminence. It also exercised a powerful effect upon the domestic politics of China. China hurriedly began to Europeanize her institutions in the Japanese mode, established a Parliamentary Government in 1911, and in 1912 overthrew the ancient Manchu dynasty, and embarked upon the hazardous experiment of a Republic. Nor was the repercussion confined to China. It was felt throughout the whole continent of Asia, and indeed wherever coloured races were in contact with whites. In India it was craftily represented as a blow to the prestige not of Russia only, but of all the Western Powers and not least of England.

in Europe

Even more significant were the reactions of the Russo-Japanese War upon Europe—primarily, of course, upon Russia herself. The Russian autocracy had long ago appreciated the fact that for them it was a race between some dramatic success achieved in foreign war, and an internal movement which, beginning with reform, might easily develop into revolution.

Changes in
Russia,
1870-1904

During the previous thirty years Russia had been the subject of three great movements, any one, or all, of which, might be properly described as revolutionary. One was industrial, a second intellectual, and a third constitutional or political. From 1870 onwards, as we have seen, Russia has been moving in an industrial sense in the same direction, if not at the same pace, as the countries of Western Europe. Curiously enough a strong impulse was given to the industrial movement by the emancipation of the serfs. Not a few of those who had subsisted in comparative comfort as serfs, found it impossible to make a living as free peasant proprietors.

Industrial
revolution

They got deeper and deeper into debt, and at last, as the only solution of their difficulties, sought and found work as wage-earners in the cities.

The progress of industrialization was followed in Russia, as elsewhere, by symptoms of intellectual, social, and political restlessness. Owing to the autocratic form of government and the severely restrictive measures taken by the Russian police, the reform movement assumed from the first a revolutionary character. Consequently, many of the most brilliant Russian intellectuals found themselves in exile. Among them was Bakunin, the prophet of anarchy, who in 1868 published at Geneva his *People's Business*, which was followed in 1873 by his *Statecraft and Anarchy*. The publication of these works may be taken as having initiated the movement which reached fruition in 1917.

Side by side with the revolutionary movement there was *Zemstva* a constitutional movement which found a focus in the *Zemstva*. In 1878 a conference of *Zemstva* met at Kieff and drafted a comprehensive programme of reform; but the assassination of the Czar Alexander II in 1881 postponed all further idea of a reform for a quarter of a century. Not until the Japanese Reaction, 1881-1904 War revealed the entire incompetence and the gross venality of the Autocracy, did the reform party venture to resume the movement which had progressed so favourably under Alexander II. In July 1904 Plehve, the reactionary Minister of the Interior, was assassinated. The first step taken by his successor, Prince Sviatopolk-Mirsky, was to suspend the Press censorship; the second was to summon a conference of *Zemstva*, which met in Petersburg in November 1904. This conference not only drafted another programme of political reform, but gave a powerful impulse to political agitation throughout the country. An incident which took place on January 2, 1905, added fuel to the flame. On that day a procession of workmen in Petersburg was fired on by the troops, with results which caused the day to be known as "Red Sunday." Disturbances continued, and culminated in the summer of 1905 in a general strike. Meanwhile the Government had already decided to summon a Representative Assembly, or Duma, endowed with merely Consultative Powers. After the general strike, however, Count Witte, who had given proof of statesmanlike qualities when appointed to

the Ministry of Finance in 1892, was recalled to power. Witte, who had just negotiated the Treaty of Portsmouth, promptly decided that the proffered concessions must be enlarged, and a Duma endowed with legislative powers, and elected on a simpler and extended franchise, was summoned.

The first
Duma

The Duma met in May 1906. There were two legislative Chambers: an Upper House, consisting of the old Council of the Empire in a reorganized form, and an elected Lower House. The majority of the Lower Chamber belonged to the party known as the Constitutional Democrats or *Cadets*, led by men like Struve and Milukov; there was also a considerable party of strong Conservatives; a Right Centre, known as the *Octobrists*, and a small Socialist representation. The meeting of this first Russian Parliament was hailed with the utmost enthusiasm throughout the Empire; a new day of liberty had dawned, it was believed, for Russia. Never were high hopes destined to more bitter disillusionment. On the eve of the opening of the Duma there was issued by the Government a *Fundamental Law* which reaffirmed in the most unequivocal terms that in the Emperor alone supreme and autocratic power was vested. Of his grace he was prepared to share with the Duma his legislative functions, but in him and him alone sovereignty was to reside.

No sooner, however, was the Duma opened than the Cadets formulated their demands: universal suffrage; reconstruction of the Second Chamber; freedom of person, of speech, of public meeting, of combination, of the Press, of conscience; compulsory and gratuitous education; fiscal reform; redistribution of landed property, and much else; but of all the demands the most fundamental was that Ministers should be responsible to the Duma, that the Legislature should control the Executive.

The formulation of such a programme recalls for Englishmen the days of the early Stuarts. The essential point at issue was identical. Where was sovereignty henceforward to reside, in the Crown, or in the King-in-Parliament?

Neither side would, or perhaps could, recede from the position it had taken up. Goremykin, who had replaced Count Witte as Prime Minister before the Duma met, was faced by a vote of censure, carried with only eleven dissents. Would the Czar give way, and accept a Duma Min-

istry ? For some two months acrimonious debates proceeded ; but in July Goremykin was dismissed, only, however, to be succeeded by Stolýpin, a younger and stronger man, who was charged with the duty of dissolving the recalcitrant Duma. On July 21 it was dissolved by Proclamation, and the members were excluded by a body of troops from their accustomed place of meeting.

A second Duma was promptly summoned to meet in the ensuing March, and in the meantime Stolýpin made it clear that while inflexibly opposed to revolution, he was not merely willing, but anxious, to carry through far-reaching reforms. The condition of Russia was at this time critical in the extreme : reeling under the shock of her recent defeat ; scandalized by successive revelations of the incompetence of generals, admirals, and officials ; dissolved in anarchy on the one side by strikes and insurrections, on the other by savage reprisals ; —such were the conditions under which the elections for the second Duma took place. Out of 470 seats the Cadets and their allies secured about 200 ; the Radicals and Socialists about 170 ; the Conservatives, 100.

The second
Duma,
March 5,
1907, to
June 10

Stolýpin met the new Chamber with a programme of comprehensive reform, but on two points, eagerly demanded by the majority, he was adamant : he would neither expropriate the landlords nor put the Executive under the heel of the Legislature. A deadlock ensued, and the Minister proposed to solve it by a sort of “ Pride’s Purge ”—by the exclusion of fifty of the extreme Socialists and the arrest of their leaders ; but on June 16 the Czar dissolved the Duma.

A new electoral law was promptly promulgated ; the franchise was varied and restricted, and a considerable redistribution of seats was effected. The result was much more favourable to the Government, and when in November the third Duma met, Stolýpin found himself at the head of a good working majority, which settled down to carry through, quietly and steadily, a comprehensive programme of sorely needed administrative reform.

The third
Duma,
Nov. 14,
1907.

Thus did the Japanese victory react upon the domestic politics of Russia. It reacted, as the next chapters will show, not less powerfully upon the international situation.

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- See also chapter xvii.

NOTE TO PP. 342-3.

Lady Gwendolen Cecil's *Life* of her father, *Robert Marquis of Salisbury* (vol. iv, especially c. i) throws additional light upon the European situation in 1887. In particular it emphasizes the fact that early in that year "war between France and Germany was [generally regarded as] inevitable" (cf. pp. 11 seq.). It also shows how "difficult" France was making herself towards England, and how anxious Italy was for an English alliance.

CHAPTER XX

DIPLOMACY AND WAR

BOERS AND BRITONS IN SOUTH AFRICA. THE U.S.A. AND
WORLD POLITICS. ENGLAND AND THE SOUDAN

WHEN the young German Emperor dropped the “old pilot,” in 1890, Germany had already forfeited the friendship of Russia, but France had not yet gained it; Austria was united by the closest ties with Germany; Italy had been brought into the Triple Alliance and estranged from France, France from England, and England from Russia. Bismarck had with amazing skill conciliated his friends and divided his potential enemies. In less than twenty years after his death, the Triple Alliance—^{Alliances and Ententes} itself none too firmly cemented as regards the third partner—was confronted by a Triple *Entente*, consisting of France, Russia, and Great Britain. It is true that the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid had become, to all intents and purposes, a member of the Central European group, and that Germany was connected by close dynastic, if not diplomatic, ties with Roumania, Bulgaria, and Greece. Against this, however, must be set the fact that the conclusion of a firm alliance between Great Britain and Japan had introduced a new and significant factor into the problem of world-diplomacy. But the outstanding fact of the diplomatic situation was that, whereas in 1890 Germany was surrounded by Powers severally and mutually isolated, and at least as friendly to her as to each other, by 1911 she was confronted by an *Entente*, equal in strength and hardly inferior in cohesion to that Triple Alliance which Bismarck had laboriously created.

This diplomatic revolution supplies the pivot of European politics during the first twenty years of the Kaiser's reign. But European politics no longer monopolize the stage, and

the present chapter must therefore carry us far beyond the confines of Europe.

Germany
and
England

When the Emperor William II ascended the throne, Prussia, and in less degree Germany, were seething with animosity against two august Englishwomen,¹ the Emperor's mother and his grandmother. Two contradictory accusations were made against Queen Victoria and the Empress Frederick in the German Press, and were widely believed by the German public. On the one hand, it was asserted that they had conspired with an English "quack" doctor (*Heil Kunster*) to bring a dying man to the German throne; and on the other, that by refusing to allow the operation recommended by the German physicians they were largely responsible for the Emperor Frederick's "tragic and untimely end."² As to the first, Bismarck himself dismissed as a "fable" the idea that "an heir to the throne who suffers from an incurable physical complaint is excluded from the succession either by the family laws of the Hohenzollerns or by the text of the Prussian Constitution"; and he further declared that there was not "a shadow of truth in the story that the Crown Prince Frederick had voluntarily pledged himself to renounce the succession, if he were proved to be suffering from an incurable malady."³ Lord Ernle has clinched the matter in a sentence. "As, therefore, on Bismarck's own evidence, the Crown Prince's succession was secure whether his malady was proved to be cancer or not, the motives which the *North German Gazette* alleges for the plot disappear and with them the plot itself."⁴

The charge that the Empress Frederick was responsible for bringing Sir Morell Mackenzie into consultation with the

¹ The present writer was in Germany in 1888, and can personally attest the accuracy of this analysis.

² The phrase is Herr Ludwig's, who in his brilliant *Kaiser Wilhelm II.* has revived the old accusations against the two Queen-Empresses. Herr Ludwig has, however, chivalrously acknowledged (*The Observer*, Feb. 3rd, 1920) that the publication of the *Letters of the Empress Frederick* by Sir Frederick Ponsonby (Macmillan, 1928) has compelled him to make "substantial changes" in his views. Cf. in addition Lord Ernle, ap. *Nineteenth Century and After* for September and October 1929, and Letters of Sir Rennell Rodd to *The Times*, Nov. 15, 1927, and Jan. 18, 1928.

³ The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* (June 26, 1888) affirmed this within ten days of the Emperor Frederick's death (June 15).

⁴ *Nineteenth Century and After* (Oct. 1929), p. 527.

German doctors has also been proved false.¹ Mackenzie's diagnosis and treatment may have been right or wrong ; to make a devoted wife responsible for a doctor's mistake is as cruel as it is ridiculous.¹

Nevertheless, the atmosphere which William II first breathed as Sovereign was deeply impregnated with anti-English prejudice. In those prejudices he himself largely shared. To say that between himself and his mother there was little sympathy would be gravely to understate the case. For years past there had been deepening hostility, ceaselessly fanned by Bismarck. "From the 'eighties onward," says Herr Ludwig, "he was convinced that the Crown Princess consciously worked for English as against Prussian and German interests." Nor did he make any effort to conceal his own hostility to his mother's country. Yet other shrewd observers perceived "behind this parade of dislike a great unconscious attraction towards England." "For a decade," writes his brilliant biographer, "his heart vacillated between these emotions of aversion, admiration and jealousy."²

With all this it is the more remarkable that the young ^{Germany and} Kaiser's first inclinations would seem to have been towards ^{England} a good understanding with England. That inclination may have been due simply to the fact that he needed time to organize his new scheme of world-policy, to foster German trade, and, above all, to create a German navy. But be this as it may, he seemed at the outset no less bent upon the maintenance of European Peace than his grandfather. England, then as always, was equally pacific in disposition, nor was she quick to take alarm or offence. True it was that the Kaiser had in set terms announced that the future of Germany was on the sea. But to most Englishmen in 1890 that future seemed a distant one. True it was that, since 1884, German colonial expansion had been extraordinarily rapid both in Africa and in the Pacific. Nevertheless, Gladstone welcomed Germany "as a friend and ally" in the spread of civilization, and, in 1890, Lord Salisbury did not hesitate to cede Heligoland in exchange for concessions in East Africa. The Berlin Conference of 1890 witnessed nothing but good-will on both sides, and three years later another Anglo-German agreement

¹ The whole matter is exhaustively discussed by Lord Ernle (*op. cit.*), and his articles ought to close the controversy.

² Ludwig, p. 15.

defined the frontiers of the two Powers in Nigeria and the Cameroons, and generally negotiated a settlement of outstanding difficulties in West Africa.

This friendliness was no doubt attributable partly to the unabated antagonism between England and Russia in the Near and Middle East, partly to the acute differences between England and France. It is not, then, remarkable that, under these circumstances, England and Germany should have been well disposed towards each other. On January 3, 1896, however, the world was startled to learn that the Emperor William had despatched to President Krüger a telegram congratulating him on having "preserved the independence of his country against foreign invasion."¹ In England the telegram was bitterly resented as an unwarrantable interference in the internal affairs of the British Empire. But in order to explain the incident we must once more recur to events in South Africa.

British
expansion
in South
Africa

Since 1884 a series of changes both rapid and profound had occurred in that region. In that year there began, as we have seen, a scramble for Africa among the European Powers. Partly under the impulse of European competition, partly stimulated by the discovery of diamonds and gold in great profusion, the British in South Africa resumed the advance which had been checked by the events of 1880-1. This advance led to the revival of a device which, since the days of Adam Smith, had fallen into some discredit. The statesmen of the seventeenth century cordially encouraged the concession of Charters to companies of merchants. Such concessions brought to the Crown a maximum of profit with a minimum of responsibility. The famous denunciation of Adam Smith brought this method of colonization into ill repute. None the less, it had solid advantages, and in the last decades of the nineteenth century they became increasingly obvious. The "company of merchants" took risks and tried experiments; the Crown and the nation reaped where the company had sown. In 1885 a Protectorate was established over Bechuana-land, partly no doubt with a view of preventing over-close relations between the Boer Republics and the recently established German colonies of Namaqualand and Damaraland

¹ This telegram was not merely the personal act of the Kaiser but was approved at a Council at which the Chancellor Caprivi and the Foreign Secretary were present.

(German South-West Africa). In the same year a Charter was granted to the Royal Niger Company, which established a Protectorate over the Niger territory on the west coast. But chartered companies and Protectorates alike represent, as a rule, transitory phases of development, and in 1900 Nigeria was annexed to the Crown. On the east coast the Chartered Company of East Africa (1888) prepared the way in similar fashion for the direct sovereignty of the Crown (1896). In the same year (1888) Lobengula, King of the Matabeles, was induced to accept British protection, and in 1889 the Chartered Company of South Africa was incorporated, and started on its conquering and civilizing mission. It established its sovereignty in no long time over the vast territory which stretches from the Limpopo in the south, to Lake Nyassa on the east, and Lake Tanganyika on the north,—a territory which recalls in its modern name, Rhodesia, the memory of the great statesman whose insight and imagination conceived, and whose resolute will went far to secure, British supremacy in Africa. About the same time (1890) Portugal was induced to renounce all rights over the hinterland which separated its possessions in the west, (Angola) from Mozambique and Portuguese East Africa. In this way the two Boer Republics were virtually encircled by British territory.

Meanwhile, in the Transvaal itself an event of first-rate importance had taken place. Valuable gold mines were discovered in 1886 on the Witwatersrand, and the discovery attracted a crowd of adventurers, who introduced into the social and economic life of the South African Republic an entirely new strain. The slow-moving, intensely conservative Boer farmers deeply resented the intrusion of the miners and financiers. Oil would not mix with water, and the newly-founded city of Johannesburg, with its new Chamber of Mines, soon found itself in conflict with Pretoria and the Volksraad. The newcomers, or *Uitlanders*, peremptorily demanded political rights commensurate with their contribution to the wealth of the community. The Boer Government, at that time dominated by President Krüger, refused to grant them. In 1895 Cecil Rhodes became Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, and in December of that same year the *Uitlanders* of the Transvaal attempted to take by force what had been denied to their arguments. Dr. Jameson, an intimate friend

Chartered
Companies

Gold-
mining
in the
Transvaal

The
Uitlanders

**The
Jameson
Raid**

of the Premier of Cape Colony, and himself the administrator of the British South Africa Company, foolishly attempted to raid the Transvaal territory with an armed force. The force, commanded by Jameson, was surrounded by the Boers at Krügersdorp and forced to surrender. Their confederates in Johannesburg were imprisoned; Jameson himself, and his comrades, were handed over for trial to the British Government.

The fiasco of the Jameson Raid had important results. Though disavowed both by the Cape Colony Government and by the Imperial Government, the raid excited the contempt and hostility of all our rivals in Africa and our enemies in Europe, and on January 3, 1896, the German Emperor despatched the historic telegram to which reference has already been made.

**Treaties
between
the Boer
Republics
and
Germany**

Jameson's Raid rendered it impossible for the paramount Power to interfere on behalf of the Uitlanders whose position became more and more desperate. Meanwhile, in March 1897, the Transvaal Republic concluded with the Orange Free State a Convention of "Friendship and Perpetual Alliance." A month later the Orange Free State concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with Germany. In view of the *rapprochement* between the two Dutch Republics, the significance of this new engagement hardly requires demonstration.

**Towards
war**

Events were clearly hastening towards a crisis. In 1897 Sir Alfred (afterwards Viscount) Milner was appointed to succeed Sir Hercules Robinson, as Governor of Cape Colony and High Commissioner of South Africa; and in the same year Mr. Chamberlain addressed to the High Commissioner a despatch, setting forth in detail the grievances of the Uitlanders against the Transvaal Government, and instructing him to raise specifically the question of the status of the Transvaal under the Convention of 1884. The terms of that Convention were admittedly ambiguous; the renunciation of suzerainty was a sentimental blunder, and recent events rendered it imperative, if grave consequences were not to ensue, that the situation should be cleared up. The Transvaal Government attempted, not unnaturally, to use Jameson's blunder for the purpose of securing a revision in their favour of the terms of the Convention of London. But Mr. Chamberlain was adamant against any attempt on the part of the Dutch

**Mr. Cham-
berlain and
Sir A.
Milner**

Republic to assert a status of complete sovereignty and independence. Meanwhile things could not remain as they were at Johannesburg. In April 1899 Sir Alfred Milner forwarded to the Queen a Petition, signed by 21,000 British subjects in the Transvaal, praying that the Queen would make enquiry into the grievances of which they were victims, and in particular their exclusion from all political rights. In June a Conference took place at Bloemfontein, between President Krüger and Sir Alfred Milner, at which the latter vainly attempted to persuade the President to make some concession to the Uitlanders. The situation became so menacing that reinforcements were despatched from England to the Cape, but in numbers insufficient to assert the British claims, though more than sufficient to provoke the apprehensions of the Boers. In October 1899 the two Dutch Republics demanded the immediate withdrawal of the British troops, and the submission of all the questions at issue to arbitration. To concede the latter claim would have been to acknowledge the equality and sovereign status of the Transvaal Government. On the implicit refusal of the demand the two Dutch Republics declared war (October 10).

The war opened disastrously for Great Britain. The British forces were quite inadequate to meet the Boers, who, mobilizing with extreme rapidity, took the offensive in Natal. A small British force under General White checked their advance at Talana Hill and Elandslaghte (October 21), but was compelled to fall back on Ladysmith, where for four months it was besieged by the Boers. Sir Redvers Buller was sent out in command of reinforcements, but made the serious blunder of dividing his force into three columns. The result was the "Black Week" of December 1899: General Gatacre was heavily repulsed in a night attack at Stromberg (December 10); Lord Methuen, moving to the relief of Kimberley, was defeated at Magersfontein (December 11); while Buller, in a dogged attempt to relieve Ladysmith by a direct frontal attack, sustained a terrible reverse at Colenso (December 15). Three days after Buller's defeat on the Tugela River, Lord Roberts accepted the Command-in-Chief, only stipulating that he should have the services of Lord Kitchener as Chief of his Staff. The two Generals landed at Cape Town on January 16, 1900, and the army under their command was

The South
African
War

The
"Black
Week,"
Dec. 1899

substantially reinforced by contingents despatched to South Africa from Canada, New Zealand, and Australia.

Victory
achieved
by Roberts
and
Kitchener

The spirit of the scene changed instantaneously. On February 15 Roberts relieved Kimberley ; on February 27 (the anniversary of Majuba) he surrounded at Paardeberg a large force of Boers under the command of Kronje, and compelled them to surrender ; he entered Bloemfontein on March 15, and advancing from the Orange Free State into the Transvaal, occupied Pretoria in the first week of June. Meanwhile Buller, after repeated failures to relieve General White and his sorely-tried garrison in Ladysmith, at last turned the flank of the Boers on the Tugela by the capture of Pieter's Hill, and so was able to relieve the devoted city. In November, Roberts handed over the command to Kitchener, and returned to England just in time to report himself at Osborne to his dying Sovereign. Despite rapidly-failing health, Queen Victoria's conduct during the Boer War was little short of heroic. She followed closely the efforts of her soldiers in South Africa, and expressed special appreciation of the gallantry of the Colonial contingents ; she went in and out among her people at home, encouraging the fighter, consoling the wounded, comforting the mourners, warning and stimulating her Ministers. She even overcame her dislike to Ireland so far as to pay a special visit to that country, in the spring of 1900, in order to thank her " brave Irish soldiers " for their efforts in South Africa, and to try, too tardily, the effect of the " talisman of the Royal presence " upon an impressionable if rebellious people. But the strain of the effort was tremendous, and on January 22, 1901, death closed her long reign of sixty-three years.

Death of
Queen
Victoria

Guerilla
warfare in
South
Africa

The war in South Africa was by no means at an end. Throughout the latter part of 1900 and the whole of 1901 it was prolonged by the brilliant tactics of Louis Botha, De Wet, and Delarey, who waged guerilla warfare with incomparable skill. Gradually, however, the grim tenacity of Kitchener bore down all resistance. Boer women and children were collected into concentration camps, and by a system of blockhouses the whole country was slowly subdued. In May 1902 peace between Great Britain and the Boers was concluded at Vereeniging.

Treaty of
Vereeniging
(1902)

The long contest between the two European races for

supremacy in South Africa was at last ended, and ended in the only possible way. The two Burgher States were annexed to the British Crown. After the conclusion of Peace, matters began to settle down so rapidly that it was deemed possible to confer responsible self-government upon the Transvaal in 1906, and upon the Orange River Colony in 1907. But as in the case of Canada and Australia, the attainment of responsibility was but the prelude to a further constitutional development. Four questions in particular compelled the immediate consideration of some scheme of Union: that of Railway Rates and Communications; the Tariff Question; the Labour Question; and, above all, the fact that the two European races were hopelessly and increasingly outnumbered by the indigenous tribes of South Africa.

Under Colonial separatism the railway problem presented a hopeless and apparently insoluble tangle. In May 1908 a Conference came together at Pretoria to consider the closely related problems of Railway Rates and Tariffs; but it was quickly realized that no ultimate solution would be found except in a political union between the four Colonies. A scheme was, after long consultation, agreed upon, embodied in a Bill, and submitted for consideration to the several Colonial Legislatures. After various amendments, the scheme now embodied in the South African Union Act, was, in June 1909, approved by all four Colonies. As finally adopted it took the form, not of a Federation, but of a Political Union. Union was in the case of South Africa preferred to federalism for several reasons, the two most important being that the distinctions in South Africa run upon lines not of locality but of race, while the economic problems which, as we have seen, so urgently pressed for solution, were more readily soluble under a unitary than under a federal system.

Thus was the dream of Sir George Grey and Lord Carnarvon more than fulfilled. They had dreamt of Confederation. Under the new Constitution, four Colonies, Cape Colony, Natal, the Transvaal, and the Orange River Colony, agreed to merge their identity in that of United South Africa, and accept henceforward the status of *Provinces*; but each Province still has an elected Provincial Council with a standing Executive Committee, elected by the Council and responsible thereto, under a chairman nominated by the Union

Government, holding the title of administrator of the Province. Provision was also made for the admission into the Union, at a subsequent date, of other Provinces, such as Rhodesia, should it be mutually desired. The Union Legislature consists of two Houses : a Senate of 40 members, and a House of 130, of whom Cape Colony elects 51, the Transvaal 45, and Natal and the Orange Free State 17 each. The Executive Council, appointed by the Governor-General, is, in effect, a responsible Cabinet. By a clumsy but perhaps unavoidable compromise, the seat of the Legislature was fixed at Cape Town, that of the Executive at Pretoria. In the *Union Act* the final stage in the constitutional evolution of South Africa has, we may presume, been reached. "Spasmodic violence alternating with impatient dropping of the reins; first severity and then indulgence, and then severity again, with no persisting in any one system—a process which drives nations mad as it drives children." Such was Froude's summary of England's dealing with South Africa in the nineteenth century. The twentieth opened under happier auspices.

The
U.S.A. and
World-
politics

During the contest between Great Britain and the Boer Republics the sympathies of most of the European peoples and Governments were manifestly, and indeed ostentatiously, on the side of the Republics. That this should have been the case in Holland was natural, and in Germany was intelligible; nor was it remarkable in view of recent events on the Nile that the hostility of France should have been at least as pronounced as that of Germany. Italy remained constant in her friendship for England, and the memory of England's friendly offices in the Spanish War was sufficiently recent to check the disposition which undoubtedly existed in the United States towards the espousal of the Boer cause.

Relations of
Great
Britain and
the U.S.A.

The relations between Great Britain and the U.S.A. had not, indeed, been consistently friendly. The war into which the two English-speaking peoples had drifted in 1812 had left bitter memories behind it. In 1830 de Tocqueville observed that he could conceive of no hatred more poisonous than that which the Americans then felt for England. In 1842 there was acute friction between the two peoples over unsettled boundary questions in Maine and New Brunswick. But the conclusion in that year of the Webster-Ashburton

Treaty provided a settlement of all open questions as to the boundaries of British North America and the United States from the Atlantic Ocean to the Rocky Mountains. The Oregon Boundary question in 1846 provided another cause of friction, but it was not until the outbreak of the Civil War in America (1861) that the two countries came actually to the brink of war. The affair of the *Trent* was only one of several incidents which during the war between North and South might have led to an explosion.

American
Civil War

Neither party in America was satisfied with the English attitude. The North regarded our neutrality as rather more than malevolent. The South thought it inadequately benevolent. More specifically there was the question of the damage inflicted upon American commerce by the *Alabama* and other cruisers sailing from English ports. The latter question was, however, ultimately submitted to arbitration. After prolonged negotiation between the two Governments, the Treaty of Washington—a portentous document consisting of forty-three articles—was signed (May 8, 1871). It expressed “in a friendly spirit the regret felt by Her Majesty’s Government for the escape, under whatever circumstances, of the *Alabama* and other vessels from British ports, and for the depredation committed by these vessels. It adjusted in minute detail outstanding disputes as to fisheries between the United States and Canada, and also referred the question of the Vancouver boundary (involving the possession of the Island of San Juan) to the arbitration of the German Emperor, who ultimately decided against Great Britain. It accepted new principles of international law, involving greater diligence in preventing the equipment of ships in neutral harbours for use against friendly belligerents, and finally it agreed to refer the *Alabama* claims themselves to a tribunal of five persons nominated by Great Britain, the United States, Italy, Switzerland, and Brazil. In the result, Great Britain had to pay £3,250,000 in damages to the United States. Mr. Gladstone, who was largely responsible for the submission of the question to arbitration, subsequently expressed the opinion that “the sentence was harsh in its extent and unjust in its basis.” But he added, “I regard the fine imposed on this country as dust in the balance, compared with the moral value of the example set, when these two great nations of England and

The
Geneva
arbitration

America . . . went in peace and concord before a judicial tribunal, rather than resort to the arbitrament of the sword." It was finely said, and impartial history applauds the sentiment. But among contemporaries there was an uneasy sense that we had been unduly complaisant.

The
Venezuelan
question

Be that as it may, the meekness of spirit exhibited by Great Britain in 1871 was ill-requited, when in 1895 Mr. Olney, Secretary of State under President Cleveland, peremptorily demanded that Great Britain should submit an outstanding dispute between herself and Venezuela to arbitration. For many years past there had been some dispute as to the precise boundary between the latter State and British Guiana. Lord Aberdeen had attempted to effect a settlement of the question as long ago as 1844, but his suggested delimitation was declined. Thirty years later Venezuela professed its willingness to accept the Aberdeen line, but Great Britain then refused to concede it. The dispute dragged on until, in July 1895, Mr. Olney suddenly interfered and called upon the parties to accept arbitration. The demand itself was startling, the terms in which it was made were not far short of insolent.

The United States attempted to justify their interference by an appeal to the doctrine enunciated in 1823 in the famous message of President Monroe. That doctrine has been from that day to this the sheet-anchor of American diplomacy, but not until 1895 had it been invoked by the United States in a matter of serious importance. It was now asserted in the most extreme form in respect to a matter with which the concern of the United States was remote.

The Olney
Despatch

"That distance and three thousand miles of intervening ocean make any permanent political union between a European and an American State unnatural and inexpedient will hardly be denied. . . . The States of America, south as well as north, by geographical proximity, by natural sympathy, by similarity of governmental constitutions, are friends and allies, commercially and politically, of the United States. . . . To-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. . . . There is, then, a doctrine of American public law, well founded in principle, and abundantly sanctioned by precedent, which entitles and requires the United States to treat as an injury to itself the forcible assumption

by a European Power of political control over an American State." Such was the remarkable language of the Olney despatch.

That despatch unquestionably gave a wide extension to the principle which was laid down by President Monroe, and it was highly provocative in tone. Fortunately Lord Salisbury declined to be provoked. He did, indeed, refuse to accept unrestricted arbitration: he politely questioned the applicability of the Monroe doctrine to the particular dispute, and he insisted that the United States was not entitled to affirm "with reference to a number of States for whose conduct it assumes no responsibility, that its interests are necessarily concerned in whatever may befall those States, simply because they are situated in the Western hemisphere." At the same time, Lord Salisbury made it clear that he had no intention of allowing Great Britain to be drawn into a serious quarrel with the United States. Unfortunately the attitude of American statesmen rendered it none too easy to keep the peace. On December 17, 1895, President Cleveland sent a special message to Congress, wherein he declared that:—

"... If a European Power, by an extension of its boundaries, takes possession of the territory of one of our neighbouring Republics against its will, and in derogation of its rights, it is difficult to see why, to that extent, such European Power does not thereby attempt to extend its system of government to that portion of this continent which is thus taken. This is the precise action which President Monroe declared to be dangerous to our peace and safety." Had the direction of English policy been in less wise and experienced hands, such language might easily have led to war. As it was, the message accentuated a difficult situation, and feeling began to run high in America. "Fortunately for us," writes an American publicist, "Lord Salisbury had a very good sense of humour and declined to take the matter too seriously."¹ Both Great Britain and Venezuela agreed to submit the evidence for their conflicting claims to a "committee of investigation" appointed by the United States; and the investigation issued in a Treaty of Arbitration, concluded nominally between the immediate disputants, but in

¹ Bingham : *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 12.

reality between Great Britain and the United States. The result of the arbitration was, on the whole, to substantiate the British claim. A still more important result ensued. In January 1897 a General Arbitration Treaty between the two great English-speaking nations was signed by Sir Julian Paunceforte and Secretary Olney. The Senate, however, refused its assent, and the treaty was not actually concluded until November 1914.

In the meantime much had happened. The Venezuelan affair really brought to an end the period of American isolation in world-politics. "Cleveland's policy," writes an American historian, "as to the Venezuelan boundary, announced to the world with seismic suddenness and violence that the American democracy was of age."¹ From the position asserted by Cleveland and Olney in 1895, their countrymen could not well recede, and the position involved important corollaries. If the United States is "practically sovereign" on the American Continent, if "its fiat is law" it can hardly avoid responsibility for the doings of its neighbours and the general maintenance of order. Several of its neighbours have shown themselves both weak and turbulent, and in 1904 President Roosevelt frankly admitted that "the adherence of the United States to the Monroe doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of wrong-doing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police Power."

The
Spanish-
American
War, 1898

As a fact the policy of isolation had been already abandoned. On April 21, 1898, war broke out between the United States and Spain. Spain had for many years past been involved in difficulties with her colonists in Cuba. A rising had occurred in 1868, and for ten years the Colony was in a state of almost perpetual insurrection. A compromise was arrived at in 1878 by the Convention of El Lanjon, but the local government was exceedingly oppressive and corrupt, and in 1895 a fresh rebellion broke out. General Weyler was sent to the Colony to restore order by whatsoever means seemed good to him. The methods he employed were as barbarous as they were ineffectual, and in view of the increasingly close business relations between the United States and Cuba it became more and more difficult for the American Government to look on unconcerned. In 1897 the United States

¹ W. A. Dunning; *The British Empire and the United States*, p. 368.

offered its good offices to Spain, but the latter neglected to avail herself of the offer. Meanwhile the drastic measures taken by General Weyler excited increasing indignation in the United States, and a Cuban Relief Committee was set up. At this juncture relations, already strained, were broken by an incident which may or may not have been fortuitous : the United States' cruiser *Maine* was on February 15, 1898, destroyed by a mine in the harbour of Havana. The American Government declined to regard the explosion as accidental, and on April 21 declared war against Spain. The Spanish army and navy were both concentrated at Santiago, where they were blockaded by the American forces. The Spanish Admiral, Cervera, was ordered to run the gauntlet of the blockade, with the result that he and his entire fleet were destroyed after a few hours' engagement by the American squadron under the command of Commodore Schley (July 2). A fortnight later the city of Santiago capitulated.

Explosion of
the *Maine*

As a result of this brief but decisive war, Porto Rico was acquired by the United States, and Spain finally disappeared from the Caribbean Sea. Cuba, after some years' occupation by American troops, was declared independent, as its annexation to the United States might have involved complications with the South American Republics, and would certainly have proved embarrassing to the United States ; but the latter, by requiring that the Cuban Government should respect rights of person and property, retained a quasi-suzerainty over it. The United States retain certain coaling stations in the island, and reserve to themselves the right of interference if the conditions upon which Cuban independence was recognized are not observed. Plainly, that independence is exceedingly precarious, and might at any time be forfeited, should the native government fail in its duties, or should strategical considerations render annexation to the United States imperative, or even convenient.

Future of
Cuba

The war between Spain and the United States was not confined to the Atlantic. As in Cuba, so in the Philippine Archipelago, the rule of the Spaniards had for many years past been both tyrannical and ineffective. The missionary friars, who really ruled the islands in the name of the Spanish sovereign, had done useful work in days gone by, but their administration had rapidly deteriorated, and a movement for

The
Philippines

their expulsion developed among the Filipinos, who in 1896 petitioned the Emperor of Japan in favour of annexation to that country. The Emperor betrayed the plans of his would-be subjects to their legitimate rulers at Madrid, who thereupon instituted a reign of terror in the Archipelago. The islanders retorted by a demand for "constitutional" government, freedom of the Press, equal laws, and in particular the expulsion of the friars.

Capture
of the
Philippines

Thus matters stood when war broke out between Spain and the United States. An American squadron under the command of Admiral Dewey appeared before Manila, forced an entrance into the ill-defended harbour, and in two hours destroyed the entire Spanish fleet (May 1). In July an American army, under General Merritt, landed at Luzon, and in August, Manila surrendered. These disasters inclined the Spaniards to peace, which was concluded at Paris in December 1898. The United States demanded and obtained the cession of the Philippines, but agreed to pay Spain \$20,000,000 in compensation for her loss.

The annexation of Cuba to the United States might, as we have seen, have raised complications both in the domestic politics and in the foreign relations of the Republic. It was otherwise with the Philippines, and no question was ever entertained as to their restoration to Spain, or even as to their independence. On this point the instructions given by President McKinley to the American Peace Commissioners were specific. "Without any original thought of complete or even partial acquisition, the presence and success of our arms at Manila imposes upon us obligations that we cannot disregard. The march of events rules and overrules human action. Avowing unreservedly the purpose which has animated all our effort, and still solicitous to adhere to it, we cannot be unmindful that, without any desire or design on our part, the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization."

The
Filipinos

President McKinley's words were strikingly indicative of the new temper in which the United States was facing external problems, and of its new and wider outlook upon world-

politics. It was not, however, all plain sailing with American policy in the Philippines. The insurgent leader, Aquinaldo, who had been deported from the Archipelago in 1897, was in 1898 permitted to return to Manila on board a United States man-of-war. Aquinaldo repaid the courtesy by proclaiming the independence of the Archipelago, and established a Philippine Republic with himself as President. In February 1899, therefore, the United States found itself involved in a fresh war with the Filipinos. The latter could not, of course, offer any effective resistance, and by the end of 1899 an American army of 60,000 men had brought to an end all organized resistance in the Archipelago. Aquinaldo, however, was still at large, and for some two years longer the American troops had to face a considerable amount of guerilla warfare, in the course of which they suffered considerable losses. At last, in April 1901, Aquinaldo was captured; on July 1 the insurrection was officially declared to be at an end, and the Philippines were handed over to a civil Government at the head of which Judge Taft was placed. The avowed intention of the American Government was to prepare the Filipinos for eventual autonomy. In 1902 a form of Parliamentary Government was established in which a large share was given to the natives, and in his message to Congress in 1904, President Roosevelt made the following pronouncement: "I firmly believe that you can help them (the Filipinos) to rise higher and higher in the scale of civilization and of capacity for self-government, and I most earnestly hope that in the end they will be able to stand, if not entirely alone, yet in some such relation to the United States as Cuba now stands." Under American rule the economic prosperity of the Archipelago has developed with remarkable rapidity, and in 1916 an *Organic Act* was passed by the American Congress, under which a large measure of local autonomy was granted to the Philippines.

Meanwhile American activities in the Pacific were develop- Hawaii
ing in other directions. The United States had for a full half-century manifested an interest in the future of the Sandwich Islands. As far back as 1854, a treaty for the annexation of the islands to the United States had been concluded with the native Government, but for the time being no positive results ensued. Internal feuds gave to the United

States an opportunity of interference, and in 1887, King Kalakana accepted a form of government which, in fact, involved the control by the white settlers. Five years later, however (1892), the native party reasserted itself, and under the championship of Queen Liliuokalani effected a *coup d'état*. Thereupon a counter-revolutionary movement was started, a Republic was proclaimed, the Queen was compelled to abdicate, and appealed to Washington. A treaty of annexation was then signed at Washington with the representatives of the Provisional Government, and was sent to the Senate for approval. The treaty was, however, subsequently withdrawn by the President, and Commissioners were sent out to the Sandwich Islands, where a form of constitutional Republic was established. Finally, in July 1898, the islands were definitely annexed to the United States, and two years later (1900) were formally constituted the Territory of Hawaii.

Samoa

In a similar way the Samoan group, or a part of it, fell into the hands of the United States. Germany had for some time past, as we have seen, been exhibiting activity in the Pacific. In December 1885 friction arose between the German administrators and the natives, with the result that in January 1886 Mr. Bayard, then Secretary of State at Washington, instructed the American Minister at Berlin to "express the expectation that nothing would be done to impair the rights of the United States under the existing treaty." The German reply was couched in friendly terms, and conferences ensued between Germany, the United States, and Great Britain. A few months later, however (July 1886), Germany suddenly declared war on the reigning King of Samoa, deposed and deported him, and set up her own nominee, Tamasese, as king, with a German Commissioner, Herr Brandeis, as his "adviser." In September 1888 the natives rose in insurrection against Tamasese and his adviser, and enthroned in their place a chieftain named Mataafa. The Germans thereupon landed a force of marines, who were ambushed by the native forces, and suffered severe losses in killed and wounded. The Germans asserted that the ambushing force was led by an American citizen; consequently considerable friction arose between Germany and the United States, and the latter Power deemed it prudent to make considerable additions to its Pacific fleet.

Bismarck, however, was anxious to keep the peace in the Pacific as elsewhere, and in 1889 conferences between the interested Powers were resumed at Berlin, with the result that the Samoan Islands were placed under the joint control of Great Britain, Germany, and the United States. The *condominium* worked badly, and in 1899 a troublesome situation was cleared up by a division of the Samoan group between Germany and the United States, Great Britain receiving her compensation elsewhere. This may be the least inappropriate point at which to mention the completion of an enterprise which may well have important repercussions upon world-politics. In 1904 the American Government purchased from the Republic of Panama a ten-mile strip with the object of cutting a canal to connect the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. After ten years' labour, greatly lightened, if not rendered possible, by the researches of Sir Ronald Ross and other English pioneers in tropical medicine, the canal was completed and opened in 1914.

Germany
and the
United
States

The
Panama
Canal

To retrace our steps. Not only in South Africa and in America did the closing years of the nineteenth century bring embarrassments to Great Britain. If the Venezuelan business brought her up against the hostility of the United States ; if in South Africa it was a case of Athanasius contra mundum ; in Europe she was brought to the verge of war with her nearest neighbour by the development of events in the Soudan.

After the death of General Gordon at Khartoum, the British Government, as we have seen, decided to abandon the Soudan, south of Wady Halfa.

Reconquest
of the
Soudan

Baring, Wolseley, and Kitchener were all strongly in favour of retaining at least the province of Dongola, but in the summer of 1885 the Ministry decided to withdraw the British force altogether, and for twelve years the Soudan was a prey to anarchy.

Meanwhile Egypt itself had, under the skilful, strong, and prudent administration of Sir E. Baring, who in 1892 was created Lord Cromer, been literally remade. There is no episode in her history which England can regard with more unfeigned satisfaction than the regeneration of Egypt ; but the story belongs to English or Egyptian history, not to that of Europe. A word must, however, be added as to the

Lord
Cromer

re-conquest of the Soudan, since it involved grave diplomatic consequences and brought England and France to the brink of war. By 1896, thanks to the patient labours of General Grenfell and General Kitchener, the Egyptian army was completely reorganized, and the Government of the Khedive determined to attempt the reconquest of the Soudan. This decision coincided with, and may have been precipitated by, the withdrawal of the Italians from Kassala.¹ General Kitchener was appointed to the command of the Nile expedition, and slowly and patiently advanced towards the completion of his great design. Before the end of September 1896 he was in possession of Dongola; Abu Hamed was taken in August 1897, and at the Atbara the Dervishes were scattered (April 7, 1898). On September 2 the power of Mahdism was finally annihilated by the great victory of Omdurman. Two days later the British and Egyptian forces were paraded before the ruined palace of Khartoum and the shattered tomb of the Mahdi, and there, on the spot where Gordon had perished, a funeral service was held in solemn memory of the dead knight-errant.

Fashoda

Hardly, however, had General Kitchener reached Khartoum, when the diplomatic sky was suddenly overcast by a threatening cloud. The French Government had never forgiven themselves for their withdrawal from Egypt at the critical moment in 1882. For more than a decade they had impeded in every possible way the work of financial and political reconstruction undertaken by Great Britain in Egypt. That task, unwillingly assumed but patiently fulfilled, seemed now to be on the point of final triumph and consummation.

French adventurers had, however, been displaying for many years remarkable activity in Central Africa. The Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 had been followed by a similar attempt to delimit the French and British spheres of influence in the neighbourhood of Lake Chad. In 1894 the British, operating from the east, established a Protectorate over Uganda, and in the same year the French, operating in West Africa, captured the city of Timbuctoo. In May 1894 Great Britain had also concluded an Anglo-Congolese Con-

¹ Occupied by them after a successful encounter with the Khalifa (Dec. 1893).

vention, according to which England ceded to the Congo Free State the left bank of the Upper Nile in return for a recognition of the acquisition of the right bank by Great Britain. In deference to French susceptibilities, this Convention was annulled, and France in her turn secured from the Free State the recognition of her rights, with certain limitations, to the left bank of the Upper Nile. In March 1895, however, Sir Edward Grey on behalf of the British Government declared that the despatch of a French expedition to the Upper Nile would be regarded by Great Britain as "an unfriendly act." Evidently the situation was already delicate, when in June 1896 Major Marchand left France to take command of the expeditionary force which was at that time being organized in the French Congo. In the course of two years, and in the face of incredible difficulties, this intrepid Frenchman pushed his way from the French Congo across Central Africa. Marchand in leading his expedition from the west was counting on a junction with another French force which was to make its way from the east coast by way of Abyssinia to the Upper Nile. The Russians, too, were active in the same region; but both the Russian force and the French had been compelled to retire, and consequently Marchand, on his arrival at Fashoda, found himself unsupported, and face to face with the British forces under General Kitchener.

General Kitchener, steaming up from Khartoum, denied Marchand's right to be at Fashoda as the political representative of France. The victory of Omdurman was a potent argument, but Marchand refused to yield even to it. The quarrel was then referred to the diplomatists. Lord Salisbury claimed for the Khedive all the lands over which the Khalifa had borne sway, and made it clear to the French Government that the claim would be asserted by the whole force of Great Britain. In the autumn of 1898 the two nations were on the brink of war. France, however, gave way, recalled Marchand, and in March 1899 concluded with Great Britain a comprehensive agreement in regard to the Soudan. By this treaty the rights of Great Britain over the whole Nile basin, from the source of that river to its mouth were acknowledged; France was confirmed in possession of a great West African Empire, but the whole of the Egyptian Soudan was to be subject to the power which ruled at Cairo. Thus the way to

Anglo-French Agreement

the Cape was still open, unblocked by any other European Power. From that moment Anglo-French relations rapidly improved, until in 1904 the Anglo-French Agreement was concluded and France agreed to give Great Britain for thirty years a free hand in Egypt. That Agreement opens a new chapter in World-History.

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See also references to chapter xviii.

CHAPTER XXI

THE ARMED PEACE (1890-1911)

ENGLAND AND GERMANY. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE. AND THE TRIPLE *ENTENTE*.

DURING the twenty-five years preceding the out-England
break of the World War, world-politics hinged on and
the relations between Germany and England.

Those forces were, as we have seen, world-wide in their Politics
operation, and, in a sense, uncontrollable by puny mortals ; and
but they were not uninfluenced by the personality of the chief personalities
actors on the stage. Among those actors Emperor William II
was the most prominent, if not, perhaps, the most potent.
His ideas were large, not to say, grandiose, but the means which
he chose to give effect to them were largely determined by
the whim and mood of the moment. Far more constant was
the influence of Baron von Holstein, who, from 1890 to 1906, Baron von
was the senior Councillor in the political division, in other Holstein
words, the permanent head of the German Foreign Office.
Prince Lichnowsky, who describes Holstein as "the almost
uncontrolled director of policy since Bismarck," regarded him
as "a national misfortune, the real father of the world-war."¹
Dr. Brandenburg describes him as "certainly the greatest
intellectual force among the statesmen of the post-Bismarck
period." A shy, eccentric recluse, Holstein was implacable
both in personal and political antagonisms, and the persistent
object of his hostility was England.² General von Caprivi, who

¹ *Auf dem Wege zum Abgrund*, ap. Gooch, *Revelations of European Diplomacy*, p. xiii.

² But Hammann (*op. cit.*, p. 108) thinks he aimed at "an ultimate understanding with England" much as he disliked her.

Sir Valentine Chirol draws a less unpleasing picture of Holstein, with whom he was intimate. He admits that he had his faults, that he was a "good hater" and that his methods were "often unscrupulous and tortuous," but speaks curiously enough of his "customary tone of friendliness towards England"; but of this the German writers give no hint. *Op. cit.*, pp. 268 seq.

Baron von
Bülow

succeeded Bismarck as Chancellor (1890-4), was a gallant soldier, with little knowledge of politics or diplomacy. Prince von Hohenlohe, who was Chancellor from 1894-1900 was much more a man of the world than his predecessor; he was closely related to the Russian Imperial family as well as to other reigning families, but his hold on the threads of diplomacy was dynastic rather than professional, and from 1897 onwards his influence on German policy was altogether subordinate to that of Prince von Bülow. The latter succeeded Baron Marschall von Bieberstein as Foreign Secretary in 1897, and four years later became Chancellor (1900-9). Bülow was a man of wide experience, of great personal charm, and immense ability, "the most brilliant and perhaps the most baneful figure of Imperial Germany under the last of her Hohenzollerns."¹ Greatly tried by the capricious temper of his master, Bülow shared his ambition to assert the world domination of Germany and was much more relentless in pursuing it. To him Professor Brandenburg, whose masterly and authoritative work² is our safest guide to German policy in this period, ascribes the chief responsibility for the "ominous isolation" of Germany and consequently for the World War. "Skilful," so Brandenburg writes of him, "in negotiating with foreign diplomatists and party leaders at home, dexterous in his management of the Kaiser, whose vanity he flattered while withholding from him important matters when he feared an unwelcome decision, he had long been able to maintain a leading position. But he lacked a sense of the great interdependence of the nations with whom our fate also was bound up, and he had no grasp of the world's history."

Tirpitz

An even more malign influence was that of Count von Tirpitz, whose gross misconception of English psychology was certainly among the most potent causes contributory to war. He was obsessed by the idea that England could be deterred from an attack on Germany only by the strengthening of the German navy. Count Metternich, who really understood England, did his utmost to convince him to the contrary. "Fear would never," he warned his Government, "drive the English into our arms, but into facing us fully armed." But

¹ *The Times* Obituary Memoir, October 29, 1929.

² *From Bismarck to the World War*, by Erich Brandenburg, Eng. trs., Oxford, 1927.

his unpalatable warnings fell on obstinate ears, and Tirpitz tried to get him removed from his Embassy.

English foreign policy was, during this period, in cautious ^{English} and competent hands. Lord Rosebery was in power, either ^{statesmen} as Foreign Secretary or Prime Minister, from 1892 to 1895, and in the latter year Lord Salisbury resumed both the offices which he had held from 1887 to 1892. In 1900, however, he resigned the Foreign Office to Lord Lansdowne, who retained it until the fall of the Balfour Ministry in December 1905, when he was succeeded by Sir Edward Grey. The latter remained continuously in office until 1915. Throughout the greater part of the Salisbury and Balfour administrations Mr. Chamberlain, as Colonial Secretary, also exercised considerable influence upon the external policy of Great Britain.

Mr. Chamberlain was much more impressed than Lord Salisbury by the dangers involved in adherence to that policy of isolation which had almost become traditional in Downing Street. England's position towards the close of the century gave some cause for anxiety to her friends. Italy was consistently cordial, but had not yet become a great Power; Austria would have been friendly had she not been bound hand and foot to Germany; we had lost our predominant influence at Constantinople; the Egyptian position precluded the possibility of friendship with France; between Russia and England there was implacable hostility. Thus it came that of the leading Powers the only one with whom there was a chance of a closer understanding was Germany.

Nor was the Kaiser ill-disposed to an understanding, or even an alliance. He had a genuine affection for his grandmother, though the dislike between himself and his Uncle Edward was mutual, and the jealousy with which he regarded England was mainly inverted admiration. He visited England almost every year, and his telegram to President Krüger in 1896 was therefore a shock to a people whose hospitality he had apparently appreciated, and who had not yet gauged either the restlessness of his ambition or the fickleness of his moods. Private explanations of the incident were, it is understood, offered and graciously accepted, and there was, in fact, no manifest breach in the cordiality of the relations between the two countries, down to the end of the century.

On the contrary, it seemed not impossible that friendship

Possibilities
of Anglo-
German
Alliance

might deepen into a formal alliance, and even that the alliance might be extended to include Japan or the United States of America. Bismarck had proposed an alliance to Lord Salisbury in 1887, but the latter held back, was coy, as he might well be, after Bismarck's anti-British attitude so lately as 1884.¹ The Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 proved, however, that his hesitation was due to caution rather than lack of cordiality. On his visit to Queen Victoria in 1891 the Kaiser was accompanied by his Foreign Secretary, Baron von Bieberstein, who discussed the situation in detail with Lord Salisbury.

The Franco-Russian *rapprochement* was perturbing to both countries, but Germany was not disposed to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for England, either in the Near East or elsewhere.

The Kaiser
in England

The matter came up again when, with Herr von Kiderlin-Wächter in attendance, the Kaiser visited Cowes in August 1895. He came to England firmly persuaded of two things: on the one hand, that, as he himself expressed it, "Germany on the whole is now in the fortunate position of being able to look on calmly and wait, for no one in Europe can achieve anything without our co-operation;"² on the other, that "England's prestige on the Continent has been on the decline from the moment Mr. Gladstone last came into power" and that she must "before long realize the necessity of coming to terms with one of the two groups of nations on the Continent." The Foreign Office at Berlin had, however, warned³ the Kaiser to be chary of committing his country to any arrangement with England in reference to the Ottoman Empire, and had besought him to "offer a firm resistance to Lord Salisbury and to beg him to drop his 'incendiary' policy in the Balkans."⁴

The Kaiser arrived at Cowes on August 5, and remained there until the 10th. On the 5th he had an interview with Lord Salisbury, at which the latter is alleged to have declared that the condition of the Ottoman Empire was "rotten," and that the time had come for liquidating the bankrupt's estate. Lord Salisbury when questioned about the matter, some

¹ Of Bismarck's overture there is no record in the English Foreign Office. On his hostility, see Fitzmaurice: *Granville*, ii, 358.

² July 1895, Brandenburg, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

³ The Kaiser to Col. Swaine (British Military Attaché at Berlin).

⁴ Telegram, Holstein to Kiderlin-Wächter, Aug. 3, 1895, *Grosse Politik*, x, 19.

twelve months later, merely remarked that the Kaiser's account of the interview "showed the expediency of having a third person present when talking to the Emperor, if he made it his practice to put into his interlocutor's mouth proposals which emanated from himself."¹ The Kaiser put his own story on record, and its accuracy has never been questioned in Germany even by the most sceptical of his critics. Moreover, plausibility was given to his version of the matter by Lord Salisbury's notorious detestation of Abdul Hamid's persecutions in Armenia, and by his confession that by backing the Turk in 1854 and 1876 England had "put her money on the wrong horse."² Lord Sanderson, who was Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the time, has left on record an important memorandum on the subject.³ "I think it," he writes, "highly probable that he (Lord Salisbury) mentioned to the Kaiser the prospect of dismemberment of considerable portions of the Turkish Empire as eventualities to be contemplated without reluctance, though I should altogether discredit the suggestion that he proposed any definite cut and dried programme." Germany had, however, by this time become the ardent champion of the Turkish Empire, and increasingly suspicious of England. No more, therefore, was heard of the matter.

Meanwhile, Mr. Chamberlain had taken charge of the Colonial Office (1895), and Baron von Bülow had become Secretary of State at Berlin (1897). Chamberlain, more clearly perhaps than Lord Salisbury, appreciated the world-wide difficulties with which England was confronted. A clash with the French was imminent on the Upper Nile; the situation in South Africa was becoming increasingly grave; war between the United States and Spain might (and did) extend into the Pacific, and sparks might easily fall on inflammable materials

¹ Chirol, *op. cit.*, p. 291.

² There is an exasperating lacuna in the Foreign Office Papers about this period, due doubtless to Lord Salisbury's practice of transacting much of the most important business of the Office by private correspondence of which there exists no official record. All the more eagerly, therefore, must we await the long delayed completion of Lady Gwendolen Cecil's *Life* of her father. Meanwhile, I have been permitted to see (and to quote) the important MS. memorandum by Lord Sanderson.

³ The memorandum is not contemporary but was written in September 1920 after the exposure contained in Baron von Eckardstein's *Recollections*. But Lord Sanderson's memory was as phenomenal as his accuracy.

in the Far East. Regarded from the standpoint of world-politics the interests of England and Germany seemed to conflict less acutely than those of any other Great Powers. A treaty between England and Germany might secure peace for the world. But Lord Salisbury disliked the idea of a violent break with the traditions of English diplomacy. Germany became increasingly suspicious both of the motives and the methods of Chamberlain; the Kaiser revealed the English overtures to the Czar and asked his "old and trusty friend" what he would do for him "if he refused the English offers"; to which the Czar was able to reply that England had approached him first.

Anglo-
German
Treaties

In the last years of the century the tension was somewhat relieved. In 1898 a comprehensive treaty was, as we have seen, concluded between England and Germany in regard to Africa; in 1899 after the Fashoda crisis an Agreement was arrived at between England and France as to the Soudan; and, in the same year England, by a further treaty, made a deal with Germany in the Pacific.

The Boer
War

The Samoan Treaty almost coincided with the outbreak of war in South Africa. To England's many enemies the disastrous opening of that war seemed to offer an irresistible opportunity, and in March 1900 Russia actually proposed to Berlin that Germany and France should offer concerted mediation to Great Britain, and that Russia should then join them. Bülow, however, declined to commit Germany to action which would estrange Great Britain, until he was assured as to the attitude of France. Only a mutual guarantee of each other's European possessions for a long term of years by Russia, France, and Germany would give the latter that assurance. Russia thereupon withdrew her suggestion.

Attitude of
Germany

On the whole, despite some friction caused by the detention of several German mail-boats in South African waters by British battleships, the attitude of Germany throughout the Boer War remained "correct." Popular feeling in Germany was, not unnaturally, strongly in favour of the Boers, but both the Emperor and his Chancellor constantly protested that they did their utmost to restrain its over-exuberant expression; but if sincere, they were not eminently successful.¹ In reference to the conduct of British soldiers in South Africa

¹ *British Documents*, i, vii.

it is impossible to believe in their sincerity. Lord Rosebery spoke of the "vile and infamous defamations" disseminated in foreign countries without a word of protest from the responsible authorities. And when a cautious official like Sir Eyre Crowe could write that "the German Government . . . abetted the campaign of odious calumny carried on throughout the length and breadth of Germany," it was small wonder that Mr. Chamberlain¹ was stung into the retort that the conduct of the British troops would compare favourably with that of any other army, not excepting that of Germany in the Franco-German War.²

Bülow, who had only a few days earlier solemnly declared to Sir Valentine Chirol that never would he allow "the anti-British sentiments of an ignorant public to deflect him by so much as a hairbreadth from the path of true friendliness towards England which lay nearest his heart," went down to the Reichstag, and delivered himself of an impassioned oration "only too well calculated," as Chirol himself says, "to raise to a white heat the popular feeling which he had so strongly reprobated in private."³

Nevertheless, largely through the efforts of diplomatists like Sir Frank Lascelles at Berlin, and Count Metternich in London, not only was peace maintained, but there was little if any interruption in the negotiations for a *rapprochement* between the two countries. An attempt to reach an agreement about Morocco was frustrated by the incurable preference of Germany for devious diplomatic paths (1900), but in October of the same year the terms of an Anglo-German Agreement in reference to China were published. In this so-called "Yang-tse Treaty," the two Governments declared, that it was a matter of permanent international interest that the ports on the rivers and littoral of China should remain free and open to trade for the nationals of all countries without distinction, and that they would uphold the same "for all Chinese territory so far as they could exercise influence;" they repudiated any desire for exclusive territorial acquisitions for themselves, and undertook to strive for the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire, should it be

The
"Yang-tse
Treaty,"
Oct. 1900

¹ Speech at Edinburgh, October 25, 1901.

² *British Documents*, i, 276.

³ *Fifty Years in a Changing World*, pp. 296-7.

threatened by any other Power. The terms of the Agreement were communicated to the other interested Powers; they were fully accepted by Japan, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, and with reservations by the United States and France. At Petersburg only did they excite irritation, (which was partially allayed by the representations of Germany).¹

Lord
Lansdowne

A change at the English Foreign Office improved the chances of an Anglo-German Agreement. At Berlin Lord Salisbury had long been regarded as the main obstacle to it,² but in October 1900 he resigned the Foreign Office in favour of Lord Lansdowne. Lansdowne was not only a born diplomatist, but had enjoyed the great advantage, denied to his predecessor, of surveying world-politics from Ottawa and Calcutta as well as from Downing Street. Like Mr. Chamberlain, who remained at the Colonial Office, he believed that the situation of England as revealed by recent events necessitated a new diplomatic departure. Fresh overtures were accordingly made both by Chamberlain and the new Foreign Secretary to Berlin. Despite the improved atmosphere created by the Kaiser's attitude at the time of Queen Victoria's death (January 1901), and his attendance at her funeral, the overtures were decisively and roughly rejected by Bülow. Nor is there any obscurity as to his motive. Germany, in his view, would under such an arrangement have become "the sword of England upon the European continent." "In the event of a general conflict," he writes, "we Germans would have had to wage strenuous war on land in two directions, while to England would have fallen the easier task of further extending her Colonial Empire without much trouble, and of profiting by the general weakening of the continental Powers. Last, but certainly not least, while military operations were going forward on the Continent and for a long time after, we should have found neither strength nor means nor leisure to proceed with the building of our navy as we have been able to do."³ In even plainer English, it would have suited England's book admirably that her German ally should fight France and Russia, diverting the attentions of both opponents, not less effectually than her own, from

¹ *British Documents*, i, 331.

² See Chiról, *op. cit.*, p. 298, and Hammann (p. 100), who refers to Holstein's "violent invectives against Lord Salisbury's 'unbearable personality'".

³ *Imperial Germany*, E.T., pp. 33-4.

colonial enterprises, while England was comfortably picking up unconsidered trifles in Africa and Asia. In Bülow's judgment, German progress, colonial, commercial, and naval, was "bound to inconvenience England, and, though the consequences of this development 'could be mitigated by diplomacy,' they could not be prevented." In other words, a struggle between Germany and England was sooner or later bound to come.

"With regard to international politics," he writes, ^{German sea-power} "England is the only country with which Germany has an account." The struggle might well have come, as we have seen, during the South African War. But Bülow was deliberately of opinion that Germany was right not to seize an opportunity, even though it was superficially favourable to her. "Even if," he writes, "by taking action in Europe we had succeeded in forcing England's South African policy, our immediate national interests would not have benefited thereby, . . . our neutral attitude during the Boer War had its origin in weighty considerations of the national interests of the German Empire." Nor was the reason far to seek: the German Navy was not ready; a premature trial of strength might have throttled German sea-power for ever. But in naval development Germany was coming on apace. In 1895 the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal had been completed, an achievement which at once doubled her effective naval force. In 1897 Admiral von Tirpitz was called to the control of German naval policy. In 1898 the first German Navy Law was passed, and a second on a far more ambitious scale in 1900. From that time onwards, the Navy became not less definitely than the Army "a constituent part of our national defence" (Bülow). The Kaiser had long since announced his policy in this matter. "I will never rest," he said, "until I have raised my Navy to a position similar to that occupied by my Army. German colonial aims can only be gained when Germany has become master on the ocean." Such sentiments, frequently reiterated, could not fail to produce an effect upon public opinion in England, however well disposed that opinion was towards Germany, and however reluctant it might be to traverse the old tradition which maintained enmity between England and France, and, still more persistently in recent years, between England and Russia.

Delcassé,
Foreign
Minister of
France, 1898

A personal change in France contributed powerfully to the same end. In 1898 Gabriel Hanotaux was succeeded at the French Foreign Office by Delcassé. Delcassé took office, firmly convinced, on the one hand, that the activity of France should be concentrated upon the Western Mediterranean, and on the other, that the diplomatic independence of his country could be established only by means of reconciliation with Italy and with Great Britain.

France and
Italy

Relations between France and Italy had long been strained. The seeds of rivalry between the two Mediterranean Powers in North Africa had been sown by the French occupation of Algeria in 1830, and that rivalry was accentuated when in 1881 France occupied Tunis. That occupation, as already noted, was cordially encouraged by Bismarck, who, with similar motives, encouraged Italy to embark upon African adventure. For some years, as we shall see, her African enterprises brought to Italy nothing but embarrassment, and consequently towards the close of the century she was in a mood to respond to the advances of France. In 1896 Italy formally recognized the French Protectorate in Tunis, and two years later, Delcassé was successful in negotiating with her a treaty of navigation and commerce. Italy definitely renounced her ambitions on the side of Morocco and Tunis, and turned her attentions, in full accord with France, towards Tripoli. Personal changes contributed to an improvement of Franco-Italian relations. Crispi had died in 1897, and in July 1900 the assassination of King Humbert placed young Victor Emmanuel III upon the throne, and opened the door still wider to friendly negotiations with France. Two Conventions were signed in 1900 and 1902, under which France definitely engaged not to frustrate the ambitions of Italy on the side of Tripoli, while Italy assured France a free hand in Morocco. These Conventions rendered the renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1903 a hollow formality.

Franco-
Italian
Conven-
tions,
1896-1902

England
and France

In the course of the year 1904, Russia, as we have seen, was involved in a struggle with Japan. The preoccupation of Russia in the Far East left France in an exposed position on the western flank of Germany. It became, therefore, a matter of supreme importance to France that she should find a new ally. Great Britain, on her side, was becoming seriously alarmed by the development of German sea-power. This was

clearly recognized in Germany, but Germany drew a sharp distinction between the rising suspicion of England and the deep-seated hostility of France. "England," wrote Bülow, "is certainly seriously disquieted by our rising power at sea, and our competition which incommodes her at many points. . . . But between such sentiments in England and the fundamental feeling in France there is a marked difference which finds corresponding expression in politics. France would attack us if she thought she was strong enough; England would only do so if she thought she could not defend her vital, economic, and political interests against Germany except by force. The mainspring of English policy towards us is national egoism; that of French policy is national idealism. He who follows his interest will, however, mostly remain calmer than he who pursues an idea."¹

The observation is an acute one, but "egoism" and "idealism" concurred to bring about the Anglo-French Convention which was concluded on April 8, 1904. Fashoda ^{Fashoda} had played a great part in preparing the way for a closer accord between England and France. The effect, though paradoxical, was not unforeseen by Frenchmen. Bülow repeats a conversation which took place between a French Ambassador—"one of the best political intellects of France"—and an Italian colleague. The latter asked "What effect Fashoda would have on French relations with England"? The Frenchman replied, "An excellent one. Once the difference about the Sudan is settled, nothing stands in the way of a complete *Entente* with England." Bülow's own comment is singularly shrewd. "There was," he writes, "disappointment in Paris because England would not, for the sake of French friendship, sacrifice any of her interests in the Sudan and on the Nile. But France was ready in any case, though with clenched teeth, to pay this price or even a higher one for England's friendship. The defeat in the Fashoda affair was set down in the debit account of the French policy of revenge, and finally resulted in renewed hatred of Germany rather than in hostility towards England."

That is profoundly true; but France would not so lightly ^{Morocco} have surrendered her interests on the Nile had she not been

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 89-90.

increasingly interested elsewhere. Morocco had long been in a very disturbed condition, especially since the death (1894) of Sultan Muley Hassan. Its proximity to Algiers rendered this a matter of special interest to France, and Delcassé perceived the opportunity of a deal with England on this basis. In 1901 the Sultan of Morocco, conscious of his danger, had offered a Protectorate over Morocco to England. England, however, was in no mood, at the moment, for further African adventure, and declined the offer. France had other ideas, and in 1902 an arrangement, known as the Convention of Algiers, was concluded between the Sultan and France, under which France, with the complete assent of England, undertook certain responsibilities for the maintenance of order on the Algerian-Morocco frontier.

Edward VII
and
President
Loubet

The improved relations between England and France were further manifested in the course of 1903 by an exchange of visits between Edward VII and President Loubet. In May 1903 King Edward paid an official visit to Paris. Received on his arrival with somewhat cold politeness, he succeeded in a few days' sojourn in completely captivating his hosts. "I have known Paris," he said, in a speech at the Élysée (May 2), "since my childhood. I have frequently visited it, and I have always been full of admiration for the unique beauty of the city, and for the spirit of its citizens. I shall never forget, M. le Président, the welcome which I have received at the hands of yourself, your Government, and the people, and it is to me a cause of happiness to believe that my visit will renew the bonds of friendship, and will facilitate such a *rapprochement* between our two countries as will conduce to the interests of both." President Loubet returned the King's visit in July, and was received with the utmost enthusiasm in London. That these visits did much to prepare the way for the treaty is undeniable. Lord Lansdowne, writing to Sir Edmund Monson, British Ambassador in Paris (April 8, 1904), referred to the "powerful impulse" thus given to the movement,¹ and M. Poincaré, when he in turn visited, as President, the City of London, used precisely the same phrase when he spoke of the "happy impetus" given at the "decisive moment" by King Edward.

By a series of Conventions and Declarations, England

Anglo:
French
Treaty
April 1904

¹ *British Documents*, ii, 364.

and France not only came to terms in regard to Morocco and Egypt, but also cleared up a number of outstanding points in reference to West Africa, Siam, Madagascar, and the New Hebrides. French fishing rights in Newfoundland had been a matter of dispute between England and France ever since the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. By mutual concession, which left to France certain fishing rights, but deprived her of any sort of monopoly, this tiresome question was settled, it may be hoped, for ever. In West Africa, England made important concessions to France on the Gambia, in Guinea, and on the Niger. Boundary questions in Siam, and tariff difficulties in Madagascar and Zanzibar, not to mention various small points in regard to the New Hebrides, were also concluded in the general settlement. The central point of the arrangement was, however, North Africa. Briefly, France recognized for the first time the actual position of Great Britain in Egypt, while Great Britain recognized the predominant claims and interests of France in Morocco. Both Governments declared that they had no intention of altering the political status of Egypt and Morocco respectively, but by a secret article attached to the Convention, it was admitted that Great Britain and France might find themselves "constrained by force of circumstances to modify this policy in respect to Egypt or Morocco." There was another secret article in reference to Spanish claims in Morocco. The two Governments also acknowledged the special interests of Spain, who (by a secret clause not revealed until 1911) was to pledge herself not to allow any of her spheres of influence in Morocco to pass into other hands.¹ Professor Brandenburg's comment on the whole matter is brief but pregnant: "With the coming of the Anglo-French *Entente* Germany's outwardly brilliant position between the two groups of Great Powers had passed for ever."² Nor does he disguise his conviction that for this disaster Germany herself, and in particular the clumsy diplomacy of Holstein and Bülow, was mainly to blame.

A pendant to the Anglo-French Agreement is found in a Franco-Spanish Treaty signed on October 6, 1904. Under Franco-Spanish
Treaty,
Oct. 1904

¹ The whole history of the negotiations is contained in vol. ii of the *British Documents* with which cf. *German Diplomatic Documents*, vol. iii.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 203.

the latter Agreement, France and Spain arrived at a complete understanding in regard to their respective rights and interests in Morocco, and Spain formally adhered to the Anglo-French Convention of April 8, thereby acknowledging the predominant interest of France in Morocco.

Much more important from the point of view of world-politics was the emergence of England from her isolated shell. Of the significance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (January 30, 1902), and of its European repercussions, enough has already been said. Less dramatic but not less important was the *Entente Cordiale* between France and Great Britain. This reversal of a long and persistent political tradition was essentially the result of circumstances already detailed, but the personal factor contributed not a little to the happy issue of the diplomatic negotiations. Delcassé was, as we have seen, convinced of the necessity of Franco-British friendship, and his efforts were cordially seconded by one of the greatest Ambassadors whom France has ever sent to England—Paul Cambon. On the English side the *Entente* was primarily the work of Lord Lansdowne, though his task would have been much more difficult had not King Edward VII, by his genial personality and his extraordinary tact, already created a favourable atmosphere.¹

Germany
and the
Entente

The conclusion of the Anglo-French *Entente* was, then, an event of high significance in the history of European diplomacy. Had Germany been in pacific mood, it might well have inaugurated a long period of world peace. Such was undoubtedly the intention of Great Britain, whose spokesmen emphasized the importance of the Anglo-French Treaty as affording a model for similar agreements between other countries. German authorities, however, take the view that the assurances given by English Ministers that the *Entente* was perfectly compatible with an amicable Anglo-German agreement were "not entirely candid."² But the actual and immediate result of the *Entente* may be gauged from the

¹ The Earl of Balfour refers to the attribution of the policy of the *Entente* to King Edward as a "foolish piece of gossip," and denies that he ever "made an important suggestion of any sort on large questions of policy." Lord Newton's *Lansdowne*, p. 293. Lord Newton holds that Delcassé "imperilled the whole agreement by haggling over details in the final stages of the negotiations" (p. 294).

² Hammann, p. 145, and cf. Brandenburg, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

words of the German Emperor. Shortly after the signature of the Anglo-French Agreement, the Kaiser used these ominous words on the occasion of the opening of a bridge at Mainz, and gave an even clearer indication of the thoughts which were moving him: "I wish from my heart," he said, "that peace, which is necessary for the further development of industry and trade, may be maintained in the future. But I am convinced that this bridge will prove completely adequate if it has to be used for more serious transport purposes." Yet almost simultaneously Bülow declared in the Reichstag (April 12, 1904) that Germany had no reason to object to the Anglo-French *Entente*. "We have no cause to apprehend that this Agreement is levelled against any individual Power. It seems to be an attempt to eliminate the points of difference between France and Great Britain by means of an amicable understanding. From the point of view of German interests we have no objection to make to it." The German Ambassador in Paris, Prince von Radolin, took a similar view. On being informed by M. Delcassé of the conclusion of the arrangement, he observed that he found it "very natural and perfectly justified."

The busy mind of the Kaiser was, however, at work on a new European combination. Two methods of nullifying the Anglo-French *Entente* seem to have occurred to him. "The first was a secret intrigue with the Czar, which would draw Russia over into the orbit of German policy; this would result either in drawing France also, and in establishing a German-Russian-French combination directed against England, or it would result in rupturing the Dual Alliance and leave England and France face to face with the old Triple Alliance, now reinsured again as in Bismarck's day on the Russian side. To Germany it did not make a great difference which of these consequences would result, for in either case Germany's position would be strengthened, and she would win the prestige of a diplomatic success. The second method of dislocating the *Entente Cordiale* was by some diplomatic triumph over France, backed up by a policy of force which would make patent to all the world the essential hollowness of the *Entente Cordiale*, and proclaim that important arrangements in the world still could not be made without consulting Germany. These two methods, the one secret and the other open, used alternately

and in combination during the next fifteen months in a series of manœuvres of extraordinary interest and intricacy, are the true explanation of the Kaiser's secret interview at Björkö and his public speech at Tangier." ¹ With these secret intrigues we shall deal presently. For the moment we will follow the course of the open diplomacy which culminated in the Algeciras Conference.

The
Kaiser at
Tangier

According to the German version, Delcassé, fortified by the Anglo-French Agreement, began to assume the rôle of a political protector over Morocco, with complete disregard of the economic interest of other nations. Accordingly Bülow, inspired by Holstein, persuaded the Kaiser, against his own judgment, to touch at Tangier on his Mediterranean cruise in March 1905. He landed only for two hours, but having done so, could not resist the temptation of delivering a somewhat menacing speech, in which he ostentatiously took under his protection the independence of Morocco and the sovereignty of its Sultan. "The demand of Germany," says Bülow, to be consulted about Moroccan affairs, "was thus announced to the world." ² Morocco, however, was primarily a symbol. No one proposed to interfere with the commercial rights of Germany in Morocco, and other rights she had none. The true inwardness of German intervention is revealed by the German historian Rachfahl. "Because," he writes, "under the surface of the Morocco affair lurked the deepest and most difficult problems of power (*Macht-Probleme*), it was to be foreseen that its course would prove to be a trial of strength of the first order." ³ The visit of the Emperor to Tangier was followed, on the one hand by a demand for the summoning of an international conference, and on the other by a demand that France should repudiate her Foreign Minister, Delcassé. In the summer of 1905, Prince Henckel von Donnersmack was sent as a special envoy from Berlin to Paris. He declared in a newspaper interview that it had now become clear that the Anglo-French *Entente* had been framed for the isolation and humiliation of Germany. . . . The policy of Delcassé was aimed at the Germans who would not wait until it was completed. It was the policy of England to destroy

¹ S. B. Fay : *The Kaiser's Secret Negotiations with the Czar*, pp. 52-3.

² *Imperial Germany*, p. 81.

³ *Kaiser und Reich*, ap. Rose, *Origins of the War*, p. 174.

the fleet of every rival, or better still to prevent its construction; but could the British fleet help France? Let France think better of it, give up the Minister who had made the trouble, and adopt towards Germany a loyal and open policy such as would guarantee the peace of the world."¹

Before this arrogant threat, France, conscious that she was not ready for immediate war, momentarily gave way. Delcassé resigned on June 12, 1905; France immediately set to work to improve her army organization, and the Government got a vote of sixty millions for this purpose and for the construction of strategic railways. About the same time a preliminary arrangement between France and Germany was concluded for the conduct of a Conference which was to meet at Algeciras in January 1906. At that Conference, in addition to Germany, France, and Great Britain, the following Powers were represented: Spain, Portugal, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, the United States, the Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, and Morocco. The mere meeting of this international Conference was undoubtedly a diplomatic triumph for Germany. It would never have been held if, on the one hand, France had been ready for war, and if, on the other, Russia had not lately suffered her crushing defeat at the hands of Japan. Bülow professed himself as highly pleased with the results of the Conference. "We succeeded," he says, "in preserving the sovereignty of the Sultan, and in securing international control of the police organization and the Moroccan National Bank, thus ensuring the open door in Morocco for German economic interests as well as for those of all other countries. . . . The decisions of the Algeciras Conference bolted the door against the attempts of France to compass the 'Tunification' of Morocco. They also provided a bell we could ring at any time, should France show any similar tendencies again." Less partial opinion, even in Germany, inclined to the view that the results of the Algeciras Conference marked, on the contrary, a decided diplomatic rebuff for Germany, and attributed to the failure to reach an agreement with England, the dilemma in which Germany found herself at Algeciras. Either she had to fight, or to acknowledge a diplomatic defeat.² The Conference was held with the definite intention of destroying in the eyes of the world the

Resignation
of Delcassé

The
Algeciras
Conference,
Jan. 1906

¹ Rose, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

² Hammann, p. 116.

significance of the Anglo-French *Entente*. It served actually to demonstrate its strength, and Bülow admitted as much in a speech in the Reichstag on November 14. "We have no thought," he said, "of attempting to separate France and England. We have absolutely no idea of attempting to disturb the friendship of the Western Powers. . . . Cordial relations between Germany and England are in perfect consonance with the *Entente*, if the latter combination follows pacific purposes."

Bülow might lay this flattering unction to his soul. His master took a different and a more discerning view. So did a more detached observer, Mr. Henry White, the United States delegate to the Conference. On his return to the Embassy at Rome he said to his German colleague: "The victor at the Conference is England." When this was reported to Berlin, the Kaiser minuted the despatch with the single word "Correct." England had won: and her victory was due largely to the tact of her representative Sir Arthur Nicolson (afterwards Lord Carnock), whose son thus aptly summarizes the results of the Conference: "She (Germany) lost the confidence of Europe; what was even more important to her, she lost the confidence of America. She obtained no compensations. She did not even succeed in humiliating France. The open door remained an aspiration. Her protection of Islam appeared to be mere rhetoric. France and Spain, England and Russia, had drawn closer together. The nakedness of the Triple Alliance had, with Italy's defection, been exposed to public gaze, and above all the Anglo-French *Entente* had assumed an entirely new character. From that moment it became essential for Germany to recover her prestige by some diplomatic victory elsewhere."¹

She got her opportunity when she dared Russia to go to the defence of the Southern Slavs after Austria had annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina (1908). The Bosnian crisis was the immediate prelude to the World War. To the fatal chain of circumstance Algeciras, therefore, supplied an important link.

The Anglo-French *Entente* was notably strengthened at Algeciras: but it still had a weak spot—the continued estrangement of England and Russia. This weakness Germany was not unnaturally determined to exploit to the full. The

¹ Harold Nicolson: *Lord Carnock*, pp. 198-9.

Kaiser hoped to do more : to detach Russia from the French Alliance, and to repair the wire between Berlin and Petersburg. To this end his secret diplomacy was persistently directed from 1904 to 1906. The remarkable telegrams exchanged during this period between the Kaiser and the Czar, known as the "Willy-Nicky Correspondence,"¹ have now come to light. The Kaiser manifested the closest interest in the fortunes of Russia in her contest with Japan. He also insinuated that English neutrality was far from friendly to Russia. Thus, on October 27, 1904, he telegraphed to the Czar : "For some time English Press has been threatening Germany, on no account to allow coals to be sent to Baltic Fleet now on its way out. It is not impossible that the Japanese and British Governments may lodge a joint protest against coaling our ships. . . . The naval battles fought by Togo are fought with Cardiff coal." The Kaiser further suggested a Franco-Russo-German understanding against England and Japan. The Czar promptly responded : "The only way, as you say, would be that Germany, Russia, and France should at once unite in an arrangement to abolish Anglo-Japanese arrogance and insolence. Would you like to lay down and frame the outline of such a treaty and let me see it? As soon as accepted by us, France is bound to join her ally. This combination has often come to my mind ; it will mean peace and rest for the world." The Czar, it will be observed, was determined to keep faith with France. The Kaiser, on the other hand, was most anxious that his alliance with the Czar should be first concluded and that France should afterwards be informed of the accomplished fact. On July 23, 1905, the Kaiser met the Czar in the Björkö Sound, and on the following day a secret treaty was signed between the two autocrats. The treaty provided that if any European Power should attack either of the two Empires, the other should come to its assistance with all its military and naval forces. The treaty was to become effective on the conclusion of the treaty with Russia and Japan. Peace, as we have seen, was concluded between these Powers at Portsmouth (U.S.A.) on September 5, 1905.

¹ These telegrams were published in the *New York Herald* in September 1917, and re-issued in book form in January 1918, as the *Willy-Nicky Correspondence*. On the whole question, cp. a valuable article by S. B. Fay in *The American Historical Review*, vol. xxiv, No. 1, October 1918.

and thereupon the Czar informed his Foreign Minister of the secret obligations into which he had entered. Count Lamsdorf immediately protested, and, reinforced by the opinion of Count Witte, compelled the Czar to annul the treaty. Its conclusion throws, nevertheless, a peculiar and significant light upon German diplomacy at this period of European tension.

Sweden
and
Norway

The "Willy-Nicky Correspondence" also throws an interesting sidelight upon the relations between Germany and Russia on the one side, and the Scandinavian countries on the other. For many years past the relations between Norway and Sweden had been far from easy. Norway had been unceremoniously handed over to Sweden as part of the European Settlement of 1814; but from the first the Norwegians had disliked the connection. Consequently, the Norwegian *Storthing* made repeated efforts to get an alteration of the fundamental law which defined the relations of the two countries. King Oscar on each occasion refused his sanction. Finally, however, in 1884 the Norwegians took the reins into their own hands, displaced the King's Government and installed in power a Government responsible to the *Storthing*. From that moment the only question was how soon the Home Rule, virtually attained in 1884, would issue in independence. In 1892 the *Storthing* took the further step of calling for the establishment of a separate Norwegian Consular Service. King Oscar refused his assent, and not until 1903 was the claim virtually conceded. The Norwegians were still unsatisfied, and after protracted and unhappy negotiations the *Storthing* declared that the King, having failed to form a new Government in Norway, had ceased, *ipso facto*, to reign, and that the union with Sweden was, therefore, dissolved. Sweden ultimately agreed to withdraw its opposition, and in October 1905 the constitutional tie between the two countries was finally severed.

The
Kingdom
of Norway

Norway having resolved to remain a monarchical State, was compelled to find a new King. The choice of the *Storthing* fell upon Prince Charles of Denmark, a younger son of the Crown Prince Frederick of Denmark; and the new King, who was married to the youngest daughter of King Edward VII, ascended the Norwegian throne with the title of Haakon VII. The election gave great offence at Berlin, and was not welcomed at Petersburg, the idea being that it must necessarily

enhance the influence of England in the Scandinavian kingdoms. The question as to the position of Denmark in the event of a European war was raised by the two Sovereigns at Björkö. It was agreed between them that : " In case of war and impending attack on the Baltic from the foreign Power (obviously England), Russia and Germany should immediately take steps to safeguard their interests by laying hands on Denmark, and occupying it during the war." The Kaiser further undertook on his way back from Björkö " to call in at Copenhagen and inform King Christian of the dispositions made in reference to his country." But, on arriving at Copenhagen, the Kaiser decided, in view of " the great number of channels leading from Copenhagen to London, and the proverbial want of discretion at the Danish Court," that it would be better not to " let anything be known about our alliance." At the same time he ascertained that the Danes fully anticipated that Russia and Germany would safeguard Danish interests. So the Kaiser, and perhaps the Czar, proposed. Not thus did events dispose themselves. Russian statesmen, less imprudent, and less under the personal influence of the Kaiser than the Czar, refused to sacrifice the friendship of France for an alliance with Germany.

The Anglo-Russian Agreement, 1907

There still remained, however, the original flaw in the new European *Entente*, the continued estrangement between England and Russia. In 1907 the difficulty was at last overcome, and the Dual Alliance was expanded into the Triple *Entente*.¹ The foundation of the Anglo-Russian *Entente* was really laid at the Algeciras Conference, where Great Britain was represented by Sir Arthur Nicolson, then Ambassador at Petersburg. Sir Edward Grey, who had come into office at the end of 1905, threw himself with ardour into the task of improving relations between the two countries. " When the interests of two Powers are constantly touching and rubbing against one another, it is hard to find a half-way house between constant liability to friction and cordial friendship." So the problem was stated by Sir Edward Grey. The interests of England and Russia had, as we have seen, been rubbing against one another in Central Asia for the best part of a century. During 1906 and 1907, however, there was a frank interchange

¹ The diplomatic history of the Anglo-Russian Agreement may be followed in detail in *British Documents*, vol. iv.

- of views between London and Petersburg, and at last on August 31, 1907, the momentous treaty was concluded. The treaty covered all the outstanding questions between the two Powers in Central Asia, and in particular dealt with
- (a) Thibet Thibet, Afghanistan, and Persia. In regard to the first, both parties pledged themselves to respect the integrity of Thibet, to abstain from all interference in internal affairs, to seek no concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, and mines, or other rights in Thibet ; not to send representatives to Lhassa, and to deal with Thibet only through the intermediary of its suzerain, the Chinese Government. As regards Afghanistan a
- (b) Afghani-
stan still more important arrangement was concluded. Subject to the consent of the Ameer (which has never, be it observed, been obtained), the Russian Government recognized Afghanistan " as outside the sphere of Russian influence ; they engaged that all their political relations with Afghanistan should be conducted through the intermediary of Great Britain, and undertook not to send any agents into Afghanistan." Great Britain, on its side, declared that there was no intention of changing the political status of Afghanistan ; that British influence would be exercised in a pacific sense, and that no steps were contemplated, or would be encouraged, against Russia. Finally, there was to be complete equality of commercial opportunity in Afghanistan for both countries.
- (c) Persia Most important of all was the agreement concerning Persia. The two Powers engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and to keep the door open to the trade and industry of all other nations. Persia was, however, mapped out into three spheres of influence. The Russian sphere embraced the north and centre, including the chief Persian cities of Tabriz, Teheran, and Ispahan. The British sphere was in the south and east ; it included the coastal district of the Persian Gulf and of the Indian Ocean to the frontiers of Baluchistan. Between the two spheres of influence was interposed a neutral zone, in which both Powers were free to obtain political or commercial concessions, while renouncing any such freedom in the spheres assigned respectively to Russia and Great Britain. The details of this arrangement were sharply criticized. Sir Edward Grey retorted that the treaty must be judged as a whole ; and while not admitting that it was unduly favourable to Russia as regards Persia,

pointed conclusively to the substantial concession made by Russia to us as regards Afghanistan.

In a retrospective view, attention is properly concentrated less upon the detail either of the Anglo-Russian or of the Anglo-French Agreement, and more upon the fact that at a critical moment in the history of European diplomacy it was possible to reach agreements at all. Adverse criticism, whether in France or in Russia or in England, might possibly justify itself at the time, and yet stand utterly condemned in view of the events of the succeeding years. For France, most of all, the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Agreement was plainly an event of the highest significance; at last the flaw in the French system of alliances was removed; not only could France be the friend at once of Russia and of England, but Russia and England could cordially shake hands.

The basis
of the
Triple
Entente

Both these Agreements were obviously defensive in character and pacific in intention; yet candour compels the admission that even defensive treaties might cause alarm to a Power which is wont itself to interpret "defensive" in a peculiar sense. Germany felt herself to be, and in a sense was, encircled by the Triple *Entente*. Professor Brandenburg's comment is eminently judicial. "Probably," he writes, "the truth is that the *Entente* . . . was neither so dangerous as the anxious-minded among us believed, nor so innocent as the other side represented." One thing, however, was certain. "Germany had been manœuvred out of her central position and into that of the head of the weaker of the two great parties. In Berlin they felt this deeply and were anxious about the future."¹

Germany
and the
Entente

Feel it they might: but if Germany were, in truth, "encircled," what was responsible for the encirclement but her own blundering diplomacy? In 1908, however, a fresh crisis in the Balkans opened to her the opportunity of the *riposte* to Russia. Nor, as will be seen in the next chapter, did she neglect it. The net result of the crisis of 1908-9 was to give a vigorous impulse to the ascendancy of *Mittel-Europa* in the Balkans, and immensely to improve the position of Pan-Germanism as opposed to Pan-Slavism in Europe. Omitting

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 262-3. Cf. also Hammann, p. 176, who like most of his countrymen is obsessed by the idea of King Edward's nefarious designs against Germany.

further reference for the present to Balkan affairs, we may pass on to notice the events which logically complete the subject of the present chapter.

Franco-
German
Agreement,
Feb. 8,
1909

Confronted by the Triple *Entente*, the Kaiser attempted in 1909 and 1910 to revive the reinsurance policy of Bismarck. On February 8, 1909, an Agreement was concluded between France and Germany on the Moroccan Question. France recognized the principle of the integrity and independence of the Shereefian Empire, while Germany admitted that France occupied an exceptional position in respect of the maintenance of order in the interior of Morocco ; but the language of the Agreement was so vague that it might sustain the interpretation of something in the nature of a *condominium*. It was, however, two years before matters became really critical in Morocco. Meanwhile the Czar Nicholas had, in November, 1910, visited Potsdam and reached an understanding with the Kaiser in reference to their respective interests in Mesopotamia and Persia. The Czar undertook that Russia would not oppose the Bagdad Railway scheme ; Germany recognized the special interests of Russia in Persia, and the two Powers mutually agreed to abstain from any engagement which might injuriously affect the other.

Russo-
German
Agreement,
1910

France and
Morocco

These "reinsurances" were clearly intended to effect a rupture in the Triple *Entente*. The stirring events of 1911 served only to consolidate it. Another crisis in Moroccan affairs reproduced, in that year, with redoubled intensity, the situation of 1905-6. The terms of the Act of Algeciras were, indeed, sufficiently vague to give either France or Germany a specious plea for divergent interpretations. Nor did the Agreement of February 8, 1909, do much to clear up the ambiguities. That France had the right to maintain order in Morocco was unquestionable ; equally certain was it that the Sultan Moulay-Hafid was either unable or unwilling to enforce it. Consequently, in April 1911 the French landed troops in Morocco, and on May 21 the Moroccan capital, Fez, was occupied.

The *coup*
of Agadi

The strictest injunctions were given to General Monier, who commanded the French Expedition, to abstain from any act which might seem to menace the sovereign authority of the Sultan or the integrity of his Empire ; yet with every advance of French troops, Germany became more and more

suspicious. "Should France find it necessary to remain at Fez," said Kiderlin-Wächter, the German Foreign Secretary, "the whole Moroccan Question will be raised afresh, and each signatory of the Act of Algeciras will resume entire liberty of action." In June the French troops commenced their retirement from Fez; but with each stage of the retirement the attitude of Germany became more menacing.

The tone of German communications to France may perhaps be explained by the domestic situation both in France and England. In France every six months saw a new Ministry, while industry was dislocated by a series of syndicalist strikes; in England the constitutional struggle over the "veto" of the House of Lords reached its zenith in the summer of 1911, while a profound upheaval in the industrial world culminated, in August, in a serious railway strike. With her opponents seemingly paralysed by domestic difficulties, the opportunity seemed to Germany too good to be missed, and on July 1 the French Government was officially informed that the *Panther*, a German gunboat, had been despatched to Agadir, an open roadstead on the west coast of Morocco, in order to protect the lives and interests of German subjects in that disorderly country.

As in 1905, so again in 1911, the motive which inspired German policy was two-fold: to impose upon France, in the eyes of the whole world, a diplomatic humiliation; and to drive a wedge into the Triple *Entente*. In both objects she conspicuously failed. To a thinly veiled demand for the partition of Morocco between Germany, France, and Spain, France hotly retorted that she was the paramount Power behind Morocco, and had been recognized as such; but while willing to negotiate on details, would concede nothing that would touch the honour of France.

England not only ranged herself solidly behind France, but plainly intimated her position to the world. As the medium of that grave intimation, the Cabinet wisely selected Mr. Lloyd George who, speaking at the Mansion House on July 21, used the following words: "I am bound to say this, that I believe it is essential in the higher interests, not merely of this country, but of the world, that Britain should at all hazards maintain her place and her prestige amongst the Great Powers of the world. If a situation were to be forced

Attitude of
Great
Britain

on us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievements, by allowing Britain to be treated, where her interests were vitally affected, as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of Nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure."

Nor was the intimation confined to the official spokesman of England. Mr. Balfour, as leader of the Opposition, thought it well to warn Germany that she could not calculate upon party strife to paralyse England's right arm: "If," he said, "there are any who suppose that we shall allow ourselves to be wiped from the map of Europe because we have difficulties at home, it may be worth while saying that they utterly mistake the temper of the British people and the patriotism of the Opposition."

It is plain that the crisis of July 1911 was nearly as acute as that of July 1914. On the 25th the German Ambassador made to Sir Edward Grey a communication of so grave a character that the latter was constrained to warn the Admiralty that "the fleet might be attacked at any moment."¹ Nor was the tension relaxed until the end of September. From September 8 to the 22nd, so constant was the expectation of an immediate outbreak of hostilities that "the tunnels and bridges on the South-Eastern Railway were being patrolled day and night." Only on the 22nd was the Foreign Office able to "give the word that a state of 'war preparedness' might be relaxed."²

Fortunately, however, the firm attitude of the British Government checked the warlike ardour of official Germany, while it diverted the attack of the fire-eaters from France to England. Mr. Lloyd George's speech, they declared, had revealed, as by a flashlight, the real enemy of Germany. England will brook no rival; she claims to dominate the world. "It is not by concessions that we shall secure peace, but by the German sword." So spake a Reichstag orator with the unconcealed approval of the Crown Prince. "England," wrote a German paper, "poses as the arbiter of the world.

¹ Winston Churchill: *The World Crisis*, i, 48.

² Nicolson: *Lord Carnock*, p. 847.

It cannot go on. The conflict between us, so far from being settled, is now more than ever inevitable.”¹

Meanwhile, prolonged negotiations between the two principals resulted (November 4) in the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty, divided into two parts: the *Accord Marocain* and the *Accord Congolais*.² By the former Germany virtually acknowledged a French Protectorate over Morocco; by the latter France ceded to Germany half the French Congo. So the acute crisis of 1911 was temporarily averted. The German Emperor had, at the last moment, recoiled from the war which the Pan-Germans were eager to provoke.

His prudence was justified, if it was not inspired, by a sinister development in the Near East. On September 29, Italy, after a brief period of negotiation, declared war upon Turkey. The threatened equilibrium in the Mediterranean was to be rectified by an Italian occupation of Tripoli. But Italy's move had more than local significance. An important member of the Triple Alliance had suddenly launched an attack upon one of the sleeping partners of the same firm. What might her action portend?

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CHAPTER XXII

THE BALKAN TANGLE

NEW FACTORS IN THE PROBLEM

“**I** SHALL not see the World War, but you will, and it will start in the Near East.” So Bismarck, shortly before his death (1898), remarked to Herr Ballin, when the latter was showing the old statesman over the great Hamburg-America liner that was to bear his name. Bismarck’s forecast was accurate. The spark that lighted the vast conflagration was dropped in the Balkans. But what Aristotle said of revolutions is true also of wars. The cause must be carefully distinguished from the occasion. The occasion of the World War was undoubtedly to be found in the Near East: whether the cause is also to be found there is a question to which we must return later. This much, however, may be said at once. For the six years preceding the outbreak of war in 1914 the Balkans supplied the focus of European diplomacy. The relations of the Great Powers may therefore be studied most conveniently in relation to the Eastern Question.

We have already followed the history of that Question down to the Thirty Days’ War of 1897.¹ In 1898 a new factor obtruded itself into the secular problem. For obvious geographical reasons Prussia and even Prussianized Germany took little interest in the Eastern Question. Despite the vehement protest of Queen Victoria, King Frederick William IV firmly declined to take any part in the Crimean War. Bismarck declared that he never took the trouble even to open the mail bag from Constantinople. Germany and the Near East

To the end Bismarck maintained his detached attitude. But a change came with the accession of the Emperor A vacancy at Constantinople

¹ See *supra*, c. xvii.

William II. Count Hatzfeld, who had been German Ambassador to the Sublime Porte in the early 'eighties, persuaded his master that there was a vacancy at Constantinople. The Kaiser determined to fill it.

The
Kaiser and
the Sultan

The first ceremonial visit paid by the Emperor William II and his Empress to a European sovereign was paid in 1889. The ruler selected for this honour was the Sultan Abdul Hamid. The visit was repeated in 1898, at a moment when the hands of Abdul Hamid were red with the blood of the massacred Armenians. The Turkish army, thanks to the training which for twelve years it had received under Baron von der Goltz, had lately inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Greeks. The success of von der Goltz's pupils in Thessaly afforded a natural excuse for a congratulatory visit on the part of his master. From Constantinople the Kaiser went on to the Holy Land. At Jerusalem he inaugurated with great pomp a Protestant Church; favour was also shown to the Roman Catholics; while at Damascus the Kaiser ostentatiously took under his protection the Moslem peoples of the world. "His Majesty the Sultan Abdul Hamid and the three hundred million Mohammedans who reverence him as Kaliph may rest assured that at all times the German Emperor will be their friend." Well might those who listened to the Kaiser's audacious utterance hold their breath. Was it intoxication or cool calculation? One auditor, Dr. Friedrich Naumann, the author of *Mittleuropa*, discerned in his Emperor's speech grave if remote possibilities. But the Kaiser's tour not only opened out remote possibilities, it yielded immediate profit. During his sojourn in the East, the *German Company of Anatolian Railways* received from the Sultan the concession of the port of Haïdar Pasha.

Germany
and Meso-
potamia

The concession was supremely significant. German diplomacy in the Near East has been from first to last in large measure railway diplomacy, and Asia Minor and Mesopotamia have provided its most fruitful soil. German savants and publicists had for many years past been calling the attention of their countrymen to the favourable opening for German enterprise in those regions. In 1896 the Pan-German League published a brochure with the suggestive title, *Germany's Claim to the Turkish Inheritance*. In 1889 the *Ottoman Company of Anatolian Railways* was promoted under the auspices

The
Bagdadbahn

of two German banks. Between 1889 and 1902 further concessions were obtained, and finally a Convention was concluded for the construction of a railway from Constantinople to Bagdad. This railway was to form one link in the long chain stretching from Hamburg to Vienna, and thence by way of Buda-Pesth, Belgrade, and Nish to Constantinople, with the possibility of ultimate extension from Bagdad to Basra. Thus would Berlin be connected by virtually continuous rail with the Persian Gulf. The conception was one not unworthy of a scientific and systematic people. Had it materialized, it would have turned the flank of the great Sea-Empire, just as in the fifteenth century Portugal, by the discovery of the Cape route to India, turned the flank of the Ottoman Turks.

For the first twenty years of his reign all went well with the policy of the Kaiser in the Near East. But everything depended upon the personal friendship of the Sultan, Abdul Hamid, and upon the stability of his throne. It was an unsafe foundation. For some years past the party of reform had been gaining ground at Constantinople. In 1891 a committee, afterwards known as the *Young Turks*, was formed at Geneva, whence it was ultimately transferred to Salonika. To transform the Ottoman Empire into a modern European State; to give to Turkey a genuine Parliamentary Constitution; to proclaim the principle of religious and intellectual liberty; to emancipate the Press; to promote intercourse with the progressive nations of the world; to encourage education; to promote trade; to eradicate the last relics of Medievalism—such was the programme with which the Young Turks astonished and deluded Europe in the summer of 1908.

On July 23 the Committee of Union and Progress suddenly raised the standard of revolt at Salonika, and demanded the restoration of the abortive Turkish Constitution of 1876. Abdul Hamid rendered the application of force superfluous by conceding everything demanded of him.

The Turkish Revolution was welcomed with cordiality in all the liberal States of Europe, and with peculiar effusiveness in Great Britain. But the brightness of a too brilliant dawn quickly faded. The Young Turks soon learnt that the introduction of European institutions into an Empire essentially Asiatic is less easily accomplished than they had supposed. The Sultan, Abdul Hamid, was even more acutely conscious

The Young
Turks, 1908

Revolution
and
counter-
revolution
in Turkey

of this truth, and on April 13, 1909, he felt himself strong enough to effect a counter-revolution. But his triumph was short-lived. The Young Turks promptly marched from Salonika, and on April 24 occupied Constantinople. On the 27th Abdul Hamid was formally deposed by a unanimous vote of the Turkish National Assembly, and his younger brother was proclaimed Sultan in his stead, with the title of Mohamed V. On the 28th the ex-Sultan was deported to Salonika and there interned.

The Balkan
crisis of
1908

Meanwhile events of great moment had been taking place in other parts of the Balkan Peninsula. On October 5, 1908, Prince Ferdinand proclaimed the independence of Bulgaria; on the same day the Emperor Francis Joseph announced the formal annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina to the Hapsburg Empire; on the 12th the Cretan Assembly voted the union of the island with the kingdom of Greece. All these events were directly attributable to the success achieved by the Young Turks in Constantinople. Ferdinand of Bulgaria had, indeed, long entertained the ambition to renounce the suzerainty of the Sultan, and himself to assume the ancient title of Czar of Bulgaria. The Young Turk Revolution precipitated his resolution, and gave him the opportunity of carrying it out, and on April 19, 1909, the Turkish Government formally recognized the independence of Bulgaria.

Austria-
Hungary
and the
Balkans

Much more serious, alike in its immediate and its remoter consequences, was the action taken by Austria-Hungary in regard to Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

Of all the great European Powers, Austria-Hungary was most closely, if not most vitally, concerned in the solution of the Balkan problem. England's interest is vital, but remote, and was secured by the virtual annexation of Egypt and Cyprus, and by the financial control over the Canal. Russia's interest also is vital. On no account must any Power, potentially hostile, be in a position to close the Straits against her. But the interests of Austria-Hungary while not less vital were even more direct.

The new
departure
in
Hapsburg
policy

The Hapsburgs had, in Bismarck's phrase, been gravitating towards Buda-Pesth ever since the virtual destruction of the Holy Roman Empire in the Thirty Years' War (1618-48). As a fact, gravitation was for many years equally perceptible towards the Adriatic and the Lombard plain. But the new

departure in Hapsburg policy really dates, not from the Treaty of Westphalia, but from the Treaty of Prague (1866). When Bismarck turned Austria simultaneously out of Germany and out of Italy, he gave her a violent propulsion towards the south-east. The calculated gift of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, supplemented by the military occupation of the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar, increased the momentum. Novi-Bazar not only formed a wedge between the Slavs of Serbia and those of Montenegro, but seemed to invite the Hapsburgs towards the Vardar valley, and so on to Salonika.

For twenty-five years Serbia appeared to be acquiescent. Had Serbia been in a position at the Congress of Berlin to claim Bosnia, or even Novi-Bazar, the whole course of Balkan politics would have been altered. But Serbia had not yet found her feet. Her geographical position as defined in 1878 was a hopeless one. And she had other troubles. Prince Milan assumed a royal Crown in 1882, but his policy was less spirited than his pretensions; he took his orders from Vienna, a fact which widened the breach between himself and the Queen Natalie, who, being a Russian, had strong Pan-Slavist sympathies. But Queen Natalie had grievances against Milan as a husband no less than as a King, and Court scandals at Belgrade did not tend to enhance the reputation of Serbia in European society. The disastrous war with Bulgaria (1885) still further lowered her in public estimation, and, in 1889, King Milan abdicated. His son, King Alexander, encountered a more tragic fate, being murdered in 1903 with his Queen Draga and all her male relations.

Position
of Serbia

This ghastly crime sent a thrill of horror through the Courts and countries of Europe, but Serbia gained immeasurably by the extinction of the decadent Obrenovic dynasty, and the reinstatement of the more virile descendants of Karageorgevic; the pro-Austrian bias of her policy was corrected; and under King Peter she regained self-respect and resumed the work of national regeneration.

That work was watched with jealous eyes at Vienna, and still more at Buda-Pesth, and not without reason. The development of national self-consciousness among the Southern Slavs seriously menaced the whole structure of the Dual Monarchy. The Emperor Francis Joseph had, as we have seen, come to terms with his Magyar subjects in the *Ausgleich* of 1867. The

Austria-
Hungary
and the
Southern
Slavs

essential basis of the formal reconciliation thus effected between Germans and Magyars was a common hostility to the third racial element in the Dual Monarchy, the element which outnumbers both Magyars and Germans, that of the Slavs.

Out of the 51,000,000 subjects of the Emperor Francis Joseph, about 10,000,000 were Magyars—these forming a compact mass in Hungary; about 11,000,000 were German; about 26,000,000 were Slavs.¹ Of the latter, about 7,000,000 belonged to the Serbo-Croatian or Southern Slav branch of the great Slav family.

Since 1867 it had been the fixed policy of the leading statesmen of both Vienna and Buda-Pesth to keep the Slav majority in strict subordination to the German-Magyar minority. The inclusion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a compact population of nearly 2,000,000 Slavs, rendered this policy at once more difficult, and, at least in the eyes of the timorous minority, more absolutely imperative. In proportion, however, as Hapsburg methods became more drastic, the annexed provinces tended to look with more and more approbation upon the Jugo-Slav propaganda emanating from Belgrade. The Serbian Minister Protich declared that the only chance of maintaining peace between the Dual Monarchy and their Slav subjects was for Austria-Hungary to transform itself into an "Eastern Switzerland." To meet the increasing menace of the Pan-Serbian agitation, the Austrian Government promoted schemes for the systematic German colonization of Bosnia in much the same way as Prussia encouraged colonization in Poland. But neither the steady progress of colonization, nor the material benefits unquestionably conferred upon Bosnia by Austrian administration, availed to win the hearts of the Bosnian Serbs, nor to repress the growing intimacy between Serajevo and Belgrade.

Trialism
v. Dualism

This fact, too obtrusive to be ignored, led some of the more thoughtful statesmen of the Ballplatz to advocate a new departure in Hapsburg policy. To maintain, in perpetuity, the German-Magyar ascendancy over the Slavs seemed to them an impossibility. But the only alternative, consistent with the continued existence of the Hapsburg Empire, was to substitute a triple for the dual foundation upon which for half

¹ The balance was made up by Italians, etc.

a century the Hapsburg Empire had rested : to bring in the Slav as a third partner in the existing German-Magyar firm.

On one detail of their programme the "Trialists," as they began to be called, were not, however, unanimous. Some who favoured "Trialism" in principle wished to include only the Slavs who were already subject to the Dual Monarchy ; others, with a firmer grip upon the nationality idea, advocated a bolder and more comprehensive policy. To them it seemed possible to solve by one stroke the most troublesome of the domestic difficulties of the Hapsburg Empire, and the most dangerous of their external problems. The Jugo-Slav agitation had not, at that time, attained the significance which since 1912 has attached to it. Serbo-Croat unity was then a distant dream. While the nationality sentiment was still comparatively weak, the religious barriers between Orthodox Serbs and Roman Catholic Croats were proportionately formidable. Whether, even then, the Slavs could have been tempted by generous terms to come in as a third partner in the Hapsburg Empire it is impossible to say ; but from the Hapsburg point of view the experiment was obviously worth making, and its success would have been rightly regarded as a great political achievement. With Serbia and Montenegro added to Bosnia, and the Herzegovina to Dalmatia and Croatia-Slavonia, the Hapsburgs would not only have been dominant in the Adriatic ; the valley of the Morava would have been open to them, and Salonika would have been theirs whenever they chose to stretch out their hands to take it. Greece would certainly have protested, and might have fought, but at that time there would have been Crete and Epirus, and even western Macedonia to bargain with. Bulgaria might easily have been conciliated by the cession of western Macedonia, including, of course, Kavala, and perhaps the vilayet of Adrianople. The Macedonian problem would thus have been solved with complete satisfaction to two out of the three principal claimants, and to the incomparable advantage of the Hapsburg Empire.

Among those who favoured this policy was the Archduke ^{The} Franz Ferdinand, heir-presumptive to the Dual Monarchy. ^{Archduke} Born in 1863 Franz Ferdinand was a son of the Archduke ^{Franz} Ferdinand Charles Louis, a younger brother of the Emperor Francis Joseph. On the death of his cousin the Crown Prince Rudolph,

in 1889, Franz Ferdinand came into the direct line of succession to the throne, and the death of his father in 1906 made him heir-presumptive to his uncle. His relations with the Emperor, never intimate or cordial, were rendered more difficult by his marriage in 1900 with Countess Sophie Chotek who was not of royal blood, and by the enforced renunciation of the succession rights of any children who might be born of his union with her. Like his wife he was an ardent Roman Catholic, a fact which may have intensified his sympathy with the Croats. Though choleric in temper, he was a man of very considerable intelligence, and clearly recognized the precarious basis on which the Hapsburg Monarchy rested.

1903

To the increasing influence exercised by the Magyars upon the policy of the Dual Monarchy he was strongly opposed, though whether the appropriate remedy was to be found in federalism or "Trialism" he was undecided. Towards "Trialism," however, things seemed to be tending in the first years of the present century. Serbia, distracted by domestic broils, was in the slough of despond; a generous offer from the Hapsburgs might well have seemed to patriotic Serbs the happiest solution of an inextricable tangle. Austria, on the other hand, had reached at that moment the zenith of her position in the Balkans. The year which witnessed the palace revolution at Belgrade witnessed also the brilliant culmination of Hapsburg diplomacy in the conclusion of the Mürzteg Agreement. Russia was on the brink of the Japanese War. Great Britain had just emerged with damaged prestige from the war in South Africa. The sagacious diplomacy of King Edward VII had not yet succeeded in bringing England and France together, still less in laying the foundation for the Triple *Entente* between the Western Powers and Russia.

The moment was exceptionally favourable for a bold *coup* on the part of the Hapsburgs in the Balkans. The Mürzteg Agreement¹ seemed almost to imply an international invitation to attempt it. But the opportunity was lost. That some powerful forces were operating against "Trialism" is certain; but their precise character remains obscure.

Baron von
Aerenthal,
1906-12

During six critical years (1906-12) the direction of the external policy of the Dual Monarchy was committed to a

¹ By this the Czar Nicholas II and the Emperor Francis Joseph agreed (1903) upon a comprehensive scheme of reform in Macedonia.

masterful and much criticized diplomatist, Baron von Aerenthal. Born in Bohemia in 1854, he was a German Czech with a strain of Jewish blood in him. He was continuously occupied in diplomacy from 1877 onwards, and in 1899 he became Ambassador at Petersburg, where he remained until his appointment to the Austria-Hungarian Foreign Office in 1906. Strongly inclined towards a Balkan *Entente* between Russia and his own country, he played a leading part in the negotiations which preceded the Mürzteg Agreement. He would gladly have preserved the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, but was determined that in the event of the "decease of the sick man," Austria-Hungary should get a fair share of the inheritance.

Meanwhile relations between the Hapsburg Monarchy and Serbia became increasingly strained. The bad feeling was further accentuated by the economic exclusiveness of the Ballplatz, which threatened to strangle the incipient trade of Serbia, and in particular to impede the export of swine, upon which its commercial prosperity mainly depended. The friction thus generated culminated in the so-called "Pig-war" of 1905-6, which convinced even the most doubting of Serbian politicians that no free economic development was possible for the inland State, until she had acquired a coast-line on the Adriatic. Unless Serbia were content to resign all hope of attaining the rank even of a third-rate European State, she must either acquire some of the harbours of Dalmatia, pre-eminently a Slav country, or obtain access to the Adriatic by union with Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

All hope of the latter solution was extinguished by Aerenthal's abrupt annexation of these Slav provinces in 1908. For that annexation Aerenthal had prepared the way by an agreement with Russia; Russia repudiated the idea of seizing Constantinople, but demanded the opening of the Straits to Russian warships. This demand Aerenthal undertook to support, on condition that equal facilities were conceded to Roumania and Bulgaria. Aerenthal also offered to give up the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar and to abandon the idea of an advance on Salonika. Europe was to be asked in Conference to confirm these arrangements (September 1908).

The sudden announcement of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (October 5) nevertheless came as an un-

Annexa-
tion of
Bosnia
and Herze-
govina

pleasant surprise to Russia, no less than to the other Powers. Austria-Hungary had, indeed, been in undisputed occupation since 1878, and no reasonable person ever supposed that she would voluntarily relax her hold. But so long as the Treaty of Berlin remained intact, so long as the Hapsburg occupation was technically provisional, a glimmer of hope remained to the Pan-Serbians. Aerenthal's action was a declaration of war. In the following year he did indeed throw a sop directly to the Turks, and indirectly to the Serbs, by the evacuation of Novi-Bazar. He took to himself great credit for this generosity, and the step was hailed with delight in Serbia. We now know that it was dictated by no consideration for either Turkish or Serbian susceptibilities; it was taken partly to conciliate Italy, the third and most restless member of the Triple Alliance; but mainly because the Austrian general staff had come to the conclusion that the Morava valley offered a more convenient route than the Sanjak to Salonika.

Feeling in
Serbia

Could Serbia hope to shut and lock both these doors against the intruding Hapsburgs? That was the question which agitated every Chancery in Europe at the opening of the year 1909. In Belgrade the action of Austria-Hungary excited the most profound indignation, and the whole Serbian people, headed by the Crown Prince, clamoured for war. Feeling in Montenegro was hardly less unanimous. The Serbian Government made a formal protest on October 7, and appealed to the Powers.

Edward VII
and the
crisis

The Powers were not unsympathetic, but urged Serbia to be patient. Upon English diplomatists the high-handed action of Austria had made a profound impression. Not least upon the Sovereign. No man in Europe had laboured more assiduously or more skilfully for peace than King Edward VII. Lord Redesdale has recorded the effect produced upon him by the news from the Balkans. "It was the 8th of October that the King received the news at Balmoral, and no one who was there can forget how terribly he was upset. Never did I see him so moved. . . . Every word that he uttered that day has come true."¹ The Great War of 1914, in fact, was implicit in the events of 1908.

¹ Lord Redesdale : *Memories*, i, 178-9. Cf. also *The Recollections* (ii, 277) of John, Viscount Morley, who was Minister in attendance at Balmoral at the time, and formed a high opinion as to the knowledge and shrewdness of King Edward VII.

Nor was King Edward the only Sovereign who was profoundly perturbed by the news of the Bosnian Crisis. "A raid on Turkey!" So the Kaiser minuted on Bülow's despatch. "Material for cheap suspicions in England about the Central Powers. . . . Vienna will incur the reproach of double-dealing and not unjustly. They have deceived us abominably. . . . This will probably be the signal for the dismemberment of Turkey. As an ally I am personally wounded in my deepest feelings. . . . Nice gratitude for our help in the Sanjak affair, when we had to endure Isvolsky's rage for months on end and for our complaisance at Vienna." ¹

The
Kaiser's
wrath

But fume as the Kaiser might, he was impotent in the face of Aerenthal's action. The Hapsburg was his only ally. He could do no other than recognize the annexation; but "what I deplore is having been put in this dilemma by Aerenthal's frightful stupidity (or levity). I cannot protect my friends (the Turks) now that my ally has wronged them. . . . King Edward will now inscribe the 'Defence of Treaties' on his banner . . . a great score over us for Edward VII." ² The third member of the Triple Alliance was not less perturbed by the action of Aerenthal, which was described by Victor Emmanuel as a fatal blow at the Treaty of Berlin.

Meanwhile the peace of Europe depended upon the attitude of Russia. Her Balkan partnership with Austria-Hungary, though manifestly weakened, had not been completely dissolved, but in 1907 she had, as we have seen, concluded a comprehensive Agreement respecting outstanding difficulties with Great Britain. That Agreement virtually completed the Triple *Entente*. In June 1908 King Edward and the Czar Nicholas met at Réval, and a further programme for the pacification of Macedonia was drawn up. Whether the Réval programme would have succeeded in its object any better than the Münztteg Agreement, which it replaced, the Young Turks did not permit Europe to learn. But at least it afforded conclusive evidence that a new era in the relations of Russia and Great Britain had dawned.

In the Balkan Question Russia was profoundly interested. To her the Serbians naturally looked not merely for sympathy

Russia and
Germany

¹ The Kaiser's written Comments endorsed on Bülow's Despatches of October 5 and 7.

² *Ibid.*

but for assistance. Russia, however, was not ready for war. She had not regained her breath after the contest with Japan. And the fact was well known at Potsdam and Vienna. All through the autumn and winter (1908-9) Serbia and Montenegro had been feverishly pushing on preparations for the war, in which they believed that they would be supported by Russia and Great Britain. Austria, too, was steadily arming. With Turkey she was prepared to come to financial terms : towards Serbia she presented an adamant front. Towards the end of February 1909 war seemed inevitable. It was averted, not by the British proposal for a conference, but by the " mailed fist " of Germany. In melodramatic phrase the German Emperor announced that if his august ally were compelled to draw the sword, a knight " in shining armour " would be found by his side. At the end of March, Russia was plainly informed that if she went to the assistance of Serbia she would have to fight not Austria-Hungary only but Germany as well. Russia, conscious of her unpreparedness, immediately gave way. With that surrender the war of 1914 became inevitable. Germany was intoxicated by her success ; Russia was bitterly resentful. The Serbs were compelled not merely to acquiesce, but to promise to shake hands with Austria. The Powers tore up the twenty-fifth Article of the Treaty of Berlin. Turkey accepted £2,200,000 from Austria-Hungary as compensation for the loss of the Serbian provinces, and in April 1909 formally assented to their alienation. Bulgaria compounded for her tribute by the payment of £5,000,000. Thus were the " cracks papered over," and Europe emerged from the most serious international crisis which had confronted her since the Russo-Turkish War (1877-8).

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CHAPTER XXIII

ITALY AND EUROPE (1871-1914)

Italy and
Russia

IN no capital in Europe did the events of 1908-9 cause more serious perturbation than at Rome. Though still a member of the Triple Alliance Italy had long looked with unconcealed uneasiness at the "forward" policy of the Dual Monarchy in the Balkan Peninsula. Russia was smarting under the public humiliation imposed upon her by the Paladin of Potsdam. Consequently, Russia and Italy tended to draw together. The cracks papered over in the spring of 1909 revealed themselves again in all their gaping ugliness in the autumn. In October the *rapprochement* between Italy and Russia was manifested by the visit paid by the Czar Nicholas to the King of Italy at Racconigi. Two years later Italy startled the diplomatic world by a sudden declaration of war on Turkey (September 29, 1911).

What induced her to take that step? Before that question can be answered, it is necessary to take a retrospective glance at Italian policy since 1871.

Italian
unity

By 1871 Italy had become a nation. The dreams of Mazzini and Garibaldi, of Cavour and Victor Emmanuel were at last realized: "Italy had entered Rome." But Italy had still to establish her position among the "Powers." In 1919 she took, for the first time, a leading place at the Council Board of Europe. Not without much tribulation had that position been attained. Her tribulation was partly domestic, partly due to external misfortunes. Some of her best friends thought that Italy had been made too fast. Cavour, if his hand had not been forced by Garibaldi, would have gone slower; and Cavour was the wisest statesman Italy has ever produced. A period of apprenticeship to federalism might ultimately have served the cause of unity, and in the mean-

time have avoided much embarrassment and disappointment. A crushing burden of taxation, grinding poverty, social unrest, and more than one military disaster—this was part of the price paid by Italy for the impatience of Mazzinian and Garibaldian enthusiasts. Nevertheless, to the great satisfaction of all who had watched with sympathy the progress of the *Risorgimento* Italy won through. The price of unity has proved to be unexpectedly heavy; but it has been courageously paid.

The policy pursued by Napoleon III between 1860 and 1870—the annexation of Savoy and Nice, the defence of the Temporal Power of the Papacy, the slaughter inflicted on the Garibaldians at Mentana—had effectively obliterated any sense of obligation which might have been evoked by Napoleon's help in the war of Italian Independence (1859). The events of 1866 left Italy with feelings of resentment against Austria. The Hapsburg Emperor remained in possession of lands which the Italian *Irredentists* regarded as part of their inheritance. Towards Prussia, which had procured for her the promised pound of flesh, but not an ounce more, Italy felt little gratitude; and had little cause to feel any.

Even less cordial were the sentiments of Prussia for Italy. ^{Prussia} “A jackal policy”: so Bismarck described the policy of ^{and Italy} Italy. “Insatiable Italy,” he declared, “with furtive glance, roves restlessly hither and thither, instinctively drawn on by the odour of corruption and calamity—always ready to attack anyone from the rear and make off with a bit of plunder. . . . On the one hand the *Irredenta*, on the other machinations in Albania, Montenegro, and the Balkan territories. . . .”¹

On the question of the *Irredenta*, the feelings of Italy were ^{Italia} unquestionably strong; but their claims were of varying ^{Irredenta} degrees of validity. The Southern Tyrol or *Trentino*, though Italian in race and language, had never formed part of Italy save when Napoleon was King of Italy. Nor did Trieste, though predominantly Italian in population, ever form part of Venetia, except when Venice itself was under Hapsburg rule. It was otherwise, however, with the Venetian provinces to the east of the Adriatic, Istria and Dalmatia, which, in

¹ Pribram, ii, 6. These remarks belong to a somewhat later period, 1880 but they represent Bismarck's attitude.

addition to the *Trentino*, Görz, and Trieste, Austria retained in 1866. For four centuries at least the Venetian Republic had been dominant on the eastern coast of the Adriatic, and Italian *Irredentists* based their claim on an even earlier title—that derived from the Roman Empire. Ticino forms the one Italian canton in the Swiss Confederation; France had snatched Savoy and Nice as the price of her assistance in 1859. Ever since 1866 secret societies had existed in Italy, pledged to recover these “unredeemed” portions of the Italian inheritance. Though not encouraged by the Government, they kept alive feelings of irritation against France, and even more strongly perhaps against Austria.

The Triple
Alliance

Nevertheless, as we have seen, Bismarck was anxious in 1882 to take in Italy as the third partner in the Triple Alliance. Relations between Italy and the Central Powers had been sensibly improved by the visits paid by Victor Emmanuel to the Courts of Vienna and Berlin, and the return visits paid by the Emperor Francis Joseph and the Emperor William to Italy in 1875. France, on the other hand, encouraged by Bismarck, had thrown down a challenge to Italy by establishing (1881) a Protectorate over Tunisia; England was deeply involved in Egypt; Tunis might well be a prelude to Tripoli; Italy feared that France would presently “encircle her with a ring of iron,” and that she might therefore find herself isolated unless she grasped the hands of friendship extended to her by the Central Powers.

Its
importance
for Italy

The first Treaty of the Triple Alliance, concluded for a term of five years on May 20, 1882, contained provisions of great importance to Italy. By Article 2, Germany and Austria-Hungary bound themselves to assist Italy with their whole military strength, in the event of an unprovoked attack by France. Italy bound herself, (but Austria-Hungary did not), to reciprocal aid to Germany in a similar event. In the event of an unprovoked attack by Russia alone, upon Germany or Austria, Italy was bound only to benevolent neutrality. If the attack were made by two or more Great Powers, the assistance was to be active. Germany was pledged to assist Austria-Hungary against Russia by the Dual Alliance Treaty of October 7, 1879; but all knowledge of that treaty was withheld from Italy. Italy would like to have brought Great Britain into the Triple Alliance; Austrian statesmen

would have welcomed her admittance "with eagerness";¹ Bismarck, better informed about the Parliamentary Constitution of England, firmly negatived the suggestion, though he agreed to the Italian proposal that ministerial "declarations" should be exchanged between the contracting parties, emphasizing the fact that the treaty was not "in any case to be regarded as directed against England." These declarations were, in fact, annexed to the Text of the Treaty.

Mutually advantageous as a whole, the Triple Alliance had one disadvantage for Italy. It secured her against attack by France, but closed the door to her ambitions on the Adriatic and in the Balkans.

From the first, indeed, there was no excessive cordiality between the Central Powers and the third partner of the Triple Alliance. Bismarck had expressed to the Crown Prince Rudolph in 1883, an opinion that it was impossible to count with full confidence on Italy if war were to break out with Russia or France, and he did not deem it incumbent on him to communicate to Italy the "Reinsurance" Treaty which, in September 1884, he concluded at Skierniewice with Russia. On the other hand, Agreements were concluded between Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, and Italy to maintain the *status quo* in the Orient, the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, and the Black Sea, and to maintain the independence of Turkey. Italy agreed to support the work of England in Egypt, and Great Britain promised support to Italy "at every other point whatsoever of the North African coast districts and in particular in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica." This meant, in effect, "the co-operation of the British fleet against French advances in the western Mediterranean and also against the Russian menace of Constantinople and the Dardanelles."² In this way it becomes hardly an exaggeration to say that "the moral extension of the Triple Alliance across the English Channel" was assured.³

The Triple Alliance itself was renewed in 1887 for a further period of five years, and again in 1891 for six years, or (unless denounced by any of the contracting parties one year in advance) for twelve. The renewal of 1887 was in three parts,

¹ Pribram, ii, 87.

² Pribram, *op. cit.*, ii, 83. Texts in vol. i, pp. 94-103 and 124-33.

³ Oncken: *Das Alte und das Neue Mitteleuropa*, p. 47, ap. Pribram, ii, 83.

one of which, a separate treaty between Germany and Italy, remained unknown until after the Great War. It was of great significance, since it virtually bound Germany to promote the extension of Italian territory at the expense of France.¹ Another, concluded between Italy and Austria-Hungary, bound both parties to maintain the *status quo* in the Balkans, the Adriatic, and the Ægean Sea, but if this should prove impossible, reciprocally to communicate their intentions to each other.

Colonial
ambitions
of Italy

Meanwhile the territorial ambitions of Italy had developed with some rapidity. Ever since the days of Cavour Italy had been anxious to obtain a commercial settlement on the coast of the Red Sea. In 1870 an Italian steamship company acquired the coaling-station of Assab, north of the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb, and in 1882 the Government took it over as a Crown Colony. Three years later, partly at the instigation of the British Government, partly as a counter-move to the French occupation of Tunis, the Italian Government announced its intention to "pick up the keys of the Mediterranean in the Red Sea" and occupied the port of Massowah on the Abyssinian coast. From Massowah the Italians advanced in 1887 into the highlands of the interior. The suspicions of Abyssinia were not unnaturally aroused; the Negus demanded the withdrawal of the Italians to the coast, and on their refusal attacked and cut to pieces an Italian column of some 500 men. This reverse negated the idea of withdrawal and, in 1889, the Italian stations were consolidated as the Province of Eritrea, and a protectorate was proclaimed over part of the Somali coast.

Great Britain recognized Abyssinia as within the Italian sphere of influence (1891), and in 1895 Crispi, who had come back into power in 1893, decided to occupy Adowa, the capital of Tigré, a little State contiguous and tributary to Abyssinia. The Sultan Menelek of Abyssinia could not tolerate this attack upon his vassal, and on March 1 the Italians were attacked at Adowa by a greatly superior Abyssinian force, and lost 10,000 out of a total of 14,000 killed and wounded. This disaster dissipated the dream of a colonial Empire in East Africa. Italy agreed to abandon the idea of

¹ Pribram, ii, 9, and Texts, p. 113.

a protectorate over Abyssinia, and to concentrate her activity in those regions on the development of trade.

The disastrous attempts to emulate the colonial expansion of her neighbours sorely taxed the exiguous resources of Italy, and contributed to the economic and financial crisis in which she now became involved. Domestic troubles

In May 1898 serious riots, attributed to a rise in the price of bread, broke out in Southern Italy, and, simultaneously, political disturbances, even more serious in character, occurred in the north. Riots of 1898

The assassination of King Humbert (July 29, 1900) gave pause to the less extreme Socialists, but the economic condition of Italy during the early years of the twentieth century was exceedingly grave. In Italy, as elsewhere, the first effect of the general use of machinery, alike in industry and agriculture, appeared to be inimical to the interests of the wage-earners. Sectional strikes occurred in 1901-2, and in September 1904 a general strike was proclaimed. In Milan, particularly, it quickly assumed the character of an anarchist insurrection, and there were very serious disturbances also in Rome, Florence, Naples, Venice, and Genoa. Repressed in 1904, anarchy again reared its head in 1907; and again Milan was the centre of disturbances, though there were agrarian insurrections as well. An eruption of Mount Etna in 1906, followed by a terrible earthquake in Sicily at the end of 1908, caused a loss of life and damage to property incomparably more serious than all the anarchist insurrections put together. Italy was, indeed, passing through a period of tribulation, deeply deplored by all who had rejoiced with her in the bright promise of the *Risorgimento*. But there is nothing more dangerous to the *morale* of a people than a political development which outruns social development and the creation of appropriate administrative machinery. If Italy was not, in 1870, ready for political unification, still less was it ready for Parliamentary Government. Tudor discipline was, in England, an essential preliminary to the success of the Parliamentary revolution of the seventeenth century. But Italy had to wait for that discipline until the third decade of the twentieth century.

Meanwhile the fall of Bismarck led to a marked improvement in the relations of Italy and France. A cordial welcome Italy and France

extended to King Victor Emmanuel and his Queen in Paris (1908), and to President Loubet in Rome (1904), improved them still further, and the rupture between France and the Vatican which followed on the latter visit tended to increased cordiality between France and the Quirinal.

The conclusion of the Anglo-French Agreement in the same year (1904) helped to bring France and Italy together, just as it conduced to better relations between Great Britain and Russia. The Conference at Algceiras in the winter of 1905-6, not only demonstrated the growing solidarity of the friendship between Great Britain and France, but revealed a cooling of affection between Italy and her partners in the Triple Alliance.

The
Racconigi
Agreement

The Central Empires were not yet, however, completely isolated, though the events of 1908, already recorded, rendered a continuance of the Triple Alliance almost a diplomatic mockery. By the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Italy was naturally and gravely perturbed. "The only State," declared a deputy in the Italian Chamber, "which really threatens us with war is in alliance with us." There were indeed Italian politicians who demanded that Italy should break with the Central Powers and join the Triple *Entente*. But Tittoni, her Foreign Minister, emphatically refused "to choose between alliance and friendship or to give up either the one or the other." "Our alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary to which we remain true must not to my mind be an obstacle to our traditional friendship with England, to our renewed friendship with France, and to the recent understanding with Russia." For some months after the annexations were announced Tittoni earnestly strove to bring about a Balkan Agreement between Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Russia; but in vain.¹

Italy and
Russia

The growing estrangement between Italy and the Central Empires was further emphasized by the visit paid by the Czar Nicholas to King Victor Emmanuel at Racconigi (28rd to 25th October, 1909). The two Sovereigns agreed to do everything in their power to maintain the *status quo* in the Balkans; if this proved impossible they were to encourage the development of the national States of the Balkans to the

¹ Pribram, *op. cit.*, ii, 145-6.

exclusion both of Austria and Italy. Russia, however, consented to maintain a benevolent attitude in reference to Italy's designs on Tripoli and Cyrenaica; and Italy promised to reciprocate this attitude towards the ambitions of Russia in reference to the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Russia communicated the terms of this Agreement not only to the other members of the *Entente*, France and Great Britain, but also to the Balkan States, and on the invitation of Russia, England and France agreed to adhere to the Racconigi Agreement. The arrangement had, as a German critic has pointed out, a two-fold significance; it registered the first united move of the *Entente* Powers in regard to the Near Eastern Question, and it marked the further progress of Italy from the Triple Alliance towards the Triple *Entente*.¹ Nevertheless, the Triple Alliance remained formally intact. In December 1909 Aehrenthal concluded a fresh Agreement with Italy in regard to the Balkans; neither Power was to come to terms with a third Power without informing the other, and Austria-Hungary specifically bound herself not to reoccupy the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar without having previously arranged with Italy for suitable compensation to her. The Alliance possessed in truth one element of reality: it was founded on common hostility to the Balkan Slavs. "It would be far more advantageous to Italy," declared the Marquis San Giuliano, "to have a strong Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as its neighbour than if a purely Slavic group were to be formed in the Balkans and to exercise its influence upon the provinces of the Dual Monarchy that border on Italy."²

The value of the Racconigi Agreement to Italy was none Tripoli the less speedily manifested. Ever since Tunis had been acquired by France, Italy had hoped to find compensation in Tripoli, and her reversionary rights to that country, in the event of a break up of the Ottoman Empire, had been tacitly recognized in the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, and again at Algeciras in 1906.

Those rights were now menaced from an unexpected quarter. The scientific interest which German geologists

¹ Brandenburg, *op. cit.*, pp. 355-6, who quotes the text of the Racconigi Agreement as communicated to France, ap. Stieve's *Schriftwechsel Iswolski's*, ii, 868.

² Pribram, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

and archæologists had lately dēveloped in Tripoli aroused grave suspicion at Rome ; and the descent of the *Panther* upon Agadir convinced Italy that unless she was prepared to forgo for all time her reversionary interests in North Africa, the hour for claiming them had struck.

Turco-
Italian
War,
Sept. 29,
1911, to
Oct. 18,
1912

On September 27, 1911, Italy suddenly presented to Turkey an ultimatum demanding the consent of the Porte to an Italian occupation of Tripoli under the sovereignty of the Sultan, and subject to the payment of an annual tribute. A reply was required within forty-eight hours, but already the Italian transports were on their way to Tripoli, and on September 29 war was declared.

Italy and
the Porte

Italy found in Tripoli no easy task. She occupied the coast towns of Tripoli, Bengazi, and Derna without difficulty, but against the combined resistance of Turks and Arabs she could make little progress in the interior. The Porte, trusting that international complications would supervene, and once again, as so often in the past, extricate it from its difficulties, obstinately refused to make any concessions. Between her two allies Germany was now in a difficult position. She was indignant that Italy should, without permission from Berlin, have ventured to attack the Turks ; but, on the other hand, she had no wish to throw the third partner in the Triple Alliance into the arms of the Triple *Entente*. Italy, however, was determined to wring consent from the Porte, and in the spring of 1912 her navy attacked at several points : a couple of Turkish warships were sunk off Beirut ; the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles were bombarded on April 18 ; Rhodes and the Dodecanese Archipelago were occupied in May. To the bombardment of the Dardanelles Turkey retorted by closing the Straits. This proved highly inconvenient to neutrals, and after a month they were reopened. Throughout the summer the war went languidly on, entailing much expense to Italy, and very little either of expense or even inconvenience to the Turks.

Treaty of
Lausanne

Then suddenly a new danger threatened the luckless Turk. The Tripoli campaign was still dragging its slow length along, and seemed as though it might be protracted for years, when the conflagration blazed up to which Tripoli had applied the first match. In view of the more immediate danger the Porte at last came to terms with Italy, and the Treaty of

Lausanne was hastily signed at Ouchy on October 18. The Turks were to withdraw from Tripoli ; Italy from the Ægean Islands ; the Khalifal authority of the Sultan in Tripoli was to remain intact ; he was to grant an amnesty and a good administration to the islands ; Italy was to assume responsibility for Tripoli's share of the Ottoman debt. The cession of Tripoli was assumed *sub silentio*. The withdrawal of the Italian troops from the islands was to be subsequent to, and consequent upon, the withdrawal of the Turkish troops. Italy has contended that the latter condition has not been fulfilled, and she remains, therefore, in Rhodes and the Dodecanese. Her continued occupation has not injured the Turks, but it has kept out the Greeks.

On the same day that the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, Greece declared war upon the Ottoman Empire. This time she was not alone. The miracle had occurred. The Balkan States had combined against the common enemy.

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NOTE TO P. 439.

For Anglo-Italian relations at this period cf. *Life of Lord Salisbury*, iv, pp. 20 seq., and Marriott : *Makers of Modern Italy* (Oxford, 1931), pp. 170-184.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE BALKAN LEAGUE AND THE BALKAN WARS

THE relations between Italy and the Dual Monarchy, discussed in the previous chapter, turned largely, as we saw, on the rapidly changing situation in the Balkans. That situation was profoundly affected by the events of 1908; but apart from the Young Turk revolution, which was a revolution indeed, those events—notably the Hapsburg annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina—marked changes less of substance than of form. It was far otherwise with the events of 1912-13.

The
Balkan
League

The idea of a permanent alliance or even a Confederation among the Christian States of the Balkans was frequently canvassed after the Treaty of Berlin. But the aggrandisement of Bulgaria in 1885, and the war which ensued between Bulgaria and Serbia, shattered the hope for many years to come. The real obstacle, however, to an *entente* between the Balkan Powers was their conflicting interests in Macedonia. Bulgaria consistently favoured the policy of autonomy, in the not unreasonable expectation that autonomy would prove to be the prelude to the union of Macedonia with Bulgaria. Neither Serbia nor Greece could entertain an equally capacious ambition, and from the first, therefore, advocated not autonomy, but partition.

Serbo-
Bulgarian
Alliance,
March 18,
1912

Between 1910 and 1912 there were various indications of some improvement in the mutual relations of the Balkan States. A favourable issue was not long delayed. On March 18, 1912, a definite treaty was signed between the kingdoms of Serbia and Bulgaria. This was in itself a marvel of patient diplomacy. Not since 1878 had the relations between the two States been cordial, nor were either their interests or their antagonisms identical. To Serbia, Austria-Hungary was the enemy. The little land-locked State, which

hoped to become the nucleus of a Jugo-Slav Empire, was in necessary antagonism to the Power which had thrust itself into the heart of the Balkans, and which, while heading the Slavs off from access to the Adriatic was itself anxious to push through Slav lands to the Ægean. Bulgaria, on the other hand, had no special reason for enmity against Vienna or Buda-Pesth. The "unredeemed" Bulgarians were subjects not of the Emperor Francis Joseph but of the Ottoman Sultan, and while the antagonisms of the two States differed, their mutual interests clashed. The treaty concluded in March 1912 reflected these conditions.

By that treaty the two States entered into a defensive alliance; they mutually guaranteed each other's dominions, and engaged to take common action if the interests of either were threatened by the attack of a Great Power upon Turkey; at the same time they defined their respective claims in Macedonia should a partition be effected. Two months after the signature of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty an arrangement was reached between Greece and Bulgaria.

Greco-Bulgarian
Treaty,
May 10,
1912

Meanwhile the Cretan difficulty had become acute, and, indeed, threatened to involve revolution in Greece. The situation was saved by the advent of a great statesman. M. Venizelos had already shown his capacity for leadership in Crete when, in February 1910, he arrived in Athens to advise the Military League. He remained to advise the King, and when, in October, the League overturned the Dragoumis Ministry, King George invited the Cretan statesman to form a Cabinet. M. Venizelos accepted the difficult task, effected a much-needed revision of the Constitution, and propounded an extensive programme of domestic reforms.

The Cretan
Question
Eleutherios
Venizelos

But the execution of such a programme predicated peace, internal and external, and in addition a certain basis of financial stability and commercial prosperity.

The Young Turks were quite determined that neither condition should be satisfied; and repeated manifestations of the extreme and persistent hostility of the "New Moslems," combined with their refusal to acquiesce in the alienation of Crete, at last compelled Greece to the "impossible" alliance with Bulgaria.

The crisis was now at hand. It was forced generally by the condition of Macedonia, and in particular by the revolt of

The
Albanian
factor

the Albanians. Both Greece and Serbia were becoming seriously alarmed by the unexpected success achieved by the Albanians, who now openly demanded the cession to them of the entire vilayets of Monastir and Uskub. Unless, therefore, the Balkan League promptly interposed, Greece and Serbia might find the ground cut from under their feet in Macedonia. Bulgaria was less directly interested than her allies in the pretensions put forward by the Albanians, but she was far more concerned in the terrible massacres of Macedonian Bulgars at Kotchana and Berana.

The
Powers
and the
Balkans

While the Turks and the Balkan States were mobilizing, the Powers put out all their efforts to maintain the peace. The Powers urged concession upon the Porte and patience upon the Balkan League. It was futile to expect either. Nothing but overwhelming pressure exerted at Constantinople could at this moment have averted war. Instead of exerting that pressure the Powers presented an ultimatum simultaneously at Sofia, Belgrade, Athens, and Cettigne.

Outbreak
of war

This ultimatum was presented at the Balkan capitals on October 8, 1912. On the same day King Nicholas of Montenegro declared war at Constantinople. The other three States presented their ultimatum on the 14th. On the 18th the Porte declared war upon Bulgaria and Serbia; and on the same day Greece declared war upon the Porte.

The war of
the
Coalition,
Oct.-Dec.
1912

Then, as M. Gueshoff writes, "a miracle took place. . . . Within the brief space of one month the Balkan Alliance demolished the Ottoman Empire, four tiny countries with a population of some 10,000,000 souls defeating a great Power whose inhabitants numbered 25,000,000." Each of the allies did its part, though the brunt of the fighting fell upon the Bulgarians.

Bulgaria's
part

The success of the Bulgarians in the autumn campaign was, indeed, phenomenal. On October 22 the Bulgarian Army attacked at Kirk Kilisse, a position of enormous strength to the north-east of Adrianople. After two days' fighting the Turks fled in panic, and Kirk Kilisse was in the hands of their enemies. Then followed a week of hard fighting, known to history as the Battle of Lule Burgas, and at the end of it the Turks were in full retreat on Constantinople.

Serbia's
part

Hardly less astonishing, though on a smaller scale than the victories of Bulgaria, were those of the Serbs. The Serbian

forces, which were about 150,000 strong, were divided into three armies. One marched into Novi-Bazar, and, after a week's stiff fighting, cleared the Turks out of that no man's land. Having done that, a portion of it was despatched down the Drin valley into Albania. A second army occupied Pristina (October 23), while the third and main army, under the Crown Prince, made for Uskub. The Turks barred the way to the ancient capital of the Serbs by the occupation of Kumanovo, and there on the 22nd of October the two armies met. Three days of fierce fighting resulted in a complete victory for the Serbs. At last, on that historic field, the stain of Kossovo was wiped out. Patiently, for five hundred years, the Serbs had waited for the hour of revenge; that it would some day come they had never doubted; at last it was achieved. Two days later the Turks evacuated Uskub, and on October 26 the Serbs entered their ancient capital in triumph. Now came the supreme question. Should they press for the Ægean or the Adriatic? Europe had already announced its decision that under no circumstances should Serbia be allowed to retain any part of the Albanian coast. But it was at least questionable whether the will of diplomacy could prevail against the intoxicating military successes of the Balkan League.

Meanwhile the main body of the Serbs flung themselves upon the Turks at Prilep, and drove them back upon Monastir, and from Monastir they drove them in utter confusion upon the guns of the advancing Greeks. The capture of Ochrida followed upon that of Monastir. Serbia, having thus cleared the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar, old Serbia, and western Macedonia, now turned its attention to Albania, and, with the aid of the Montenegrins, occupied Alessio and Durazzo before the end of November.

On December 3 the belligerents accepted an armistice proposed to them by the Powers; but from this armistice the Greeks were, at the instance of the League, expressly excluded. The League could not afford to permit the activity of the Greek fleet in the Ægean to be, even temporarily, interrupted.

On land the part played by the Greeks, though from their own standpoint immensely significant, was, in a military sense, relatively small, but on November 6 the Greeks entered Salonika.

Salonika

Hardly had the Greek troops occupied Salonika when the Bulgarians arrived at the gates. Only after some demur did the Greeks allow their allies to enter the city, and from the outset they made it abundantly clear, not only that they had themselves come to Salonika to stay, but that they would permit no divided authority in the city, which they claimed exclusively as their own.

The Greek fleet

Meanwhile the Greek fleet had, from the outset of war, established a complete supremacy : practically all the islands, except Cyprus and those which were actually in the occupation of Italy, passed without resistance into Greek hands. But Greece looked beyond the Ægean to the Adriatic. On December 3 the Greek fleet shelled Valona, where its appearance caused grave concern both to Italy and to Austria-Hungary. Both Powers firmly intimated to Greece that though she might bombard Valona, she would not be permitted to retain it as a naval base.

The Adriatic coast

Austria-Hungary had already made similar representations to Serbia in respect to the northern Albanian ports. Russia, on the other hand, favoured the cession of an Adriatic port to Serbia, and was supported by England and France, while Germany did all in its power to restrain the war-like ardour of Austria-Hungary. The reinstatement of Conrad von Hötzendorf at the head of the General Staff was, however, an ominous sign that the war party was again predominant in Vienna. Meanwhile the military situation of the Turks was desperate, and when the armistice was concluded on December 3, the Turks remained in possession only of Constantinople, Adrianople, Janina, and the Albanian Scutari. Outside the walls of those four cities they no longer held a foot of ground in Europe.

The London Conferences, Dec. 1912-Jan. 1913

The centre of interest was now transferred from the Balkans to London, where, by general admission, Sir Edward Grey was assiduously working to restore peace in the Balkans, and to maintain it in Europe. By January 22, 1913, Turkey had agreed to accept as the boundary between herself and Bulgaria a line drawn from Midia on the Black Sea to Enos at the mouth of the Maritza on the Ægean, thus surrendering Adrianople. On the following day the Young Turks effected a *coup d'état* which brought the London negotiations to an abrupt conclusion, and on February 1 the Conference broke

up. The armistice had already been denounced by the allies (January 29), and on February 4 the Bulgarians resumed the attack upon Adrianople. Not, however, until March 26 did the great fortress fall, and the Bulgarians had to share the credit of taking it with the Serbians. Meanwhile the Greeks had won a brilliant and resounding victory. On March 6 the great fortress of Janina, the lair of the "Lion," and hitherto deemed impregnable, fell to their assault; the Turkish garrison, 33,000 strong, became prisoners of war, and 200 guns were taken by the victors.

Enver's
coup d'état,
Jan. 23
Resumption
of war

Adrianople and Janina gone, there remained to the Turks, outside the walls of Constantinople, nothing but Scutari in Albania.

Scutari was clearly the key of the diplomatic situation. Montenegro was determined to take Scutari, whatever the decision of the European Powers. The latter had, indeed, decided, as far back as December 1912, that Scutari must remain in the hands of Albania. An autonomous Albania was an essential feature of Aerenthal's Balkan policy, and upon this point Austria-Hungary was supported by Italy and Russia.

Nothing which concerned the future position of Austria-Hungary on the Adriatic could be a matter of indifference to Berlin.

Hardly had the Balkan League entered upon the path of victory, when Serbia received a solemn warning from Berlin that she would not be permitted to retain any ports upon the Adriatic. This was a cruel blow to her national ambitions; but it was something more. It was a diplomatic move of Machiavellian subtlety and skill. If Serbia could be effectually headed off from the Adriatic; if the eastern boundaries of an autonomous Albania could be drawn on sufficiently generous lines, Serbia would not only be deprived of some of the accessions contemplated in her partition treaty with Bulgaria (March 1912), but would be compelled to seek access to the sea on the shores of the Ægean instead of the Adriatic. A conflict of interests between Serbia and Bulgaria would almost certainly ensue in Macedonia; conflict between Serbia and Greece was not improbable. Thus would the solidarity of the Balkan League, by far the most formidable obstacle which had ever intervened between *Mittel-Europa* and the Mediterranean, be effectively broken.

Germany
and the
Balkan
League

To return to Scutari. With or without the leave of the Powers, Montenegro was determined to have it. On February 6, 1912, she attacked the town. The Powers, however, insisted that the town should be surrendered to them. King Peter of Montenegro was compelled to yield, and Scutari was taken over by an international force landed from the warships which had been blockading the Montenegrin coast.

Treaty of
London,
May 30,
1913

A few days before the fall of Scutari an armistice was concluded between Turkey and the Balkan League, and the next day (April 21) the League agreed to accept unconditionally the mediation of the Powers, but reserved the right to discuss with the Powers the questions as to the frontiers of Thrace and Albania, and the future of the *Ægean* islands. Negotiations were accordingly reopened in London on May 20, and on the 30th the Treaty of London was signed. Everything beyond the Enos-Midia line and the island of Crete was ceded by the Porte to the Balkan allies, while the questions of Albania and of the islands were left in the hands of the Powers.

The European Concert congratulated itself upon a remarkable achievement : the problem which for centuries had confronted Europe had been solved ; the clouds which had threatened the peace of Europe had been dissipated ; the end of the Ottoman Empire, long foreseen and long dreaded as the certain prelude to Armageddon, had come, and come in the best possible way ; young nations of high promise had been brought to the birth ; the older nations were united, as never before, in bonds of amity and mutual good-will. Such was the jubilant tone of contemporary criticism.

The victors
and the
spoils

Yet in the midst of jubilation, notes of warning and of alarm were not wanting. Nor were they, unfortunately, without justification. Already ominous signs of profound disagreement between the victors as to the disposal of the spoils were apparent. As to that, nothing whatever had been said in the Treaty of London. Whether the temper which already prevailed at Sofia, Belgrade, and Athens would have permitted interference is very doubtful : the Treaty of London did not attempt it. In effect the belauded treaty had done nothing but affix the common seal of Europe to a deed for the winding-up of the affairs of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. How the assets were to be distributed among the

creditors did not concern the official receivers. Yet here lay the real crux of the situation.

The problem was, in fact, intensified by the sudden collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the unexpected success achieved by each of the allies. The Balkan League might have held together if it had been compelled to fight rather harder for its victory. Greece and Serbia, in particular, were intoxicated by a success far greater than they could have dared to anticipate. Bulgaria's success had been not less emphatic; but it had been achieved at greater cost, and in the wrong direction. The Bulgarians were undisputed masters of Thrace; but it was not for Thrace they had gone to war. The Greeks were in Salonika; the Serbs, in Uskub and Monastir. For the victorious but war-worn Bulgarians the situation was, therefore, peculiarly exasperating.

Bulgaria's exasperation was Germany's opportunity. To fan the fires of Bulgarian jealousy against her allies was not difficult, but Germany spared no effort in the performance of this sinister task. The immediate sequel will demonstrate the measure of her success. Bulgaria and Greece had appointed a joint commission to delimit their frontiers in Macedonia on April 7; it broke up without reaching an agreement on May 9. Roumania, too, was tugging at Bulgaria in regard to a rectification of the frontiers of the Dobrudja. On May 7 an Agreement was signed by which Bulgaria assented to the cession of Silistria and its fortifications, together with a strip of the Dobrudja. Notwithstanding this Agreement a Military Convention was concluded between Serbia, Greece, and Roumania, and on May 28 Serbia demanded that the Treaty of Partition concluded between herself and Bulgaria in March 1912 should be so amended as to compensate her for the loss of territory due to the formation of an autonomous Albania. The demand was not in itself unreasonable. It was impossible to deny that the formation of an autonomous Albania had profoundly modified the situation, and had modified it to the detriment of Serbia in a way which had not been foreseen by either party to the treaty of March 1912. On the other hand, the demand was peculiarly irritating to Bulgaria, who found herself bowed out of Macedonia by Greece.

The situation was highly critical when, on June 8, the Czar of Russia offered his services as arbitrator. Taking

To Dissensions
among the
Allies

Interven-
tion of the
Czar
Nicholas

advantage of the position assigned to and accepted by him in the treaty of March 1912, the Czar appealed to the Kings of Serbia and Bulgaria not to "dim the glory they had earned in common" by a fratricidal war, but to turn to Russia for the settlement of their differences; and, at the same time, he solemnly warned them that "the State which begins war would be held responsible before the Slav cause," and he reserved to himself "all liberty as to the attitude which Russia will adopt in regard to the results of such a criminal struggle."

Serbia accepted the Czar's offer; but Bulgaria, though not actually declining it, made various conditions; attributed all the blame for the dispute to Serbia, and reminded the Czar that Russia had long ago acknowledged the right of Bulgaria to protect the Bulgarians of Macedonia.

The War
of Partition

Events were plainly hurrying to a catastrophe. Greece had made up its mind to fight Bulgaria, if necessary, for Salonika; Serbia demanded access to the Ægean. "Bulgaria is washed by two seas and grudges Serbia a single port." So ran the order of the day issued at Belgrade on July 1. Meanwhile, on June 2, Greece and Serbia concluded an offensive and defensive alliance against Bulgaria for ten years. Serbia was to be allowed to retain Monastir. The Greeks did not like the surrender of a town which they regarded (as did the Bulgarians) as their own in reversion, but Venizelos persuaded them to the sacrifice, on the ground that unless they made it they might lose Salonika. Bulgaria, in order to detach Greece from Serbia, offered her the guarantee of Salonika, but M. Venizelos had already given his word to Serbia, and he was not prepared to break it.

On the night of June 29 the rupture occurred. Acting, according to M. Gueshoff,¹ on an order from headquarters, the Bulgarians attacked their Serbian allies; the War of Partition had begun.

It lasted only a month; but the record of that month is full both of horror and of interest. The Serbs and Greeks, attacking in turn with great ferocity, drove the Bulgarians before them. In the course of their retreat the Bulgarians inflicted hideous cruelties upon the Greek population of Macedonia; the Greeks, in their advance, retaliated in kind. But the Bulgarians had not only to face Serbs and Greeks.

¹ Gueshoff: *The Balkan League*, p. 92.

On July 9 Roumania intervened, seized Silistria, and marched on Sofia. Bulgaria could offer no resistance and wisely bowed to the inevitable. Three days later (July 12) the Turks came in, recaptured Adrianople (July 20), and marched towards Tirnovo. Bulgaria had the effrontery to appeal to the Powers against the infraction of the Treaty of London; King Carol of Roumania urged his allies to stay their hands; on July 31 an armistice was concluded, and on August 10 peace was signed at Bucharest.

Bulgaria, the aggressor, was beaten to the earth and could not hope for mercy. By the Treaty of Bucharest she lost to Roumania a large strip of the Dobrudja, including the important fortress of Silistria; she lost also the greater part of Macedonia which she would almost certainly have received under the Czar's award, and had to content herself with a narrow strip giving access to the Ægean at the inferior port of Dedeagatch. Serbia obtained central Macedonia, including Ochrida and Monastir, Kossovo, and the eastern half of Novi-Bazar; the western half going to Montenegro. Greece obtained Epirus, southern Macedonia, Salonika, and the seaboard as far east as the Mesta, thus including Kavala.

Treaty of
Bucharest,
Aug. 10,
1913

But the cup of Bulgaria's humiliation was not yet full. She had still to settle with the Porte, and peace was not actually signed between them until September 29. The quarrel between the allies put the Ottoman Empire on its feet again. The Turks were indeed restricted to the Enos-Midia line, but lines do not always run straight even in Thrace, and the new line was so drawn as to leave the Ottoman Empire in possession of Adrianople, Demotica, and Kirk Kilisse. Having been compelled to surrender a large part of Macedonia to her allies, Bulgaria now lost Thrace as well. Even the control of the railway leading to her poor acquisition on the Ægean was denied to her.¹ The terms dictated by the Porte were hard, and Bulgaria made an attempt by an appeal to the Powers to evade payment of the bill she had run up. The attempt though natural was futile. The Powers did go so far as to present a joint note to the Porte, urging the fulfilment of the Treaty of London, but the Sultan was well aware that the Powers would never employ force to

Bulgaria
and Turkey

¹ Gibbons : *New Map of Europe*, p. 325.

compel Turkey to satisfy a defeated and discredited Bulgaria, and the joint note was ignored.

Results
of the
Balkan Wars

The results of the two Balkan Wars may now be briefly summarized.

In territory and population Turkey was the only loser. Before the war her European population was estimated to be 6,130,200, and her area 65,350 square miles. Of population she lost 4,239,200, and she was left with only 10,882 square miles of territory. Greece was the largest gainer, increasing her population from 2,666,000 to 4,363,000 and her area from 25,014 square miles to 41,933. Serbia increased her population from just under three millions to four and a half, and nearly doubled her territory, increasing it from 18,650 square miles to 33,891. Roumania added 286,000 to a population which was and is the largest in the Balkans, now amounting to about seven and a half millions, and gained 2687 square miles of territory, entirely, of course, at the expense of Bulgaria. The net gains of Bulgaria were only 125,490 in population and 9663 square miles; while Montenegro raised her population from 250,000 to 480,000 and her area from 3474 to 5603 square miles.¹

The significance of the changes effected in the map of "Turkey in Europe" cannot, however, be measured solely by statistics.

Greece

The settlement effected in the Treaty of Bucharest was neither satisfactory nor complete. Of the recent belligerents Greece had most cause for satisfaction. To the north-east her territorial gains were not only enormous in extent, but of the highest commercial and strategic importance. The acquisition of Salonika was in itself a veritable triumph for the Greek cause, and Greece would have been well advised to be content with it. The insistence upon Kavala, whatever her ethnographic claims may have been, is now recognized as a political blunder. On the north-west Greece acquired the greater part of Epirus, including the great fortress of Janina, but she was still unsatisfied. For many months she continued to urge her claims to portions of southern Albania, assigned by the Powers to the new autonomous State. But to press them would have brought Greece into conflict with Italy. "Italy," said the Marquis di San Giuliano, "will

¹ Robertson and Bartholomew: *Historical Atlas*, p. 24.

even go to the length of war to prevent Greece occupying Valona; on this point her decision is irrevocable.”¹ On that side Greece, therefore, remained unsatisfied. There remained the question of the islands. Crete was definitely assigned to Greece, and on December 14, 1913, it was formally taken over by King Constantine, accompanied by the Crown Prince and the Prime Minister, M. Venizelos. Thus was one long chapter closed. The question as to the rest of the islands was reserved to the Powers, who ultimately awarded to Greece all the islands of which the Porte could dispose, except Imbros and Tenedos, which were regarded as essential for the safeguarding of the entrance to the Dardanelles, and were, therefore, left to Turkey. The Sporades, including Rhodes, remained in the occupation of Italy. Greece, therefore, had reason for profound satisfaction. Not that even for her the settlement was complete. Some 300,000 Greeks still remained under Bulgarian rule in Thrace and eastern Macedonia, while in the Ottoman Empire—mainly, of course, in Asia—Greece still claimed some 3,000,000 “unredeemed” co-nationals. But no settlement could achieve ethnographic completeness, least of all one which was concerned with the Balkans, and Greece had little cause to quarrel with that of 1913.

Nor had Roumania. In proportion to her sacrifices her Roumania gains were considerable, but for the satisfaction of her larger claims the Balkan Wars afforded no opportunity. The “unredeemed” Roumanians were the subjects either of Austria-Hungary or of Russia. Transylvania, the Bukovina, and Bessarabia were the provinces to which Roumania laid claim.

Bulgaria's position in 1913 was less favourable; but her Bulgaria misfortunes were largely of her own making, not the less so if her shrewd German King was pushed on to the destruction of his country by subtle suggestions from Vienna and Berlin. When the Treaty of London was signed in May, fate seemed to hold for Bulgaria the promise of a brilliant future. Despite the secular hostility of the Greeks and the rivalry of the Latins, Bulgaria was then first favourite for the hegemony of the Balkans. The Bulgarians lacked some of the cultural qualifications of their neighbours; they were the latest comers into Balkan society, but they had given proof of a virile and progressive temper, and were advancing rapidly in the arts

¹ Kerofilas : *Venizelos*, p. 155.

both of peace and war. Then suddenly they flung away in a short month the great position secured to them by the patient labours of a generation. As it was, they got an area relatively circumscribed, with a wretched coast-line bounded by the Mesta, and in Dedeagatch a miserable apology for an Ægean port; above all, they lost the coveted districts of Ochrida and Monastir. The impartial judgment of history will probably incline to the view that in defining so narrowly the share of Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia alike showed short-sightedness and parsimony. Bulgaria ought at least to have been allowed a wider outlet on the Ægean littoral, with Kavala as a port. Nothing less could reconcile Bulgaria to the retention of Salonika by Greece.

Serbia

Serbia, too, showed herself lacking in prudent generosity. The gains of Serbia were, as we have seen, very considerable. The division of Novi-Bazar between herself and Montenegro brought her into immediate contact with the Southern Slavs of the Black Mountains, while the acquisition of Old Serbia and central Macedonia carried her territory southwards towards the Ægean. But Serbia's crucial problem was not solved. She was still a land-locked country; deprived by the subtle diplomacy of the German Powers of her natural access to the Ægean, and pushed by them into immediate conflict with the Bulgarians, perhaps into ultimate conflict with Greece. Disappointed of her dearest ambition, flushed with victory, duped by interested advice, Serbia can hardly be blamed for having inflicted humiliation upon Bulgaria, and for having yielded to the temptation of unexpected territorial acquisitions.

Montenegro

Montenegro shared both the success and the disappointment of her kinsmen, now for the first time her neighbours. King Nicholas's disappointment at being deprived of Scutari was acute, and was hardly compensated by the acquisition of the western half of Novi-Bazar. His position as regards seaboard was less desperate than that of Serbia, but he too had an account to settle with the European Concert.

The
Powers
and
Albania

The Powers were determined to secure autonomy to Albania. Such a solution offered obvious advantages. It might stifle the incipient pretensions of Italy and Austria-Hungary; it might arrest the inconvenient claims of Greece upon "northern Epirus"; it might interpose a powerful

barrier between the Southern Slavs and the Adriatic; it might, above all, repair the havoc which the formation of the Balkan alliance had wrought in German plans in regard to the Near East. Nor was it the least of its advantages that it could be commended, without excessive explanation of details, by democratic Ministers to the progressive democracies of Western Europe.

Of the conditions which really prevailed in Albania little was or is accurately known. But the decree issued that it should be autonomous, and on November 23 a German Prince, a Russian soldier, a nephew of the Queen of Roumania, Prince William of Wied, was selected for the difficult task of ruling over the wild highlanders of Albania. On March 7, 1914, he arrived at Durazzo, but the intrigues of more than one interested Power rendered his position from the first impossible. The Prince and his family were compelled to take refuge temporarily on an Italian warship on May 24, and in September they left the country. When the European War broke out no central authority existed in Albania. The Greeks took possession of southern Albania or northern Epirus; the Italians promptly occupied Valona. For the rest, there were as many rulers in Albania as there are tribes.

For the conclusion of peace at Bucharest one Power in *Mittel-Europa* and the Peace of Bucharest took special credit to itself. No sooner was it signed than the Emperor William telegraphed to his cousin, King Carol of Roumania, his hearty congratulations upon the successful issue of his "wise and truly statesmanlike policy." "I rejoice," he added, "at our mutual co-operation in the cause of peace." Shortly afterwards King Constantine of Greece received at Potsdam, from the Emperor's own hands, the baton of a Field-Marshal in the Prussian army.

If the Kaiser had been active in the cause of peace, his august ally at Vienna had done his utmost to enlarge the area of war. On August 9, 1913, the day before the signature of peace at Bucharest, Austria-Hungary communicated to Italy and to Germany "her intention of taking action against Serbia, and defined such action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the *casus fœderis* of the Triple Alliance." Italy, however, as we have seen, refused to recognize the proposed aggression of Austria-Hungary against Serbia as a *casus*

fœderis. Germany also exercised a restraining influence upon her ally, and the attack was consequently postponed ; but only for eleven months. Germany was not quite ready : on November 22, however, M. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador at Berlin, reported that the German Emperor had ceased to be "the champion of peace against the warlike tendencies of certain parties in Germany, and had come to think that war with France was inevitable."

Meanwhile the eyes of the German Powers, and more particularly of Austria-Hungary, were fixed not upon the west but upon the south-east.

*Serbia
Delenda*

Serbia had committed two unpardonable crimes : she had strengthened the barrier between Austria-Hungary and Salonika ; and she had enormously enhanced her own prestige as the representative of Jugo-Slav aspirations. Serbia, therefore, must be annihilated.

But Serbia did not stand alone. By her side were Greece and Roumania. The association of these three Balkan States appeared to be peculiarly menacing to the Hapsburg Empire. Greece, firmly planted in Salonika, was a fatal obstacle to the hopes so long cherished by Austria. The prestige acquired by Serbia undoubtedly tended to create unrest among the Slavonic peoples still subject to the Dual Monarchy. And if Jugo-Slav enthusiasm threatened the integrity of the Dual Monarchy upon one side, the ambitions of a Greater Roumania threatened it upon another. The visit of the Czar Nicholas to Constanza in the spring of 1914 was interpreted in Vienna as a recognition of this fact, and as an indication of a *rapprochement* between Petersburg and Bucharest.

*The
German
Powers
and the
Ottoman
Empire*

If, therefore, the menace presented to "Central Europe" by the first Balkan League had been effectually dissipated, the menace of a second Balkan League remained. One crumb of consolation the second war had, indeed, brought to the German Powers : the vitality and power of recuperation manifested by the Ottoman Turk. So long as the Turks remained in Constantinople there was no reason for despair. The key to German policy was still to be found upon the shores of the Bosphorus.

Constantinople and Salonika were then the dual objectives of Austro-German ambition. Across the path of the Central

Empires lay Belgrade. The Power which held Belgrade must be crushed. In order to displace the "guardians of the Gate" Europe was to be involved in the greatest war in history.

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 And see chapters xxi and xxii.

CHAPTER XXV

THE BRITISH EMPIRE (1815-1920)

DEMOCRACY AND FEDERALISM

AS we stand on the brink of the cataclysm which brings this period of history to a close, the opportunity may be taken to repair an omission.

No survey of world-politics in the nineteenth century could be regarded as even approximately complete, if it left altogether out of account the expansion of the British Empire in every quarter of the globe. It happens, moreover, that the British Empire affords the most striking illustration of the two principles which, in the sphere of Government, are especially distinctive of the period under review. Nowhere else is it possible to follow so clearly the evolution of the principle of Representative Democracy, or to exhibit the different forms which Federalism has assumed in the modern world.

The
Second
Colonial
Empire



The secession of the American Colonies, regretfully recognized by Great Britain in 1783, had shattered the first colonial Empire. Newfoundland, which, in virtue of Cabot's discovery and Gilbert's "occupation" (1583), claims pride of place as the oldest British Colony, remained, indeed, in our possession; as did the colonies which now form the "Maritime Provinces" of the Dominion of Canada. We retained also the Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, and other West Indian islands. Thanks to the genius and energy of Warren Hastings, the East India Company succeeded in maintaining its position in India, but only after a severe struggle with the great Hindu Confederacy of the Marathas, and with Hyder Ali, the Sultan of Mysore, who, like the American colonists, received all possible help and encouragement from the French. But of the great self-governing Empire of to-day we possessed, after 1783, only Newfoundland and the Maritime Colonies. Canada

was an English possession, but had not yet become an English Colony.

The loss of the thirteen colonies, the nucleus of the United States of North America, hurtful as it was to our pride and prestige, was not without compensating advantages. Had those colonies been retained under the British Crown, British Canada might not, for many a year, have come into existence ; Australia might have remained a derelict discovery. But the secession of the "States," and the vindictive treatment accorded to those who had remained loyal to the British Crown, drove thousands of families across the borders into Canada. These "United Empire Loyalists" laid the foundations of British Canada. About 28,000 migrants found homes in Nova Scotia, mainly in districts in the fertile valley of the St. John, which in 1784 became the separate colony of New Brunswick, with its own representative Legislature. About as many more settled on the northern shores of the great lakes and particularly on the rich Niagara peninsula. The total migration is estimated at about 60,000. Each family received 200 acres of land, and grants amounting to over £3,000,000 were made by the British Government to furnish them with immediate necessities, seed, and tools. In 1789 they were officially granted the title of United Empire Loyalists for themselves and their descendants, and among the Canadians of to-day there are none who bear prouder titles. The Loyalists were reinforced by considerable numbers of emigrants from Great Britain, and thus, within a few years, British Colonies were superadded to the French in what became officially known as British North America.¹ Sierra Leone, on the west coast of Africa, also owed its origin, as we shall see, to United Empire Loyalists, but they were of a different colour and race from those who settled in New Brunswick and Ontario. It cannot be denied that the development of a British Settlement in Upper Canada gave rise to grave problems of government, but a consideration of them must be postponed.

Meanwhile, owing to the secession of the Carolinas, the British Government was confronted with the problem of finding a new location for transported criminals. Captain Cook had lately (1769-70) explored the great island-continent

¹ George Bryce : *The Canadian People*.



of the Southern Seas and claimed it in the name of King George, and in 1787 it was decided to utilize part of "New South Wales" as a convict settlement. Captain Arthur Phillip was accordingly sent out in command of a shipload of convicts, and in 1788 laid on Botany Bay the foundations of a hut village, which has since expanded into the great city of Sydney. Van Diemen's Land (subsequently rechristened Tasmania) was occupied as an auxiliary penal station in 1803, but became a separate colony in 1825. The beginnings of a colony in Western Australia were made by the Swan River Company in 1829; a settlement in South Australia was effected (1835-7) by a chartered company, which had been formed to make a practical experiment in a system of colonization propounded by Edward Gibbon Wakefield;¹ Victoria, originally part of New South Wales, became a separate colony in 1851; Queensland was similarly separated from the parent colony of New South Wales in 1859. New Zealand was formally annexed by the Governor of New South Wales in 1839, and became an independent colony in 1841.

British
Dominion
in India

Even an outline of the growth of the British Dominion in India would be impossible in the present sketch, nor would it be appropriate. Yet to omit all reference to it would be unthinkable, for, as de Tocqueville pointed out many years ago, "there never has been anything so extraordinary under the sun as the conquest and still more the government of India by the English; nothing which from all points of the globe so much attracts the eyes of mankind to that little island whose very name was to the Greeks unknown." A recent German critic is hardly behind the French philosopher in admiration for England's achievement in India, though his admiration is, indeed, more reluctant, and he characteristically sees in India "the great central barracks of (the British) Empire," and the great political training ground for English administrators and for the English people as a whole.²

The eighteenth century saw an English Trading Company, insensibly but inevitably developing into a political ruler, established at Bombay, and on the eastern coast of Hindustan from the Ganges to Cape Comorin. In India, as in North

¹ First propounded in *A Letter from Sydney* (1829); elaborated in *Art of Colonization*, 2 vols., 1849.

² *England*, by Dr. Wilhelm Dibelius, p. 58.

America, the Seven Years' War (1756-63) marked the crisis of the contest for supremacy between England and France, and thanks to Clive and Coote, the contest in India ended decisively in favour of England. Victorious over the French, the English Company was irresistibly drawn into the turbid sea of Indian politics. The break-up of the Mogul Empire had left vacant the paramountcy of India. But that is a position which can never remain vacant for long. In the eighteenth century it had to be filled either by one of the great native princes, or by the Maratha Confederacy, or by the English Company. The first round in the contest was decided by Clive's great victory at Plassey (1757).

That victory established English power in Bengal. The contest between the Company and the Maratha Confederacy lasted for nearly forty years (1779-1818); that between the Company and Hyder Ali and Tipu, successively Rajahs of the great principality of Mysore, lasted for nearly twenty years (1780-1801). Thanks to Warren Hastings, the brothers Wellesley and the Marquess of Hastings, both were ultimately decided in our favour.

On the foundations laid by these illustrious statesmen and soldiers, the British Dominion in India was in the nineteenth century built up. The Mutiny of 1858 brought the rule of the East India Company to an end, and British India passed under the direct rule of the Queen, who, in 1877, assumed the appropriate title of Empress of India. About one-third of the area of India still, however, remains under the rule of native princes and chiefs, all of whom have accepted the suzerainty of the British Crown, and have repeatedly proved their loyalty to the British Empire.

India never has been and never can be a British "Colony," a field for the expansion of the British race, in the same sense as the Great Dominions, nor is it, as yet, in a constitutional sense a self-governing Dominion. But throughout the nineteenth century, and more particularly in the last half-century, it exercised a profound influence upon English, and indeed upon world-politics. The outposts, naval and coaling stations (presently to be enumerated) have been established primarily with the object of maintaining our oceanic connection with India, though they have come to serve the not less important purpose of connecting Great Britain with her Pacific

Dominions and with the Far East. Not until India began to exercise an influence over English policy did we manifest any interest in the affairs of south-eastern Europe, of the Levant and Egypt. It was India also that took us, as it had previously taken the Dutch, to South Africa.

Ceylon

With the story of the acquisition of South Africa we have already dealt, but it is noteworthy that two other outposts of Colonial Empire also passed into our hands during the Napoleonic Wars. Ceylon, which like Cape Colony was a dependency of the Dutch East India Company, surrendered to an enterprising Scottish Professor from St. Andrews, Dr. Hugh Cleghorn, in 1796, and was retained at the Peace of 1814.¹ Java, which the French had captured from the Dutch, was also acquired (1812) but was handed back to the Dutch at the conclusion of the war. The Mauritius, the principal connecting link between France and the Far East, was also conquered by Great Britain (1810), and was retained at the Peace.

Malaya

The British position in the Far East was further strengthened by the acquisition of the island of Singapore. Practically uninhabited at the time, but destined to be of immense commercial and strategical importance, Singapore was acquired from the Sultan of Johore by the sagacity and foresight of one of England's great adventurers—Sir Stamford Raffles (1819). Raffles had also been mainly responsible for the acquisition of Java, had temporarily administered it, and given it up at the Peace with great reluctance. In Singapore he sought compensation for the abandonment of Java, and fully was his foresight justified. Malacca was obtained from the Dutch in 1824 in exchange for Sumatra, and the whole peninsula passed under British control. In 1837 Singapore became the administrative centre for the "Straits Settlements," as they were officially named,—Singapore, Malacca, and Penang. By subsequent treaties the native rulers accepted British Residents as "advisers," and by a treaty concluded in 1909 Siam transferred to Great Britain all rights of suzerainty, protection, administration, and control of the four north Malay States : Kedah, Perlis, Trengganu, and Kelantan. Thus, as the late Parliamentary Under-Secretary

¹ For details of this romantic enterprise, see *The Cleghorn Papers* (Black, 1927).

of State for the Colonies writes : " The Malays remain the subjects of the Mohammedan monarchies which they themselves established. Malay custom is not interfered with and the Malays play a large part in the government of their States ; but . . . they have the assistance of a body of trained British Civil Servants to guide and assist the development and administration of their countries." ¹

Meanwhile, between 1874 and 1909, Perak, Selangor, Pahang, and a group of small States known as the Negri Sembilan (Nine States) were federated, and became a British Protectorate with the title of the Federated Malay States under a British High Commissioner, who is also Governor of the Straits Settlements. Johore, like the four non-federated northern States mentioned above, remains outside the Federation ; but in 1885 the Sultan placed the foreign relations of his State under British control ; a British adviser, to assist the Sultan in his internal administration, was appointed in 1910, and additional British officials in 1914. Johore is not technically a part of the British Empire.

Another important outpost of the Empire, Hong-Kong, Sarawak was acquired as the result of the Chinese War of 1841-2 ; Wei-Hai-Wei, ² as we have seen, in 1898 ; the island of Labuan, near Borneo, became a Crown Colony in 1847 ; but in Borneo itself the position was and remains almost Gilbertian. Sir James Brooke, an ex-officer of the Indian army, visited Sarawak in 1840, helped to suppress a rebellion then in progress, and was appointed Governor of the country by the Sultan. He rooted out piracy along the coasts, and eventually became sovereign of Sarawak, a position which became hereditary in his family. ³ The British Government appointed him Governor of Labuan and Consul-General of Borneo, but his own principality of Sarawak he retained as an independent sovereignty. In 1888, however, the external relations of the country were placed under the control of the Foreign Office.

In 1881 the Crown granted a Charter to a British Company which had already begun to exercise sovereign rights in North

¹ Report on Malaya by the Right Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore, M.P., Cmd. 8235, p. 9.

² Retroceded 1930.

³ The present Rajah, third in descent from Rajah Brooke, is H.H. Sir Charles Vyner Brooke, G.C.M.G. He succeeded in 1917.

Borneo, and in 1888 the territory was formally recognized as a British Protectorate.

**The Pacific
Islands**

Borneo may be regarded as a half-way house between the Indian sphere, to which Malaya naturally belongs, and the Australian sphere in which lie the Pacific islands. In the 'eighties the Australian Colonies were, as we have seen, gravely perturbed by the activities of Germany and other European Powers in the Pacific, and endeavoured to excite similar apprehensions in the minds of the Home Government. But Downing Street was still dominated by the ghost of Cobden: the "Weary Titan" shrank from the assumption of fresh responsibilities, or, as Lord Derby more bluntly phrased it, "Great Britain had already black subjects enough." Had Australia been able to speak with the single voice of a Federal Government, it is unlikely that Germany would ever have been permitted to occupy any part of New Guinea, or other islands which Australia and New Zealand have long regarded as essential units in their strategical scheme. In 1883 Queensland actually hoisted the British flag in New Guinea, only to be ordered by Lord Derby to haul it down again, on the ground that apprehensions of a German occupation were ridiculous. In 1884, however, the German flag was hoisted over northern New Guinea and the adjacent Bismarck Archipelago. At last the Colonial Office was roused to the realities of the situation, and tardily assented to the annexation of the southern coast of New Guinea and certain islands adjacent thereto. Hardly, however, had the World War broken out in 1914, before the whole of the German possessions in the Pacific had fallen either to Australia and New Zealand, or to Japan. At the Peace Conference (1919) Australia made a great fight for the annexation of these islands to the British Empire; but her ambition was defeated by the rigid adherence to President Wilson's inconvenient formulas, and Australia was forced to accept the principle of the mandate, though in a form consistent not only with the national safety of the Australasian Dominions, but with their "economic, industrial, and general welfare." In plain English that meant the maintenance of a "white Australia"—even in the islands, and a preferential tariff. Japan acquiesced in these reservations only under protest, but all the islands south of the equator passed into British hands, under Mandate "C":

the Bismarck Archipelago, German New Guinea, and those of the Solomon Islands which had formerly belonged to Germany to Australia; German Samoa to New Zealand; Nauru to the British Empire.¹ The islands north of the equator passed, also under Mandate, to Japan.

Among other outposts which act as connecting links in the chain of the Oceanic Empire mention may be summarily made of Gibraltar (1713), Malta (1814), Cyprus (1878),² Aden (1837), Perim (1857), Sokotra (occupied by the East India Company in 1834 and formerly declared a British Protectorate in 1886), Zanzibar (1890), and Seychelles (1814). These, with the outposts already named, guard the two main routes between Great Britain and her Asiatic and Australasian possessions. The decreasingly important route by Cape Horn is guarded by the Falkland Islands (ceded to us in 1771), and more remotely by St. Helena (1673), which alone of English possessions is under the Admiralty, and Ascension (1815). The cutting of the Isthmus of Panama has evidently added immensely to the strategical importance of the West Indian islands, and in less degree of the Bermudas.

Of all the strategical points held by the British Empire the Cape of Good Hope is, with the possible exception of the Suez Canal, the most important. With the position of the English in South Africa, however, this narrative has already dealt. But long before Cape Colony passed under the Sovereignty of Great Britain, isolated points had been occupied on the west coast of Africa. Down to the time when the slave trade was abolished (1807), these points were valued chiefly as convenient centres for that nefarious traffic. Forts and factories were established on the Gold Coast, and at the mouth of the Gambia River, early in the reign of Charles II (1662-4), and shiploads of slaves were sent from there to the West Indies and the American Colonies. After the traffic in slaves was abolished, and before the new era of European expansion had opened in the later years of the nineteenth century, there were serious thoughts of abandoning these pestilential possessions. Gambia was, however, placed under the administration of Sierra Leone in 1821, and was not separated from it until in 1888 it became a Crown Colony

¹ For these Mandates, cf. Cmd. 1201, 1202, and 1203 (1921).

² Formally annexed 1914.

under an independent Government. It remains a mere islet in the vast ocean of French West Africa, but is a not unimportant depot for the export of ground nuts and palm kernels. Much more important from an economic point of view is the Gold Coast Colony, which has an external trade of some £26,000,000 a year, including exports which represent more than half the world's supply of cocoa. The forts and factories on the Gold Coast passed backwards and forwards between various trading companies and the Crown, but were finally taken over by the Crown in 1843. Later on, the British Government bought out the contiguous Dutch and Danish forts, and, owing to attacks by the inland kingdom of Ashanti, were compelled to establish Protectorates over that country and the Hinterland now known as the Northern Territories. But like Gambia, the Gold Coast Colony is surrounded, save as to its coast side, by French dominions.

Sierra
Leone

In striking contrast to the history of Gambia and the Gold Coast is the history of Sierra Leone, which was bought by the British Government in 1787 from a native chief, for the purpose of establishing a settlement for liberated negroes—primarily for those who had fought under the British flag in the American War of Secession. The strip of coast-land thus acquired not only gave us the finest harbour on the west coast of Africa, but provided a home for over one thousand negroes who had followed their masters to New Brunswick. Neither climatically, economically, socially or politically was New Brunswick suited to negroes, however touching their loyalty to the masters, or to the Empire they had served. A body of philanthropists suggested to the Government their repatriation to Africa, and so Sierra Leone with its capital of Freetown came into being. The black Empire Loyalists were presently reinforced by slaves who were rescued at sea, or had escaped from the West Indies and the United States, and after 1807 the philanthropic Company, to which in 1791 a charter of incorporation had been granted, transferred their rights to the Crown. Sierra Leone is now a Crown Colony with a partly elected Legislature, and exercises a Protectorate over the adjoining territory.

Nigeria

Of the British possessions in West Africa, the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria is much the largest and most important. Until the “scramble for Africa” began among the

European Powers, the swamps on the delta of the Niger offered no temptations to any Government, but the country was exploited by various traders, mainly for the sake of the palm-oil which its forests yielded in profusion. When the scramble began, a British Company, headed by Sir George Taubman Goldie, was successful in establishing its title to possession. A charter was granted to the Royal Niger Company in 1886, but fierce competition for possession of the Hinterland continued between the English and the French, until in 1898 their respective spheres were delimited. Two years later the political jurisdiction of the Royal Niger Company was transferred to the Crown, but the Company continued its activities as a commercial undertaking.

With the development of Nigeria, a territory about one-third of the size of British India, two names will be immemorially associated. That of Sir Ronald Ross who effected the conquest of the mosquito, and that of Sir Frederick (now Lord) Lugard, who has devoted some of the best years of a long life to the extirpation of slavery in tropical Africa. For some years he was engaged in that humanitarian work in East Africa, but from 1894 until the close of the World War he was (save for an interval of five years spent as Governor of Hong-Kong) employed in West Africa. In 1897 he raised the West African Frontier Force—a native army under British officers—and with their aid he did much to secure the native chiefs of the interior against the advances of France and Germany. By a series of Conventions between Great Britain and France (1890-9), the northern frontiers of Nigeria and the French sphere of influence were delimited, and Lugard and his West African Frontier Force were then compelled to undertake the effective occupation of the Moslem Emirates (1902-3). The native chiefs were, as far as possible, confirmed in their authority over their tribesmen, but they had to accept British Residents, to put a stop to slave raiding, to contribute to the expenses of administration, to maintain order, and to execute justice. When in 1907 Lugard left Africa to take up the Governorship of Hong-Kong, he could already point to great improvements in the economic and social condition of the people. He returned in 1912 as Governor of North and South Nigeria, and when in 1914 the two Protectorates were amalgamated, Lugard became

Governor-General of a united Nigeria, with its capital at Lagos, a former entrepôt of the slave trade, but acquired by the British Government in 1861, with a view of putting an end to that traffic.

The
German
Colonies in
West Africa

The partition of Africa brought the Germans (in Togoland) into contiguity with the Gold Coast Colony, while the German Cameroons marched with the eastern frontier of Nigeria. Within a month of the outbreak of the World War Togoland surrendered to a Franco-British force and at the Peace was divided between the conquerors. About one-third of the colony (some 12,500 square miles) bordering on the Gold Coast Colony was assigned (under Mandate) to Great Britain and the remainder to France. The Cameroons proved a harder nut to crack and did not surrender until February 1916. The Cameroons also was divided : an area of 33,000 square miles (out of 191,130), extending from the coast along the frontier of Nigeria up to Lake Chad, was assigned to Great Britain, the rest to France.

East Africa

Until the 'eighties Eastern Equatorial Africa came under the notice of Europe only through the devoted labours of explorers and missionaries. The Sultan of Zanzibar exercised jurisdiction over about 1000 miles of coast, nor were his claims over an ill-defined Hinterland questioned by Europeans. In the early 'eighties, however, the Powers began to occupy strategic points on or off the coast of East Africa. Great Britain, as we have seen, had long ago secured a station on the opposite shore at Aden (1837), and at Perim (1857). Sokotra, occupied by the British East India Company in 1834, was declared a British Protectorate in 1886. Eritrea, with a coast-line of some 700 miles along the Red Sea, passed into the keeping of Italy between 1882 and 1888, as did Italian Somaliland. By a series of treaties with the Somali Sultans, and Agreements with Great Britain and the rulers of Zanzibar and Abyssinia (1889-1905), Italy obtained this latter territory, and, in 1925, Great Britain transferred to it a portion of Kenya Colony, known as Jubaland, with the port of Kismayu. British Somaliland, opposite Aden, was declared a British Protectorate in 1884, and its limits were defined by treaties with France (1888), Italy (1894), and Abyssinia (1897). The town and territory of Obock, on the Red Sea, opposite Aden, were purchased by a Frenchman in 1857, but only in 1883 did France

take formal possession of the patch of territory now known as French Somaliland. A French Protectorate over Madagascar was recognized by the British Government in 1890, but not until 1896-9 was that large island with its dependencies brought into submission to the French Government.

Meanwhile, as we have already seen, the Germans had ^{German Africa} established themselves not only on the west coast (Togoland and the Cameroons), but on Walfisch Bay (German South-West Africa) and also in the territory now known as Tanganyika. So far as there was any "Sovereignty" in these regions it belonged to the Sultan of Zanzibar, whose independence was formally recognized by the British and French Governments in 1862. In 1878 the Sultan offered to lease all his territories on the mainland, for seventy years, to Sir William Mackinnon, Chairman of the British India Steam Navigation Company, well known not only as a keen and successful man of business, but as a great philanthropist and Imperialist. The territory comprised nearly 600,000 square miles, and included the Lakes Victoria Nyanza, Tanganyika, and Nyassa. The British Government refused to sanction this large addition to the Empire; but in 1885 the German Empire put in a claim to a considerable slice of this territory, and the claim was conceded by the Sultan of Zanzibar. The German and British spheres were delimited under a series of Agreements (1886-90), and in 1887, within a few months of each other, the German Africa Company and the British East Africa Association were ^{British East Africa} formed. The latter, under the chairmanship of Mackinnon, received a Charter in the following year, and in 1890 Zanzibar was taken under British protection. In 1895 the Govern- ^{Kenya}ment bought out the territorial rights of the company, and put the administration of the new East Africa Protectorate under the Foreign Office. Between 1896 and 1903 a railway was constructed between the important harbour of Mombasa and Lake Victoria Nyanza. White settlers followed in the track of the railway, but a good deal of friction ensued between them, the natives, and the Home Government, who were anxious to deal fairly with both parties. In 1905 the control of the Protectorate was transferred to the Colonial Office, and in 1920 it became a Crown Colony with the new title of Kenya. In addition to the Crown Colony proper there is a strip of coast, leased from the Sultan of Zanzibar, known as the Kenya Protectorate.

Tanganyika
territory

At the same time German East Africa which, after a strenuous campaign, fell to the British Empire in the World War, was renamed Tanganyika Territory. By the Peace Treaty it was handed over under Mandate to Great Britain, and is now administered, virtually as a Crown Colony, though under certain responsibilities to the League of Nations, as a Mandated Territory.

Uganda

North of Tanganyika, bounded on the west by the Belgian Congo, and on the east by Kenya Colony, lies the Protectorate of Uganda. This country was first revealed to Europeans by Stanley and the missionaries in the 'seventies, and after the acquisition of German East Africa, Germany threatened to absorb Uganda also, and thus to obtain control of the Nile's sources, so vital to Egypt and the Soudan. The Anglo-German Treaty of 1890, however, assigned Uganda to Great Britain, and the Imperial British East Africa Company having secured the services of Captain (now Lord) Lugard sent him to Uganda to administer the territory. With most inadequate resources Lugard asserted British claims, but the Home Government was impatient, and but for the urgent representations of Bishop Tucker and Lugard himself, would have abandoned the territory. In default, the Government consented to send out Sir Gerard Portal to report on the situation. Portal reported strongly in favour of retention, and in 1894 Uganda was declared a British Protectorate.

Thus, as Lugard writes, "the continuous control of the Nile from its sources in the Great Victoria and Albert Lakes was secured to the Empire."¹ In 1903 East Uganda was annexed to the East Africa Protectorate—now Kenya Colony—and three years later the control of the Uganda Protectorate was transferred from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office. The completion of the Mombasa-Uganda Railway (1923) has opened up the territory, but the Uganda Protectorate will never be a white man's country, as part of Kenya Colony well may be.

Measurable
results

A few statistics, hitherto studiously avoided, may serve to summarize the broad results of European intervention in Africa during the last half-century. Before the scramble initiated in 1884, Portugal, in respect of area, held the first place among European Powers in Africa. Nominally its

¹ *Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa*, p. 21.

sovereignty extended over 700,000 square miles, though only hardly one-twentieth of this vast area was under effective control. To-day Portugal holds fourth place with 788,000 square miles. France now holds the first place with 4,200,000 square miles, but much of this is desert. Great Britain is not far behind in area with 3,984,000 square miles, and from the point of view of strategy and commerce, holds a position incomparably more advantageous than that of any other Power. The Congo with an area of 909,654 square miles gives Belgium the third place. Italy, with an area of 680,000 square miles, now holds the fifth place among the European Powers. Before 1884, as we have seen, Germany did not possess a single subject in Africa; but in less than two years she had attained the position of the third European Power with an area of 910,000 square miles. By her own rash act she has forfeited this great inheritance, and no longer holds a foot of territory on the dark Continent.

The problems confronting the British Empire in Tropical Africa are many and stubborn. They have, in the last few years, been brought prominently under notice by the official Reports of the Right Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore, M.P., and Sir E. Hilton Young, M.P., and by the works, among others, of Lord and Lady Lugard, but a discussion of them lies outside the scope of this book. Southern Rhodesia was in 1923 taken over from the British South Africa Company, and advanced to the status of a self-governing Colony with a "responsible" Executive. In the following year Northern Rhodesia was taken over as a Crown Colony. Thus from Cape Town to the Upper Nile there is now a solid block of British territory with a continuous coast-line from Walfisch Bay to Mombasa, broken only by Portuguese territory in Mozambique. This block affords a microcosm, in a constitutional sense, of the Overseas Empire; with its self-governing Dominions (the Union of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia), the Crown Colonies of Northern Rhodesia and Kenya, the Uganda and Basutoland Protectorates, not to mention two different types of "Mandated" territories in South-West Africa and Tanganyika. The constitutional destiny of the several parts of this vast territory may be uncertain, but meanwhile, the claims put forward on humanitarian grounds by Lord Lugard are, in respect of tropical

Africa, unquestionably justified: "We have," he writes, "added to the prosperity and wealth of these lands and checked famine and disease. We have put an end to the awful misery of the slave trade and inter-tribal war, to human sacrifice and the ordeals of the witch doctor."¹ Nor is this proud claim in any wise weakened by the fact that these tropical Dependencies are invaluable to the Empire, alike from an economic and a strategical point of view.

There is, however, another aspect of Imperial politics which demands attention.

The British Empire presents to-day every possible variety of governmental form, from military autocracy to full-fledged democracy, with many examples of the intermediate species. Highest in status are the self-governing Dominions: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, the Irish Free State, Newfoundland, and Southern Rhodesia, to which should be added (though it is not on exactly the same constitutional plane) Malta. Of these Dominions the first five are, like the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, individual members of the League of Nations: so also is India—though it has not yet attained Dominion status, and its representation in the Assembly is anomalous.

Crown
Colonies

The second class, Crown Colonies, comprises colonies of widely differing status. Some, like Bermuda, Barbados, and the Bahamas, possess a representative and elective Legislative Assembly, and differ from self-governing Dominions mainly by reason of the absence of a "responsible" Executive. In others, like Ceylon, there is an elective majority in the Assembly; in Jamaica and Trinidad the elected members constitute a minority; in British Honduras the Legislature is wholly nominated. Lowest of all among the Crown Colonies, in constitutional status, come military outposts like Gibraltar, where the Governor is supreme and irresponsible, both as regards legislation and administration.

Protector-
ates

Protectorates like Uganda and Bechuanaland are in a separate constitutional category, though the former has a Legislative Council (wholly nominated) and the latter has not. North Borneo alone survives to illustrate the method of government by a Chartered Company.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 610.

Finally, there are no fewer than three classes, A, B, and C, of territories held, under varying terms of mandate, from the League of Nations. ^{Mandated territories}

To trace the constitutional evolution of each Dominion would involve tedious repetition and is unnecessary. Canada in this respect showed the way to the rest of the Dominions. ^{The evolution of self-government}

From the time (1760) when Canada passed by conquest to Great Britain until 1774 it was under a military Governor, but in the latter year the *Règne militaire* gave place to Crown Colony administration. The *Quebec Act* (1774) set up a Legislative Council, consisting of members nominated by the Crown, with power to make ordinances though not to impose taxation. ^{Canada}

Thus far Canada (Quebec) was exclusively French in population, and even in the Maritime Provinces there was a large French element. The migration of the United Empire Loyalists, and the establishment of a British Colony in Upper Canada, created difficulties which were only partially solved by the enactment of the *Canada Constitutional Act* of 1791.

Under that *Act* Canada was divided into two colonies: Quebec, consisting almost entirely of French Roman Catholics; and Ontario, inhabited by British Protestants. In each colony there was to be a Governor, with an Executive Council responsible to himself, and a Legislature of two Houses: a Council of nominees, and an elected House of Representatives.

The Legislatures had, however, no control over the Executive, and a Representative Legislature without a Responsible Executive was, in Charles Buller's striking phrase, "like a fire without a chimney." Nor did this constitutional anomaly present the only difficulty. Both Canadas broke out into rebellion in 1837, and though the rebellion was ultimately suppressed, the Home Government thought it well to suspend the Constitution of 1791, and to send out Lord Durham as High Commissioner. ^{Responsible government}

From Lord Durham's famous *Report*, or rather from the acceptance of it by the Home Government, Colonial self-government dates. Durham recommended the union of the two Canadas; an increase in the numbers of the Legislative Councils; a regular Civil List for the support of the officials; ^{The Durham Report}

¹ For the history of the evolution of Colonial self-government, cf. Marriott: *Mechanism of the Modern State* (Oxford, 1927), c. viii.

a reform of municipal government, and, above all, the appointment of an Executive, in harmony with, and responsible to the Legislature.

His views were promptly adopted, and thus, in the course of a few years, the British Cabinet system was established in Canada.

Responsible government proved reasonably successful; unitary government did not. The idea of a unitary Constitution is, indeed, flatly negatived by geography. Nor were other centrifugal tendencies lacking. Quebec and Ontario soon showed themselves to be "ill-matched yoke-fellows." Race, language, creed, and political tradition all served to keep them apart. The Maritime Provinces, on the contrary, had much in common both with each other and with Ontario, and there a desire for closer union soon began to manifest itself. Between Ontario and the little settlement to the west of the Rocky Mountains lay the prairies, hardly known even to the fur traders of the North-West. For the vast sub-continent stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific a unitary system of government was plainly out of the question. This being so the choice could only lie between two alternatives. That British North America should comprise half a dozen or more entirely separate colonies was unthinkable. There remained only the *sors tertia* of Federation.

Federation

The lead towards Federalism was given by the Maritime Colonies. In 1864 the Legislatures of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island agreed to hold a Convention to discuss the matter. Canada sought and obtained permission to send delegates to the Convention which met at Charlottetown on September 1, 1864. A second Convention met at Quebec in October; a scheme was agreed upon, and after a Conference in London (1866), was embodied in the *North America Act* which passed through the Imperial Parliament in 1867. The Federal Legislature was to consist of a nominated Senate and an elected House of Representatives. The Executive was vested in a Governor-General with a Cabinet responsible to the Legislature. In each "Province" there was to be a Lieutenant-Governor nominated by the Governor-General, with an Executive Council responsible to the Provincial Parliament. But the powers delegated to the Provincial Governments were carefully specified in the Act

of Federation. Quebec, Ontario, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick were the original constituent Provinces of the new Dominion, but provision was made for the admission of other colonies or territories. Newfoundland has consistently declined to take advantage of this provision, but in 1870 a new Province of Manitoba, carved out of territories surrendered to the Crown by the Hudson's Bay Company, was created and admitted to the Federation, and in 1905 two further Provinces, Saskatchewan and Alberta, were carved out of the Great North-Western territory, and were similarly admitted. Meanwhile British Columbia had come in (1870), and Prince Edward Island in 1873.

For some years the Confederation was very loosely knit. Only when the engineers came to the assistance of the Constitution makers did the Federal principle become practically effective. In 1886, however, the Canadian Pacific Railway, connecting Montreal with Vancouver, was completed, and from that moment the Dominion of Canada began to advance apace. The prairies were opened up to settlement, and Canada rapidly became one of the great wheat-growing countries of the world. Thanks to the Canadian Pacific railroad, and to the cutting of the Isthmus of Panama, Vancouver has developed with amazing rapidity. It is already the rival of Montreal, and is clearly destined to become one of the great ports of the Empire, and indeed of the world.

The Australian Colonies, having attained to "responsible" government by precisely the same stages as Canada, decided towards the close of the nineteenth century to follow her example also in the adoption of Federalism. To this expedient the six Colonies of Australia were driven largely by the appearance of European rivals in the Pacific. The Imperial Government, particularly during Lord Derby's tenure of the Colonial Office (1882-5), turned an unsympathetic ear to the apprehensions expressed by the Colonies; the latter, thrown on their own resources, were driven somewhat reluctantly to federate.

The Federal Constitution of Australia differs from that of Canada in at least two important respects: first, the Federal Senate is not nominated, but consists, like that of the United States of America, of an equal number (6) of elected representatives from each State; and secondly, the residue of



powers is vested not in the Federal but in the State Governments. The Federal Government can exercise only such powers as the Colonies (or States) are willing to delegate to it. In this respect also the precedent of the United States was followed in preference to that of Canada.

The Union
of South
Africa

The constitutional history of the several colonies in South Africa was parallel with that of the Canadian and Australian Colonies up to the stage of complete internal self-government : but in the final stage of evolution South Africa diverged. For reasons already explained it preferred " union " to federalism. The Union is also the Mandatory Power for the former German Colony of South-West Africa. Whether the self-governing Dominion of Southern Rhodesia will ultimately be drawn into the Union is doubtful. Had South Africa decided for federalism, it is not improbable that Southern Rhodesia would sooner or later have been attracted towards its neighbour. Union is a different matter, and at present the omens are decidedly unfavourable. The future cannot be foreseen, but the ultimate constitutional destiny of Southern Rhodesia can hardly fail to be affected by developments in British East Africa. Should the varied units of East Africa be brought into some form of federation the two Rhodesias might also come in, but prophesy is not the function of the historian.

The
future

All that can safely be predicted of the British Empire as a whole is that things will not remain exactly as they are. Whether we look at the self-governing Dominions, with their deepening consciousness of nationhood, or at India, or at the many groups of colonies in the Dependent Empire, it is obvious that the present condition of affairs is even more than usually transitional. Some acute observers hold that the centrifugal tendencies so clearly manifested since the World War are already weakening ; that the operation of economic forces, outside as well as within the Empire, are making for closer union among the scattered communities which owe allegiance to the British Crown. Others point to the Report of the Imperial Conference of 1926, to the claim put forward by Canada and Southern Ireland to separate diplomatic representation in foreign countries, to impatience with the appellate jurisdiction of the Privy Council, and to the virtual repudiation, in some quarters, of the sovereignty of

the Imperial Parliament, as conclusive evidence of a disruptive disposition. The historian must be content to record the past ; the future lies on the knees of the gods.

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 (For full Bibliography, see Marriott : *Mechanism of the Modern State*, vol. ii, pp. 553-7, Oxford, 1927.)

Note (to pp. 477 and 484) on Southern Rhodesia.

Southern Rhodesia, though transferred from the Colonial Office to the Dominions Office, is not technically a "Dominion," but a "Self-Governing Colony." Yet it is not under the Colonial Office but the Dominions Office. Its status is said to be the same as that of Newfoundland ; but Newfoundland is represented in the Imperial Conference ; Southern Rhodesia is not. Who is sufficient for these things ?

CHAPTER XXVI

THE WORLD WAR (1914-18)

THE Franco-Prussian War "lay," according to Bismarck's philosophy, "in the logic of history." After Austria, France ; Sedan was implicit in Sadowa. Did the World War follow as a logical consequence on the German victory over France ? Was the Somme implicit in Sedan ?

The historian who attempts to answer this question finds himself overwhelmed by an avalanche of evidence constantly gathering additional weight and momentum. Since the close of the World War, the Great Powers, particularly those which have abolished their hereditary monarchies, have vied with each other in opening their archives, and in disclosing to a curious world the secrets of the "old diplomacy." Statesmen, soldiers and sailors, publicists and diplomatists, have betrayed equal eagerness, by full and apparently frank disclosures, to shift responsibility to other shoulders, and to justify themselves in the eyes of posterity. The historian of remoter periods frequently suffers from lack of material : the historian of these times may well be bewildered by its abundance. Nor will it lessen his embarrassment to know that the evidence thus forthcoming is first-hand : the diaries and memoirs of the men who were "making history" ; diplomatic documents and correspondence disgorged in vast quantities from the archives of every capital in Europe—particularly from Berlin. Historians also are already at work, sifting the evidence, and giving forth to the world the contradictory conclusions which they severally draw therefrom. Much of this work is admirable in scientific detachment ;¹ some of it does not rise

¹ In this class I should respectfully place the work of Professor Pribram of Vienna, and Professor Brandenburg of Leipzig, to mention only two enemy historians. A short list of authorities, primary and secondary, is appended to this chapter. In the published or accessible English documents

above the level of patriotic apologia or even party propaganda. In a sketch so rapid as the present the utmost that can be attempted is a very rough summary, an *ad interim* attempt to appreciate the forces which operated to produce the world cataclysm.

The immediate occasion of the Great War is not in dispute. It is, without doubt, to be found in the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his Consort, in the streets of Serajevo, the Bosnian capital, on the 28th June, 1914. That crime supplied Austria-Hungary with a valid excuse for the chastisement of Serbia. The occasion of the War

The circumstances surrounding the tragedy are, however, still wrapped in mystery. The assassins were Serbs, and the assassination was planned in Belgrade where a memorial has since been erected to commemorate it. Yet the Archduke himself, though strongly anti-Magyar in sentiment, was less definitely anti-Serb, and would gladly have seen a revival of the League of the Three Emperors, and a consequent accommodation between Austria and Russia in the Balkans. Moreover, so inadequate were the measures taken for the protection of the Archduke and his Consort in Serajevo as to give rise to the suspicion that the Austro-Hungarian Government was *particeps criminis*. Dr. Seton-Watson, however, (and there is no higher authority) rejects this theory as "fantastic." But it was reported that the Archduke in his last moments exclaimed: "The fellow will get the Golden Cross of Merit for this"; no steps were taken to punish those who had criminally neglected the duty of guarding the person of the heir to the throne, and, in certain quarters in Vienna and Buda-Pesth, no pains were taken to conceal the satisfaction with which news of the tragedy was received. Finally: the circumstances of the Archduke's funeral served to deepen the mystery attending his death. Prince Arthur of Connaught was appointed to represent King George, but he did not leave London. The German Emperor, having announced his intention of attending the funeral, was indisposed. The funeral of the heir to the Hapsburg Empire was "private."

Politically, the murder of the Archduke served admirably Ultimatum to Serbia

there is at present an awkward gap 1878-98, but by the courtesy of the Librarian of the Foreign Office, Mr. Stephen Gaselee, C.B., I have been able partially to bridge it.

the purpose of the war party at Vienna. On the 23rd of July the Austro-Hungarian Government despatched its ultimatum to Belgrade. Only forty-eight hours were given for a reply. Serbia did its utmost to avert war; it accepted at once eight out of the ten principal points; it did not actually reject the other two, and offered to submit the whole question at issue between the two Governments to arbitration, either by The Hague Tribunal or by the Great Powers. No submission could have been more complete or more prompt, but submission was treated with contempt at Vienna. The Austrian Ambassador left Belgrade on July 25; on the 28th Austria declared war against Serbia and hostilities began.

Peace
efforts

Great efforts were even then made, notably by Great Britain, to localize the war and preserve the peace of Europe. Sir Edward (now Viscount) Grey, on learning of the despatch of the ultimatum (July 24), suggested mediation by the four disinterested Powers: Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain. That suggestion was rejected by Germany (July 27). On the 28th, after the declaration of war, Russia suggested to Austria that Petersburg and Vienna should enter into friendly discussion as to the best means of settling the conflict.¹ Austria, prompted by Germany,¹ declined ² to discuss the matter with Russia, or to negotiate with the Powers on the basis of the Serbian reply. The quarrel with Serbia was "purely an Austrian concern." It was impossible for Russia, more especially after the rebuff of 1909, to accept this view, and partial mobilization was begun. On the 29th Great Britain renewed the proposal for mediation by any method acceptable to Germany, but Sir E. Grey warned the German Ambassador that he must not count on England's neutrality under all circumstances. Germany thereupon attempted to obtain from Great Britain an assurance of unconditional neutrality, on the faith of a German promise to respect the European territorial integrity of France, Belgium, and Holland, but declined to extend its promise to the French Colonies. Great Britain was, in effect, asked to "stand by while French Colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the Colonies." To that proposal there could be but one answer, and Sir E. Grey gave it: "it would be a disgrace for us to make this bar-

¹ Brandenburg, *op. cit.*, p. 490.

² *Ibid.*, p. 497.

gain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover."

Germany, seriously alarmed by this reply, warned Austria ^{Germany and Austria} that she would not allow herself "to be drawn lightly into a world-conflagration by Vienna, without consideration for her (our) advice." The admonition was too late. Austria had counted confidently on German support. Even had Germany wished to do so she could not now withhold it.

There are, indeed, those who hold that even at this last hour Germany could have averted a general war by a plain intimation to Austria that if she remained obstinate German support would be withdrawn. Could it have been averted by an equally plain intimation from Great Britain that if Germany drew the sword in support of Austria, Great Britain would be found at the side of France?

A section of German opinion blames Sir E. Grey for not giving that intimation.¹ More balanced critics in Germany acquit not only Great Britain but also France of all responsibility for the outbreak of war, and lay the blame primarily on Austria, and in secondary degree on Russia. Germany, it is admitted, was culpable in having plunged from one diplomatic blunder into another, until the isolation of Berlin and Vienna was complete. But it is argued that in July 1914 the Austrian steed took the bit in its teeth, and the German rider could not stop it. The apology is ingenious, but no one who has followed closely the diplomatic correspondence can regard it as conclusive. Of the accusation levelled against Sir Edward Grey, it can only be said that the state of opinion in the Asquith Cabinet rendered it impossible for him to give France an unqualified assurance of support, even had he himself desired to do so.² Whether such an assurance could have averted war, at the eleventh hour, can only be a matter of conjecture.

On July 31 Austria and Russia ordered general mobiliza- ^{The sands run out} tion; Germany, thereupon, issued an ultimatum to Russia requiring her to countermand mobilization within twelve hours, and on the 1st August, on the failure of Russia to

¹ E.g. Hermann Lutz: *Lord Grey und der Weltkrieg* (Eng. trans., 1928), Munich, 1926.

² For Grey's own "apologia" cf. *Twenty-Five Years*, Lond., 1925. Cf. also Viscount Morley: *Memorandum on Resignation*, Lond., 1928, and Asquith, *Genesis of the War*, Lond., 1923.

comply, declared war on her. France and Belgium thereupon made urgent appeals to King George, and when German troops entered the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg (August 2), Sir E. Grey gave an assurance to France that the British fleet would protect the shipping of France, and her northern and western coasts, against hostile operations by the German fleet. To the British request for a pledge against the violation of Belgian neutrality, France gave an affirmative reply, Germany refused, and by midnight on August 4 England and Germany were at war. Germany had declared war on France on August 3.

General
causes of
the war

Such in roughest outline is a summary of the immediate antecedents of the Great War. But the causes of war must be carefully distinguished from the "occasion." The remote causes are, indeed, written large over all the later pages of this book. Among them the most potent is to be found in the circumstances under which Germany rose to the first place among Continental Powers. "*La Guerre est l'industrie nationale de la Prusse.*" So Mirabeau had summarized Prussian history in the eighteenth century. In the nineteenth century Germany was merged in Prussia. That process was accomplished by the success of Prussian arms. The unity of Germany was achieved not by the speeches and votes of the members of the Frankfurt Parliament, but by Bismarck's policy of "blood and iron." "Germany," said Moltke in 1875, "must remain armed to the teeth for fifty years in order to keep what took her six months to win." For exactly fifty years she was permitted to remain armed to the teeth; but at the end of that time she had lost all that Bismarck and Moltke had won for her.

But if Germany was compelled to suffer the humiliation of disarmament and loss of territory, it was, as her more detached publicists now acknowledge, her own fault. Nobody sought, in 1914, to deprive Germany of anything she possessed. When having provoked war she suffered defeat, France naturally took the opportunity of recovering the provinces of which she had been deprived by the Prussian victories in 1870-1. But France was not contemplating in 1914 an attack on Germany for the purpose of recovering them. Nor was any one proposing to deprive her of any part of her Colonial Empire. On the contrary, her colonies in Africa and Oceania had been

acquired, as we have seen, with the entire good-will of England. Had we apprehended the full significance of the "*plan pan-Germaniste*"; had we suspected that Germany was thinking less of commerce than of strategy, it might have been otherwise. But it had seemed to English statesmen of both parties that Germany, with her rapidly expanding commerce, was entitled to a place in the tropical sun, and we put no obstacle in the way of her acquiring it.

The rapid increase of the German navy was, be it admitted, somewhat disquieting to the country whose very existence depended on maintaining the security of her oceanic highways; but had German diplomacy been quietly conciliatory instead of blustering and quarrelsome, Admiral von Tirpitz might still be building warships. Had that been so, England would doubtless have been compelled, however reluctantly, to enlarge her own naval programme, and such competition might have led to ultimate collision, but no responsible English statesman would ever have dared to embark on an aggressive war. Not even the completion of the Bagdad Railway, obviously designed though it was to turn the flank of the dominant sea-power, would have provoked Great Britain to conflict.

The Bagdad Railway scheme was the most significant manifestation of Pan-Germanist policy in the Near East. In that quarter Bismarck, as we have seen, predicted that the conflagration would start. Bismarck was right. "The war comes from the East; the war is waged for the East; the war will be decided in the East." So wrote a distinguished German publicist at the end of 1916.¹ As a fact it was the campaign on the Western Front which proved finally decisive, but the Mesopotamian and Palestine campaigns shattered the Pan-Germanist scheme, and did much to detach from Germany her Balkan allies. Moreover, German opinion inclines increasingly to the view that the *fons et origo belli* is to be found in the growing antagonism between the Hapsburg monarchy and the Slavs, both inside and outside the Empire, and the consequent estrangement between Vienna and Petersburg. Among the most significant telegrams received at the Foreign Office in the days of tension which preceded the outbreak of war were two from the British Embassies in Rome and

¹ Professor Ernest Jäckh in *Deutsche Politik*, Dec. 22, 1916.

Constantinople. On July 25 Sir Rennell Rodd telegraphed from Rome: "There is reliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonika railway." On the 29th the following telegram arrived from Constantinople: "I understand that the designs of Austria may extend considerably beyond the Sanjak and a punitive occupation of Serbian territory." In plain English, Belgrade blocked Austria's path to Salonika. Therefore, *Serbia delenda est*. If the first and fiercest German onslaught was directed against Paris, it was less because France was the hereditary foe which must once for all be crushed, than because France was behind Russia, and the annihilation of France was therefore an essential preliminary to the defeat of Russia. But the defeat of Russia was less a German than an Austrian interest. Thus support is ingeniously obtained for the thesis which the most recent German critics and historians are concerned to maintain, that Germany was dragged into the war at the heels of Austria.

Were regard paid only to the situation at the eleventh hour, this view might be accepted. There is evidence that the German Emperor did hesitate at the decisive moment and that his hesitation was shared by the Chancellor; but not by his generals, still less by his Ambassador at Vienna.¹ Impartial history cannot, however, ignore the whole tendency of German diplomacy—the provocative and malignant speeches of the Kaiser, the blundering diplomacy of his servants at home and abroad—during the decade preceding the actual outbreak of the war. Those who would dispute the war-guilt of Germany must choose, then, between the two horns of a dilemma: if German policy was not inspired by a deliberate intention to provoke a world-conflict, it was conducted with crass stupidity. On neither hypothesis can Germany be acquitted of the charge of direct and primary responsibility for the cataclysm in which the world was engulfed.²

Outbreak
of war

The details of military history lie outside the scope of this book. Only the briefest summary of events between 1914 and 1918 can, therefore, be attempted.

¹ On the attitude of Herr von Tschirschky, cf. *British Documents*, vol. xi, Nos. 40, 150; *French Yellow Book*, No. 18; *Russian Book*, No. 41. The view of the Allied Ambassadors has since been confirmed by Czernin.

² The charge of stupidity is not denied by the most distinguished of German publicists. Cf. e.g. Brandenburg, *o p. cit.*, *passi m.*

On August 2 Germany announced her intention to march through Belgium, and if her advance were opposed, to treat Belgium as an enemy. That announcement decided the attitude of the British people, and brought the Government almost unanimously into the war.¹ On August 3 Great Britain announced that, faithful to her word given in the "scrap of paper," and true to her traditional policy of resisting any attack upon the independence of the Low Countries, she would stand by Belgium and France. On the 4th Germany declared war on Belgium, and, in accordance with her prearranged plans, commenced to "hack her way through" to Paris.

The German plan was, by a rapid thrust at Paris, to overwhelm France, before slow-moving Russia could render her western ally effective assistance. When France had been humbled in the dust, deprived, perhaps, of her channel ports,² certainly of her overseas Empire, Germany could turn to meet and to repel the onslaught of Russia. To a straight fight between the Central Powers and Russia, with France laid out and England neutral, there could be but one issue. With Russia out of the way, the Central Powers could work their will upon the Balkans. England might, by that time, have awakened to the danger, but it would have been too late. The whale could not single-handed have opposed the progress of the elephant.

Paris, it was hoped, might be taken in a month. That Belgium's could have only been done, however, if the way through Belgium was rapidly cleared. Belgium, to her eternal honour, but to the chagrin of the Germans, made an heroic resistance. Liège barred the way for nearly a week. Not until the 15th was the last of its forts taken. The fall of Liège opened the way to Brussels, and the Belgian Government was compelled to withdraw to Antwerp (August 17). On the 20th the Germans occupied Brussels, and on the 24th the great fortress of Namur, on which many hopes depended, was after a bombardment of twenty-four hours surrendered. The fall of

¹ Only two Cabinet Ministers, Lord Morley of Blackburn and Mr. Burns, with one or two Under-Secretaries, resigned. But up to August 2 the Cabinet had been greatly divided. See Morley: *Memorandum on Resignation* Lond., 1928.

² Not, however, if England had accepted the preferred treaty of neutrality. Cf. *supra*.

Namur gravely disarranged the French scheme of defence ; but Joffre, who commanded the French army, was not to be diverted from his main plan. Instead of rushing to the relief of Belgium and the defence of north-eastern France, he attacked the Germans in Alsace and Lorraine. The Germans, meanwhile, were giving in Belgium an example of the calculated frightfulness which they were afterwards to exhibit on many fields. Louvain, Malines, and Termonde, though undefended, were ruthlessly destroyed. Then came the turn of the French.

England's
effort

Trusting confidently in the Navy, England did not hesitate to denude herself of troops and to throw all her available forces into the field. Lord Kitchener had been appointed Secretary of State for War on August 5, and two days later the embarkation of British troops began. In ten days the whole Expeditionary Force, consisting of one cavalry and six infantry divisions—less than 110,000 men in all—had been landed on French soil without accident or hitch of any kind. The disembarkation was concluded on August 16, and exactly a week later (August 23) the British troops found themselves in the firing-line at Mons. Then began the famous fortnight's retreat. Hopelessly outnumbered, lacking transport and supplies, not yet established on French soil, out of touch with their allies, the British forces were compelled to fall back in some confusion. Nevertheless, their extrication from Mons reflected high credit on the generals in command, and proved to all time the heroism and endurance of the British soldier. Not until September 5 was the retreat arrested. In the meantime the Aisne had been forced by the Germans ; the French had been driven out of Amiens, and Laon occupied by the enemy (August 30). The Germans were now within striking distance of Paris, and on September 3 the French Government transferred itself to Bordeaux. Meanwhile the German commander, Von Kluck, had commenced his critical manœuvre. On August 31, instead of continuing his march in a south-westerly direction, he turned sharp to the left across the British Front. On September 25 he crossed the Marne, and on that same day Joffre issued his famous order that the retreat was at an end, that " no man must go back any further, but each be killed on the spot rather than give way an inch." The order was obeyed, and for a week (September 6-12) the

The
retreat
from Mons

Battle of
the Marne,
Sept. 6-12

hosts of France, England, and Germany were engaged in one of the decisive battles of the world—the Battle of the Marne. That battle marked the turn of the tide; on the 9th the British crossed the Marne; the Germans were driven back to the Aisne and there dug themselves in. For many a long month the Germans and the Allies faced each other in trenches, attacking, counter-attacking, but virtually immovable. The second phase of the War had begun.

The Belgians meanwhile were in terrible plight. Antwerp Antwerp had always been regarded by England as a point of supreme importance to her. That Antwerp should be in friendly hands has been always one of the traditional maxims of British statesmanship. The city was now in imminent danger from the Germans. An effort must be made to save it. On October 5 we landed in Antwerp a miserably equipped and miscellaneous force of some 8000 sailors and marines, with a large admixture of untrained civilians.¹ About the same time a 7th division of the Expeditionary Force—under the command of General Rawlinson—was landed at Ostend. The idea was that at all costs the enemy must be headed off from the coasts of France and Flanders, and for this purpose the British force was transferred from the Aisne to the Lys and Yser. Antwerp, however, fell on October 9 and the Belgian Government was transferred to Havre. A few days later the great battle began around Ypres. It lasted until the middle of November. When it ended the British Expeditionary Force had almost ceased to exist, but Ypres had been held, and the holding of Ypres denied the Germans access to the Channel ports. Had Ypres fallen, the Germans would have been within striking distance of Dover. No words, therefore, can overestimate the debt which England and the world owes to the heroes who laid down their lives in the long-drawn-out battle of October and November 1914.

First battle
of Ypres,
Oct.-Nov.

The services rendered to the common cause by Russia at Russia this juncture must not be forgotten. Russia, mobilizing with unexpected rapidity, gave ear to the call for help from Belgium and France, and thrust forward a force into East Prussia in the first days of August, and caused great alarm at Berlin. On August 26, however, Hindenburg inflicted a crushing

¹ For a brilliant defence of the Antwerp expedition, see W. Churchill : *World Crisis*, i, xv.

defeat upon the Russians at Tannenberg on the historic field where in 1410 the Poles had defeated the Teutonic knights. The Russian invaders were cleared out of East Prussia, and before the end of the first week of September the Prussians were on Russian soil. The main Russian attack, however, was delivered in Poland. Lemberg was captured on September 1 by the Russians, who quickly made themselves masters of Galicia. Then Hindenburg, having cleared East Prussia, attacked in Poland and thus relieved the Russian pressure upon Austria and Hungary. Austria herself was cutting a very poor figure in the war. Even against Serbia her success was evanescent. In the autumn of 1914 she launched a terrific attack upon Serbia, and after four months of sanguinary fighting succeeded (December 2) in capturing Belgrade; but her triumph was short-lived. The Serbians, three days later, recaptured their capital; the Hapsburg assault was repelled, and for the first half of 1915, Serbia enjoyed a respite from the attack of external enemies. An epidemic of typhus fever wrought terrible havoc, however, upon an exhausted, ill-fed, and in places congested population. From this danger Serbia was rescued by the heroism of English doctors and English nurses. Had the methods of diplomacy been as energetic and effective as those of the Medical Service, Serbia might still have escaped the terrible fate in store for her.

By the end of 1914, then, the position may be summarized thus: The Germans, instead of finding themselves comfortably in Paris, dictating humiliating terms to a defeated France, were entrenched on the Aisne. Instead of shelling Dover and Folkestone from the Channel ports, they were still pinned behind Ypres. Instead of invading Russia, Prussia had herself suffered invasion, and her help was sorely needed to save her Austrian ally from annihilation at the hands of Russia. Above all, not a single German merchantman remained at sea.

The Western Front witnessed during 1915 few incidents of which a narrative so brief as the present can take account. During the whole year the Allied and German hosts were confronting each other in long lines of entrenchments, stretching almost from the Channel to the frontier of Switzerland. A great battle raged in the spring from April 22 to May 11 round the devoted city of Ypres. In the result Ypres was held. In the autumn there were terrific battles between the British

The
Western
Front in
1915

Second
Battle of
Ypres

and the Germans at Loos, and between the French and Germans in Champagne. The losses on both sides were enormous, but the military results were not commensurate with the shedding of blood. The Germans on the Western Front were undoubtedly weakened by the tremendous effort directed against Russia on the Eastern Front, as a result of which Warsaw was captured on August 4, Kovno (17th), Brest-Litovsk (August 25), Grodno (September 2), and Vilna (18th).

At the end of the second year (1915), Germany unquestionably found herself in a strong position. Under a series of shattering blows the *morale*, if not the military strength, of Russia had been gravely impaired; two spirited enterprises initiated by England, the one on the Gallipoli Peninsula, the other in Mesopotamia, had been frustrated by the Turks; true, the Turks had suffered defeat at the hands of Russia in the Caucasus, but the Russian effort had not availed to save their English allies, and the Caucasus campaign had little effect on the ultimate issue of the war. England still held command of the surface of the sea, and in the more distant theatres of war the Dominion forces were clearing the Germans out of every colony they had ever acquired; but, nearer home, the submarines were doing their deadly work, and on the Western Front the Allies, despite the weakening of the German forces opposed to them, had definitely failed to break through.

The year 1916 was remarkable on the Western Front for 1916 the terrific battle waged between the Germans and the French round the great fortress of Verdun. Opening in February, Verdun the battle lasted until July; by that time the German attack was definitely repulsed, and at the very end of the year (December 15) French arms won a brilliant victory over the Germans on that historic field. Meanwhile in July the British, aided by the French, had taken the offensive on the Somme. The Somme battle raged from July until November, The Somme and in respect of men engaged was up to that date the greatest battle in recorded history. But the end of the fighting of 1916 seemed to have resulted on the Western Front in stalemate. It is not, therefore, surprising that Germany should (December 12) have made certain "Peace Proposals," or that Mr. Wilson, the President of the United States, should have been moved to formulate a Peace Note (December 20).

We must now leave the West to follow the course of events in the more distant theatres of the war.

Turkey and
the war

First we turn to the Near East. The war in that theatre presents many problems and suggests many questions. Whether by a timely display of force the Turk could have been kept true to his ancient connection with Great Britain and France; whether by more sagacious diplomacy the hostility of Bulgaria could have been averted, and the co-operation of Greece secured; whether by the military intervention of the *Entente* Powers the cruel blow could have been warded off from Serbia and Montenegro; whether the Dardanelles expedition was faulty only in execution or unsound in conception; whether Roumania came in too tardily or moved too soon, and in a wrong direction—these are questions of high significance, but more easy to ask than to answer.¹

Meanwhile it must suffice to summarize events.

On the outbreak of the war the Porte declared its neutrality—a course which was followed in October by Greece, Roumania, and Bulgaria. The Allies gave an assurance to the Sultan that, if he maintained neutrality, the independence and integrity of his Empire would be respected during the war, and provided for at the Peace settlement. That many of the most responsible statesmen of the Porte sincerely desired the maintenance of neutrality cannot be doubted; but the forces working in the contrary direction were too powerful. The traditional enmity against Russia; the chance of recovering Egypt and Cyprus from Great Britain; the astute policy which for a quarter of a century the Kaiser had pursued at Constantinople; the German training imparted to the Turkish army; above all, the powerful personality of Enver Bey, who, early in 1914, had been appointed Minister of War—all these things impelled the Porte to embrace the cause of the Central Empires. Nor was it long before Turkey gave unmistakable indications of her real proclivities.² In the first week of the war the German cruisers,

¹ Cf. Mowat: *European Diplomacy, 1914-1925*, c. vii, for a good sketch of the diplomatic history of the Balkan States during the war.

² Djemal Pasha admits that by the end of the Second Balkan War the Young Turks had decided in favour of Germany, *Memories of a Turkish Statesman*, p. 107. Sir E. Grey was of opinion that "nothing but the assassination of Enver would keep Turkey from joining Russia." *Twenty-five Years*, ii, 164.

the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, having eluded the pursuit of the allied fleet in the Mediterranean and reached the Bosphorus, were purchased by the Porte, and commissioned in the Turkish navy. Great Britain and Russia refused to recognize the transfer as valid, but the Porte took no notice of the protest. Meanwhile Germany poured money, munitions, and men into Turkey; German officers were placed in command of the forts of the Dardanelles; a German General, Liman von Sanders, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish army, and on October 28 the Turkish fleet bombarded Odessa and other unfortified ports belonging to Russia on the Black Sea. To the protest made by the Ambassadors of the Allied Powers the Porte did not reply, and on November 1 the Ambassadors demanded their passports and quitted Constantinople. A few days later the Dardanelles forts were bombarded by English and French ships; Akaba in the Red Sea was bombarded by H.M.S. *Minerva*. Great Britain promptly annexed Cyprus (November 5), declared Abbas, Khedive of Egypt, deposed, put the son of Ismail on the throne in his stead, and proclaimed a Protectorate over the country. For the first time in history Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire were at war.

Germany hoped that by means of the Turkish alliance she would be able to exploit Mesopotamia, to penetrate Persia commercially and politically, to deliver a powerful attack upon the British position in Egypt, and to threaten the hegemony of Great Britain in India. For all these ambitious schemes Constantinople was an indispensable base.¹

The Pan-German plan

Nothing, therefore, would have done so much to frustrate German diplomacy in south-eastern Europe as a successful blow at Constantinople. In February 1915 an English fleet, assisted by a French squadron, bombarded the forts of the Dardanelles, and high hopes were entertained in the allied countries that the passage of the Straits would be quickly forced. But the hopes were destined to disappointment. It soon became evident that the Navy alone could not achieve the task entrusted to it. Towards the end of April a large force of troops was landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula; but the end of May came, and there was nothing to show for the

The Dardanelles Expedition

¹ Cf. a powerful speech in the House of Lords by Earl Curzon of Kedleston (Feb. 20, 1917).

loss of nearly 40,000 men. On August 6 a second army, consisting largely of Australians, New Zealanders, and English Territorials, was thrown on to the peninsula. The troops displayed superb courage, but the conditions were impossible; Sir Ian Hamilton, who had commanded, was succeeded by Sir C. C. Munro, to whom was assigned the difficult and ungrateful task of evacuating an untenable position. To the amazement and admiration of the world, a feat deemed almost impossible was accomplished before the end of December, without the loss of a single man. How far the expedition to the Dardanelles may have averted dangers in other directions it is impossible to say; but, as regards the accomplishment of its immediate aims, the enterprise was a ghastly though a gallant failure.¹

The failure was apparent long before it was proclaimed by the abandonment of the attempt. Nor was that failure slow to react upon the situation in the Balkans.

Greece

On the outbreak of the European War Greece proclaimed its neutrality, but in Greece, as elsewhere in the Near East, opinions if not sympathies were sharply divided. The Greek kingdom owed its existence to the Powers comprising the Triple *Entente*; the dynasty owed its Crown to their nomination; to them the people were tied by every bond of historical gratitude. No one realized this more clearly than M. Venizelos, and no one could have shown himself more determined to repay the debt with compound interest. Moreover, M. Venizelos believed that the dictates of policy were identical with those of gratitude. The creator of the Balkan League had not abandoned, despite the perfidious conduct of one of his partners, the hope of realizing the dream which had inspired his policy in 1912. The one solution of a secular problem, at once feasible in itself and compatible with the claims of nationality, was and is a Balkan Federation. A German hegemony in the Balkans, an Ottoman Empire dependent upon Berlin, would dissipate that dream for ever. If that disaster was to be averted, mutual concessions would have to be made, and Venizelos was statesman enough to make them. Early in 1915 he tried to persuade his sovereign to offer Kavala and a slice of "Greek" Macedonia to Bulgaria.

¹ Cf. Churchill: *World Crisis*, vol. ii, for a brilliant defence of his own policy.

He was anxious also to co-operate in the attack upon the Dardanelles with Allies who had offered to Greece a large territorial concession in the Smyrna district. To neither suggestion would King Constantine and his Hohenzollern Consort listen. Venizelos consequently resigned.

If Venizelos desired harmony among the Balkan States, so also, and not less ardently, did the Allies. Macedonia still remained the crux of the situation. Had the advice of Venizelos been followed, Bulgaria would have gained a better outlet to the Ægean than that afforded by Dedeagatch. Serbia possessed no statesman of the calibre of Venizelos, but the situation of Serbia was in the last degree hazardous, and under the pressure of grim necessity she might have been expected to listen to the voice of prudence.

Not, however, until August 1915 was Serbia induced to offer such concessions to Bulgaria in Macedonia as might possibly have sufficed, if made three months earlier, to keep Bulgaria out of the clutches of the Central Empires. In Bulgaria, as elsewhere, opinion was sharply divided. Both groups of Great Powers had their adherents at Sofia. Had the Russian advance been maintained in 1915; had the Dardanelles been forced; had pressure been put by the *Entente* upon Serbia and Greece to make reasonable concessions in Macedonia, Bulgaria might not have yielded to the seductions of German gold and to the wiles of German diplomacy. But why should a German King of Bulgaria have thrown in his lot with Powers who were apparently heading for military disaster, whose diplomacy was as inept as their arms were feeble? What more natural than that, when the German avalanche descended upon Serbia in the autumn of 1915, Bulgaria should have co-operated in the discomfiture of a detested rival?

Yet the *Entente* built their plans upon the hope, if not the expectation, that Bulgaria might possibly be induced to enter the war on the side of the Allies against Turkey.¹ Serbia was anxious to attack Bulgaria in September, while her mobilization was still incomplete. It is generally believed that the Allies intervened to restrain the Serbians, hoping against hope that a concordat between the Balkan

¹ Cf. Sir E. Grey in House of Commons, Oct. 14, 1915.

States might still be arrived at. To that hope Serbia was sacrificed.¹

The chas-
tisement of
Serbia

A great Austro-German army, under the command of Field-Marshal von Mackensen, concentrated upon the Serbian frontier in September, and on the 7th of October it crossed the Danube. Two days later Belgrade surrendered, and for the next few weeks von Mackensen, descending upon the devoted country in overwhelming strength, drove the Serbians before him, until the whole country was in the occupation of the Austro-German forces. The Bulgarians captured Nish on November 5 and effected a junction with the army under von Mackensen; Serbia was annihilated; a remnant of the Serbian army took refuge in the mountains of Montenegro and Albania, while numbers of deported civilians sought the hospitality of the Allies. On November 28 Germany officially declared the Balkan campaign to be at an end. For the time being Serbia had ceased to exist as a Balkan State.

King
Constantine
and
M. Venizelos

What had the Allies done to succour her? Russia was not, at the moment, in a position to afford any effective assistance, but on October 4 she despatched an ultimatum to Bulgaria, and a few days later declared war upon her. On October 5 the advance guard of an Anglo-French force, under General Sarraill and Sir Bryan Mahon, began to disembark at Salonika. The force was miserably inadequate in numbers and equipment, and it came too late. Its arrival precipitated a crisis in Greece. As a result of an appeal to the country in June, King Constantine had been reluctantly compelled to recall Venizelos to power in September. Venizelos was as determined as ever to respect the obligations of Greece towards Serbia, and to throw the weight of Greece into the scale of the Allies. But despite his Parliamentary majority he was no longer master of the situation. The failure of the Dardanelles expedition, the retreat of Russia, the impending intervention of Bulgaria on the Austro-German side, the exhortations and warnings which followed in rapid succession from Berlin, above all, the knowledge that von Mackensen was preparing to annihilate Serbia, had stiffened the back of

¹ Cf. *The Times*, Nov. 22, 1915. But for a contrary view, cf. E. J. Dillon —no apologist for English diplomacy in the Balkans, ap. *Fortnightly Review* for Jan. 1916. Djemal (*op. cit.*, p. 127) states categorically that King Ferdinand offered a military alliance to Germany in August 1914.

King Constantine. Technically, the landing of an Anglo-French force at Salonika looked like a violation of Greek neutrality, and Venizelos was compelled by his master to enter a formal protest against it. But the protest was followed by an announcement that Greece would respect her treaty with Serbia, and would march to her assistance, if she were attacked by Bulgaria. That announcement cost Venizelos his place. He was promptly dismissed by King Constantine, who, flouting the terms of the Constitution, effected what was virtually a monarchical *coup d'état*.

The King's violation of the Hellenic Constitution was the opportunity of the protecting Powers. They failed to seize it, and Constantine remained master of the situation. From an attitude of neutrality professedly "benevolent," he passed rapidly to one of hostility almost openly avowed. That hostility deepened as the year 1916 advanced. On May 25, in accordance with the terms of an Agreement secretly concluded between Greece, Germany, and Bulgaria, King Constantine handed over to the Bulgarians Fort Rupel, an important position which commanded the flank of the French army in Salonika. A few weeks later a whole division of the Greek army was instructed to surrender to the Germans and Bulgarians at Kavala. Kavala itself was occupied by Constantine's friends, who carried off the Greek division, with all its equipment, to Germany. Nearly the whole of Greek Macedonia was now in the hands of Germany and her Allies, and the Greek patriots, led by Venizelos, were reduced to despair. In September a Greek Committee of National Defence was set up at Salonika, and in October Venizelos himself arrived there.

By this time the Balkan situation had been further complicated by the military intervention of Roumania on the side of the Allies. In Roumania, also, opinion was, on the outbreak of the war, sharply divided. The sympathies of King Carol were, not unnaturally, with his Hohenzollern kinsmen, and, had he not been, in the strict sense of the term, a constitutional Sovereign, his country would have been committed to an Austro-German alliance. Nor was it quite clear to which side Roumanian interests inclined her. If the coveted districts of Transylvania and the Bukovina were in the hands of the Hapsburgs, Russia still kept her hold on Bessarabia. A

Roumanian
intervention

“ Greater Roumania,” corresponding in area to the ethnographical distribution of population, could, therefore, come into being only by taking provinces from Hungary and Russia respectively. Could Roumania hope, either by diplomacy or by war, to achieve the complete reunion of the Roumanian people ?

In October 1914 King Carol and his old friend and confidant, Demetrius Sturdza, died. The two strongest Pro-German forces were thus removed. On the outbreak of war Roumania had declared her neutrality, and that neutrality was, despite the affinities of the Roumanians with France and Italy, scrupulously observed until August 1916. But on the 27th of that month Roumania declared war, flung a large force into Transylvania, and in a few weeks a considerable part of Transylvania had passed into Roumanian hands. But the success, achieved in defiance of sound strategy, and in disregard of warnings addressed to Roumania by her Allies, was of brief duration. In September, Mackensen invaded the Dobrudja from the south, entered Silistria on September 10, and, though checked for a while on the Rasova-Tuzla line, renewed his advance in October, and captured Constanza on the twenty-second.

Meanwhile a German army, under General von Falkenhayn, advanced from the west, and on September 26 inflicted a severe defeat upon the Roumanians at the Rothenthurm Pass. The Roumanians, though they fought desperately, were steadily pressed back ; at the end of November von Mackensen joined hands with Falkenhayn, and on December 6 the German armies occupied Bucharest.

Thus another Balkan State was crushed. Throughout the year 1917 there was little change in the situation. The Central Empires remained in occupation of Roumanian territory up to the line of the Sereth, including, therefore, the Dobrudja and Wallachia, and from this occupied territory Austria-Hungary obtained much-needed supplies of grain. Meanwhile the Roumanian Government remained established in Jassy, and from its ancient capital the affairs of Moldavia were administered. Into Moldavia the Central Powers made no attempt to penetrate, being content to await events. Nor was it long before their patience was rewarded.

The military collapse of Russia in 1917 sealed the fate of

Roumania. From no other ally could succour reach her. <sup>Treaty of
Bucharest,
May 7, 1918</sup> Perforce, therefore, Roumania was compelled to concur in the suspension of hostilities to which the Russian Bolsheviks and the Central Empires agreed in December 1917.¹ Roumania, nevertheless, announced that though she agreed to suspend hostilities she would not enter into peace negotiations. But the logic of events proved irresistible: on February 9, 1918, Germany concluded peace with the Ukraine, and on March 5 the preliminaries of a peace were arranged with Roumania. The definitive Treaty of Peace was signed at Bucharest on May 7. The terms of that treaty were humiliating and disastrous to Roumania. The Dobrudja, except a corner of the Danube delta, was surrendered to Bulgaria, and the whole of the economic resources of Roumania, in particular her grain and oil, were to be at the disposal of the conquerors, who were further to enjoy the right of military transport through Moldavia and Bessarabia to Odessa. Germany acquired, by means of this corridor, command of two of the most important ports in the Black Sea, giving her alternative routes to the Middle East. Roumania was prostrate at the feet of Germany and her Allies.

Meanwhile the German victories in the north-east of the peninsula naturally reacted upon the situation in the south-west. Towards the end of November 1916 a Serbian army, re-formed and re-equipped, had the gratification of turning the Bulgarians out of Monastir, and the Allies still held a corner of Greek Macedonia. For the rest, Germany and her Allies were in undisputed command of the Balkan Peninsula from Belgrade to Constantinople, from Bucharest to the valley of the Vardar. Even the hold of the Allies on Salonika was rendered precarious by the increasing hostility of Constantine and his friends at Athens. The patience with which his vagaries were treated by the allied Governments tended to evoke contempt rather than gratitude in Athens. Whatever the nature of the obstacles which impeded the dealings of the Allies with the Hellenic Government, the results were disastrous. We discouraged our friends and put heart into our enemies. King Constantine, obviously playing for time, was allowed to gain it. The attitude of his partisans in Athens towards the Allies grew daily more insolent, until

¹ Cf. *infra*.

it culminated (December 1-2, 1916) in a dastardly attack upon a small Franco-British force, which Admiral de Fournet landed at the Piræus. The landing of troops may have been unavoidable, but its results, as Venizelos pointed out, were singularly unfortunate. Momentarily, indeed, there was some improvement in the relations between Constantine and the "protecting" Powers. An apology for the insult to the French and British flags was tendered and accepted, and the King withdrew his army from Thessaly, where it plainly menaced the security of the allied forces at Salonika. Essentially, however, the situation was an impossible one. The authority of Venizelos, firmly established at Salonika, was gradually extended in the spring of 1917 to Corfu and the other islands; while in Athens the King's position was apparently unassailable. The Allies for a while looked on helplessly, but on May 1 an Hellenic Congress in Paris called upon them to facilitate the summoning of a constituent assembly in Athens, and to recognize a republic which it was believed the Assembly would proclaim. Almost simultaneously the Venizelists at Salonika demanded the immediate deposition of King Constantine. At last the Allies resolved to take action. On June 11 King Constantine was required to abdicate, and to hand over the government to his second son, Alexander; Constantine and his Prussian Queen, with the Crown Prince, were deported to Switzerland; Venizelos returned to Athens, and on June 30, 1917, the Hellenic kingdom broke off its relations with the Central Empires and at last took its place in the Grand Alliance.

Salonika,
1918

The adhesion of Greece greatly improved the military situation in Macedonia. The allied army at Salonika was reinforced by the Greeks, who gained some important ground on the Vardar. Matters still tarried, however, on the Salonika front, until in June 1918 the command was taken over by General Franchet d'Esperey. By September his preparations were complete; in the course of a week's brilliant fighting the Bulgarian army was routed, and after a harrying retreat in which the Serbs played a foremost part, Bulgaria sued for peace. On September the 30th, barely a fortnight after the commencement of the advance, Bulgaria made unconditional surrender, and handed over her troops, her railways, her stores, and her government, into the hands of the Allies. On

October 12 the Serbians occupied their old capital, Nish, and so cut the Berlin-Constantinople Railway at one of its most vital points. The Allies were on the point of advancing on Constantinople itself when the Sultan sued for peace, and an armistice was concluded (October 30).

From the Near East we pass to the Middle East. Early in the war (November 21, 1914) Basra, at the head of the Persian Gulf, was occupied by the 6th Indian Division. From Basra the force advanced up the Tigris; Kurna, at a confluence of the two rivers, was occupied in December, and in April 1915 a heavy defeat was inflicted on the Turks at Shaiba. Reinforced from India, the troops again advanced, captured Amara, and from Amara advanced on Kut, which was taken on September 28, 1915. Against his own better judgment, General Townshend, who was in command, continued his march towards Bagdad, but after a brilliant attack at Ctesiphon (November 22-25) was compelled, by lack of ammunition, to withdraw with a loss of nearly half his force to Kut. There he was besieged for five months (December 3, 1915, to April 29, 1916). Three efforts were made to relieve Townshend and his gallant garrison, but in vain, and, on April 29, 1916, Kut was surrendered, and some 8000 survivors, of whom 6000 were Indian troops, fell into the hands of the Turks. The British prisoners were shamefully maltreated, and more than half of them died in captivity.

The British Government took prompt measures to retrieve this grave disaster. Sir Stanley Maude was appointed to the command in Mesopotamia; the force was reorganized and re-equipped, and after a skilful advance Kut was recovered on February 24, 1917. Advancing rapidly from Kut, Maude inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Turks, and on March 11 entered Bagdad. On April 18 the Turks suffered a further defeat, and the British army took possession of the Bagdad Railway as far as Samarra, nearly seventy miles north of Bagdad. In November Maude died of cholera, but the campaign was successfully carried on by Sir William Marshall, who finally reached Mosul on November 3, 1918. By that time, however, the Turk had been utterly defeated and had sued for an armistice.

Not only in the Balkans and in Mesopotamia were British arms victorious over the Turk. From the opening of the war

Meso-
potamia

Egypt and
the Canal

it was realized that of all the vital points in our "far-flung battle line" the most vital, perhaps, was the Suez Canal. After the Porte had definitely thrown in its lot with the Central Empires, it was deemed wise, as already noted, to depose the Khedive of Egypt, Abbas II (November 1914). Turkish sovereignty was denounced; Egypt was declared a British Protectorate; and the Sultanate was conferred (December 18, 1914) on Hussein Kamel. In February 1915 the Turks made the first of several attacks upon the Suez Canal, but they were all repulsed with heavy loss. Stirred up by German intrigue, the Senussi gave us some trouble in Western Egypt, though they were heavily punished in several actions at the end of 1915 and the beginning of 1916.

Palestine,
1916-18

In March 1916 another phase of the war opened: Sir Archibald Murray began his advance on the eastern side of the Canal. A patient march through the desert brought him into Palestine at the beginning of 1917, but in April he was heavily repulsed by the Turks at Gaza. In the summer, Murray was relieved of his command and succeeded by Sir Edmund Allenby, who, reinforced from India and Salonika, inflicted a tremendous defeat upon the Turks at Beersheba, which he captured on October 31. He stormed Gaza (November 7), Askalon a few days later, Jaffa surrendered to him on November 16, and on December 9 a brilliant campaign was crowned by the capture of Jerusalem. Early in 1918 General Allenby established communications with the Arabs and the King of Hedjaz, whose allegiance had been secured to us by Colonel Lawrence, and on February 21 captured Jericho. Owing to the success of the German offensive in France he was then compelled to despatch his best troops to the Western Front, and it was not until September that he was ready to make his final assault upon the enemy opposed to him. On the 19th, however, he fell upon the Turks and broke them, and on the following day Nazareth was occupied. Having effected his junction with the Arabs, Allenby then advanced on Damascus, which surrendered on October 1. At Damascus 60,000 prisoners and 800 guns were taken. Advancing from Damascus, Beirut was taken on October 8, and in rapid succession Sidon, Tripoli, Homs, and Aleppo (October 26). The annihilation of the Turkish forces was now complete, and Palestine and Syria, like Mesopotamia, passed into English keeping.

It is time to retrace our steps and return to Europe. We have already followed the course of the war on the Western Front down to the close of 1916. Certain political events must, however, be briefly noticed. Early in December of that year Mr. Asquith resigned the Premiership in England and was replaced by Mr. Lloyd George. Mr. Asquith's position had been shaken by the rebellion which at Easter, 1916, had broken out in Ireland. At the outbreak of the war, Irish feeling was keenly aroused on behalf of the Belgian Roman Catholics, and it seemed not impossible that the Catholic South might fling itself into the struggle against Germany with not less ardour than the Protestant North. During 1915 that hope faded. The disloyal section of the Irish Catholics gained the ascendant, entered into treasonable correspondence with Germany, and, relying upon the promised assistance of England's enemies, raised the standard of rebellion in April 1916. Unhappily, the episode was not without precedent. England's difficulty had always been Ireland's opportunity. But the rebellion of 1916 came as a shock to those in England, who had complacently imagined that the passing of a Home Rule Bill for Ireland would suffice to heal the secular discord between the two countries. The rebellion was promptly crushed, but its eruption added to the anxieties of the British Government. It could not paralyse their activities.

In May 1916 Great Britain had tardily adopted compulsory service for all able-bodied men between the ages of 18 and 41. Hardly was the new Act on the Statute Book when the great soldier, who had reorganized the whole military system of his country and had, in the language of the street, given his name to the new army, met his doom amid the storms and shadows of the North Sea. On June 5, 1916, the *Hampshire*, bound for Archangel, went down with Lord Kitchener and every soul on board. Deep called to deep, but not one echo ever reached the shore. In 1918 the age-limit for conscripts was raised to 51. The new recruits were badly needed. In 1917 a strenuous and sustained effort was made to bring the war on the Western Front to an end. The effort was not unattended by brilliant military successes. On April 9 a terrific attack, launched at Arras, resulted in the capture of Vimy Ridge, and two months later a second victory not less brilliant was won at Messines Ridge. A further advance was

The Irish
Rebellion,
1916

Compulsory
service in
England,
May 1916

The
campaign
of 1917

timed to begin at the end of July. On the day it began (July 31) the weather broke, and the operation was conducted under impossible conditions. Some ground was gained, but at an enormous sacrifice of life, and the objective—to clear the Flanders coast of Germans—was not attained.

Events remote from the Western Front were powerfully reacting upon the war in France and Flanders. Of these the most direct were the outbreak of revolution in Russia (March 12); the intervention of the United States (April 6); and the defeat of the Italians at Caporetto (October 24). To these events we must now turn: dealing first with the last.

Italy and
the war

Both to the Central Powers and to the *Entente* the attitude of Italy, at the outbreak of the war, was a matter of deep concern. Italy, as we have seen, had renewed, not without hesitation, the Triple Alliance so lately as December 1912. Her sympathies had, however, been veering for some years past towards the *Entente*. "The attitude of Italy at the Algeiras Conference and during the Bosnian crisis was," wrote Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, "sufficiently suggestive of the real state of the case. Its flirtations with the *Entente* had led to dangerous intimacies."¹ As regards England it was, indeed, no recent "flirtation," but a life-long friendship. Consequently neither at Berlin nor at Vienna could it have caused much surprise when, on August 3, 1914, Italy declared her neutrality. The *casus fœderis* had not, in her opinion, arisen: the Austrian Note to Serbia had not been previously communicated to her Italian ally, and Italy had, consequently, no opportunity of exercising her influence in favour of peace. Moreover, the Triple Alliance being essentially defensive in character, Italy was not bound to assist her Allies in an aggressive war.

Austrian
offers to
Italy

Germany made desperate efforts to prevent an actual rupture of the Alliance, and brought all possible pressure to bear upon Austria-Hungary in order to induce her to make larger and larger concessions to the ever-increasing demands of Italy. But all to no purpose. Italy was determined to use the opportunity to get all that she had been denied by Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1866, and perhaps something more. "Italy," said Signor Salandra, the Premier,

¹ *Reflections on the World War* (Eng. trans.), Lond., 1920, p. 16.

"has legitimate aspirations to affirm and sustain."¹ The world now knows precisely what they were. As to neutrality, Italian opinion was solid : as to intervention it was divided. But late in 1914 the interventionist party received a powerful impulse from the adhesion of a leading socialist, Benito Mussolini, who founded *Il Popolo d'Italia* to popularize his policy. That Italy could have obtained the Trentino without war is certain : but for the *Irredentists* that was not enough. In April 1915 Italy made her fateful decision.

By the Treaty of London, concluded on April 26, 1915, ^{Treaty of London} between Italy, Great Britain, France, and Russia, Italy undertook to put all her strength into the war against the enemies of the *Entente*. In return she was to obtain the district of the Trentino, the Southern Tyrol up to the Brenner Pass, Trieste, the counties of Gorizia and Gradisca, the whole of Istria up to the Quarnero, including Volosco and the Istrian Archipelago, the Province of Dalmatia in its existing frontiers, together with most of the islands in the Adriatic (including Lissa), and she was to retain Valona and the Dodecanese.² Italy also stipulated for a loan of £50,000,000 on easy terms, and that the Pope should have no say as to the final terms of peace. Italy at the same time agreed that large accessions of territory should be assigned to Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro.

On May 3 Italy declared that the alliance with Austria-Hungary was at an end ; war was declared against Austria-Hungary on May 24 ; against Turkey on August 21, and a few weeks later, against Bulgaria. Against Germany Italy did not declare war until August 27, 1916.

The intervention of Italy was, both in a moral and military ^{Italy in the war} sense, of immense advantage to the *Entente* ; but it introduced a considerable complication into the diplomatic situation. The Serbs were gravely perturbed by the adhesion of a Power whose notorious ambitions threatened to frustrate the dream of a greater Serbia. Rather than see Italy established on the Dalmatian coasts and Archipelago, the Serbs would have preferred to leave Austria-Hungary in occupation. The *Entente*, however, had no option but to pay the price demanded by Italy.

¹ Dec. 1914, cf. Sir James Rennell Rodd : *Social and Diplomatic Memories* (third series).

² *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1919, vol. cxii, 978 seq.

For Italy, as for other belligerents, sunshine alternated with shadow during the next three years. On the whole she somewhat improved her position during the campaign of 1916; she tasted triumph in the summer of 1917, but in the autumn of that year it was her fate to learn the bitterness of defeat. Neither politically nor in a military sense could Italy present a united front to the enemy. Not only had she to count on the hardly-disguised hostility of the Papacy, but there was a considerable pro-German party among the upper classes, and a very strong section of "internationals" among the Socialists of the cities. The latter party was greatly strengthened by the disaster which overtook Italian arms when, in October 1917, the long-prepared Austro-German attack was finally launched.

The defeat
of Caporetto,
Oct. 1917

Poltroonery or treachery left open a gap in the Italian line; the second Italian army was compelled to fall back; the retreat became a rout; the rout of the second army involved the retreat of the third, and within three weeks the enemy had captured 2800 guns and taken nearly 200,000 prisoners. The fourth army then made a stand on the line of the Piave, and on the holding of that line the safety of Venice, Verona, and Vicenza depended. The moment was intensely critical, but England and France realized the danger to the common cause, and large reinforcements were promptly despatched from the Western Front. The arrival of French and English troops, commanded by General Fayolle, Sir Herbert Plumer, and Lord Cavan, stiffened the Italian defence, and when the Austrians again attacked, somewhat tardily in June 1918, they were gallantly repulsed. Lord Cavan in command of a mixed British and Italian force, and General Diaz in command of a re-equipped Italian army, took the offensive in their turn in October, and, in a brief but brilliant campaign, chased the Austrians out of Italy. On November 4 Austria begged for an armistice.

Italian
recovery,
1918

The Russian
Revolution,
March 1917

The assistance so promptly given to Italy by England and France had not merely saved the military situation but had produced an excellent moral effect. But, unfortunately, a terrible blow had in the meantime fallen upon the Grand Alliance. In the first months of the war Russia had rendered invaluable service to the cause of the Allies; but her troops were badly equipped; she lacked guns and munitions;

worst of all, her efforts in the field were paralysed, if not by actual treachery, at least by gross maladministration. To the general incompetence there was, indeed, one brilliant exception. Under the Grand Duke Nicholas, Russia won a succession of victories against the Turks in the Caucasus in 1916, and the capture of Erzerum (February 16, 1916), of Trebizond (April 7), and Erzinjan (July 25) raised the hope that she might render effective assistance to our own hard-pressed forces in Mesopotamia. Moreover, before the end of 1916 Russia had, apparently, overcome the worst of the difficulties which had paralysed her military efforts on the Eastern Front. So competent a critic as Mr. Winston Churchill goes, indeed, so far as to say that she was in a far better position at the close of 1916 than she had been at the opening of the war. "Surely," he writes, "to no nation has Fate been more malignant than to Russia. Her ship went down in sight of port. She had actually weathered the storm when all was cast away. . . . Despair and treachery usurped command at the very moment when the task was done. The long retreats were ended; the munition famine was broken; arms were pouring in; stronger, larger, better equipped armies guarded the immense front . . . victory (was) certain."¹

Be this as it may, all hopes were shattered when, on March 13, 1917, the long-threatened revolution at last broke out. That resounding event cannot be adequately treated in a brief summary of the war; it must suffice to say that the Czar Nicholas was compelled to abdicate on March 15, and, after being held captive for some time, was with his wife and children foully murdered by his captors. With the overthrow of Czardom, the whole structure of Russian autocracy fell with a crash to the ground; a Republic was proclaimed, and a real effort was made by the moderate Progressives to organize the Republic at home and to wage war at the Front. The effort was wholly in vain. Just as the Girondins, in the French Revolution, were pushed aside by the Jacobins, so in Russia, the "bourgeois" Ministers like Prince Lvov, Kerensky, and Miliukov were, in turn, pushed aside, and power was quickly usurped by the extreme communist party led by men of the type of Lenin and Trotsky.

¹ Churchill: *World Crisis*, iii, 223-4; and General Ludendorff is cited in support of this view: cf. Ludendorff: *General Staff*, i, 305.

The
Bolshevik
Revolution,
Nov. 1917

The second or Bolshevik Revolution (November 7, 1917) put these men in power, the former as Premier, and Trotsky as Commissar of Foreign Affairs. Lenin (1870-1924) was an ardent disciple of Marx, who during his ten years' exile (1907-17), had directed the extreme revolutionary movement in Russia. In April 1917 he returned to Petersburg to denounce the inadequacy of the "bourgeois" revolution and to preach the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Trotsky or Bronstein had, save for a few months in 1905, spent nearly all his adult life (1898-1917) in exile, but returned to Russia in the spring of 1917 to take his place with Lenin in the Bolshevik movement.

Lenin and Trotsky carried everything before them. The only justification for autocracy is success. The Russian autocracy had miserably failed. Nor was there anything in the country on which a moderate Government could base itself. Apart from a handful of intellectuals, of professional men and technicians, there was no middle class in Russia; the mass of the people were illiterates—a ready prey to superstition and propaganda, religious or political. Moreover, the peasants torn from their land to fight for a Czar who could neither feed nor arm them, were utterly war weary. Lenin could promise them a cessation of war and the ownership of the land. For Kerensky and the Provisional Government there was, therefore, even less hope than for the Czardom. Moscow offered a stout resistance to the Bolsheviks, but in Petersburg the Revolutionary Committee of the Soviet of Workmen, Peasants, and Soldiers, established its supremacy without difficulty. Early in November, Lenin could announce the deposition of the Provisional Government, and the transfer of all the powers of the State to the "Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers' Deputies." The immediate offer of a democratic peace, the abolition of the rights of landlordism, the workers' control of industry, and the establishment of a Soviet Government, such was Lenin's programme; the temptation to accept it was irresistible.

Once the Bolshevik Revolution was accomplished, the Russian sailors mutinied and murdered their officers; the Russian soldiers flung down their arms, and raced home with all speed to secure the loot which the social revolution promised.

On the military results of the Russian Revolution it is superfluous to dwell. Germany was able to withdraw great armies from the East, and fling them into the line against the Allies on the West; Austria was, as we have seen, free to concentrate on the Italian Front. It ought, however, to be said that, with or without the revolution, similar results might have ensued, for there is reason to suspect that the Autocracy was already contemplating a separate and therefore a shameful Peace.¹

Such a Peace the Bolshevik Government did actually conclude at Brest-Litovsk. It took no one by surprise. The Bolsheviks had from the first days of the revolution denounced the imperialistic war, and had demanded that it should be transformed into a civil war against the capitalistic Governments throughout the world, as a prelude to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Accordingly a ten days' truce was arranged (December 5, 1917); negotiations for a definitive Peace were begun on the 22nd, and on March 3, 1918, a treaty was signed at Brest-Litovsk ^{Treaty of Brest-Litovsk} ² between Russia on the one side, and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey on the other. The parties mutually agreed to "refrain from all agitation or provocation against Government or State or their "existence"; Russia agreed to give up all rights in Poland, Courland, and Lithuania, to evacuate Esthonia, Livonia, the Ukraine and all the occupied Turkish territories, and to demobilize her army.³ The terms thus imposed upon Bolshevik Russia possess, indeed, no more than an historic interest, since, as Count Czernin writes, "the waves of war have passed over the Peace of Brest-Litovsk washing it away as completely as a castle of sand on the shore is destroyed by the incoming tide."

The broad result was that Russia was definitely out of the war. The *Entente* was broken. The Western Powers must carry on the struggle as best they could.

Two months after the signature of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Quadruple Alliance also imposed peace, as we ^{Treaty of Bucharest}

¹ Cf. Czernin, *op. cit.*, p. 141, and Mowat, *op. cit.*, p. 76, and the authorities there cited.

² For an exceedingly interesting diary of the proceedings at Brest-Litovsk, cf. Czernin, *op. cit.*, pp. 211-57. Count Czernin and the Emperor Charles were in favour of a separate Peace with Russia had Germany refused.

³ Abridged text, ap. *Peace Conference*, iii, 42-3.

have seen, on Roumania. But in view of subsequent events, this treaty also was waste-paper.¹

Intervention
of the U.S.A.,
April 1917

The defection of Bolshevik Russia, and the Peace imposed on Roumania by the Central Empires, left the latter free to concentrate their efforts on the Western Front. But almost at the moment that Russia failed, a new ally, morally if not militarily worth a dozen Russias, had come into the field against Germany. The attitude of the United States during the first two years of the war had been gravely disappointing, not only to the Allies, but to many of their own citizens. President Wilson essayed to play a mediating part in the world-conflict.² Not even the sinking of the *Lusitania* could drive him from the position he had assumed. But the more doggedly President Wilson persisted in the policy of neutrality, the more daring became the German attacks upon neutral shipping. At last, on February 1, 1917, Germany proclaimed "unrestricted submarine warfare": any ship trading with Great Britain was to be sunk at sight. This culminating insult was too much even for the patience of the American President; on February 2 the United States broke off diplomatic relations, and on April 6, 1917, declared war on Germany. "With the entrance of the United States into this war, a new chapter opened in world-history." So spake Lord Bryce. "The entrance of the United States into the war was the greatest mental effort and spiritual realization of truth which has occurred in the whole course of secular history." The words are Mr. Churchill's, and they anticipate the verdict of posterity. That America should so far abandon her traditional policy and fling all her weight, moral and material, into the war was, in truth, an event of solemn significance. The military effect of her intervention was not, however, felt until the closing months of the war, when it did much to turn the scale against Germany; the moral effect was felt from the moment when President Wilson made his famous speech to Congress on April 2. The American point of view is admirably expressed by an American historian in words reminiscent of Abraham Lincoln. "The world was too small to contain two fundamentally hostile principles of life

¹ For first-hand account of the negotiation, see Czernin, pp. 258-70; text ap. *Peace Conference*, iii, 44-50.

² For his Peace efforts, cf. *infra*.

. . . the world cannot permanently exist or longer live half-slave and half-free.”¹ Others quoted, somewhat tardily it is true, Mazzini’s famous aphorism: “Neutrality in a war of principles is mere passive existence, forgetfulness of all which makes a people sacred, the negation of the common law of nations, political atheism.” The pity was that America had not heeded Mazzini’s words two years earlier.

How badly American help was needed, the story of 1918 will tell. Between March and July the Germans on the Western Front launched four terrific attacks. The first (March 21) opened near St. Quentin, and resulted in the repulse of the 5th British Army under Sir Hubert Gough.² Six hundred thousand Germans attacked the weakest point in the Anglo-French line, and by the mere weight of numbers pierced it. Bapaume and Péronne, Albert, Montdidier, Noyon—all the expensive fruits of the sacrifices on the Somme were lost; but in front of Amiens the German advance was stayed. The crisis was valiantly met. Foch was invested with supreme command of the allied forces; all the available British reserves were hurried across the Channel; troops were summoned from Palestine; America was urged to expedite the despatch of her forces. Thanks in large measure to the British Navy, the Americans soon began to pour across the Atlantic. Over 80,000 were sent off in March, nearly 120,000 in April, over 245,000 in May, nearly 280,000 in June, over 300,000 in July, over 285,000 in August, and 257,000 in September. In all, forty-two American divisions were landed in France. Fifty-one per cent. of the troops were carried in British, 46 per cent. in American vessels; and out of the vast total, only two hundred men were lost through the attacks of enemy submarines. Germany was astounded at this remarkable feat, having believed it to be impossible of accomplishment.

Meanwhile, on April 9, Germany launched a second attack south of Ypres. The offensive lasted for three weeks, and was very costly both to the Germans and to the Allies. A third attack, opened on May 26, brought the Germans once

¹ Professor McLaughlin.

² This was the official view; but the question whether the 5th Army were vanquished or victors is now hotly disputed. For a spirited defence of Gough, see Lord Birkenhead: *Turning Points of History*, Lond., 1930.

more on to the Marne, but at Chateau-Thierry their advance was stayed by Foch (June 11). The enemy attacked again on July 15, and were permitted by the great French soldier to cross the Marne. But on the 18th, Foch let loose his reserves, and the Germans were driven back with immense slaughter.

The counter-offensive,
Aug.-Nov.

On August 8 the British counter-offensive began. The fierce fighting between that date and November 11 may be regarded as one almost continuous battle, in the course of which the British armies captured nearly 200,000 prisoners and not much short of 3000 guns; 140,000 prisoners and nearly 2000 guns fell to the French; 43,000 prisoners and 1400 guns to the Americans; while the gallant remnant of the Belgian army also claimed its modest share in the greatest battle of all recorded history. The details of the fighting must be sought elsewhere. The result may be chronicled in a sentence. The great military machine of Germany was at last broken into fragments; the German people turned in anger upon the dynasty, and William of Hohenzollern having surrendered the Crown of Prussia and the throne of Germany (November 9), fled for safety to Holland. Already the terms of an Armistice had been agreed upon by the Allies at Versailles (November 4), and on November 11 they were accepted by the accredited envoys of Germany. The Great War was over.

Germany
"cracks"

The influence of
sea-power

To this result many convergent causes had contributed. The gallant resistance of Liége; the superb courage and unyielding tenacity of the French armies and the French people; the dogged endurance and the heroic sacrifices of Britons from many lands; the fell decision of Germany to hack her way through Belgium which brought Great Britain into the war; the tardy but effective help of America—all these were factors of immense significance; but not one of them would have availed had Great Britain lost command of the sea. How gravely that command was imperilled in the spring of 1917 may now be confessed.

The
capture of
German
Colonies

The influence of sea-power upon the issue of such a war can be demonstrated only by a detailed analysis, impossible in this place.¹ One demonstrable and dramatic result may, however, be summarily indicated. Before the end of 1917, Germany had ceased to own one foot of territory beyond the

¹ For remarkably vivid accounts of the war at sea, cf. Churchill: *World Crisis*, Lond.; and Sims: *Victory at Sea*.

confines of Europe. Her Pacific possessions were swept up in the first months of the war. German Samoa was occupied by a force from New Zealand on August 29 ; the Bismarck Archipelago and German New Guinea fell to the Australians in September ; the Japanese took the Marshal Islands, and on November 7 Kiaochow surrendered to the combined attack of Japanese and British forces. In West Africa, Togoland was taken by British and French forces in August 1914, and was divided between the captors. The Cameroons was attacked by French troops from the French Congo and by a small British force from Nigeria in the same month. Not, however, until February 1916 was it actually taken. Meanwhile General Botha had been busy in the south of the continent. His first business was to suppress an insurrection headed by De Wet in his own country. That task accomplished, he led an army into German South-West Africa and captured Windhuk, its capital, on May 12, 1915. On July 9 the Germans agreed to an unconditional surrender, and the most important of their African Colonies passed into the keeping of the Union of South Africa.

Arduous as was Botha's campaign in South-West Africa, ^{The} it was neither so arduous nor so prolonged as the fight for the ^{campaign} possession of German East Africa. ^{in East} Strategically the East ^{Africa} was even more important than the South-West. Could Germany have held it with adequate naval as well as military forces, she would have threatened the British Empire's line of communications at a vital point. Our naval supremacy averted this danger ; but Germany had made elaborate preparations to defend her own colony, and if occasion offered to attack British East Africa. General von Lettow-Vorbeck commanded a force of 3000 Europeans and 12,000 well-equipped and well-disciplined Askaris. A British attack on Tanga was repulsed in November 1914, and not until General Smuts took over the command of the British forces at the beginning of 1916 was any effective progress made. Dar-es-salaam was captured in September 1916, but another fourteen months of hard fighting were required before the Germans were cleared out of the colony. They took refuge in Portuguese East Africa, and thence in the autumn of 1918 made their way into Northern Rhodesia ; nor did they surrender until compelled to do so by the terms of the Armistice

The
victory at
sea

To return to the war at sea. No attempt can be made to tell the heroic story in detail; nor indeed in outline: partly from lack of space, partly because in the history of naval warfare the World War was unique. "Barring a few naval actions between surface vessels, such as the battles of Jutland and of the Falkland Islands, the naval war was for the most part a succession of contests between single vessels or small groups of vessels." So writes Admiral Sims of the United States Navy.¹ The English victory at sea was won for the most part by silent but unrelaxing pressure in the North Sea, and by vigilant watch in the Channel, the Mediterranean, and the Eastern Atlantic. On August 28 three German cruisers had indeed been sunk in an engagement in the Bight of Heligoland, but on September 22 we in turn lost three fine cruisers, *Aboukir*, *Hogue*, and *Cressy*, by submarine attack. Further afield, two British cruisers *Good Hope* and *Monmouth*, were sunk (November 1) by the German Pacific Squadron, commanded by Von Spee, off the coast of Chile, when Admiral Cradock went down with fourteen hundred officers and men; but the German triumph was short-lived. A squadron was promptly sent out from England under the command of Sir Doveton Sturdee, who, making all possible speed, arrived off the Falkland Isles on December 7. On the very next day Admiral Sturdee fell in with Von Spee, and *Gneisenau*, *Scharnhorst*, *Leipzig*, *Nuremberg* were sunk after a gallant fight; only the *Dresden* escaped. The British loss was only seven men killed. The *Dresden* was caught and sunk three months later. Much damage to British merchantmen in the Far East had meanwhile been done by the German cruiser *Emden*, which sailed from China early in August; but she was at last hunted down and sunk off Cocos Island (November 10) by the Australian cruiser *Sydney*.

The
submarine
menace

The first months of 1915 were marked by the opening of a new phase in the war at sea. On February 15 a blockade of the British coasts was declared by Germany, and was to some extent enforced by her submarines. On March 1 Great Britain retorted by Orders in Council which established a blockade of the German coast; but partly owing to a desire to avoid offence to neutrals, partly owing to the mischievous provisions the of "Declaration of London" (1908) the blockade did not

¹ *The Victory at Sea*, p. xii.

become really effective until, in July 1916, the Declaration of London was denounced. On May 7, 1915, Germany committed one of the greatest crimes and perhaps the greatest blunder of which even she has ever been guilty. Her submarines torpedoed the great Atlantic liner the *Lusitania*, with the loss of over a thousand non-combatants, men, women, and children. Had Germany's ultimate fate ever been in doubt, that great crime had sealed it. From that moment, the conscience of the American people was aroused, and it was only a matter of time how soon outraged moral feelings would translate themselves into effective military action.

The only action of the war in which great fleets were engaged was the battle of Jutland. Of the Grand Fleet under Admiral Sir John Jellicoe little had been heard during the first eighteen months of the war. During that time it was mostly at sea, for the simple though almost incredible reason that there was no defended East Coast harbour ready for its reception. After the opening of war the defences of Rosyth, in the Firth of Forth, abandoned half-finished in a fit of penury, and those of Scapa Flow in the Orkneys, were rapidly pushed forward; before the end of the war they had been rendered virtually impregnable against German attacks. But not only were defended harbours lacking; the Germans had the superiority in guns (save for our 15-inch guns), in mines, in Zeppelins (incalculably useful for naval scouting), in submarines, and in high explosive shells; nor were they markedly inferior in gunnery; but the Grand Fleet was virtually unassailed, and the German Fleet did not come out.

At last, however, it resolved to try conclusions, and on ^{Battle of} May 31, 1916, the fleets of England and Germany met in the ^{Jutland} mighty conflict which to all time will be known as the battle of Jutland. One hundred and forty-five British ships and 110 German ships were engaged. Of Dreadnoughts we had 28 against 16; of cruisers of various types, 40 against 16; of destroyers, 77 against 72; but Germany had in addition 6 pre-Dreadnought battleships. As to the result of the battle, experts are still disputing; a layman can only note the fact that the German Fleet never showed itself again until it sailed, under custody, to shameful captivity. When ordered to put out in the last days of the war, the crews mutinied. Yet one of the greatest of the allied experts holds that the German

Admiralty were entirely right ; that in harbour the German Fleet was doing work which it could not have done had it come out. To have come out would have meant almost certain annihilation for itself, and the setting free the flotilla of British destroyers for convoy work, and for the hunting down of German submarines. The German Fleet in harbour was effectually protecting German submarines ; so long as it was in being the British destroyers, urgently needed elsewhere, must stay to screen the Grand Fleet. Yet there is a converse to the picture, as the same expert has pointed out : " In April 1917 the allied navies while they controlled the surface of the water did not control the sub-surface . . . yet the determining fact . . . was that their control of the surface was to give us the control of the sub-surface also. Only the fact that the battleships kept the German Fleet at bay made it possible for the destroyers and other surface craft to do their beneficent (convoy) work." ¹

The
situation
in 1917

Yet in the spring of 1917 the allied position was unspeakably grave. Literally, everything depended on British sailors and British ships. On January 31, the war at sea had entered upon a new phase : Germany carried out her threat of " unrestricted " submarine warfare—the sinking of unarmed merchantmen, hospital ships, anything afloat,—without warning. For many months the new method proved terribly effective. By April 1917, British ships had carried, in comparative safety, no less than 8,000,000 troops over sea ; they had kept open the allied lines of communication in the Channel, in the Atlantic, in the Mediterranean (with the help of French, and Italian ships), and of Japan in the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific ; they had brought to the Allies food and munitions. But they had accomplished this wonderful task at a high cost in lives and ships, and the strain upon them was intense.

In the early summer of 1917 the strain came perilously near the breaking-point. " A year ago it was supposed that England would be able to use the acres of the whole world, bidding with them against the German acres. To-day England sees herself in a situation unparalleled in her history. Her acres across sea disappear as a result of the blockade which submarines are daily making most effective around England." These words, uttered by Dr. Karl Helfferich, the

¹ Sims, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

German Secretary of the Interior, in February 1917, were no idle boast. The real facts were carefully and properly concealed from the British and allied peoples, but Helfferich spoke truth. The losses of British, allied, and neutral ships increased from 181 (298,000 gross tonnage) in January, to 259 (468,000 tons) in February, 325 (500,000 tons) in March, and 423 (849,000 tons) in April. In April, writes Mr. Churchill, "the great approach to the south-west of Ireland was becoming a veritable cemetery of British shipping, in which large vessels were sunk day by day about 200 miles from land."¹ One ship out of every four that left British shores never came home, but as Mr. Churchill proudly and justly adds: "no voyage was delayed for lack of resolute civilian volunteers."² The facts were known in Germany, where it was calculated that the end must come in July or at latest by August 1. Unless the submarine peril could be countered, surrender, according to the official view of the British Admiralty, could not be postponed beyond November.

Happily for the world, countered it was by the adoption of the "convoy" system, and the advent in rapidly increasing numbers of American destroyers. ^{The United States Navy in the war} The first American flotilla of six destroyers reached Queenstown on May 4, 1917; by July 5, thirty-four had arrived and were at the disposal of Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, commanding at Queenstown. In all, the United States contributed to the naval forces of the Allies some 70 destroyers, 120 submarine chasers, 20 submarines and other small craft, besides mine-sweepers (13), mine-layers (9), and auxiliary craft of various descriptions. The aid they rendered to the allied cause came at a critical moment, and its value can hardly be over-estimated.

In December 1917 four American Dreadnoughts joined Admiral Beatty at Scapa Flow, and these, with a fifth which arrived later, formed the 6th battle squadron of the Grand Fleet, with which it acted during the remaining ten months of the war as an integral unit. The American ships "adopted the British systems of tactics and fire control, and in every other way conformed to the established practices of the British."³ The fine spirit shown by Admiral Rodman and

¹ *Op. cit.*, iv, 362.

² *Op. cit.*, iv, 351.

³ The part played by the American Navy is described most vividly and with characteristic modesty by Admiral Sims in *The Victory at Sea*.

the officers and men under his command, was cordially acknowledged in a farewell speech by Sir David (afterwards Earl) Beatty, who spoke of the "wonderful co-operation and the loyalty you have given to me and to my Admirals," and thanked them "again and again for the great part the 6th battle squadron played in bringing about the greatest naval victory in history."

Perhaps the most notable contribution of the American Navy to the ultimate victory at sea was the construction of the great North Sea barrage. The idea of such barrages, to catch the German submarines before they could reach their hunting grounds off the Irish coasts, had frequently been mooted, and had indeed been partially carried out. Not, however, until America came in was the appropriate mine invented, nor could it before then have been manufactured in sufficient quantities; but in 1917 the Americans flung themselves into the work with marvellous energy, and in the summer of 1918 they laid 57,571 of the newly-invented mines between the Orkneys and Norway, while the British during the same period laid 13,546. The barrage, intended to cover the whole distance of 250 nautical miles, was not completed when the Armistice was signed. A similar though, of course, much smaller barrage was constructed by the Americans to close the channel between Scotland and Ireland. How far these barrages contributed to dispel the submarine menace can never be exactly known; but the mutiny in the German Navy (November 2) is commonly accepted as an eloquent testimony to the terror they had inspired among the crews. The actual losses of the American Navy were few and insignificant, but before the close of the war they had in all about 380 ships in European waters, with a personnel of over 80,000 officers and men.

Due appreciation of the American effort must not, however, be permitted to disguise the plain fact that the victory at sea was, in the main, the superb achievement of the British Navy, and the British Mercantile Marine. Words cannot express the debt which the Allies owed to the latter no less than to the former. The losses suffered by the Merchant Service were relatively the highest in the war. No less than 9,031,000 tons of British merchant shipping were sunk, and more than 44,500 men were killed, drowned, or severely

wounded ; of whom 14,661 were killed or drowned. The naval casualties amounted to 27,175 of whom no fewer than 22,258 were killed or drowned. The heroism of the men of the Mercantile Marine is attested by the fact that before the close of the war many men had been torpedoed five or six times, and yet there is no single instance on record of a man having refused to re-ship.

When all did such magnificent service it is almost invidious to mention particular units or individual exploits ; but a French Admiral has not hesitated to describe the raid on Zeebrugge as " the finest feat of arms in all naval history of all times and all countries." ¹ This was the work of the " Dover Patrol," and was accomplished by a flotilla—mostly very light craft—of 142 ships, under the command of Sir Roger Keyes. The night selected for this daring exploit was St. George's Day (April 23, 1918) ; the object of it was to seal up the most important of the German submarine bases. In the case of Zeebrugge the object was largely attained ; the attack on Ostend for the moment miscarried, but on May 10 it was renewed with considerable though not complete success. From that moment the submarine attacks rapidly decreased. Of the 182 German submarines known to have been sunk or captured in the course of the war, no fewer than 175 were the victims of British seamen.

The defeat of the submarines was, however, only a fraction of the task they accomplished. To have kept inviolate (save for a few tip-and-run raids early in the war) the coasts of Great Britain ; to have transported across thousands of miles of ocean millions of men from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, South Africa, the West Indies, and the United States ; to have carried them to and from the half-dozen theatres of war ; to have safeguarded the commercial routes and to have kept Great Britain and her Allies supplied with food, with raw materials, and munitions ; to have kept open the long lines of communication in the Atlantic, the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean—such was the superb achievement, largely silent and half unperceived, of the British Naval and Merchant Services.

To Britain, therefore, it was fitting that the German Navy should be surrendered. The first batch of the surrendered

¹ Quoted by Fletcher, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

submarines reached Harwich on November 19; two days later the High Seas Fleet was handed over at Rosyth. On that day (November 21) Admiral Beatty signalled to the Fleet: "The German flag will be hauled down at sunset to-day, and will not be hoisted again without permission."¹ So ended the war at sea.

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CHAPTER XXVII

RECONSTRUCTION

THE WORLD SETTLEMENT. THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND
AFTER

The slate
and the
writing

QUAND Dieu efface, c'est qu'il se prépare à écrire. Bossuet was right. If God cleans the slate it is only in order to write something fresh on it. Destruction can only be justified by reconstruction. Between 1914 and 1918 the European slate was wiped clean. Nor in forwarding that process could the allied armies doubt that they were doing the work of Providence. It remained for allied statesmanship to justify the supreme self-sacrifice of soldiers, sailors, and airmen. A hundred years earlier, the sword of Napoleon, though selfishly and arrogantly wielded, had undoubtedly done destructive work, which was an essential preliminary to the constructive work of the nineteenth century. A united Germany and a united Italy rose on the ruins of the structures which Napoleon ruthlessly destroyed. The Corsican adventurer came as a scourge to Europe ; but it was a cleansing scourge. Europe was the healthier for his coming.

The sword reluctantly drawn from the scabbard by the Allies, in order to meet the deliberate assault of the Central Empires in 1914, has, we may hope, accomplished a similar task. The three great dynastic Powers of Central Europe—the Hohenzollerns, the Hapsburgs, and the Ottoman Turks—were overthrown. Those Powers had for centuries existed in defiance of the two leading principles, which by general consent have given to the later periods of European history their distinctive significance : the idea of Liberty and the idea of Nationality. To the advance of these principles, Prussia, Austria, and Turkey opposed an adamant front. And not unnaturally : their existence depended upon the negation

of these principles. In this connection, it is, however, important to distinguish between Prussia and Germany. Prussia, like Austria and Turkey-in-Europe, is a purely artificial product, corresponding to no vital principle of State growth, economic or ethnographic. It is otherwise with Germany. Modern Germany was indeed brought into being by Hohenzollern statecraft and the Prussian sword. But the product corresponds, as Prussia did not, to vital principles quite distinct from the genius of a dynasty, or the power of an army. Nor did the settlement effected by the diplomatists at Versailles fail to respect and reflect the distinction here drawn. Prussia was destroyed; Germany remains virtually intact. Before proceeding to examine the details of the post-war settlement, we must glance at the successive attempts which were made, during the actual progress of hostilities, to bring about a Peace by negotiation.

The war was not many weeks old before there came ^{Peace efforts during the war} rumours, from one quarter and another, of negotiations for Peace; but the first serious effort was that put forward by Mr. Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, in February 1916. Sir Edward Grey learnt, through Colonel House, the confidential agent of the President, that Mr. Wilson was prepared to propose the summoning of a Conference, and that, if Germany then refused "reasonable terms," the United States would probably enter the war on the side of the Allies. By "reasonable" terms Colonel House understood: "complete restoration of Belgium and Serbia, return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, Constantinople for Russia, an independent Poland, cession of Italian-speaking regions by Austria to Italy, compensation to Germany outside Europe, abolition of competitive armaments, and guarantees against military aggression."¹ Grey was reluctant to press these terms upon the French lest the latter should suspect England of readiness to desert their Allies. Nor, indeed, would Germany have considered these terms for a moment.²

So nothing came of the interesting suggestion; but on German ^{move,} December 12, 1916, the Germans published a Note expressing ^{Dec. 12,} their willingness to enter a Peace Conference, though without ¹⁹¹⁶ specifying any terms. Almost simultaneously (December 18),

¹ *Intimate Papers of Col. House*, ii, 170.

² So Col. House learnt in 1925.

but independently, President Wilson invited both belligerents to state their views as to the terms of Peace. The German reply was entirely vague. The Allies, though resenting Wilson's suggestion that "the causes and objects of the war are obscure," stated their war aims in a Note issued from Paris on January 10; and in a despatch of the 16th January, Mr. Balfour¹ reiterated them with even greater precision. The Allies demanded "the restitution of provinces formerly torn from the Allies by force, or against the wish of the inhabitants, (a sentence intended, as Mr. Balfour made clear, to cover Alsace-Lorraine); the liberation of the Italians, as also of the Slavs, Roumanians, and Czecho-Slovaks; the setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks, and the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly alien to Western civilization; the restoration of Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro, with the compensations due to them; the evacuation of the invaded territories in France, Russia, and Roumania, with just reparation; the reorganization of Europe guaranteed by a stable régime, and based at once on respect for nationalities and on the right to full security and liberty of economic development possessed by all peoples, small and great, and at the same time upon territorial conventions and international settlements so as to guarantee land and sea frontiers against unjustifiable attack."

The Allies further pointed out that the Czar had promised independence to Poland,² and declared their collective and whole-hearted adherence to a League of Nations as suggested by President Wilson.

Mr. Wilson
and the
Senate

Mr. Wilson was not, however, a dictator in foreign affairs—as the Allies ought to have remembered at Paris. On January 22, 1917, in a notable speech, he communicated to the Senate, who were jointly responsible with him for the conclusion of treaties, his view of the situation. "The war must not be ended by any Peace of the ordinary type. It must be a Peace worth guaranteeing and preserving—a Peace without victory," a Peace, the principle of which is equality and a

¹ Mr. Balfour had succeeded Sir Edward Grey at the Foreign Office in December 1916.

² In view of what had happened after 1815 this promise was somewhat ambiguous, and the Western Allies were perhaps all the more anxious on that account to insist on it.

common participation in a common benefit. It must recognize the principle that all Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. Poland, for example, must become independent and autonomous. Every great people should, as far as practicable, "have a direct outlet to the great highways of the sea"; the seas must be "free" to all; armaments must be limited; and a "concert of power's" must be substituted for a "balance of power"; there must be no entangling alliances. In fine, the world must follow the example of the United States and adopt the Monroe doctrine.

The phrase "Peace without victory" was regrettable, and as Mr. Page (who implored his President to delete it) predicted, was deeply resented by the Allies. Nevertheless this declaration of policy was, in view of subsequent events, of high significance.¹

The German response to it was characteristic. On January 31 they announced unrestricted submarine warfare; consequently the United States broke off diplomatic relations with Germany on February 3, and on April 6 declared war.

Austrian
attempts at
Peace

Within a week of the American declaration of war (April 12), Count Czernin, who in December 1916 had become Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary, under the new Emperor Charles, addressed a Memorandum to his master, recommending Peace as the only way of averting the collapse of the Hapsburg Monarchy, and the ruin of its subjects. The military strength of Austria was "coming to an end"; revolution "supported by England" was threatening the throne; the burdens imposed on the people were becoming intolerable; the U-boat warfare was not going to bring England to her knees; the only chance was to make Peace before American intervention became effective.²

Germany, believing that the military situation was favourable to her, and especially elated by the success of U-boat warfare "far exceeding all calculations and expectations,"³ would not listen to these suggestions; and the Emperor Charles, convinced that Czernin was right, attempted, therefore, to negotiate a separate Peace, through his brother-in-law, Prince Sixte of Bourbon-Parma. The Austrian Emperor promised to

¹ Hendrick's *Page*, iii, 316.

² Czernin, *In the World War*, pp. 146-50.

³ The Kaiser to Emperor Charles, Czernin, p. 151.

"support . . . the just French claims on Alsace-Lorraine, and the reinstatement and compensation of Belgium and Serbia." Prince Sixte, who was a combatant officer in the Belgian army at the time, met the civilian chiefs of England and France, who were not discouraging, provided Italy could be satisfied.¹ The Austrian Emperor, whose original proposal had ignored Italy, was brought to the point of ceding the Trentino. That, however, was far from satisfying Italy, who insisted on "the whole claim—as promised in the Pact of London." On that point the Sixte negotiations broke down, as did subsequent attempts of the Emperor Charles.² The efforts of Czernin and his master were, though ineffective, palpably sincere. "The future will show," said Czernin, after the conclusion of the Armistice, "what superhuman efforts we have made to induce Germany to give way. That all proved fruitless was not the fault of the German people but that of the leaders of the German military party (which) . . . had attained a degree of power in the State rarely equalled in history."³

Mr. Wilson's
"Fourteen
Points"

In making this distinction between the German people and their masters, Count Czernin re-echoed the language consistently used by Mr. Wilson. Early in January 1918 both Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Wilson stated their war-aims with renewed clearness. The British Empire, said the former, was not aiming at the "break up of the German people or the disintegration of their State or country"; it was not proposed to "alter or destroy the Imperial Constitution of Germany"; nor to "destroy Austria-Hungary," nor "to deprive Turkey of its capital," or of Thrace. "Genuine self-government" must, however, be "granted to those Austro-Hungarian nationalities who have long desired it," and the subject-lands of Turkey were entitled to a "recognition of their separate national existence." Alsace-Lorraine must be restored to France. Poland must be made independent; Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro, and Roumania must be restored, while the German Colonies must be "held at the disposal of a Con-

¹ Mr. Lloyd George took Prince Sixte to see King George in whom the French had the greatest confidence.

² On the whole of this interesting episode, cf. Manteyer: *Austria's Peace Offer* (E.T., Lond., 1921); Mowat, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-111; Czernin, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-87; and Sir C. Petrie, *Fortnightly Review*, Nov. 1930.

³ Speech of December 11, 1918, Czernin, *op. cit.*, pp. 325 seq.

ference whose decision must have primary regard to the wishes and interests of the native inhabitants of such Colonies." Finally, "permanent Peace must be founded on : (1) the re-establishment of the sanctity of treaties ; (2) a territorial settlement based on the right of self-determination ; and (3) the creation of some international organization to limit the burden of armaments and diminish the probability of war."

Three days later Mr. Wilson formulated his famous "Fourteen Points." Why Mr. Wilson should have issued "fourteen commandments" when "even le bon Dieu was content with ten," M. Clemenceau could never understand. As regards territorial readjustments Mr. Wilson's "Points" did not essentially differ from the demands made by Mr. Lloyd George, though the President was more specific as to Italian claims, and insisted also on reduction of armaments, open covenants of peace, the freedom of the seas, the removal, as far as possible, of all economic barriers among all nations consenting to the Peace, and, above all, on a League of Nations "formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike."

The German High Command refused even to listen to "terms." "If Germany makes Peace without profit, then Germany has lost the war." So said Ludendorff to Czernin, who was, however, somewhat comforted by the whispered assurance of the German Chancellor Count Hertling : "Leave him alone ; we two will manage it together without him."¹

Eight months later Ludendorff and Hindenburg were insisting on an immediate Peace ; there was no longer any question of "profit" for Germany ; she had "lost the war."

The final counter-attack of the Allies was launched, as we saw, on the 8th of August. Thenceforward events moved with great rapidity. Less than a week later, the two Emperors had a fateful Conference with their civilian and military advisers at Spa. After that it was a case of *sauve qui peut*. On September 10, Hindenburg recommended the Austrian Emperor to make the best terms he could with the enemy. On the 15th, the Emperor addressed to President Wilson a Peace

Preparations
for an
Armistice

¹ Czernin, Feb. 5, 1918, *op. cit.*, p. 247. The words had reference specifically to the negotiations then in progress at Brest-Litovsk, but they had a more general application.

Note. On the 29th, King Ferdinand of Bulgaria made an unconditional surrender, and on October 4, abdicated. Meanwhile, on September 29, the German Government decided to ask for Peace, and, aware of the fact that President Wilson would not conclude Peace except with a democratized Germany, prepared at the same time to initiate a Parliamentary régime. Prince Max of Baden was induced to take office as a "responsible" Minister; but the army chiefs, who had resisted Peace proposals at Spa, suddenly lost nerve, and on October 1 frantically appealed to the Government to make an immediate offer of Peace: "To-day the troops are holding their own; what may happen to-morrow cannot be foreseen." "The army," wrote a Foreign Office official from Army Headquarters, "cannot wait forty-eight hours." The magnificent machine had cracked. The men who had made the war confessed their failure.

Prince Max accordingly made formal application to President Wilson for an Armistice on the basis of his speech of January 8 (the "Fourteen Points"), and subsequent declarations.

Notes passed and repassed between Berlin and Washington. There could be no Armistice without "absolutely satisfactory safeguards for the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States and of the Allies," and unless the German Government could speak for the German people. All the talk of a "Peace without victory" had gone. Prince Max, on his part, gave his assurance that the request for Peace came "from a Government which, free from every arbitrary and irresponsible influence, is supported by the approval of the overwhelming majority of the German people." But the fighting at the Front did not cease; the Germans were in full retreat.

On October 27 Austria informed Germany that she must make a separate Peace. On the same day Ludendorff was dismissed by the Kaiser. On the 30th, the Turks signed the Armistice of Mudros, and on November 3, Austria signed an Armistice with Italy. On the same day the sailors mutinied at Kiel, and the Red Flag was hoisted in several German towns. By the 9th, the "Revolution" had reached Berlin. On that day the Emperor abdicated, and with the Crown Prince fled to Holland.

Meanwhile the Germans had formally applied for an Armistice to Marshal Foch (November 6). A meeting was held on the 8th. The Armistice was signed at 5 a.m. on the morning of November 11.¹ At 11 o'clock a.m. the "cease fire" was sounded.

Between the signature of the Armistice and the opening of the Peace Conference in Paris, two months were permitted to elapse, unfortunately but unavoidably. The Conference had to wait upon the arrival of President Wilson from America, and upon the verdict of a General Election in Great Britain. Meanwhile a most elaborate machinery was set up in Paris. An army of delegations with their staffs descended upon the French capital; the British Delegation alone, with its clerical staff, numbered over six hundred persons. The vastness of the machinery was not perhaps incommensurate with the range of the war, or the scope of the treaties, but it did not make for the expeditious settlement which on every ground was much to be desired. The Conference itself when in plenary session consisted of seventy delegates; of these, fourteen represented the British Empire; France, Italy, United States, and Japan claimed five each; Belgium, Jugoslavia, and Brazil, three apiece; China, Czecho-Slovakia, Greece, Portugal, Roumania, Poland, Siam, and the Hedjaz, two each; Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Hayti, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, one each. The treaty itself was signed by sixty-eight of these, China alone abstaining. The defeated belligerents were not admitted to the Conference. Frenchmen remembered, if others did not, what Talleyrand had done at Vienna. As a fact, the ultimate decisions were reached by four men—the principal representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States; some of the most important by two only—M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George. The writing on the slate was largely in their hands.

M. Poincaré, President of the French Republic, formally opened the Conference which elected M. Clemenceau as its President on the 18th January.

For some months the machinery of the Conference creaked

¹ Granted in the first instance for 36 days the Armistice was renewed on the 13th December, 16th January and 16th February—in the last case indefinitely.

ominously. More than once there seemed danger of a complete breakdown ; but the two chief representatives of Great Britain and France were not easily discouraged, and, with the help of President Wilson, they hammered out the terms of a treaty, which by the end of April was ready for presentation to the German Delegation, who arrived at Versailles on the 29th. On the 7th, the Treaty of Versailles was formally presented to them, and from then until June 22 there was a constant interchange of Notes between the German Delegation and the Conference. On June 22, Clemenceau announced that the time for discussion was over. If the Germans did not signify their adherence to the treaty within twenty-four hours, the allied army would recommence their advance. Under protest the Germans gave way, and on June 28 the treaty was signed in the Hall of Mirrors in the Palace of Versailles, the self-same room where, on January 18, 1871, the German Empire had been proclaimed.

Of the settlement embodied in the Treaty of Versailles, and in the treaties subsequently concluded with Austria,¹ Hungary,² Bulgaria,³ and Turkey, only a bare summary can be attempted. It falls naturally into three parts : (1) the re-making of the political map of Europe ; (2) the territorial readjustments in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific ; and (3) the regulation of future international relations by means of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

§ 1. THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE

The Peace
Settlement

The territorial resettlement in Europe depended upon five pivots : the readjustment of the eastern frontiers of France ; the liberation of the peoples formerly annexed by Prussia, mainly Poles and Danes ; the disintegration of the composite Empire of the Hapsburgs ; the redemption of unredeemed Italy ; and the liquidation of the Turkish estate in Europe.


The Rhine
frontier

The question as to the frontier between France and Germany had formed the subject of diplomatic controversy for at least three centuries. Ever since the seventeenth century it had been the declared ambition of France to reach " *les limites naturelles* " : the Rhine, the Alps, and the

¹ St. Germain, September 10, 1919.

² Trianon, June 4, 1920.

³ Neuilly, Nov. 27, 1919.



CENTRAL AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE, 1921

Alsace-
Lorraine

Pyrenees. That ambition was never completely realized by the old Bourbon Monarchy. The Pyrenees was reached in 1659 ; Napoleon's conquests extended beyond the Rhine and the Alps, but those conquests were not permanently retained by France. Despite the protests of Prussia, France did, however, retain in 1815—thanks mainly to the advocacy of the Duke of Wellington—Alsace and Lorraine ; she lost them, as we have seen, in 1871, and they formed the first subject to be settled in 1919. On the question of Alsace-Lorraine, ethnography speaks with an uncertain voice ; nor are economic considerations all on one side ; but the matter has now been decided on the one hand by the sword, on the other by the indubitable wishes of the great mass of the inhabitants of the two Provinces. In 1871 Alsatians and Lorrainers cried in chorus : “ French we are and French we desire to remain.” In the intervening years, Germany did nothing to wean them from that allegiance. Alsace and Lorraine were restored to France with their frontiers as in 1870. In regard to the Rhine frontier, France obtained a strong military guarantee : Germany was not to maintain or construct any fortification either on the left bank or within 50 kilometres of the right bank of the Rhine ; within this area she might maintain no armed forces, either permanent or temporary, or hold any manœuvres, or maintain any works for facilitating mobilization. As to the Saar Valley, the provisions of the treaty were elaborate. The territory of the Saar Basin is a thickly populated industrial district, nearly 700 square miles in area, situated directly north of Lorraine. The population is almost wholly of German nationality, but Germany was compelled under the treaty to cede to France the full and absolute possession of the valuable coal-field of the district. This concession represented appropriate, though partial, reparation for the wilful and wanton destruction by Germany of all the mineral wealth of France, on which during the war she could lay hands. The district as a whole was to be administered for fifteen years by a Commission nominated by the League of Nations, and at the close of that period a plébiscite must be taken in order to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants. They will have three alternatives to choose from : continuance of the régime under the League of Nations ; union with France ; or re-union with Germany. It is probable that the

The Saar
Basin

plébiscite to be taken in 1935 will result in re-union with Germany. In the meantime the task assigned to the governing Commission has been, particularly during the earlier years of the experiment, one of great delicacy. The social and economic life of the district was dislocated; the attitude of many leading inhabitants and of the local Press was sullen, not to say hostile to the Commission; the Commission was accused of being French in composition and sympathies, and the impartiality of the League of Nations itself was impugned. The situation has, however, notably improved in recent years, and the Council of the League of Nations has, after careful investigation, expressed its "great appreciation of the administrative work achieved by the governing Commission . . . in particularly difficult circumstances."¹

Belgium obtained some rectification of frontier—subject **Belgium** in parts to a plébiscite (subsequently decided in her favour)—the districts of Eupen and Malmédy, Moresnet-Neutre, and part of Prussian Moresnet. These districts contain only about 400 square miles; they carry a sparse population, but their transference has added greatly to the reasonable security of Belgium against attack from the East. Belgium also attained, in accord with her own ambitions, "complete independence and full sovereignty"; she was no longer to be either neutralized or protected, and the treaties of 1839 were entirely abrogated. As regards **Luxemburg**, Germany was **Luxemburg** compelled to denounce her various treaties with the Grand Duchy, to recognize that it ceases to be a part of the German *Zollverein*, to renounce all rights of exploitation of the railways, and to adhere to the abrogation of its neutrality.

Schleswig-Holstein presented a problem hardly less difficult than that of Alsace-Lorraine. In no respect, however, did the Paris Conference show more scrupulous regard for the rights even of a defeated enemy, or stricter adherence to its own avowed principles. In filching these duchies, in 1863, from the Crown of Denmark, Bismarck had shown himself as unscrupulous as he was shrewd. Still, Holstein is German, and Prussia was allowed, therefore, to retain it, together with southern Schleswig; the fate of central and northern Schleswig was to be determined by plébiscite. The inhabitants of the

Schleswig-Holstein

¹ Cf. Periodical Reports of the Saar Basin Governing Commission to the League; Reports to the Assembly on the work of the Council, etc.

northern zone plumped for Denmark ; those of the central zone, including Flensburg, for Prussia.

The
problem of
Poland

Most difficult of all, perhaps, was the problem of Poland. The independence of Poland was recognized at the first plenary session of the Conference, but the precise delimitation of its frontiers proved to be no easy matter. That Poland should be reconstituted as a Sovereign State was, from August 1914 onwards, accepted as one of the cardinal war-aims of the Allies. France, in particular, regarded the reconstitution of Poland as of vital import, not merely to the Poles themselves, but to the European equilibrium. This opinion had been tenaciously held by French statesmen of all parties for at least a century. " *La question la plus exclusivement Européenne est celle qui concerne la Pologne.*" Thus wrote Talleyrand to Metternich during the Congress of Vienna. " The future of Europe really depends on the ultimate destiny of Poland." Such was the opinion of Napoleon I. On August 16, 1914, M. Clemenceau hailed with enthusiasm the proclamation of the Grand Duke Nicholas of Russia : " Poland will live again." The enthusiasm for Poland was hardly less pronounced, though more recent and less informed in England than in France. But the reconstitution of Poland, as some of these enthusiasts had apparently forgotten, necessarily involved the disintegration of Prussia—though not of Germany. The new Poland includes practically all that was taken from Poland by Prussia and Austria in the partitions of the eighteenth century : Posen and West Prussia were restored to her by the former, Galicia by the latter. The fate of East Prussia and Upper Silesia, the allegiance and nationality of which were in doubt, was to be decided by plébiscite. In the result, East Prussia decided for Prussia ; Upper Silesia, where the vote was more ambiguous, was divided between Prussia and Poland. As to the city of Danzig there was great controversy. Poland depends on the Vistula, and the Vistula depends on Danzig, but racially Danzig is predominantly Prussian ; to give it to Poland would contravene the fashionable formula ; to give it to Prussia would throttle Poland. The city of Danzig, therefore, with the district immediately around it, reverted to the position assigned to it in the Treaty of Tilsit : it became a free city, under the guarantee of the League of Nations. Poland, however, was to be permitted to include it within the

Polish Customs frontier, "though with a free area within the port"; she was to enjoy the use of all the city's waterways and docks and all the port's facilities, the control and administration of the Vistula, and the whole through railway system within the city, and postal, telegraphic, and telephonic communication between Poland and Danzig; precaution was also taken against discrimination against Poles within the city, and its foreign relations and the diplomatic protection of its citizens abroad were committed to Poland. The device adopted, though clumsy, was at least a transparently honest attempt to reconcile awkward facts with accepted formulæ, and to do the maximum of justice with the minimum of violence to the susceptibilities of minorities. Poland thus emerged from the war an important State, with an area of 150,000 square miles and a population of at least 30,000,000.

Of the three Empires affected by the reconstruction of ^{The} Central Europe, that of the Hapsburgs¹ suffered most severely: ^{Hapsburg} Empire as an Empire, as a State, even as a "Power," it was literally wiped out. For four hundred years that Empire had occupied a unique place in the European polity. With none of the conventional conditions of existence had it ever complied: it had no "natural" frontiers; its subjects were not united by community of race or creed; geographically, politically, economically, and ethnographically, it consisted of a congeries of antagonistic atoms. Yet there is no denying the fact that it was a convenience, and at times a necessity, to Europe. Endowed with a gift of political adroitness almost amounting to genius, proverbially lucky in their marriage alliances, constantly aided by fortune, the Hapsburgs ruled for centuries over a mosaic of nationalities—Germans, Magyars, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Ruthenians, Roumanians, Croats, Slavs, Italians—with conspicuous skill and a large measure of success.

This conglomerate Empire was by the Treaty of Versailles dissolved into its constituent elements. Austria proper was left in a pitiable plight. Reduced by the creation of Czecho-Slovakia, by territorial concessions to Poland, to Italy, to Roumania, and Jugo-Slavia, and by separation from Hungary, to a State with only 6,000,000 people, she was cut off from territorial access to the sea, and denied the possibility of

¹ On the Dissolution of the Hapsburg Empire, cf. L. B. Namier, ap. *Peace Conference*, vol. iv, c. i, pt. 3.

union with Germany. That this prohibition, though solemnly embodied in the treaty, will permanently avail to obstruct union, should it be desired by both peoples, is highly improbable, but in the meantime Austria presents to Europe a peculiarly perplexing problem. Encompassed by a ring of small States, self-contained, highly protective, none too friendly; deprived of her natural sources of supply, denied access to her natural markets, the little State has still to maintain one of the great European capitals, a city of 2,000,000 souls. The problem presented to the Paris Conference was, indeed, formidable. Yet the decision taken was inevitable, if the territorial settlement had to be based upon the proclaimed principles of nationality and "self-determination." Of those principles, the Hapsburg Empire was the negation incarnate. If they were to stand, the "ramshackle" Empire was doomed to fall. Nor, if moral responsibility for a stupendous crime was to be brought home to the perpetrators, could the Hapsburgs be permitted to escape. True, Vienna had been for some time past the creature and catspaw of Berlin; still, the match to inflammable material was actually applied, if not by Vienna, by Buda-Pesth. But with all its faults, the Hapsburg Empire was a political convenience, and it has yet to be proved that the Peace of Europe will, on balance, gain by its dissolution.

Czecho-
Slovakia

The first of the new States to arise on the ruins of Austria-Hungary was Czecho-Slovakia, which now consists of the historic kingdom of Bohemia, together with Moravia, and Ruthenian territory to the south of the Carpathians. This means an area of some 55,000 square miles, and a population of about fourteen millions. Czecho-Slovakia proclaimed its independence before the Armistice was actually signed, and on November 15, 1918, elected Dr. Masaryk, a great student and a great patriot, as its President. Its independence was confirmed in the treaty between Austria and the Allied and Associated Powers.¹ Hungary proclaimed itself a Republic on November 17,² but since the readjustment of frontiers under the Peace treaties, the Hungarian Republic has represented only a shrunk fragment of the historic kingdom. In the north a large district has been ceded to Czecho-Slovakia, another in the south to Jugo-Slavia, and a third in the east

Hungary

¹ Part iii, section iii, pp. 53-8.

² See note, p. 566.

to Roumania. Hungary was thus reduced in population to eight millions, in area to 36,000 square miles. Jugo-Slavia represents the union of the southern Slav peoples, as Poland and Czechoslovakia represents the triumph of the northern Slavs. The new State includes, in addition to Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia, the Herzegovina, Croatia-Slavonia, parts of Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and practically the whole of Dalmatia. This triune kingdom covers an area of some 248,050 square miles, with a population of perhaps ten millions. The war forced upon Roumania a difficult, indeed, a perilous choice. At the Peace she reaped the reward of the wisdom and courage with which she made it. The area of the State was doubled by the acquisition of Bessarabia from Russia, and of Transylvania, a large part of the Bukovina and half the Banat of Temesvar, from Austria-Hungary. In population she stands, with 16,000,000 inhabitants, first among the Balkan States. But she has difficult problems to face, internal and external. Of the external problems the most difficult is that presented by her relations with Hungary. The Magyars are a proud people, unduly disdainful of their neighbours, and in the transferred Province of Transylvania there are almost as many Magyars (1,500,000) as Roumans (2,300,000). Roumania, consequently, is faced by a "minority" problem not less obstinate than that which faced the Hapsburg lords of Transylvania. She has attempted to secure the permanence of the *status quo* by a close alliance with the other "succession States," which have risen on the ruins of the Hapsburg Empire, Czechoslovakia and Jugo-Slavia. Cordial relations have further been established between their "Little Entente" and France and Poland; but, even so, the future is uncertain.

Bulgaria, with whom a Peace treaty was signed at Neuilly (November 27, 1919), had to pay the penalty of its adherence to the Central Empires. Strumnitza, with other territory on the west, was assigned to Jugo-Slavia, and Bulgarian-Macedonia to Greece.

Not until August 10, 1920—nearly two years after the surrender at Mudros—was Peace concluded between the Allies and the Ottoman Turks. It was too hastily assumed that the sick man was, at last, dead, and that the final liquidation of his troublesome estate might, therefore, be safely deferred

until more pressing matters had been disposed of. But the Turkish factor in European politics has always been unpredictable, and events were, once more, to demonstrate the folly and danger of delay. It was, indeed, hoped that the United States would take on the duties of liquidator, and that the chief sponsor of the League of Nations would be able to persuade his countrymen to accept, if not the guardianship of Constantinople and the Straits, Mandates under the League at least for Mesopotamia and Palestine. But that hope was one of the unfortunate results of the presence, at the Paris Conference, of a statesman who, alone among the delegates, could not answer for the people he was supposed to represent. Those who were less unfamiliar than the majority of the delegates with the unbroken traditions of American foreign policy, who knew the hold which the oft-quoted aphorisms of Washington and Jefferson have on the mind of the American people, realized from the outset that the hope was illusory. Yet the reluctance to abandon it explains the delay in completing the liquidation of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. "We cannot," said Mr. Lloyd George (September 1919), "settle Turkey until we know what the United States is going to do."

Treaty of
Sèvres

The Treaty of Sèvres (August 10, 1920) was never ratified by the Sultan. Its terms consequently possess only an academic interest. Successive declarations of "war-aims" had, in reference to Turkey, revealed, if not some infirmity of purpose, some disposition to wait on events. At one moment opportunity was to be taken to turn the Turk bag and baggage out of Europe. At another (January 5, 1918) we were not "fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace." Constantinople and the Straits had, as we have seen, been promised to the Czar: but the Czar had been murdered and his former subjects had deserted the cause of the Allies. The Bolshevik Government had, moreover, disclaimed the idea of annexations. If the Turks were turned out, to whom was Constantinople to go? But for Balkan jealousies, Greece perhaps might have obtained Byzantium—the capital of the old "Greek" Empire, though neither France nor Italy was anxious to see a Greek hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean. Constantinople, with a minimum of circumjacent

territory, was therefore to be left in the hands of the Sultan, while the control of the Straits was confided to the League of Nations. Syria was assigned, under Mandate, to France, Palestine and Mesopotamia to Great Britain.

Greece, thanks entirely to Venizelos, was to be enlarged Greece by the addition of Macedonia and Thrace, together with Smyrna and a large strip of Asia Minor, and the Dodecanese islands—except Rhodes, which remained in possession of Italy.

The Allies, and England in particular, had yet to gather the bitter fruits of procrastination. The occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks (May 1919), supported by the warships of Great Britain, France, and the United States, aroused bitter resentment among the Turkish “Nationalists”—a party which was rapidly establishing its supremacy, under the vigorous leadership of a brilliant soldier Mustapha Kemal Pasha. In July 1919 Kemal escaped from Constantinople, proceeded to rouse the Turks in the Anatolian highlands, and established at Angora a rival Government to that of Constantinople. When the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres were revealed, the Angora Government promptly refused to accept them, despite the fact that the Greeks had, in the summer of 1920, inflicted a severe defeat on the Nationalist Turks, occupied Brusa—the ancient capital of the Ottomans (July 8), made good their position in Thrace, and entered Adrianople.

Then the tide of fortune turned. The young King Alexander died suddenly (October). Venizelos, despite his brilliant success at Paris, was defeated at a General Election (November), and left the country. The ex-King Constantine was recalled, and though the Allies refused to recognize him, managed to retain his throne until the autumn of 1922. The Allies then attempted, by modifying the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, to come to an agreement both with Constantinople and Angora (February-March 1921). But Turks and Greeks alike rejected the proposed modifications. Meanwhile France, in return for valuable commercial concessions, had concluded with the Angora Government the “Franklin-Bouillon Agreement”¹ (October 20, 1921).

This Agreement, jeopardizing as it did our difficult position in Mesopotamia, was very distasteful to Great Britain; it stiffened the back of the Turk, and did nothing to help the

The
Turkish
revival

France
and
Turkey

¹ Named after M. Franklin-Bouillon who negotiated it.

Greeks. The latter were doing badly in the autumn, and by February 1922 their position was almost desperate. The Allies then suggested to both belligerents terms which represented a drastic revision of the Treaty of Sèvres in favour of the Turks. The Greeks and Constantinople Turks accepted the suggestions, but the Kemalists refused an Armistice, swept the Greeks before them into the sea, and occupied Smyrna, which they delivered over to fire and sword. Greeks from all parts of Asia Minor fled panic-stricken before the Turks; about 1,000,000 of them were fortunate enough to escape on Allied and Greek ships.

Greece was in the toils: the troops mutinied at Salonika, in Crete, Chios, and Mytilene; Constantine was forced, for a second time, to abdicate, and in January 1923 died in exile at Palermo.

Meanwhile a serious international crisis had developed. The Kemalist Turks, flushed with their bloody victory over the hereditary foe, advanced on the Dardanelles, entered the neutral zone, and actually came within fighting distance of the British garrison which, from Chanak, held the southern shore of the Dardanelles. France withdrew her troops; the Italians, who hated the Greeks, intimated that in the event of the renewal of war, no help was to be expected from them; Great Britain faced the Kemalists alone.

Chanak

The situation was critical. The British Government hurriedly despatched ships and men to the Dardanelles; applied for help to the Dominions; and told the Kemalists that they would not be permitted to cross into Europe. In response to the appeal of the British Government, New Zealand promptly promised help; Australia promised rather less readily; Canada asked for further information; a reply from South Africa was delayed by the absence of General Smuts.

Fortunately war was, though narrowly, averted, mainly by the admirable firmness and not less admirable patience and tact of Sir Charles Harington, the Allied Commander-in-Chief at Constantinople. On October 11 an Armistice was signed between the Greeks and the Kemalists, and on November 20 another Peace Conference opened at Lausanne.

For more than two months the diplomatists, under the skilful and patient guidance of the British Foreign Minister,

The
Treaty of
Lausanne

Lord Curzon of Kedleston,¹ endeavoured to find the solution of a difficult situation. If the Turk had generally managed to evade the consequences of defeat, it was unlikely that he would now forgo the fruits of a victory as dramatic as it was complete. And at Lausanne he held all the diplomatic as well as the military cards. He could count on the traditional hatred of Italy for Greece, and turn to his own advantage the growing tension between England and France. What wonder, then, that the tone he adopted at Lausanne was lofty to the verge of insolence. Terms were, however, all but arranged, when the Conference was broken up by the demand of Turkey for further delay (January 1923).

Despite this fiasco the Conference reassembled in April 1923. Peace was at last signed on July 24, and a month later was ratified by the Assembly at Angora.

The Greeks had to pay the penalty for over-vaulting political ambition and a disastrous military defeat. Greece lost to Turkey Eastern Thrace with Adrianople and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos, but retained the rest of the Turkish islands in the Ægean, and Western Thrace up to the Maritza. Turkey gave up all claims upon Egypt, the Soudan, Cyprus, Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Arabia, but retained in full sovereignty Smyrna and the remainder of the Anatolian Peninsula. The difficult problem of minorities, racial and religious, had been to a great extent solved by the simple method of extermination; but the Turks agreed to confirm the rights of minorities on the terms already agreed upon between the Allies and Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and other Sovereign States. The treaty also provided for a compulsory interchange of Greek Moslems and Turks of the Orthodox Church, excepting only the Turks of Western Thrace and the Greeks of Constantinople, who were permitted to remain in their respective homes.

Two questions remained: the position of foreigners in Turkey, and the control of the Straits. On both, concession was made to Turkish susceptibilities. The "Capitulations" which, ever since the sixteenth century, had afforded protection to foreigners in Turkey, were abolished. As regards

¹ Mr. Lloyd George and his Coalition Ministry had fallen in October. Mr. Bonar Law had become Prime Minister, with Lord Curzon as Foreign Secretary and Leader of the House of Lords.

the Straits, Turkey was, in default of any alternative tenant, permitted to remain at Constantinople, and to retain a garrison in the city, under stringent guarantee ; but the Straits were to be neutralized ; a free passage for foreign aircraft and ships, warships and merchantmen alike, was to be guaranteed to all the States of the world ; and on both coasts demilitarized and unfortified zones were to be created under the guarantee of the League of Nations.¹

The
Turkish
Republic

The Treaty of Lausanne represents a conspicuous triumph for the Ottoman Turks ; but it was not enjoyed by the Ottoman Empire. On November 1, 1922, the Grand National Assembly at Angora issued an edict that the office of Sultan had ceased to exist, and on the 17th, Mohammed VI, the last of the Ottoman Sultans, left Constantinople on board a British warship. Thus fell the last of the Central Empires which had formed the Quadruple Alliance ; had its fall brought to an abrupt and inglorious end a great chapter in modern history ?

Prince Abdul-Mejid, cousin of the ex-Sultan, and the eldest prince in male descent of the House of Osman, was elected Caliph (November 18), but in March 1924 the Caliphate itself was abolished by the Grand National Assembly, and the Caliph and his family went into exile. Meanwhile Turkey had been proclaimed a Republic with Mustapha Kemal Pasha as its first President, and Angora as its capital (October 1923). Greece reached the same Republican goal, though by a more devious route.

Of the many hopes raised by the World War there was none more confidently entertained than that the Peace would register a solution of the immemorial problem of the Near East. When the Turk joined the Central Empires he signed, so it seemed to the Allies, his own death warrant. The Turkish Empire has perished : the Turks are still encamped on European soil ; though the garrison is ignominiously small. Yet it may well be that the Turk, reinvigorated in body and mind by the bleak and bracing uplands of Anatolia, inspired by ideals not merely military but political, may yet win for his country a conspicuous place among the Nation-States of the modern world. Should this be so it would only be in accord with the eternal paradox of Turkish history.²

¹ Cmd. 1929 of 1923.

²For further details, cf. Marriott : *Eastern Question*, 3rd edition, Epilogue III.



After a prolonged parenthesis we must return to Paris. Of the Powers represented at the Conference none was more nearly interested in the Eastern Question than Italy. Nor had any Power entered the war with aims more clearly defined. Moreover, large but precise promises had, as we have seen, been made to her by the Allies in the Treaty of London. The time had come for their fulfilment. But Serbia, who had so gallantly held the gate against the Central Empires, was also entitled to the fullest consideration at the hands of the other Allies. How were the claims of the Italians and the southern Slavs to be reconciled? Flushed with a victory over Austria to which the Allies had largely contributed, Italy was determined to assert her claims to the very last island, not only as against Austria, but also against the new triune kingdom of Jugo-Slavia. Jugo-Slavia, on the other hand, while not ignoring the enormous accretions of territory secured by her in the Hinterland, was insistent at least on reasonable access to the Adriatic, and in particular was immovable on the subject of Fiume. Without Fiume, Croatia-Slavonia is virtually landlocked, and with Trieste and Pola in Italian hands Fiume affords the only outlet for the trade of Carinthia, Carniola, and Styria. In President Wilson the Serbs found an ardent champion of their claims. Partly out of genuine sympathy for the Serbs, partly by reason of a pedantic adherence to the fashionable formulæ, partly perhaps as a protest against the "secret diplomacy" of England and France, President Wilson offered throughout stout opposition to the claims of Italy. England and France desired not only to deal fairly by both their Allies, but also to procure a lasting settlement of the Adriatic problem. Always, however, there was in the background the Pact of London, to the terms of which they were determined to adhere.

Throughout a great part of the year 1919 the Adriatic problem proved a terrible stumbling-block in the path of the Allies, and more than once it threatened to dissolve the accord between them. Preference was given to the question by the Supreme Council on April 14; but a week later Mr. Wilson withdrew from the discussion, and on the 23rd he published a formal statement on the question. He contended that since the date of the Pact of London, for which he had no responsibility, "the whole face of circumstances had been altered." But not even in that Pact had Fiume been assigned to Italy,

for the good reason that "it must serve as the outlet of the commerce, not of Italy, but of the lands to the north and north-east of that port." The partition of the Adriatic was intended to make Italy secure against Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary no longer existed. This statement was bitterly resented by the Italian representatives, particularly by Signor Orlando, who stood out not only for the whole pound of flesh promised in the Treaty of London, but in addition for Fiume. On the 24th Orlando abruptly left Paris for Rome, where he received an enthusiastic welcome, and his policy was endorsed in the Chamber by 382 votes to 40. The French Press cordially supported Italy, and an open rupture was averted only by the tact of Mr. Lloyd George. In December 1919 England, France, and the United States agreed on terms which were presented to Italy almost in the form of an ultimatum.¹ When Italy refused to accede to them, England and France were disposed to stand aside and let Italy and Jugo-Slavia settle things between them.

Meanwhile another grave complication had entered into the problem. Early in September, D'Annunzio—one of the most romantic figures in Italian life, a great poet and an ardent patriot—had with a body of enthusiastic volunteers occupied Fiume, and defied either the Italian Government or the Jugo-Slavs to turn him out. The Italian Government were on the horns of a dilemma: they were threatened with revolution if they attempted to expel D'Annunzio; they were threatened by the wrath of the Powers if they did not. Nor was the position much easier for the Jugo-Slav Government. Their claim to Fiume, whether based on geography, ethnography, or economics, was irresistible. The Treaty of London had reserved for Serbia, Croatia, and Montenegro the Adriatic coast from the Bay of Volosca to the northern frontier of Dalmatia, including Fiume and the whole coast then belonging to Hungary and Croatia, together with the ports of Spalato, Ragusa, Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno, and San Giovanni di Medua, and several of the islands. But Fiume was the key of the position.² There was increasing restlessness among the southern Slavs at the failure of the

D'Annunzio
at Fiume

¹ Cf. *Correspondence relating to the Adriatic Question*, published as a "White Paper" (Cmd. 586 of 1920).

² For text of Treaty of London, cf. *White Paper Miscellaneous*, No. 7 (1920), and *H.P.C.*, V, Appendix III, where all the important documents relating to Fiume are printed in full.

Government to obtain a settlement of this and other outstanding questions.

San Remo
Conference

So matters stood when, towards the end of April 1920, the English, French, and Italian Premiers met at San Remo. M. Trumbitch, the Foreign Minister of Jugo-Slavia, was invited to the San Remo Conference, but was unable, owing to a political crisis at home, to reach it in time, and proposed that the matters in dispute should be settled by direct negotiation between Italy and Jugo-Slavia. Signor Nitti assented to the suggestion, and Mr. Lloyd George and M. Millerand cordially concurred. Accordingly, about a month later, M. Pashitch and M. Trumbitch met Signor Scialoja at Pollenza. Italy was in a complaisant mood. Signor Nitti, indeed, was hardly less anxious for a final settlement of the Adriatic problem than were the Jugo-Slavs themselves; and negotiations, therefore, proceeded favourably. Unfortunately, before they could be concluded, they were broken off by a political crisis in Rome, and although Signor Nitti weathered the storm for the moment, his Ministry foundered on the nationalistic rocks, and Signor Giolitti took office, with Count Sforza as Foreign Secretary.

Treaty of
Rapallo

No Government, however, could ignore a situation which daily became at once more menacing and more grotesque. Early in November, negotiations were resumed at Rapallo, and there, on November 12, 1920, a treaty was signed. Fiume was recognized by both parties as independent, under the guardianship of the League of Nations, with the addition of a narrow strip of coast territory north-westwards, towards Volosca, giving Italy direct access to the independent State; but Sushak with Porto Baros was to remain in the hands of Jugo-Slavia. Zara and its adjacent communes were assigned to Italy, together with the islands of Cherso, Lussin, Lagosta, and Pelagosa, with the adjacent islets and rocks. Dalmatia, on the other hand, was given to Jugo-Slavia with Lissa and the rest of the islands. D'Annunzio and his Legionaries were ejected and replaced by Italian regular troops (January 1921), who in their turn began to give trouble, but were at last induced to evacuate Porto Baros and the Delta which they had occupied. Tedious negotiations as to the delimitation of frontiers ensued, but the frontier line between the two States in the north-east was ultimately drawn in a sense favourable

to Italy. On the whole, a reasonable compromise seemed to have been reached. But the troublesome business of Fiume was not, even now, ended. Not until after the accession of Signor Mussolini to power (October 1922) was the matter finally settled. Italy and Jugo-Slavia were by this time in a less unfriendly mood. The independent State of Fiume was partitioned. Porto Baros and the adjacent Delta were assigned to Jugo-Slavia, which also obtained a fifty years' lease of a basin in the main harbour of Fiume. The rest of Fiume, with the coastal corridor, somewhat narrowed, passed to Italy. This sensible arrangement was embodied in an Agreement signed in Rome (January 1924), and a *Pact of Cordial Collaboration* (July 1924) further strengthened the accord at long last arrived at between the two Adriatic Powers.

Thus was accomplished the difficult and tedious task of reconstructing the political map of Europe. Many problems, predominantly financial, still awaited solution; but the main work to which in 1919 the diplomatists had set their hands at Paris was completed.

The Great War was not, however, exclusively European. It was heavily charged with the destinies of untold millions of the human race in Asia, Africa, and Oceania. To the arrangements made in the Peace Treaties for their better government and social well-being we must now turn.

§ 2. THE GERMAN COLONIES

The fortunes of war had, as we have seen, placed practically the whole continent of Africa at the disposal of the Allies. The terms of Peace reflected the completeness of Germany's defeat.

By Articles 118 and 119 of the Treaty of Versailles, ^{The} Germany renounced in favour of the Principal Allied and ^{"Manda-} Associated Powers all her rights over her overseas posses- ^{tory"} system sions. To whom should they pass? There was a strong feeling among the Allies that whatever Power should be entrusted with the government of territories inhabited by

¹ On the Adriatic question generally, cf. Marriott: *The European Commonwealth*, cxiv; Vellay: *La Question l'Adriatique*; Seton-Watson: *The Adriatic Italy and the Southern Slavs*, and articles by A. E. H. Taylor and others in the *Balkan Review*.


backward peoples, the task should be undertaken not for purposes of political aggrandisement or commercial exploitation, but in the spirit of trusteeship. An Englishman may be forgiven for saying that the spirit which has in the main, despite occasional backsliding, inspired the Colonial administration of Great Britain, was henceforward to govern the relations between European rulers and their non-European subjects. This intention was embodied in Article XXII of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which laid down that "to those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the Sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them, and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization." It further suggested that the best way of giving effect to this principle is that "the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience, or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories of the League." The character of the Mandate must, however, differ "according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances."

South-West
Africa

"German " South-West was, as we have seen, conquered by a force raised in the Union of South Africa, and commanded by General Louis Botha. At the Peace the territory was assigned by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to His Britannic Majesty to be administered on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South Africa under a Mandate approved by the Council of the League of Nations.

Mandates

South-West Africa, together with certain South Pacific islands, was indicated in Article XXII of the Covenant as one of the territories which "owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, [which] can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards



AFRICA : POLITICAL DIVISIONS, 1921

above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population." The Mandate was accordingly issued in the form prescribed for "Class C" territories. Its terms enjoined upon the Mandatory the duty of promoting to the utmost "the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants"; they prohibit slavery, the sale of intoxicants to natives, the establishment of military or naval bases; and provide for complete freedom of conscience, and facilities for missionaries and ministers of all creeds.

The Mandatory is in this, as in all cases of Mandate, required to make an annual report to the Council of the League, containing full information with regard to the territory, and indicating the measures taken to fulfil the obligations the Mandatory has assumed.¹

East Africa

The former Colony of German East Africa was originally assigned to Great Britain, but in consequence of strong protests from Belgium was ultimately divided between the two Powers.

The British portion, now known as the Tanganyika Territory, lying immediately to the south of the Kenya Colony (formerly the British East Africa Protectorate) has a coastline of 620 miles, extending from the mouth of the Uмба to Cape Delgado, an area of some 384,180 square miles, and an estimated pre-war native population of about 7,600,000. It is held under Mandate. The Mandate for the rest of German East Africa—the Provinces of Rhuanda and Urandi, together with the country round Lake Kivu—was conferred upon Belgium. A strip on the east of the Belgian portion has, however, been reserved to Great Britain to facilitate the construction of the Cape to Cairo Railway.

West Africa

Togoland, which surrendered to a Franco-British force in the first month of the war, was divided between the two Powers; about one-third of the Colony (some 12,500 square miles) bordering on the Gold Coast territories being assigned to Great Britain, and the remainder to France. The Cameroons also was divided: an area of 33,000 square miles (out of 191,130), extending from the coast along the Nigerian frontier up to Lake Chad being assigned to Great Britain, and the rest to France.

East Africa, Togoland, and the Cameroons are all held by

¹ For the terms of the Mandate, see Cmd. 1204 (1921).

their respective assignees under Mandate from the League of Nations. These Mandates, however, unlike that for the South-West Protectorate, belong not to Class C, but to Class B, which differs in two important respects from the former. On the one hand, the "Mandated Colony" does not become an integral portion of the territory of the Mandatory; on the other, the Mandates secure "equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the League." No such provision is contained either in the Mandate for South-West Africa, or in those for the Pacific islands. The insertion of such a provision would plainly have proved too embarrassing to the Union of South Africa in the one case; to Australia and New Zealand in the other. Hence the necessity for the distinction contained in the Covenant. The Mandates in Class B also provide more specifically and elaborately for the protection of the natives "from abuse and measures of fraud and force by the careful supervision of labour contracts and the recruiting of labour."¹

Portugal put in a claim to a share in the re-partition of Africa, but after careful consideration it was disallowed.

The general result of the partition may be summarized as follows: out of the 12,500,000 persons who were in 1914 living under the German flag in Africa 42 per cent. have been transferred to the guardianship of the British Empire, 33 per cent. to that of France, and 25 per cent. to Belgium.² The settlement would seem in the main to accord with the principle laid down by Mr. Wilson, who insisted that there should be: "A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all Colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined."³ If there was one point upon which every African native who had ever lived under German rule was resolved, it was that under no circumstances would he voluntarily remain under or return to it. For the protection of native interests in the future, every possible security has been taken in the Mandates approved by the Council of the League of Nations.

¹ East Africa, Cmd. 1284; West Africa, Cmd. 1350 of 1921.

² *H.P.C.*, ii, 244.

³ Address of Jan. 8, 1918.

The
Pacific
Islands

In regard to the Pacific settlement there was some difficulty at Paris, mainly between the British Imperial authorities and those who represented primarily Australasian interests. "One of the most striking features of the Conference," said Mr. Hughes, the Premier of the Australian Commonwealth, "was the appalling ignorance of every nation as to the affairs of every other nation—its geographical, racial, historical conditions, or traditions."¹ The safety of Australia, so her sons have consistently maintained, demands that the great rampart of islands stretching around the north-east of Australia should be held by the Australian Dominion or by some Power (if there be one?) in whom they have absolute confidence. At Paris Mr. Hughes made a great fight to obtain the direct control of them; worsted in that fight by Mr. Wilson's formulas, Australia was forced to accept the principle of the Mandate, but her representatives were careful to insist that the Mandate should be in a form consistent not only with their national safety but with their "economic, industrial, and general welfare."

In plain English that meant the maintenance of a "White Australia" and a preferential tariff. On both points Australia found herself in direct conflict with Japan, but, despite the formal protest and reservation of the latter, the Mandates for the ex-German possessions in the Pacific were issued in the form desired by the British Dominions: i.e. in the same form ("C") as that accepted for South-West Africa.

The islands north of the Equator, namely, the Marshall, Caroline, Pelew, and Ladrone Islands, went to Japan, as did Kiaochow; those south of the Equator to the British Empire or its Dominions: the Bismarck Archipelago, German New Guinea, and those of the Solomon Islands formerly belonging to Germany, to Australia;² German Samoa to New Zealand;³ and Nauru to the British Empire,⁴—in all cases under Mandate.

Palestine
and Meso-
potamia


Conquered by British forces during the war, Palestine remained in their occupation until July 1, 1920; as from that date the country passed under the rule of a British High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel. Under the Treaty of Sèvres, Turkey renounced all rights and title over the country

¹ Commonwealth of Australia: *Parliamentary Debates*, No. 87, pp. 12, 178.

² Cmd. 1201 (1921).

³ Cmd. 1203.

⁴ Cmd. 1202.



in favour of the Principal Allied Powers, who conferred the Mandate upon Great Britain. In accordance with Mr. Balfour's declaration of November 2, 1917, Great Britain undertook to place the country under such conditions, political, administrative, and economic, as would secure the establishment of "a national home for the Jewish people," develop self-governing institutions, and safeguard the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion. English, Arabic, and Hebrew were to be the official languages of Palestine, and the most stringent precautions were taken for securing freedom of conscience and equality of commercial privileges.¹

"Class A"
territories

The Turkish vilayets of Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Syria were, evidently, in a very different position from the colonies taken from Germany in Africa. They were communities which (in the words of the *Covenant*) had "reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone."

Moreover, a few days after the conclusion of the Armistice with Turkey, the British and French Governments had issued a joint declaration stating their aim to be: "the complete and final enfranchisement of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national governments and administrations drawing their authority from the initiative and free choice of native populations." The Mandates were accordingly issued in a form ("A") in accordance with these principles.

Iraq

In Mesopotamia or Iraq the situation was complicated by the delays interposed by the events in the Near East already related. In 1921 the Emir Faisal, son of Hussein, the ex-King of the Hedjaz, was elected King of Iraq, and an Arab Government was set up, and Great Britain concluded with it a treaty, which was to remain in force only until Iraq was admitted as an independent Sovereign State to membership of the League of Nations. To secure that admission the British Government undertook to use its good offices. The treaty embodied the obligations of the *Covenant*, and was

¹ Cmd. 1500 (1921).

ratified by the Council of the League. The Mandate like the treaty will expire when Iraq is admitted to the League.¹

Neither in Palestine nor in Iraq has the path of the Mandatory Power been smooth. But it has been roughest perhaps in Syria, which was assigned under Mandate to France. These matters belong, however, to a chapter of European history which lies outside the scope of the present volume.

It is, nevertheless, proper to add that the League of Nations exercises supervision over all the Mandatories by means of a Permanent Mandates Commission. This Commission consists of ten members representing the three Mandatory and seven Non-Mandatory States. It receives and examines the annual reports which each Mandatory is bound to furnish, and also receives memorials and petitions from the indigenous inhabitants of Mandated territories, or others interested in them. The functions of the Commission are, therefore, of a peculiarly delicate character, though they are purely advisory, and the Commission can rely on no sanction save the force of international public opinion.²

Apart from readjustments of territory, the Treaty of Versailles, and the complementary treaties, dealt with a vast variety of topics such as war costs, reparations, ports, waterways, railways, and many questions affecting wage-earners. To deal with the last a special department—the International Labour Office—has been set up in connection with the League of Nations at Geneva.

§ 3. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The preceding sections of this chapter must have made it evident that the whole of the cement for the vast edifice, erected with so much labour by the diplomatists at Paris, was provided by the Covenant of the League of Nations. The text of that Covenant was prefixed to all the principal treaties concluded between the Allied and Associated Powers and their late enemies. The drafting and elaboration of its provisions

¹ On June 30, 1930, a treaty was concluded between Great Britain and Iraq (Mesopotamia) anticipatory of the admission of Iraq to the League in 1932 and the consequent determination of the Mandate.

² For the Mandate System, cf. Lord Lugard, ap. *Edinburgh Review*, vol. 238, pp. 398-408, and the same writer, ap. *Encycl. Brit.*, new vols. ii.

occupied much of the time and thought of some of the leading statesmen of the world at the Peace Conference. Whether the procedure adopted was the best ; whether it was wise to incorporate the Covenant in the text of the Treaties of Peace ; whether it would not have been wiser first to formulate the terms to be imposed upon Germany and her Allies, and then to have proceeded to elaborate the Covenant, are questions on which there is room for legitimate difference of opinion. But, as things are, the whole structure rests to a large extent upon the observance of the Covenant.

The
Covenant
of the
League

That Covenant, therefore, demands analysis. Having proclaimed that the purpose of the High Contracting Parties was "to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war," it proceeded to lay down rules as to the membership, the government, and the procedure of the League. Membership is open to any fully self-governing State, Dominion, or Colony, which is prepared to give effective guarantees for adherence to the principles and observance of the rules of the League, provided its admission is agreed by two-thirds of the Assembly. The government of the League is vested in an Assembly and a Council, and the administration of its affairs is provided for by the establishment of a permanent Secretariat.

The Assembly consists of representatives of all the members of the League, now (1930) fifty-four in number ; each member has one vote and may have not more than three representatives. The Assembly meets annually, and decisions must be unanimous.

The
Assembly

Its most important work has perhaps been the creation (in accordance with Article XIV of the Covenant) of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court is composed of eleven judges and four deputy-judges holding office for nine years, and sits annually at The Hague. The Assembly has also set up technical organizations to deal with Economics and Finance, with Transit and International Hygiene, besides several Advisory Commissions of which the most important (except the Mandates Commission) is that for the reduction of armaments.

The
Council

The Council originally consisted of four permanent members (the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan), together

with four other members of the League, to be nominated by the Assembly. The permanent membership was increased to five by the admission of Germany (1926), and the non-permanent to nine; of the latter, three retire annually. On the Council each member may have only one representative and one vote, and decisions must be unanimous.

The relation of the Council to the Assembly was purposely left undefined in the original Covenant, but it was subsequently decided that the Council was not to be regarded as standing to the Assembly in the relation either of a Second Chamber or an Executive, but that both bodies might discuss and examine any matter which is within the competence of the League. The Council meets at least four times a year.

Apart from the Council, continuity is secured by a permanent Secretariat established at the seat of the League. Permanent Secretariat The first Secretary-General, Sir Eric Drummond, was named in the Annex of the Covenant. When he vacates office the Secretary will be nominated by the Council and approved by a majority of the Assembly. Upon the efficiency of the Secretariat almost everything, it is obvious, will depend.

Such are the organs of the League. Its primary function Functions of the League is to maintain peace among its own members; its second, to maintain it in the world at large. This purpose it hopes to achieve (Articles VIII-XVII) by a limitation of armaments; a mutual guarantee of territorial integrity and independence; a mutual Agreement not to resort to arms until an attempt to settle a dispute by peaceful means has been made; the provision of machinery for facilitating such peaceful settlement, of sanctions for the breach of the Agreement mentioned above, and for settling disputes in which States, non-members of the League, are concerned. One point in this connection is important: the League has no power to dictate to its members the size of their armaments, though the Council may make suggestions. No member of the League may, however, make war upon another member without submitting the dispute either to arbitration or to the Council, or without waiting for three months after the award, or in defiance of the award, provided all the members of the Council, not parties to the dispute, assent to it. Should any State break this most essential article of the Covenant, all the other members are pledged to break off all relations, including

trade and financial relations, with the offending State, and resort, if necessary, to armed force. How precisely that force is to be supplied remains one of the problems to be solved.¹

Treaties
and
Agreements

All treaties are henceforward to be (1) public ; (2) liable to reconsideration at the instance of the Assembly ; and (3) consonant with the terms of the Covenant. The members of the League further pledge themselves to secure, both in their own countries and in all countries with whom they have dealings, "fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women, and children," and also just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control ; to entrust the League with the supervision over the execution of Agreements in regard to the traffic in women and children, in opium and other dangerous drugs, and in arms and ammunition ; and, finally, to take steps in the matter of international hygiene, to maintain equitable treatment for the commerce of all members, and to secure freedom of communications and transit.²

Earlier
Projects
of Peace

Such, in rough outline, are the main provisions of the League Covenant, designed to initiate an experiment in the organization of peace. The experiment, though not the first of its kind, is incomparably the most important, and is, moreover, being tried under circumstances far more conducive to success than those under which its predecessors foundered. Ever since the dissolution of the unity precariously maintained throughout the Middle Ages by the Church and the Empire, ever since the emergence of the Nation-State, and the evolution of a European polity based upon the recognition of the independence and equal rights of a number of separate States, men have been feeling after some principle or device which should redeem Europe from international anarchy. To the long and interesting series of Projects of Peace reference has already been made.³ Henri IV and the Abbé de

¹ For criticism, cf. D. Davies : *The Problem of the Twentieth Century*, Lond., 1930.

² For an account of the work done since 1919 by the League of Nations, cf. *Reports* and other official publications of the League (Catalogue obtainable from Messrs. Constable & Co.); T. P. Conwell-Evans : *The League Council in Action*, Oxford, 1929 ; and for a restatement of International Law in the light of the Covenant, J. L. Brierley : *Law of Nations*, Oxford, 1928 ; and J. T. Shotwell : *The Pact of Paris and War as an Instrument of National Policy*, 1929.

³ *Supra*, c. iii.

Saint-Pierre, Hugo Grotius, William Penn, and Immanuel Kant—all their proposals anticipated, in greater or less degree, the ideas which have taken shape in the Covenant of the League of Nations; they all represented attempts—mostly made after periods of prolonged war—to escape from a state of chaos and war, and to discover some basis for a social compact among the nations which should restore to the world the blessing of peace; they all sought to substitute for the rude arbitrament of war the procedure of an international court and the sanctions of international law. To not one of these schemes was there given a chance of practical application.

The first practical attempt to organize peace was made, as we have seen, by the Czar Alexander I, and took shape in the *Holy Alliance* of 1815. That attempt failed not because it was not made in good faith, nor because it was a “league of autocrats,” but partly because the settlement which the Alliance was designed to perpetuate was based upon outworn principles, and still more because the august Allies felt constrained, in order to maintain international peace, to intervene in the domestic politics of the Allied States. In brief, the Alliance foundered upon the rock of intervention, and by reason of the difficulty of discerning between external and internal affairs.

Is this difficulty inherent in every attempt to organize international peace? Can a League of Free Nations avoid the pitfall in which the Alliance of Autocrats was engulfed? Is it possible to reconcile the idea of an international Polity with the adequate recognition of the rights of individual nationhood? Upon what sanction can a court of international justice rely, without risk of offence to the legitimate susceptibilities of the constituent States?

These are obstinate questions. Upon the finding of satisfactory answers the whole fabric of civilization would seem to depend. “If,” said Lord Grey of Fallodon, “the world cannot organize against war, if war must go on, then the nations can protect themselves henceforth only by using whatever destructive agencies they can invent, till the resources and inventions of science end by destroying the Humanity they were meant to serve.”

The League of Nations represents an attempt to organize the world against war. The task it essays is obviously one of supreme difficulty; the machinery of the League is at

present embryonic ; its members are painfully feeling their way ; the ideals it professes offer an easy butt to the cynic and the pessimist. But even the cynic may be invited to formulate his alternative. Is there indeed any alternative save that the nations should be crushed under the burden of armaments, and when that burden can no longer be endured, that civilization itself should perish under the shock of the inevitable explosion ?

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NOTE TO P. 542.

In 1920 Hungary was, by a unanimous vote of the National Assembly, reconstituted a kingdom. The throne has, however, remained thus far (1933) vacant.

CHAPTER XXVIII

EPILOGUE

THIS book opened with the Congress of Vienna and the Treaty of Vienna and the Treaty of Versailles closes with the Conference of Paris (1919) and the Treaty of Versailles sheaf of treaties, beginning with the Treaty of Versailles and ending with the Treaty of Lausanne, by which an attempt has been made to restore Peace to the post-war world.

The Treaty of Vienna (June 9, 1815) contained one hundred and twenty-one Articles and was signed by seventeen plenipotentiaries. Great Britain was represented by three : the Earl of Clancarty, Earl Cathcart, and Lord Stewart, the last two being professional diplomatists.¹ The Treaty of Versailles (June 28, 1919) contained four hundred and forty Articles, and was the work of no fewer than seventy plenipotentiaries,² the British Empire alone contributing fourteen to this total.

The Treaty of Vienna was concerned exclusively with Europe : the sheaf of treaties which emanated from the Peace Conference of Paris attempted to order the affairs of the whole world. The two great Congresses were separated in time by only one hundred and four years ; but in the interval the political and economic conditions of the world had, as we have indicated, been entirely transformed. That transformation has been the dominant theme of this book. Only in so far as they have contributed to the world-process has it been possible to refer to the history of individual nations. Attention has accordingly been concentrated upon the World-Powers. Those Powers happened, by something more than coincidence, to be the belligerents in the World War.

¹ The principal negotiators of the treaty were, however, the Duke of Wellington and Lord Castlereagh.

² This includes the two representatives of Germany who signed the treaty but had no part in negotiating it ; and also two representatives of China who took part in negotiating but did not sign the treaty.

The
smaller
States

Of the neutral States there has been little mention in these pages. Perhaps the inhabitants of those countries are to be envied. Proverbially happy is the country that has no history. Switzerland and the Netherlands, the Scandinavian States and Spain, have not assuredly been devoid of history ; but they have not, during the period under review, made any conspicuous or confluent contribution to the main current of international affairs.

Switzerland

Switzerland has provided a fertile field for the trial of the experiment of a form of Democracy which, as I have elsewhere shown,¹ Swiss jurists have claimed as the only true type of Democracy in the modern world. There are, however, substantial grounds for the belief, widely entertained outside Switzerland, that the principle of Direct Democracy is applicable only to the City State, or to States, which, like the Helvetic Republic, are at once relatively small and consist of cantons in which the form of government approximates to the type perfected in the City States of Ancient Greece. But be this as it may, the history of Switzerland has been, since 1815, save for a passing hour in 1847, of purely domestic interest. The selection of Geneva as the seat of administration for the League of Nations, though at first sight appearing to contradict this proposition, is in reality confirmatory. Geneva has become the centre of international administration precisely because Switzerland has played so unobtrusive a part in international diplomacy, and no part at all in international war.

Sweden
and
Norway

As the Helvetic Republic has afforded a conspicuous illustration of the success of the federal system of government, so Norway and Sweden have illustrated the precarious nature of a Personal Union. The circumstances under which, in 1814, Norway was handed over to Sweden gave the Personal Union a bad start, and the relations between the two peoples have continuously been something less than cordial. Not even King Oscar II (1872-1907), who, though descended from a French peasant, was conspicuous among contemporary Sovereigns for his King-like bearing and winning personality, could conciliate the affection of his Norwegian subjects. Throughout the whole of his reign a separatist agitation was carried on in Norway ; the establishment of a separate Con-

¹ *The Mechanism of the State*, vol. i, chap. iv.

sular service to which King Oscar refused to assent, brought matters to a head in 1905 ; the Norwegian *Storting* declared that the King of Sweden had ceased to reign in Norway, and Norway was erected into a separate kingdom. The Crown was accepted by Prince Carl, the second son of Frederick VIII of Denmark. The Prince ascended the throne as Haakon VII and greatly strengthened his dynastic position by a marriage (1896) with Princess Maud, third daughter of King Edward VII. Norway, with a population of less than three million people, possesses a mercantile marine approximately equal to the merchant fleets of France and Italy. During the financial and industrial crisis of 1921 a very large proportion of the merchant fleet lay idle, but a gradual recovery has taken place, though Norway is still suffering from the effects of the inflated prosperity which she enjoyed during the Great War.

Denmark has, to her misfortune, mingled more in the high Denmark politics of Europe than the other Scandinavian Kingdoms. Enough has, however, been said in preceding chapters of the events connected with the Danish Duchies, and it must suffice to add that Denmark, like Sweden and Norway, has not only given evidence of vigorous constitutional life, but, like them, has also enjoyed a remarkable measure of economic prosperity. That prosperity she owes partly to the untiring industry of her people, and partly to the systematic development of higher technical education, particularly in relation to agriculture.

The wealth of Denmark is mainly the product of *la petite culture*, as is indicated by the fact that while her imports from Great Britain are less than half those of Germany, her exports to Great Britain nearly treble those to Germany.

The international position of all three Scandinavian countries during the war was difficult : that of Denmark was precarious. At the Peace, however, she reaped the reward of strict neutrality by the acquisition (under plébiscite) of Northern Schleswig. She was greatly disappointed not to have obtained Central Schleswig as well ; and this disappointment combined with industrial depression to bring Denmark, at Easter 1920, to the verge of revolution. The constitutional crisis was happily surmounted, but Denmark since the war has had her full share of commercial, and in particular of monetary, dislocation.

The
Netherlands

The Kingdom of the Netherlands has appeared in preceding chapters only in connection with the brief and unfortunate experiment initiated by the diplomatists of Vienna. Patience and tact exercised at The Hague, particularly if combined with a less ungenerous fiscal policy, might have surmounted the difficulties inherent in the union of 1814. But Holland, in its dealings with Belgium, exhibited complete lack of statesmanship, and the revolution of 1830 was, as we have seen, the unfortunate, though perhaps inevitable, result. Since the separation effected by that revolution, Holland has greatly prospered in an economic sense, but has played little part in international affairs. Had she not, with great prescience, remodelled her scheme of land defence, she might have been involved in the World War no less disastrously than Belgium. There are, indeed, ample grounds for the belief that the original plan drawn up by the German General Staff for the invasion of France, involved the violation of the Dutch province of Limburg. The defensive preparations of the Dutch Government led, however, to an alteration of the plan, and Holland, consequently, was able to declare and to maintain her neutrality. But of all the neutral States Holland, for obvious geographical reasons, probably suffered most severely. Her overseas trade, proverbially the main sustenance of the Dutch, was virtually annihilated by the submarine campaign conducted by Germany. The allied blockade was hardly less disastrous to her domestic industries.

Nor did the troubles of Holland come to an end with the Armistice. At the Peace Conference the Belgians put forward a demand for the cession of Dutch Limburg, which had formed part of Belgium between 1830 and 1839, and the possession of which was, the Belgians contended, essential alike to their military security and their economic well-being. Belgium also demanded a readjustment of the arrangements under which Holland has for centuries controlled the mouth of the Scheldt. The Belgians maintained that the Treaties of 1839 imposed serious disabilities, strategic and economic, upon Antwerp. No Belgian warships could pass up and down the Scheldt in peace or war; Antwerp could not become a naval base; and the closing of the Scheldt by Holland, on the outbreak of war, made it impossible either to succour or evacuate the garrison of Antwerp by sea. On the other hand, these

restrictions operated to prevent the Germans from attacking Antwerp by sea, or from developing it as a submarine base after its capture, and the authors of the *History of the Peace Conference at Paris*, after a judicial examination of the whole case, concluded that the balance of advantage in the existing arrangement inclined towards the Allies.¹

The diplomatists at Paris declined, very properly, to adjudicate on cessions demanded from a neutral Power, which was not represented at the Conference, and referred the question to direct negotiation between the two countries immediately concerned. But the matter was not finally settled until the signature of a treaty in 1925. The principle of perpetual liberty for all mercantile vessels in the Scheldt was then reaffirmed; Holland undertook to keep the river in a navigable state, and it was agreed that all vessels bound for Antwerp should be exempt from examination or detention during their transit of the Dutch portion of the river. Holland also assented to the construction, through Dutch territory, of canals to connect Antwerp with Moerdijk and Ruhrort respectively. Limburg remains in the hands of the Dutch.

Of the neutral Powers Spain has come into the preceding Spain narrative more often than the others. As the scene, after 1815, of violent reaction and of recurrent insurrections; as a theatre for the display of the activities of the Holy Allies and of Canning's strong opposition thereto; as the victim of the revolutionary or "nationalist" policy in South America; as the arena of the intrigues of Louis Philippe and the scandal of the "Spanish Marriages"; as one of the rivals of France in Northern Africa; above all, as the antagonist of the United States of America, when the latter for the first time emerged from the isolation prescribed by President Monroe,—Spain touched the main stream of world-history more often, and more intimately, than any of the Powers which were not admitted to the circle of the "Great." In the World War Spain declared her neutrality, and maintained it with less difficulty, and perhaps with greater material advantage to herself, than any other European Power. But economic prosperity did not provide any solution of the political problems by which Spain has been, throughout the century, distracted. Spain has always, in a constitutional sense,

¹ *H.P.C.*, ii, 192 seq.

oscillated between violent extremes: the principle of absolutism has its adherents, so has that of republicanism; dictatorship alternates with democracy; but united Spain has never proved its aptitude for Parliamentary government as understood in England, though her constituent Kingdoms were among the first to witness the growth of Parliamentary assemblies, and of municipal self-government. Perhaps the fundamental factor in the political life of Spain may be discovered in the survival of provincialism. The prolonged contest between Christians and Moslems, the slow redemption of the soil of Spain from the dominion of the Moors, combined with obvious topographical characteristics to emphasize the disunion of the Christian Kingdoms, and to veto the idea of national cohesion. Political parties in Spain have consequently tended to follow the lines of Provincial boundaries. This tendency has proved fatal alike to national solidarity and to the success of Parliamentary Democracy. But to pursue this theme would be to overstep the self-imposed limitations of this chapter and, indeed, of this volume.

Of the once-mighty oversea Empire of Spain it need only be said that it has shrunk so rapidly that it is now reduced to an area of less than 130,000 square miles in Africa, with a population of less than one million persons; though Spain still possesses the Balearic and Canary Islands.

That a country with a population exceeding 21,000,000, and one which still commands considerable material resources, should have contributed so little, in recent years, to the mainstream of world-history, must needs provoke speculation as to the reasons for decay, but the temptation to embark upon it must be resisted.

A retrospective glance on the path traversed in the course of our journey since 1815 may, however, be permitted.

The
triumph of
Nationalism

The nineteenth century witnessed, as we have seen, the completion of the process which began with the break-up of the medieval polity in the sixteenth century. The idea of national individualism triumphed over the centralized system bequeathed to Europe by the Roman Empire. Before the nineteenth century closed, Europe was exhaustively parcelled out among a number of Sovereign States nominally coequal in

status, and entirely independent of each other. But the centripetal tendency within the Nation-State was not less conspicuous than the centrifugal tendency in Europe as a whole. Thus the outstanding and most characteristic political achievements of the century were, on the one hand, the unification of great States like Germany and Italy, and on the other, the reassertion of national independence by small States like Belgium, Norway and the National States which in the Balkan Peninsula re-emerged from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire.

Hardly was this process completed before a new era in ^{The triumph of Science} world-history dawned. New forces began to make themselves felt in politics. Man achieved a notable victory over nature. The discoveries and inventions of science made the whole world geographically and politically one. All the continents and all the oceans were brought within the ambit of European diplomacy. Preceding chapters have illustrated this thesis in some detail. We have seen, for example, how the victory won by Japan over China reacted upon the policy of France, Russia, and Germany; how the defeat of Russia at the hands of Japan reacted upon Asia; how Africa, north and south, east and west, affected the relations between the Powers of Western Europe; how the United States of America, reluctantly abandoning the precepts of Washington and Jefferson, was drawn into the maelstrom of world-politics; how Great Britain, renouncing her adherence to the maxims of the Manchester School, ceased to regard her colonies as encumbrances laying an intolerable burden upon a "weary Titan," and offered them a working partnership in a great Imperial polity.

This growing inclination to "think in continents" was ^{Imperialism} universal among the great nations of the world. That "imperialism" (if we may summarize the new temper in a word) had its sinister aspect cannot be denied. That it led, in some instances, to the economic exploitation of some among the less advanced peoples of the world is a charge frequently preferred and difficult to rebut. But no fair-minded critic, trained to regard the larger movements of history with the eyes of a detached philosopher, can doubt that British rule in India (to take a conspicuous illustration) has, on balance, brought great blessings to the teeming millions of that great

The
principle of
Trusteeship

sub-continent. Alexis de Tocqueville, perhaps the greatest of French political philosophers, bore testimony, some eighty years ago, to the amazing achievement of England in India. An English writer of to-day (1930), of long and varied experience in India, has borne testimony, less detached but even more remarkable to the beneficent work accomplished by his countrymen in British India. "The only true friends of the 'under-dog' in India have been the British. . . . The standard that the (Indian) services have tried to follow, whatever the shortcomings of fallible human agency, has been the standard of 'justice, equity, and good conscience.' " ¹

As in India so in Egypt. Not the most extreme nationalists in Egypt would deny that his own ambitions could never have been born, much less realized, but for the regenerative work accomplished by "the great Pharaoh of Modern Egypt," and the band of devoted administrators he gathered round him. Even more remarkable, in a sense, though a different one, has been the work accomplished by English administrators among the native peoples of East and West Africa.² An Englishman may, indeed, proudly recognize that the principle of "Trusteeship," now embodied in the Mandatory system of the League of Nations, is but the adaptation to the Public Law of the world of principles upon which English administrators have long been accustomed to act in all parts of the globe.

Welt-Politik
and war

That there has been a reverse side to the medal is not denied ; the philosophical historian can only strike a balance.

One serious indictment must, however, be met. It has been contended that the development of *Welt-Politik* was responsible for the cataclysm of 1914, and that on Great Britain, as the greatest of World-Powers, must rest a special degree of responsibility. If the facts stated in preceding chapters are accepted as accurate, this contention cannot be sustained.

If *Welt-Politik* be acquitted of the crime ; can the earlier principle of "nationalism" be inculcated ?

International
anarchy

Philosophic writers of different schools of thought, and starting from premisses widely divergent, have reached the conclusion that the "international anarchy" which preceded

¹ Sir R. Craddock : *The Dilemma in India*, Lond., 1929, pp. vii, 4, 27.

² See *supra*, chap. xxv, and in particular Lugard : *Dual Mandate in Africa*.

the World War, and out of which it arose, was, in large measure, the product of exaggerated national self-consciousness. Thus, within a century, the compass had been boxed. The diplomatists of Vienna were persistently blamed for ignoring or violating the sacred principle, which could alone afford a basis for the resettlement of Europe after the upheaval and dislocation of the Napoleonic wars.

The doctrine of nationality advanced steadily in the course of the nineteenth century, and by the 'seventies was unmistakably triumphant. But the triumph of the doctrine brought to Europe, instead of the anticipated peace, a sword sharper than any she had used before. The statesmen of the twentieth century, accordingly, are censured for giving rein to the principle which the diplomatists of Vienna, to their eternal condemnation, flagrantly violated.

Amid this welter of contradictions, this breakdown of international diplomacy, this bankruptcy of civilization, the world, exhausted by a war waged on a colossal scale and with unprecedented violence, was suddenly called upon to organize peace. A great experiment was initiated. All the important nations of the world, with two notable exceptions, have joined in a League to enforce peace and discourage armaments. The international organization cemented by the Covenant of the League of Nations is still in its infancy. The statesmen entrusted with the conduct of its affairs have wisely resisted the temptation to force the pace. The Council and Assembly of the League have gone steadily forward, without haste but without rest. Its activities have been supplemented by the conclusion of a considerable number of international Agreements, notably by the Pact of Locarno (1925) and the Pact of Paris for the renunciation of war (1928). Again, however, the temptation to embark on further details must be resisted.

The acceptance of the Covenant of the League of Nations marks the close of a great era in world-history; there is ground for the hope that it has inaugurated another. But into the future it is not the historian's function to pry.

The century which closed with the World War was, as we have seen, dominated, even more distinctly than its predecessors, by certain outstanding ideas, principles, or forces. The triumph of nationalism, and the formation or re-forma-

The
organization
of Peace

Dominant
ideas of the
nineteenth
century

tion of States on the basis of that elusive idea ; the rapid growth of industrialism and the shifting in the balance of population from country to town ; the marvellous development in the arts of production, and in the mechanism of the distribution and exchange of commodities ; the revolution effected in the means of transport, locomotion, and communication ; the extension of European dominion over large portions of the earth's surface ; the spread of Christianity throughout the world, and the introduction of European ideas among the " backward " races of mankind ; the substitution of the rule of the many for that of an autocratic monarch, or that of an oligarchical nobility ; the extension of the principle of federal government not only in republican States, but also in those which acknowledge the authority of a constitutional monarch ; —these are the things which give unity and cohesion to the political phenomena, apparently disconnected, unquestionably multifarious and bewildering, which have passed under review in the preceding pages of this volume. The students of Physical Science have repudiated the claim of History to admission within the exclusive circle of the " Sciences." Historical students are not agreed among themselves as to whether they desire admission. Yet in the broad sense none can deny the truth of the famous aphorism of Leibnitz : *The Present is the creation of the Past, and is big with the Future.* No age can live to itself alone. Each great period in world-history must be exhibited as the heir of those that have preceded it, the parent of those that come after.

The
heritage of
the past

The nineteenth century—the period which lies between the Congress of Vienna and the Peace Conference of Paris—was, in a very special sense, the heir of the three centuries that preceded it. From the sixteenth century to the nineteenth, international politics were dominated by the claims and ambitions of ruling dynasties, and by the idea of a Balance of Power among the leading States of Europe.

The
Settlement
of 1815

The re-settlement of Europe in 1815 paid, as we have seen, excessive deference to the ideas which had dominated the preceding period, to the claims of rival dynasties and to the principle of European equilibrium ; but this must be said in its favour : the nineteenth century, as compared with its predecessors, was a century of peace.

Except in the ever-combustible Balkans, the peace of

Europe was unbroken during the first fourteen years of the twentieth century ; but it was an armed peace ; and the menace of war hung over the European peoples with such persistence that the actual outbreak of war was almost welcomed as a relief from unendurable tension. Any such feeling, however, was transient ; the horrors of the ensuing war quickly dissipated all illusions, and from the four years of carnage Europe emerged with an overmastering determination never again to allow itself to be involved, if the will of the peoples could avert it, in war.

That resolution took shape, as we have indicated, in the Covenant of the League of Nations, in the Pact of Locarno, and in the Pact of Paris. Whether the resolution will survive the generation which had personal experience of the horrors of the World War, who can tell ? The present generation has learnt a lesson which it is not likely to forget : that victory is apt to be almost as costly as defeat. Whether the international organization erected at Geneva will succeed in keeping that lesson continuously before the minds of the generations to come, whether it can eliminate the causes of international friction and bring international disputes to the bar of an international tribunal—these matters are on the knees of the gods. But there is one obtrusive fact of which statesmen will have to take account. The danger zone has shifted from Dynastic Politics to Social Economics. It will be no gain to the peace of the world to have mitigated the asperities of political rivalries, and to have adjudicated on territorial claims, if war between classes be substituted for war between nations. The omens are none too favourable ; but these things are hidden in the womb of time. The duty of the historian is to preserve a faithful record of the past ; he must not attempt to forecast the future.

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More specialized bibliographies are appended to the chapters to which they refer.

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